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ABSTRACT 
Official statistics show that the revenue from film production in Wellington has 
increased in the last decade. However, unofficial debates identify that the Wellington 
film industry lacks financial capacity and has only intermittent levels of production. I 
argue that the absence of sustainability, defined here as long-term endogenous viability, 
underlies the difficulties faced by the film industry in Wellington. However, cultural 
industries studies have overlooked the issue of sustainability in the film industry, or 
dealt with it only indirectly.  
This study draws on theoretical approaches from the political economy of culture and 
geographical industrialisation theory, suggesting that integrated relations among the 
value chain phases, and synergistic interactions among the film industry organisations, 
are crucial to film industry development. Accordingly, this thesis derives from the 
hypothesis that such relations are key to sustainable outcomes. The main question that 
this research addresses is, What interrelations in the film industry enable its 
sustainability? The thesis uses the empirical example of the film industry in Wellington 
as an industrial district that sheds light on similar film industrial districts that depend on 
transnational outsourcing and government funding, yet struggle to achieve a sustainable 
endogenous industry. Although the district in Wellington has unique characteristics, it 
cannot be understood without referring to the determinant influence of policies and 
economic flows that occur at the national and international levels. Therefore, a large 
part of the thesis is dedicated to examining such external dynamics.  
I gathered data through 30 qualitative interviews with key practitioners as well as 
boundary spanners in the film industry. Boundary spanners are people who are 
responsible for establishing relations with other film-related organisations and the 
industrial district environment. The research also drew on secondary data from various 
sources, mainly official documents and statistics, media reports, public information of 
film industry organisations and previous academic studies. 
As part of my analysis, I identified localised ‘vertical’ blockages in the value chain, 
such as the disarticulation of production from distribution and commercialisation of 
films, and ‘horizontal’ blockages in a vast array of interlinked organisations and policy 
environments. I have argued that these constraints obstruct synergistic interrelations 
towards achieving sustainability as they underwrite outcomes in five main areas: 
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financial capacity, ability to maintain labour pools, ability to feed from creative sources, 
ability to develop productivity and infrastructure, as well as the opportunity to reach 
audiences. The Wellington example showed structural blockages in all those areas and 
the thesis suggests general paths to canalise relationships in the industry to create 
sustainability. 
My analysis contributes to the international field of cultural industries studies, in which 
there is very little clarity about how to give an account of sustainability in the film 
industry. The thesis has identified a gap between the theoretical accounts explaining 
how the film industries work, and international organisations’ advocacy for sustainable 
development in the cultural industries. By proposing a definition of sustainability in the 
film industry as well as suggesting systematic accounts of sustainability as an analytical 
and normative framework, the thesis contributes by establishing a bridge between the 
theory and its application to achieve normative (or desirable) sustainable outcomes.  
In addition, the research findings provide an increased understanding of the industry for 
both film industry practitioners and film policy advisors. When contrasting the findings 
with the conditions for a sustainable industry, I have noted that the film industry in 
Wellington presents several challenging areas. I suggest that policy-makers should pay 
special attention to them. These are audience development; professionalisation in 
scriptwriting and original creative content; intermediary expertise (not at the individual 
but at the organisational level so that knowledge around marketing and copyright 
management can be accrued and transferred in the long-term); alternative channels of 
distribution and dissemination (whose contracts guarantee with minimum standards a 
fair and quick redistribution of the revenue stream for the producer). Likewise, I 
consider it essential to increase the collaboration of local companies with independent 
(as opposed to major) international players in order to maintain the balancing power in 
negotiation without compromising control over revenue. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This research is motivated by the idea that different cultures have the right to express 
themselves and make themselves known through cinema (UNESCO, 2002). However, 
the current global imbalance in the flow of films reflects the struggle of regions to 
sustain local film industries. New Zealand is one of such regions and this thesis focuses 
on its “film capital”, Wellington, for its capacity to provide insights into the broader 
issue of underdeveloped local film industries and be revelatory as an example for other 
regions. In this regard, this thesis addresses the issue of how a film industry can be 
made sustainable. 
In this chapter I introduce the Wellington film industry as a site for my empirical study, 
and the challenges that it faces. I also present my main argument and position it in 
relation to the concept of sustainability in the film industry. In addition, I set out my 
research questions, introduce my integrated theoretical framework and explain the 
structure of the thesis. 
The New Zealand film industry can be grouped with other small developed nations like 
Ireland or Norway which have small national film industries.1 Like Australia and 
Canada, New Zealand is an anglophone country that has historically allocated state 
funding for arts and culture as well as being endowed with public service in the media 
industries but has recently transitioned into a market-driven model of ‘creative 
industries policies’  (Volkerling, 2001). Wellington, has been described as “Cool-with-a-
capital-C” and “the best little capital” (Lonely Planet, 2010). It is renowned for being 
the cultural capital of the country and a centre of film production. My empirical 
research focuses on the film industry in Wellington but I take into account the 
determinant influence of policies and economic flows occurring at the national and 
international levels to better understand it. Wellington’s current character, its density, 
walkability, thriving street life, culinary and café culture, facilitate networks of 
socialisation and cultural consumption (Stahl, 2011). Such characteristics confer 
Wellington’s filmmaking a unique atmosphere of film production based on a spirit of 
experimentation and a community ethos grounded on solidarity networks (see a full 
                                                 
1 New Zealand is a small nation of 4.4 million inhabitants. 
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introduction to Wellington in Chapter 7). By contrast, Auckland, the other film centre in 
the country, is seen as more conventional and professional, as well as having more 
consistency of work due to synergies with the television industry.  
The Wellington film district has at least two different production models: Hollywood 
satellite production and domestic production. The former has produced ‘global’ content 
fantasy films which are large-budget blockbusters with great computer graphics and 
visual effects. A series of national and local government policies―including tax 
rebates, subsidies―and “film-friendly” attitudes have attracted inflows of US capital 
(DP, 2006). In turn, domestic production is dependent on state subsidies in the form of 
contestable schemes for low- and medium-budget feature and short films. In order to get 
state finding, projects are required to comply with New Zealand cultural content, 
meaning, “films that reflect New Zealand or New Zealanders” (NZFC, 2011, p. 6). The 
films produced under these schemes give greater access to diverse New Zealand film-
makers whose films resonate particularly with New Zealand audiences. 
According to official statistics, the film industry in Wellington has grown in a 
substantial way in the last decade. Screen production gross revenue increased 85% from 
2009 to 2012 (SNZ, 2012). This growth is mainly driven by post-production gross 
revenue, particularly by providing animation and visual effects service work to overseas 
productions (such as runaway or satellite productions). Such figures seem to legitimise 
government policies which have had an important role in providing financial incentives 
for this change to occur, as well as other subsidies for domiciled productions.  
However, such official accounts contradict perceptions from other sources such as 
government commissioned reports, media and academic research as well as industry 
practitioners’ accounts. They see the local and the satellite production models in 
Wellington (and in New Zealand) have struggled to establish a local financial and 
infrastructural capacity (Finlay, 2006; Jackson & Court, 2010; Jones, Barlow, Finlay, & 
Savage, 2003; NZ Actors’ Equity, 2013; Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003; 
Rothwell, 2010; Rowlands, 2009a). 
The main challenges identified by those varied unofficial accounts are: the 
undercapitalisation of the film industry (lack of financial capacity); flickering 
production (lack of consistent production); and an insufficient level of production. Such 
challenges jeopardise potential social, economic and cultural benefits. For instance, they 
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have generated employment and business instability, and lack of representation of local 
narratives on screen (compared to foreign audio-visual products available). Those issues 
alone represent persistent blockages to maintaining positive industrial outcomes for the 
film industry in Wellington (and New Zealand). In other words they are indicators of the 
lack of long-term viability of the film industry. 
This thesis argues that the absence of sustainability―where sustainability is defined as 
the long-term viability of the film industry, as opposed to short-term foreign capital 
investment―underlies the difficulties faced by the industry. In order to surmount such 
obstacles, efforts should be made at the policy and business strategy levels to 
understand and eventually develop a self-sustainable industrial complex. However, there 
is a dearth of official and academic studies in New Zealand addressing the problem of 
self-sustainability in this field. Certainly there is no systematic study of the dynamics 
that create the challenges the film industry faces such as its inability to increase its 
financial capacity and the level and frequency of production. This research contributes 
to understanding these challenges in the light of sustainability criteria. 
Line of Inquiry: Studying Sustainability in the Film Industry 
The challenges faced in New Zealand and Wellington are not exclusive to these regions; 
they are shared with many other film industries around the world. Therefore, my 
research inquiry addresses the global problem of contemporary societies that struggle to 
sustain local film industries and to express diverse cultural depictions through cinema. 
Scholars seem to agree that the destiny of regional cinema is linked in one way or 
another to Hollywood’s global supremacy―built through an extensive system of 
distribution channels inclined towards an oligopolistic concentration―and its 
aggressive policies in the market front (Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Scott, 2005; Wasko, 
2004).  
However, worldwide academic and policy accounts of cultural industries have 
overlooked the issue of self-sustainability in the film industry. When the sustainability 
of cultural industries has been addressed by governments, international agencies or 
academic work, the resultant studies have been rather superficial, or the issue has been 
dealt with only indirectly.  
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This thesis will tackle the issue of sustainability theoretically at first by drawing on 
academic research that has addressed factors that explain film industry development. 
For instance, the political economy of culture and the theory of geographical 
industrialisation are robust approaches that have developed theory suggesting that 
relations between the value chain phases―such as production, distribution and 
consumption of films, in each of which “value is added to a product” (Picard, 2002, 
p.30)―and the interactions among the film industry organisations are key to film 
industry development. Accordingly, this thesis derives from the hypothesis that relations 
among film industry components and players enable sustainable outcomes. Secondly, 
the thesis uses the empirical case of the film industry in Wellington to provide an 
analysis of its industrial and institutional relations and test the theory in the light of 
accounts of sustainability. In order to analyse the film industry in Wellington, the thesis 
builds upon practitioners’ opinions and normative evaluations as well as academic 
studies and policy reports.  
Accounts of film industry sustainability that I propose based on the theory are not 
intended to provide exclusive and unique standards. Rather each industry region in the 
world should be able to negotiate and define its own accounts which are important 
especially for policymaking. What I propose here corresponds to my object of study and 
my methodological interests but, nonetheless, is based on the theory. I argue that some 
general standards on sustainability can be justified by understanding the relational 
dynamics of film industries. 
The main question that this research addresses is What interrelations in the film industry 
enable its sustainability? In order to answer that question the thesis describes how the 
industry works and, in turn, the results of this process in order to contrast it with 
accounts of sustainability. A subset of concrete questions derives from the main question 
and guides the argument in subsequent chapters. For instance,  
 How can we give an account of sustainability in the film industry?  
 What are the international relations shaping the opportunities of the New 
Zealand film industry with respect to achieving self-sustainable outcomes?  
 What are the relations among the phases of the film industry value chain in New 
Zealand and what do they mean to its sustainability?  
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 What are the relations within the Wellington film industrial district and what is 
their ability to generate self-sustainable results?  
 How can relationships in the film industry in Wellington work to create 
sustainability? (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Line of inquiry cutting through the layers of study of the film industry. 
 
 
 
Note. Own elaboration. 
In order to answer these research questions, I focused on gathering data through 
qualitative interviews with key practitioners and boundary spanners in the screen 
industry. Boundary spanners fulfil certain roles through being in charge of establishing 
relations with other film-related organisations and with the rest of the industrial district 
environment. The research also drew on secondary data from various sources, mainly 
official documents and statistics, media reports, and public information about film 
industry organisations. The field study was centred in Wellington but a few stakeholders 
were based elsewhere in New Zealand. The small size of the film industry in Wellington 
shaped the research design as, in order to provide a free space for criticism, anonymity 
was guaranteed for practitioners concerned with the reputational repercussions of their 
opinions.  
Contributions 
This research contributes theoretically to the study of sustainability in the cultural 
industries field by systematising and testing the main theories explaining interactions of 
International
New Zealand
Wellington
Sustainability 
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film industry stakeholders with the environment. In this sense, it adds to the literature of 
political economy of culture and geographical industrialisation. The thesis also provides 
a bridge between those theories and their application to achieve desirable sustainable 
outcomes in the film industry. In other words, I propose an analytic and normative 
framework that can be used to inform policies that aim the long-term viability of the 
film industry. Such framework can be useful in other studies of film industries and 
possibly in other cultural industries. 
The thesis also contributes to the literature about the film industry in New Zealand that 
has so far focused on one particular aspect of the film industry in the country (Finlay, 
2006; Prince, 2010; Rowlands, 2009a), while a few other studies present a broad 
panorama (Conor, 2004; Dunleavy & Joyce, 2012; Jones et al., 2003). However, there is 
a considerable gap regarding material that critically examines the local mechanisms of 
the film industry in Wellington and the national and international dynamics that have an 
influence on the region in a comprehensive and integrative way. With that in mind, the 
research uses the existing literature about the film industry in Wellington and New 
Zealand and complements it with original research to build a panoramic and integral 
study.  
This research also contributes socially, specifically to New Zealand, in monitoring the 
state of cultural industries in the country, which are part of the cultural human rights 
advocated by UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2002). Thereby, 
the research outcome hopes to impact indirectly on the opportunity for New Zealand 
society to depict its cultural concerns through cinema.  
Finally, the research findings provide practical contributions such as an increased 
understanding of the industry to both film industry practitioners and film policy 
advisors, and could also serve as the rationale for the redesign of socially inclusive 
cultural policies and entrepreneurial strategies to foster the development of the film 
industry. The thesis outlines the areas that need special attention such as audience 
development; professionalisation in scriptwriting and original creative content; 
intermediary expertise (not at the individual but at the organisational level so that 
knowledge around marketing and copyright management can be accrued and 
transferred); alternative channels of distribution and dissemination (that guarantee with 
minimum standards a fair and quick redistribution of the revenue stream for the 
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producer). Likewise, I consider it essential to increase the collaboration of local 
companies with independent (as opposed to major) international players in order to 
maintain the balancing power in negotiation without compromising control over 
revenue. 
Boundaries and Definitions 
Some conceptual elucidation is needed to clarify some of the terms used throughout this 
research as well as to explain the areas that are acknowledged but beyond the confines 
of this thesis.  
For the purposes of this research, I consider the film industry to be a cultural industry. 
This term denotes industries that produce goods and services that have higher symbolic 
value than their practical use as they are sources of entertainment, artistic appreciation 
and information (Scott, 2000b). As industrial processes, cultural industries are 
multiplied in several tangible or intangible copies to encounter consumers (Bustamante, 
2003). But the term also refers to the “network of organisations―from creators [artists, 
musicians, actors, writers] and brokers [agents], through the cultural product's producers 
[publishers, studios], distributors [wholesalers, theatres], and media outlets― [that] 
collectively constitute cultural industries” (Hirsch, 2000, p. 356). The film industry is 
defined by the characteristics mentioned above, although it has its own specificity (as 
discussed in Chapter 2) as it produces and disseminates movies. 
Despite my focus on the feature film industry, there are crucial synergies with other 
audio-visual industries. On the one hand, as happens in Wellington, film production 
companies are more and more diversified in producing content for several formats like 
television programmes, television commercials, video games, online content, and music 
videos. On the other hand, the flow of workers, ideas and products is constant and 
nurturing. There is also marketing crossover and, furthermore, digital convergence has 
allowed the dissemination of content in various platforms (Bustamante, 2003). For 
example, films have increased their windows beyond theatrical, television, and DVD 
retail and rental to video on demand through the Internet. For those reasons, it is 
difficult―and could be inappropriate―to isolate the film industry. However, there are 
still major differences in trying to study the socio-economics of audio-visual products 
and the ways they are financed, produced, disseminated and consumed. Their 
aggregation in the category of “screen industries” clearly applies to the synergies and 
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commonalities mentioned before. Nonetheless, it should be taken cautiously as it can 
produce deceptive perceptions of industrial welfare. For example, a few companies 
focused on particular audio-visual products might be driving growth and masking the 
fact that other industries are in a precarious position which would be a major obstacle to 
understanding and supporting them. This thesis uses film or screen industries depending 
on the degree of specificity that I am trying to convey. 
The screen industry in New Zealand is not homogeneous, and neither is its film 
industry, including the one based in Wellington. For almost two decades, the 
Wellington film industry has hosted foreign satellite or runaway productions mainly 
from Hollywood. In order to distinguish films made by international runaway 
productions and co-productions from movies “whose conception, narratives, financing, 
development, and completion are all centred on New Zealand culture, creative 
personnel, and institutions” (Dunleavy & Joyce, 2012, p.20), Dunleavy and Joyce have 
coined the term domiciled film industry. This thesis will refer to it as the local or 
domestic industry. The distinction made by Dunleavy and Joyce is also applicable to the 
concrete case of the Wellington film industry.  
It is important to clarify that for practical and methodological reasons I concentrate on 
Wellington and not on the entire New Zealand film industry. I conducted an empirical 
study of the film industry’s interrelations in Wellington, therefore, my empirical 
research (a meso-level analysis) and practical contributions to policy-making areas fit 
within the Wellington industrial district boundaries. However, the Wellington district 
cannot be understood without referring to the influence of policies and economic flows 
that occur at the national and international levels (macro-level). The reader might find 
that chapters 4–6 focus on the film industry in New Zealand and little on Wellington but 
this is because the national and international settings are not simple background 
contexts but sometimes determinant forces shaping the Wellington district. And 
although the latter has unique features it shares some broader characteristics that 
constitute the film industry in New Zealand such as film distribution patterns (which are 
also measured statistically as a national sector) and national film policies. For this 
reason, some of the findings of this research, including the analytical and theoretical 
framework of sustainability as well as some suggestions for policy areas, are 
transferrable to the New Zealand film industry.  
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Although this project will not undertake a cultural analysis of the films made in 
Wellington or their cultural impact on society―topics best reserved for stand-alone 
research―I believe that, in general terms, the cultural aspect of films is the most 
relevant as it provides a space for people to communicate, create and generate a sense of 
community. Therefore, a study of the socio-economic factors that enhance film 
production and dissemination is necessary in order to develop and protect such an 
important cultural space. Needless to say, cultural policies which foster, plan, and 
regulate the industry are crucial (Van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003). The cultural 
relevance of films has driven most of the film industry research in New Zealand, where 
“domestic production {…} has been perceived to contribute significantly to New 
Zealand’s broader attempt to nourish and foster a sense of cultural identity” (emphasis 
added) (Dunleavy and Joyce, 2012, p. 17). The latter can be understood not as a 
“homogeneous set of national characteristics or affiliations but instead to the many 
permutations of identity” (Dunleavy & Joyce, 2012, p. 17). Even though I share those 
views, my concerns as a non-New Zealander are somewhat broader, framed by the right 
to cultural diversity as an ethical imperative “that all cultures can express themselves 
and make themselves known” (UNESCO, 2002). This has become more relevant as 
“economic globalisation and digital technologies have accentuated interdependence 
among societies that had developed in relative isolation in the past” (García Canclini, 
2012). It is in this context that production, distribution and dissemination of cultural 
industries has been seen as a source to tackle contemporary issues on intercultural 
relations (UNESCO, 2002). The broader scope of my interest differs from other studies 
concerned with New Zealand’s cultural identity as they have paid greater attention to 
the instruments that enable domestic production such as funding agencies and 
production policies (Blomkamp, Dunleavy & Joyce, 2012; King, 2010). My research 
integrates those valuable contributions but in focusing on cultural diversity it factors in 
cultural dissemination as much as cultural expression. As a result, the research delves 
into the potential for self-sustaining mechanisms―including the canalisation of state 
resources―and consequently expands on meso- and macro- levels of analysis of a wider 
ecology of industrial organisation that links production with dissemination settings. 
Cultural Industries Studies: A Theoretical Background 
The approach I take in this thesis is based in the field of cultural industries studies. It is 
an interdisciplinary field nurtured by disciplines like sociology, economics, film and 
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media studies, public policy, organisational studies and economic geography. These 
disciplines have contributed to the development of useful approaches to study cultural 
industries such as the political economy of culture (PEC), the theory of geographical 
industrialisation (GI) and the production of culture perspective (PCP).  
Accordingly, this research employs an interdisciplinary scope and draws on PEC, GI, 
PCP as well as organisational studies (OS). Although they are very useful approaches, 
when used individually they have certain limitations.  
Therefore, the following theoretical background draws on all these approaches to 
identify the main analytical tools that could be relevant, specifically to this research. 
The first set of approaches (GI, PCP and OS) will help me to map my object of study. 
The second set (PEC and GI) will allow me to generate theoretical explanations. The 
last approach (PEC) provides critical devices to make a critical analysis of my findings. 
The concluding part of this theoretical background presents an integrative conceptual 
framework for my research.  
Mapping 
In this section I discuss the theories that help me to map―to describe and 
conceptualise―the characteristics of my topic. The theory of geographical 
industrialisation, developed by the California school since the 1980s, has generated 
useful and innovative explanations about endogenous regional development. 
Accordingly, regional development is generated by the articulation among industrial 
district components. Markusen and Park, defined an industrial district as “a sizable [sic] 
and spatially delimited area of trade-oriented economic activity which has a distinctive 
economic specialisation, be it resource-related, manufacturing or services” (cited in 
Markusen, 1996, p. 296). The GI school has specifically studied cultural industries, in 
particular film industrial districts (Scott, 2000b; Storper & Christopherson, 1987).  
The relevance of GI as a mapping tool for this project stems from the identification of 
the industrial district components that entail specific institutional forms of organisation. 
For example, it tells us that a film industrial district is comprised of an industrial 
atmosphere (see Figure 2) that consists of production companies; general and 
specialised service providers like catering and equipment rental; industry-related 
companies such as advertising firms; local labour markets; associations and agencies; 
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consumer markets; legal frameworks; and public policies and infrastructure (Porter, 
2000; Scott, 2005). Another important component is the cultural atmosphere that 
captures the social phenomena involved in the film industry such as forms of creativity, 
innovation and tacit knowledge rooted in the production system and its geographical 
milieu (Scott, 2005). The conceptualisation of the industrial district is similar to models 
of “media ecologies”  that “emphasize relational dynamics and processes between 
agents, in particular their lived professional realities marked by collaboration as well as 
competition in an evolving media economy” (Baltruschat, 2010, p. 18). Although 
authors use the term ecology to refer to the interconnectedness of screen institutions 
comprising interdependent networks of mutually beneficial relations (Corner, 1999), it 
is important to emphasise that power imbalances also involve a nuanced range of 
relations from symbiotic to parasitic.  
Figure 2 An abstract model of the components of a film industrial district 
 
Note. Own elaboration 
Another important approach this research draws from comes from the sociology of 
culture. Since the 1970s, the so-called production of culture perspective, examines 
cultural industries according to their analytical dimensions: technology, laws and 
regulation, industry structures, organisational structures, occupational careers, markets 
and management structures (Peterson & Anand, 2004). The PCP approach is useful as it 
reminds us of the different angles to consider in regard to the film industry.  
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As suggested by the PCP, the work of organisational studies, which has researched 
creative labour and management in cultural industries, has flourished over the last two 
decades. Film production, for example, entails complex management practices, “But at 
the heart of this managerial scaffolding is a creative space that is jealously guarded {…} 
an intimate and exclusive space is created around the actors and directors, where they 
could ‘do the unimaginable’” (Kavanagh, O’Brien, & Linnane, 2002, p. 281).  
The OS constructs such as project-based organisations (Blair, Grey, & Randle, 2001), 
flexible firm boundaries and the rationales for these (Schilling & Steensma, 2002), 
social networks, careers (Rowlands, 2009), and hierarchical and centralised 
management structures (Davenport, 2006) are key to understanding the organisational 
models that dominate the contemporary film industry, including Wellington’s. 
Furthermore, OS is the discipline behind the conceptualisation of boundary spanners. 
Boundary spanners are defined here as intermediaries that link different kinds of people, 
knowledge and resources. They are producers, service providers, facilitators, advisors, 
and gatekeepers. They span the boundaries of an organisation between its members and 
non-members (Aldrich & Herker, 1977). Boundary spanner studies have contributed to 
the field of knowledge management as they study key agents through which social 
capital is produced (Burt, 2004). In other words, it is through boundary spanning 
activities that diversity in interorganisational dynamics achieves knowledge translation 
and can potentially identify and develop opportunities: 
Given greater homogeneity within than between groups, people whose networks bridge 
the structural holes between groups have earlier access to a broader diversity of 
information and have experience in translating information across groups. This is the 
social capital of brokerage. (Burt, 2004, p. 354) 
The production of culture perspective was one of the first fields to introduce the term 
boundary spanners to study cultural industries (Hirsch, 1972). Since then a body of 
literature has collected empirical evidence and has proposed theoretical constructs 
around this figure in different cultural industries and different phases of their value 
chain (Kawashima, 1999; Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010; Powell & Friedkin, 1986).  
This study contributes to the idea that the film industry is articulated not only through 
brokers (creativity-financial negotiators, managers of creative processes or gatekeepers) 
but also through the more general figure of boundary spanners (see Figure 3), whose 
role is to link the organisation with the environment (Friedman & Podolny, 1992). 
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Boundary spanners make the intermediations necessary for the film industry’s 
institutional components to function. As mentioned in the Field Studies (see Chapter 2), 
conceptualising the work of boundary spanners is an important element in this research 
design and in the study of the relations in the film district. Based on such 
conceptualisation, I conducted interviews with practitioners who have a boundary 
spanner role―that gives them the advantage of strategic vision―in order to collect 
information about the characteristics of the institutional interrelations and the film 
industry as a whole (Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010). 
Figure 3 Institutional interrelations through the roles of boundary spanners 
 
Note. Own elaboration 
Theorising and critical analysis 
In this section I discuss the approaches that helped me to theorise; that is, tell a story 
that explains how and why something is happening―as well as the approach that gave 
me the elements to undertake a critical analysis (in order to see the implications of what 
is happening). Nowadays, there are two main theories that scholars have developed in 
order to explain how film industries work in contemporary capitalist societies. The first 
is GI, as mentioned previously, and the second is the political economy of culture 
(PEC). The latter is also a critical approach concerned with the sociopolitical 
implications of its theoretical explanations. 
As mentioned above, GI identifies the components of a film industrial district, but it 
also argues that the relationships between the industrial district components can 
generate good or bad outcomes for the industry. Such relations have been framed within 
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the capitalist stage of flexible production (Storper & Christopherson, 1987). In order to 
explain flexible production historically, the researchers Hirst and Zeitlin (1997), Piore 
and Sabel (1990) and Storper and Salais  (1997) looked back to the world economic 
crisis of the nineteen-seventies. From that period onwards, international economic 
competition increased. The world economy, which was mainly characterised by mass 
production, was changing and flexible production—where labor, machinery, inputs and 
diversification of goods can quickly adjust to changes—turned out to be the most 
appropriate means of satisfying the new market demands (Hirst & Zeitlin, 1997). As 
such, the use of infrastructure and labour by flexible film production companies could 
quickly adjust to changes in the environment and the new market demands. This 
phenomenon can be perceived in large conglomerates and small companies that 
outsource work or provide service work for a third party. 
Based on such assumptions, GI suggests that, as core film productive activities need 
supplier services, inputs and specialised work, film production companies are able to 
create economic spillovers or secondary economies to other businesses. As a 
consequence, film production facilitates the involvement of other economic agents and 
generates increasing returns with each stage of reinvestment (Scott, 2005). For example, 
a film production company might require special effects, and these, in turn, might need 
the services of software development. But film production activities also spawn the 
participation of non-commercial organisations which create synergies between them. 
For instance, companies might need more specialised workers trained by film schools. 
In other words, due to the dynamic interdependence among institutional players, core 
film production activities engender new activities and rounds of production in a spiral of 
expansion where accumulation forms are in growth (see Figure 4) (Young, 1928). 
According to GI, the degree of interaction, interdependency and stability in the 
components’ transactions impacts on the welfare of the local industry (Nelson & Winter, 
1982). This is because as the relations among the components become more frequent, 
there is greater trust and communication among them (Williamson, 1981). This 
familiarity can be a potential competitive advantage as it increases the customised 
relations in regard to the specificity of the assets, the sharing of tacit knowledge, and the 
reduction of transactions cost (Scott, 2000b; Williamson, 1981). This is why GI argues 
that an industrial district generates an adhesive quality, becoming an amalgam that has 
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the ability to attract and maintain the attraction among the district’s components 
(Markusen, 1996).  
In spite of the primary focus on endogenous industrial development, GI has expanded 
its scope, acknowledging criticisms of the PEC approach that observes how the 
development of the film industry is influenced by the external bonds of the industrial 
district with outside economic forces, such as film distribution and exhibition 
subsectors, with other manufacturing or service industries (like DVD retailers, video on 
demand, and TV industries), as well as with broader national and international 
economies and economic players (e.g. foreign investment or transnational outsourcing) 
(Aksoy & Robins, 1992, Coe, 2001). 
From a GI perspective, Markusen (1996) acknowledges that the cohesive capacity of 
industrial districts can be threatened by changes in the global economy. Their ability to 
persist depends on the “power relationships, sometimes within the district and 
sometimes between district entities and those residing elsewhere” (Markusen, 1996, p. 
297). Markusen elaborates a typology of industrial districts that varies according to firm 
configurations―including flexible firm boundaries, their vertical and horizontal 
disintegration―their internal versus external orientations, and governance structures, all 
of which have different repercussions for regional development. An actual district may 
be an amalgam of one or more types, and districts may mutate over time. The 
“marshallian” industrial district (the typical cluster type) is seen in regions whose 
business structures are composed of small, locally-owned companies. The “hub and 
spoke” district comprises business around one or more dominant and externally oriented 
firms such as monopolistic transnational firms. The “satellite” district is “an assemblage 
of unconnected branch plants embedded in external organisation links”, and it has been 
used to theorise the Hollywood runaway productions in Vancouver (Coe, 2001). Finally, 
the “state-anchored” district is focused “on one or more public-sector institutions” 
(Markusen, 1996, p. 296). 
An important contribution of GI to my research project is its emphasis on the relevance 
of place. Although film locations, distribution channels, and the mobility of film 
workers and capital might tend to be geographically dispersed in the current 
transnational capitalist environment, it is not a coincidence that centres of production, 
including satellite production centres, have been rooted in specific urban regions. Cities 
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are protagonists in contemporary global capitalism. They “constitute dense polarized 
masses of capital, labour, and social life that are bound up in intricate ways” (Scott, 
2006, p. 814). Furthermore, cities have a hinge-type function linking local flows to 
global ones (Parnreiter, 2002).  
Economic geographers have studied how the production of cultural industries located in 
a specific place can generate endogenous regional development (Scott, 2000b; Storper 
& Christopherson). GI explains that “the endogenous conditions underlying local 
economic development are cultural or institutional, in the specific sense that they entail 
the formation of routines of behaviour―carrying knowledge and information―that 
potentiate and shape activities such as production, entrepreneurship and innovation” 
(Scott & Storper, 2003, p.8). The importance of place relies on the fact that such habits, 
relationships and symbolic practices are strongly bound to a specific place and 
culturally rooted, therefore they cannot be transferred easily from one place to another 
(Power & Scott, 2004). 
In conclusion, GI provides an explanation of why and how there is endogenous 
development in a film industrial district. It also provides a framework for an empirical 
analysis. For instance, GI analyses the patterns of labour, industrial, and institutional 
organisation as well as the geographic location of the film-related players. Therefore, 
this theory is useful because it links the theory to an approach to study the film industry 
empirically. 
However, authors of PEC 2 emphasise economies of scale and distribution as the key to 
the development of cultural industries rather than having a primary focus on production 
whereas GI does (Aksoy & Robins, 1992). Contrary to the approach of GI, which is 
preoccupied with explaining how things work, the PEC critical approach is more 
involved in analysing the problems and power imbalances in the film industry.  
Since the 1960s PEC has spread around the world developing a wide range of 
approaches. PEC work has in common the study of cultural and communication 
industries mediated by political, economic and social systems (Hesmondhalgh, 2007; 
Mastrini & Bolaño, 2000). In other words, PEC “is the study of social relations, 
particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution and 
                                                 
2 Also referred as political economy of communication or political economy of information. 
17 
 
consumption of resources, including communication resources” (Mosco, 2009, p. 2). 
There are four characteristics of the PEC tradition, “a strong commitment to historical 
analysis, to understanding the broad social totality, to moral philosophy or the study of 
social value {…}, and, finally, to social intervention and praxis” (Mosco, 1996, p. 17). 
PEC’s critical analysis of film industries in capitalist structures around the world, 
converge on finding oligopolies3 in the phases of distribution and commercialisation of 
the film industry value chain (Aksoy, 1992; Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Pendakur, 1990; 
Sánchez Ruiz, 2003; Wasko, 2004). Oligopolistic control creates barriers to entry for 
competitor businesses that want to enter the markets or expand the existing ones 
(Picard, 2002). This is due to major Hollywood studios competitive advantages: their 
broad distribution networks have created economies of scale and scope, resulting in 
highly capitalised transnational companies (Garnham, 2005) with great lobbying power 
to influence regulation (Christopherson, 2006). This in turn has allowed them 
historically to expand ownership to control other phases of the value chain (vertical 
integration) allowing them to control prices and supply, as well as expand to other 
media industries (horizontal integration); such concentration allows them to use a 
crossover marketing strategy (Picard, 2002).  
According to PEC, capital concentration has generated difficult access to financial pools 
for independent small- and medium-sized production companies, as well as adverse 
policy environments for publicly funded cultural industries. Consequently, there is 
limited access to production and consumption of cultural industries due to rising prices 
and distribution blockage (Garnham, 2005). In summary, this approach analyses the 
cultural and social consequences of a non-competitive (or oligopolistic) economy.  
However, GI has observed processes of vertical and horizontal disintegration as 
opposed to integration. GI authors have discerned how major companies outsource 
semi-independent companies instead of internalising tasks in-house (Storper & 
Christopherson, 1987). Nonetheless, PEC has emphasised the existence of hierarchical 
and power structures in the relationships of major companies within flexible 
disintegrated networks (Aksoy & Robins, 1992). Some of the economic 
interdependencies that GI assumes as symbiotic have been questioned by PEC. For 
                                                 
3 Defined as “control of a commodity or service in a given market by a small number of companies” 
(Neufeldt & Guralnik, 1996, p. 944). 
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example, the possibilities of varied forms of interaction in film industrial districts could 
range from forms of cooperation (co-productions) and cooperative competition―which 
involves some forms of outsourcing, as when two companies in the same market work 
together in some phases of the value chain and compete in others (McGovern & Mottiar, 
1997)―through to oligopolistic competition and practices. In the cooperative 
competition, power is localised in the district itself (mainly in the marshallian type) or 
in the district and the satellite headquarters (in the satellite type). In oligopolistic 
competition, the dominant power relations are localised in the financial, distribution and 
lobbying capacity of a few large companies (hub-and-spoke type).  
In a way, oligopolies are more than economic entities, they are also cultural 
organisations exerting power on the market and the rest of the institutional environment 
(Aksoy & Robins, 1992). The present research incorporates critical concerns similar to 
how PEC problematises the film industry as it provides explanations of how market 
structures of capital concentration that lack the appropriate regulation have generated 
powerful players that “dictate the rules of the game”―through business models, 
revenue stream financial structures, and shaping legislation―at the expense of other 
social players. Therefore, it gives an account of the social repercussions of the state of 
the film industry in Wellington as seen through employment quality, profits share, 
diversity of products and access to production and consumption of films by diverse 
social groups. 
Having said that, this research echoes some of latest PEC calls to engage in meso-levels 
of analysis to acknowledge the specificities and complexity of capitalist modernity and 
avoid macro-level overgeneralisations (Garnham, 2012; Thompson, 2011a). The 
challenge is to “ground critical-political economic analysis in empirical specifics” 
(Thompson, 2011a, p. 2). In this way, for example, the concept of oligopolistic control 
needs to be understood not as a conscious deliberate plan from any players but as an 
abstract term that describes the effects on market shares, as well as the results of the 
stakes involved in institutional interactions and their negotiation of macro-level forces 
(Thompson, 20011a, p. 3). In Chapter 6, for example, I have developed an explanation 
of the pervasiveness of oligopolies in film distribution in New Zealand based on my 
empirical findings over distributors’ relationships with exhibitors, not from the point of 
view of oligopolistic imposition but from the interdependency generated by demand-
side network economies of scale.  
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To sum up, PEC pins down the exogenous factors that shape the development of the 
film industry. Its empirical analysis is based on historical-structural characteristics, 
sectoral indicators that expose the value chain articulation, the forms of industrial 
organisation, the public policies that regulate the industry as well as the socio-economic 
indicators that give reason of the social access to production, and consumption of films. 
Hence, besides providing elements to theorise and to critique, PEC offers a useful 
empirical analysis to study the film industry. 
An integrative conceptual framework for an empirical analysis 
Integrating the cultural industries studies’ approaches mentioned in this theoretical 
background provides a preliminary framework for my research findings and the criteria 
with which to evaluate their relevance (a more definitive framework is provided in 
Chapter 2). The selected approaches have been used to study cultural industries in 
various capitalist environments that make them completely relevant to studying the film 
industry in Wellington.  
GI and PEC are methodologically and analytically complementary as each of them 
studies a different aspect of the same topic, namely the production versus the 
dissemination of films. GI provides a meso scope―an endogenous insight including 
satellite production centres―while PEC has a macro scope―external links including 
historic-structural socio-economic factors―to study the film industrial districts. More 
specifically, they share an economic foundation based on the political economy 
tradition. For example, both are based on heterodox institutional economics where the 
economy is influenced by social and institutional frameworks and which considers that 
markets tend to constant disequilibrium and are based on limited rationality and 
inadequate information. As a result, PEC and GI justify the role of the state as a 
regulator of market mechanisms (Garnham, 2012; Storper & Walker, 1989). This is in 
contrast to the arguments of orthodox neoclassic economics which emphasise the self-
regulatory market tendency to equilibrium, accurate sources of information and rational 
decision-making.  
Initially, the schools also differed, as Conor well observed, in their notions of power 
structures. The PEC model emphasised the corporate power of major transnational 
companies, their oligopolistic organization, and their “vertical and horizontal re-
integration as strategies of consolidation, risk minimization and profit maximization” 
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(Conor, 2004, p. 14). On the other hand, the GI model argued that a partial dispersal of 
power had occurred through flexible organisation and specialisation, with the 
accompanying disintegration and de-concentration of the majors’ activities in favour of 
local independent companies, local service providers, and overseas destinations (for 
example, the Hollywood runaway productions) (Conor, 2004).  
Despite the early debate between GI and PEC (Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Storper, 1993; 
Storper & Christopherson, 1987), so far authors from both models agree on the others’ 
proposals. For example, GI authors Scott (2005) and Christopherson (2006) 
incorporated into their study the oligopolistic power of transnational companies and 
other external links, while Garnham (2012) and other PEC authors revised the need to 
avoid overgeneralisations and to look for historical, empirical evidence of the changes 
in the development of cultural industries including specificities of production relations.  
Figure 4 Integrative conceptual framework: the factors shaping the film industry 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Own elaboration 
 
Integrating both theoretical contributions allows for a preliminary conceptual 
framework (see Figure 4) that guides the question of the influence of the film industry’s 
interrelations on how the industry works. According to GI, the degree of institutional 
relations among the components of the industrial district shapes the development of the 
film industry. Following PEC, the type of institutional relations with external ties 
ENDOGENOUS RELATIONS 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
DISTRICT (GI) 
 
* Interdependencies among the 
industrial district components 
-The industrial organisation of 
production companies 
- Relations among production 
companies and: 
o service providers 
o worker’s 
organisations 
o public agencies 
o civil associations 
o legal frameworks 
o the cultural 
atmosphere 
o the geographical ties 
 
SHAPE 
S 
H 
A 
P 
E 
 
EXTERNAL LINKS  
OF THE INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT (PEC) 
- The power relations among: 
o The value chain between different sectors 
(production, distributions and exhibition 
of films) 
o The film industry and other screen 
industries (e.g. TV)  
o The film production district and other film 
districts (e.g. Hollywood) 
o  The film industry and national and 
international economic policies 
FILM INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT 
21 
 
(among production, distribution and commercialisation of films, with other industries, 
or with other industrial districts) shapes how the film industry works as well. In Chapter 
2, the links to assess how the industry works with regards to sustainability criteria will 
be explored in order to answer: What are the interrelations in the film industry that 
enable sustainability?  
In this research, I incorporate the analytical approaches that PEC, GI, PCP and OS have 
undertaken in studying the film industry. For instance, I make use of the type of 
institutional and industrial analysis they have utilised. I examine the functional and 
power relations facilitated by cultural policies, regulations and legal frameworks, the 
market and organisational structures as well as patterns of labour, industrial and 
geographic organisation (see Table 1). This integrative framework and model of analysis 
makes logical sense of the relationships among the several factors that have been 
identified as important to the research problem (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, & 
Lowe, 2008). 
Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided in three parts and nine chapters. Part I introduces the main 
argument of the thesis to the reader. Chapter 1 provides a thorough introduction to the 
topic, line of enquiry, research questions and the theoretical background reconciling the 
disciplinary strands on cultural industries studies providing the theoretical 
argumentation with regards to why and how the film industries develop. Chapter 2 
integrates the theoretical accounts described in Chapter 1 to present a normative and 
analytical framework of self-sustainability with which to organise and evaluate the 
empirical findings. In Chapter 3 the previous theoretical underpinnings are translated 
into methodological steps to collect and analyse empirical data. 
Part II of the thesis addresses the research findings. Chapter 4 offers an overview of the 
international dynamics shaping the film industry in New Zealand and its position in 
Asia-Pacific. It pinpoints how such arrangements potentially limit or enable 
sustainability in the film industry in New Zealand and Wellington. Chapters 5 and 6 
analyse the historic and current relationships between the film industry value chain in 
New Zealand with emphasis on its articulation. Chapters 7 and 8 provide an industrial 
and institutional analysis of the film district in Wellington with emphasis in its 
components’ relations. 
22 
 
Part III of the thesis presents the discussion and conclusions. Chapter 9 gives a 
summary of the line of enquiry and the previous findings in the context of interview 
accounts, normative statements and links back to the theory with special emphasis on 
issues on sustainability. Finally, Chapter 10 provides concluding remarks on the 
analytical contributions of the thesis, potential paths for policymaking in Wellington, as 
well as possible routes for future research. 
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Table 1 Comparison of cultural industries’ institutional approaches 
Approach Function Scope Units of analysis Socio-spatial 
levels 
Dimensions Explanatory 
Cues 
PEC Theorise/ 
Critique 
Macro Economic 
systems 
Industrial sectors 
International, 
national and local 
 Policies, regulations and 
legal frameworks 
 Market structures 
 Social implications 
Film distribution is 
key. 
Articulation of the 
value chain and 
external power 
relations, as well as 
historical-structural 
factors 
GI Map/Theorise Meso Industrial 
districts 
Local  Policies, regulations and 
legal frameworks 
 Patterns of labour 
 Geographic patterns  
 Industrial organisation 
Film production is 
key. Functional 
internal relations 
among the industrial 
district components 
PCP Map Meso/Micro Cultural 
industries 
systems 
Institutional 
entities 
 Technology 
 Laws and regulation 
 Industry structures 
 Organisational structures 
 Occupational careers 
 Markets 
 Management structures 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
OS Map Micro Firms, workers, 
entrepreneurs 
Organisations 
and individuals 
 Management structures 
 Occupational careers 
 Labour patterns 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
Note. Own elaboration
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Chapter 2  
Theoretical and Normative Models of Sustainability 
This thesis argues that the inability of the Wellington film industrial district to generate 
a sustainable industry is explained by the structural difficulties it faces. Those structural 
difficulties include unstable production and a lack of financial capacity. The argument 
of this study is that, to overcome those obstacles, efforts should be made to develop a 
sustainable industrial complex. This chapter addresses one of the secondary questions in 
this thesis: How can we give an account of sustainability in the film industry? By 
account I mean a device to evaluate sustainability theoretically and empirically. 
For the purposes of this study, in this chapter I propose a definition of sustainability as a 
concept which provides a potential analytical and normative framework. In order to do 
so, I review previous studies that link sustainability to culture. I also reinterpret, in the 
light of sustainability outcomes, the explanatory cues of political economy of culture 
(PEC) and geographical industrialisation (GI) around how the film industry works. I 
draw on the integration of both theories presented in the previous chapter to develop a 
framework on sustainability to be tested against the Wellington case in the remainder of 
the thesis. Neither PEC nor GI are necessarily prescriptive theories; instead, they are 
analytic and critical theories. Nonetheless, both contain normative statements and hence 
provide the possibility of reinterpreting their potential application for the needs of this 
study. The objective of this chapter is to revise how they can contribute to thinking of 
film industries in terms of sustainability.  
Besides clarifying what I understand by sustainability I also address a set of related 
normative concepts often used in the same context such as self-sustainable, developed, 
successful, self-sufficient, self-funding, wellbeing, viable, and healthy. Then I question 
the relevance of the concept sustainability to study the Wellington case outlined 
previously and the need to rethink the sustainability of cultural industries in the current 
transnational environment. 
Normative Concepts 
Despite a substantial research tradition in fields such as cultural policies, creative and 
cultural industries, academic and policy accounts have overused and, at the same time, 
overlooked the issue of sustainability in the film industry. When sustainability has been 
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mentioned by these studies it has been done rather superficially, or dealt with implicitly 
or indirectly. Here, I propose that at the core of the main theories explaining 
contemporary film industries lie some ideas that imply sustainability. 
Having said that, there are no single definitions, for example, about what a “successful 
film industry” is, or what the “wellbeing of the industry” consists of. This is mainly 
because each region and each stakeholder involved in the industry has particular 
characteristics and objectives. It would be unrealistic to hope for a universal agreement 
on such an issue. Therefore, such concepts are rather fields of flexible and contesting 
positions that I consider important to expose and to negotiate socially. The objectives of 
this thesis include identifying general criteria used to refer to the process of enhancing 
the film industry.  
The literature which focuses on cultural industries uses a vocabulary to evaluate the 
positive outcomes of the cultural industries such as successful, developed, wellbeing, 
viable and welfare among others. Phrases like “the success of the industry” (Coe, 2001, 
p. 1770; Scott, 2005, p. 170), “industry development” (Chaminade & Vang, 2008, p. 
401), and “to establish cultural industries that are viable and competitive” (UNESCO, 
2002) lack an explicit definition. However, by using them, authors refer to implicit 
criteria to evaluate and leverage cultural industries. In other words, in using them the 
authors assess what they think the industry should be. 
Authors from other disciplines studying those concepts regard them as belonging to a 
similar semantic field whether they constitute nouns, adjectives or verbs, as the term 
sustainable development attests (Avila-Pires, Mior, Aguiar, & Schlemper, 2000; Lélé, 
1991). The words of a semantic field share a core meaning represented by a semantic 
component. To explain what such terms might have in common I explored their 
semantic components in Table 2, that is, their semantic ‘atomic predicates’ drawing on 
their definitions and etymology (Fodor, Fodor, & Garret, 1975; Goddard, 2011). For 
instance, the table shows that the set of words in question connotes a “state of things”. 
However, those words require other syntactic structures to be operational. For example, 
all of them require a noun that embodies such a “state of things”. The words also need 
conditions of reference to be able to interpret them and make sense of them. For 
example, the first group―success, health, and wellbeing―expresses “a positive state”. 
Using those words requires having in mind a previous set of positive standards to be 
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collated with the subject they are describing. The group which includes development 
and progress connotes “a state of positive change along certain trajectory”. They require 
being associated not only with a set of positive standards but with the idea of a 
trajectory towards a preconceived goal. However, concepts like perpetuate, reproduce 
and sustain imply “a state moving along a trajectory whose essence remains without 
change.” In turn they also require definition of what are the conditions which must be 
preserved in a certain path or trajectory. Finally, concepts like self-perpetuate, 
reproduce or self-sustain ask for a set of conditions to be preserved in a reiterative 
course of action that reverts on the subject itself. 
Table 2 Semantic analysis of normative concepts in the film industry 
[state] + 
[positive] 
[state] + 
[change]+ 
[trajectory] 
[state]+ 
[trajectory]+ 
[positive] 
[state] + 
[change] + 
[positive] + 
[trajectory] 
[state] +  
[trajectory] + 
[change]+ 
[reiterate] 
[state] +  
[trajectory] + 
[change] +  
[auto] + 
[reiterate]  
Success Process Viable Develop Perpetuate Reproduce 
Health   Progress Sustain Self-perpetuate 
Wellbeing   Growth  Self-sustain 
Note. Own elaboration based on Fodor. et. al. (1975), Goddard (1998), and Lewis (1992). 
Although those concepts give valuable information, they do not provide the normative 
answers I am looking for. Other research has similarly highlighted the ambiguity and 
vagueness of such terms questioning the “development of what?” or “the success with 
regards to what?” (Avila-Pires et al., 2000; Lélé, 1991). It is the work of scholars 
studying the film and cultural industries which contains the conditions (nouns, positive 
standards, goals and paths) enabling an interpretation of their normative vocabulary. The 
difficulties for such analysis are varied. For example, scholars concur on the need for 
regions to develop film industries but they do not make explicit what the outcome of 
such development should be, or what steps are necessary for that to happen.  
In the following list I summarise some of the implicit conditions (criteria or standards) 
highlighted by PEC, GI and other studies of the cultural industries as essential parts of a 
positive state of the film industry. They are: 
 local financial capacity (cycles of reinvesting and increasing economic returns),  
 pools of specialised workers and a production system with the ability to generate 
and maintain quality jobs,   
 the capacity to feed from creative sources (or creative environments),   
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 appropriate levels of productivity and infrastructure, and  
 captive local and/or international audiences.  
For PEC authors it is also desirable to have access to production and consumption of 
films by different social groups. All those factors are part of what I consider ‘theoretical 
normative statements’ and they will be further elaborated in the next sections. Many of 
those factors entail long-term temporality rather than proposing, for example, ephemeral 
box office success or revenue growth. The criteria also cover a wide range of cultural, 
economic, social and political aspects. I think that the term sustainability, among the set 
of terms mentioned before, is a very relevant concept to study leveraging the film 
industry. This is because in multiple disciplines (environmental, agricultural, 
engineering and economic sciences) the concept of sustainability has been used to 
encapsulate the long-term maintenance of systems and to capture a holistic 
interconnectedness of different dimensions such as economic, cultural, and social.  
From the Latin word meaning “to hold up”, “to nurture”, the term sustainable denotes 
maintaining a certain state of things and self-sustainable has been used to refer to a 
system that fends for itself (Lewis & Short, 1969, p. 1822). Therefore, the word has 
evolved to be reframed in ethical reflections on agricultural, economic or ecological 
issues extensively used since the 1970s. The semantic elements of this word could be 
also applied to the cultural field as the ability of cultural systems to hold and fend for 
themselves. 
Sustainability in the Cultural Field 
The effort to postulate a link between sustainability and culture has come from the 
agendas of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the 
European Union (EU). On the one hand, in the 1990s the World Commission on Culture 
and Development (WCCD-UNESCO), also known as the Brundtland Commission, 
linked sustainable ecological and economic outcomes to pursue self-perpetuating 
economic development that would not compromise the preservation of environmental 
values through the maintenance of natural ecosystems. However, the link between 
culture and sustainability was “only fleetingly suggested: ‘Culture valuations and 
cultural activities can be looked at in terms of cultural sustainability’” (WCCD, as cited 
in Throsby, 1997, p.10). Nonetheless, the document suggested the need to do more 
research in the area. This call echoed Throsby’s (1997) theoretical work which was 
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taken up again by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report on 
Creative Industries (UNCTAD, 2010).  
On the other hand, the European Task Force on Culture and Development argued that, 
historically, economic growth as a quantitative measure of success and an approach to 
development has been generating “undesirable ecological, social and cultural side-
effects” (Council of Europe, 1997, p. 31). According to this task force, policies centred 
in economic growth had ignored the holistic notions that community development 
depends on the “interrelatedness of different actions with a larger environment, whether 
physical, cognitive or cultural” (Council of Europe, 1997, p. 30). 
Later, Throsby engaged in a theoretical effort to define and link sustainability and 
culture. He described sustainability as “the long-term supporting viability of any type of 
system” (Throsby, 1997, p. 10). He also argued that culture has “an instrumental role in 
promoting economic progress and a constituent role as a desirable end in itself, the 
characteristic of civilisation that gives meaning to existence” (emphasis added) 
(Throsby, 1997, p. 9). Subsequently, he took further steps to see both aspects of culture 
as desirably sustainable.  
However, it was more precisely the concept of cultural capital that allowed Throsby to 
build the bridge with sustainability, as it is a term more congruent with economic 
language. Bourdieu (1986) defined cultural capital as a form of accumulated labour that 
can be embodied―incorporated in the “dispositions of the mind and body”―or 
objectified, in “cultural goods” (1986, p. 243). In both cases accumulation takes time 
and resources, as other forms of labour do. Cultural capital, observed Bourdieu, could 
be appropriated by individuals or social groups both “materially―which presupposes 
economic capital―and symbolically―which presupposes cultural capital” (1986, p. 
246). But in any case they were appropriating “social energy in the form of reified or 
living labour” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241). Similarly, Throsby (1997) suggested that 
cultural capital can take the form of tangible assets or services, from art works to 
cultural heritage. But it can also be intangible as found in art works like music, or as it 
embodies knowledge, values, beliefs and ideas shared with some community groups and 
even humankind. Both tangible and intangible cultural stocks carry a symbolic value 
that can vary across different social groups and which can also “decay through neglect 
or increase through new investment”―in other words, cultural deterioration, cultural 
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preservation, or cultural growth (Throsby, 1997, p. 15). Furthermore, the maintenance 
of existing cultural capital and its creation requires resources just as other elements of 
economic and social systems do. 
A set of concepts have been derived from the work of Throsby, EU and UNESCO which 
proposed a theoretical marriage of cultural sustainable development, as outlined by 
UNCTAD (2010). Those concepts are:  
1. Inter-generational equity or the protection of the capacity of future generations to 
access cultural resources and meet their cultural needs.  
2. Intra-generational equity or the provision of “equity in access to cultural production, 
participation and enjoyment to all members of community on a fair and non-
discriminatory basis” (UNCTAD, 2010, p. 26). This attribute has also appeared among 
the normative statements of PEC (Golding & Murdock, 2000).  
3. Diversity which takes into account the value of cultural diversity in the process of 
economic, social and cultural development.  
4. Precautionary principles which cover protecting cultural heritage from destruction or 
the extinction of valued cultural practices.  
5. Interconnectedness which is a concept embodying the idea that “economic, social, 
cultural and environmental systems should not be seen in isolation; rather, a holistic 
approach is required” (UNCTAD, 2010, p. 26).  
If Throsby’s ideas were to be applied to the film industry and its double cultural-
economic component, addressing sustainability in the film industry would mean to 
ascertain the long-term supporting viability of the cultural aspects of film and the 
economic aspects of its industry. But the question is how to achieve it? In the next 
section I pinpoint general theoretical constructs that shed light on this query.  
The Cyclical Dynamics of Sustainability in Theories of the Film Industry  
In this section I apply the ideas around sustainability mentioned above to the cultural 
industries and particularly to the film industry. As with any other industry, the film 
industry can be conceived of in terms of a system with the ability to achieve long-term 
supporting viability of the cultural aspects of film and the economic aspects of its 
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industry as well as the capacity to fend for itself without neglecting the 
interdependencies it establishes with the environment. 
Interestingly, contemporary theories of film as a cultural industry have made use of 
visual metaphors like “spirals”, “circuits”, virtuous “circles” and positive “cycles” as 
adequate ways of depicting the dynamics of self-sustaining systems. In this chapter, I 
will use these visual metaphors to illustrate what the two main academic approaches 
have developed in order to explain how film industries work in contemporary capitalist 
societies. 
The explanatory cues of PEC and GI imply a long-term maintenance of industrial 
outcomes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the fundamental explanation arising from GI 
studies of industrial and regional development (Scott, 2007) is based on the expansion 
of the division of labour inside or outside of companies (Smith, [1776] 2005). Several 
institutional economists (see Chapter 3) preluded GI’s location theory, such as the work 
of Young (1928) on industrial organisation. He suggested that production activities are 
primary economies that generate opportunities for other secondary economies or 
organisations to get involved. In a GI analysis of film districts, secondary economies 
include mainly services to production or film-related players. For example, companies’ 
activities might justify the existence of government bodies. For instance, they might be 
logistically supported by a location office to cut the red tape; in turn, the location office 
survival as an institution depends on the core film production activities. With each 
round of investment at the core, the secondary players and economies might benefit and 
in turn the core benefits as well. Hence, when this system begins working, not only do 
increasing returns occur inside the company, they also occur in other sectors, or the 
economy as a whole (Young, 1928). Another milestone in industrial organisation was 
the observation by Coase in 1937 of a firm’s institutional role in evaluating which 
activities should be internalised or outsourced within a market environment of uncertain 
information (1937). This is relevant to the study of why film production companies 
decide to integrate or disintegrate services, marketing or distribution activities. In the 
study by Williamson (1981) he explained that the decision to internalise or externalise 
activities depends on how (a) uncertain, (b) frequent, or (c) asset specific transactions 
are in the marketplace. Specificity of assets is particularly important as it refers to 
investments that are made because of the specificity of their location; the specificity of 
the product or service (for example, a unique component); or the specificity of the 
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human input (a specificity arising from learning by doing). As Williamson explained 
“asset specificity is critical {…} once an investment has been made, buyer and seller are 
effectively operating in a bi-lateral exchange {…} [they are] ‘locked into’ the 
transaction to a significant degree” (Williamson, 1981, p. 555). The previous 
explanation is related to a central concept in GI accounts, and that is the development of 
interdependencies which are the processes where diverse agents learn from the 
experience and interaction among them. Nelson and Winter (1982) distinguished two 
types of interactions: formal (traded interdependencies) and informal or untraded 
interdependencies, such as cultural atmosphere, tacit knowledge, regulatory 
frameworks, etc. (Storper & Walker, 1989). Although depending on the decisions of 
others can generate a competitive advantage―mutual benefits, it can also promote 
uncertainty, and mutual decline. Nonetheless, agents that are able to codify such formal 
or informal links might have a better chance of being successful (Nelson & Winter, 
1982).  
The concept of informal interdependencies is related to other types of spillover effects 
that do not occur through the direct interaction among players. Bator (1958) defined 
them as externalities, that is, the benefits or costs that an activity generates for third 
parties that remain external to the transaction. In Scott’s study of the Hollywood film 
district, industrial development was in itself the product of positive agglomeration 
externalities such as “inter-firm networks, the local labour markets and learning effects 
{…} [which are] frequently amplified by the physical and institutional infrastructures” 
(Scott, 2005, p. 14). Scott sketches the agglomeration process in Hollywood in three 
phases: (a) “an initial geographic distribution of production units over the landscape, 
possibly at random, possibly as a result of some pre-existing geographic condition”; (b) 
“one particular location starts to pull ahead of the others and form a nascent 
agglomeration {…} purely by random or it may stem from a peculiar conjuncture”; (c) 
“a breakthrough moment, in which the agglomeration, building on its intensifying 
competitive advantages, extends and consolidates its market reach” (Scott, 2005, p. 16). 
In sum, for GI, primary film production activities propel new rounds of production 
generating spirals of increasing returns in a commercial but also a non-commercial way 
(see Figure 5) (Storper & Walker, 1989; Young, 1928). And it could be inferred that as a 
result of the functional interdependencies among institutional players and the 
development of positive externalities, a film industrial district develops and maintains 
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the attraction of its components (Markusen, 1996). In other words their relations 
become sustainable. 
Figure 5 Spirals of increasing returns 
 
Note. Own elaboration. 
PEC’s explanatory cues also address the long-term maintenance of the film industry by 
focusing on the articulation of the value chain. A strand of institutional economics (see 
Chapter 3) that resonated among PEC authors, was Marxian political economics and 
their observation of the “transition to monopoly capitalism or the tendency for a few 
large companies to dominate markets and restrict competition” (Mosco, 2009, p. 54). 
Authors using PEC as a theoretical guideline observed that in many capitalist societies, 
economies of scale in the film distribution phase―such as low or nill marginal costs per 
unit distributed―allowed large capital concentration (that is, the creation of oligopolies 
such as Hollywood’s), and political influence over regulation (Garnham; 2005; Picard, 
2002). As a result new players were disadvantaged and lacked the financial capacity to 
compete with Hollywood studios’ large promotional expenses and distribution 
networks. Major studio productions and independent productions compete unequally for 
the opportunity to reach audiences. It can be inferred that the constraints on film 
industries, according to PEC authors, are demarcated by how the oligopoly of 
transnational conglomerates creates a bottleneck controlling the traffic of products 
(Garnham, 2005). The latter must be dislodged in order to make the capital flow from 
production to commercialisation and back to production. Consequently, that positive 
cycle is the key to a sustainable film industry (see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6 The value chain of the film industry 
 
Note. Own elaboration 
The system at work 
The cyclical models of spirals of increasing returns and value chains depend on 
“complex synchronic and diachronic interrelations that must be present before the 
creative dynamics” can emerge (Scott, 2006, p. 11). In this way, the models represent 
sufficient conditions for the reproduction of capital. In addition, academic research has 
noted some necessary conditions that, I suggest, mutually constitute the cyclical models 
explained previously. These necessary conditions are a set of criteria which recur in 
what many authors consider viable film industries. Such criteria cover social, cultural, 
political, and economic dimensions. As a result these perspectives match the holistic 
properties of the sustainable approach to the cultural industries which sees the 
interconnectedness of such dimensions. 
In the next sections, I explore these criteria. As it will be noted, they reinforce one 
another. In this manner, they can be seen as a giant machine comprised of different cogs 
that need to move together for the machine to operate. Having said that, they are 
necessary conditions but they fail to explain, by themselves, the sufficient conditions 
under which production system cycles operate. It is the value chain articulation and the 
spirals of increasing returns which sets the following factors in motion. 
Financial capacity 
The film industry business measures positive financial outcomes of single films by their 
commercial returns. In a similar way, economic and business reports measure entire film 
industries’ financial success by aggregating annual commercial revenue including also 
Production
DistributionConsumption
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box office, territory distribution sales, retail and ancillary returns from a bundle of films 
that comprise that industry (De Vany & Walls, 1999; MacPherson, 2010).  
However, according to my theoretical stance the revenue captured by the 
commercialisation sector must be put in context to account for the long-term, positive 
outcome of any film industry. It is expected that part of that revenue will be reinvested 
to maintain the value chain cycles and the virtuous circles of increasing returns 
mentioned in the last sections. Even in publicly funded film industries within market 
economies, there is a widespread expectation that films will return money or social 
recognition, although, expectations vary in relation to different regional schemes. Scott 
(2002) stressed that “the distribution system disseminates the industry’s products on 
wider markets, pumps revenues and information back to [producers], and hence is a 
basic condition of the sustained economic well-being of the [industry]” (Scott, 2002, p. 
969). Similarly, Pendakur (1990) observed that in order for film production to be 
sustainable, production and distribution companies need to be integrated. For Garnham, 
“the problem in this circuit is how to establish a viable linkage between production on 
the one hand and exchange (exhibition) on the other” (Garnham, 1990, p. 183). As I will 
explain, there are four main obstacles to entering or maintaining such reinvestment 
circuits.  
First, the long-term economic life span of films―cinema release, video rental, 
download, and television broadcast―and ancillary products can last years, which 
creates a negative mismatch between cost of inputs and commercial returns (Picard, 
2002). In the same way the large number of participants in the value chain, including 
numerous distribution and exhibition businesses involved, leaves the producer at the 
back end of the revenue downstream. Despite the fact that independent producers deal 
with higher costs and risks they are often left undercapitalised (Magder, 1996; Ugalde, 
2005). This has an impact on the opportunities for reinvestment and the expansion of 
the productive sector.  
Second, film products need large capital investment in early production phases. This 
imperative derives from the economic characteristics of the film industry itself. High 
fixed and variable costs are required to produce the first prototype or master (Picard, 
2002). 
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Third, there are low or nil marginal costs required for reproducing and distributing 
films, more so with digital technologies (Picard, 2002). High production costs and low 
distribution costs mean that increasing the number of units of production, decreases the 
mean costs, favouring the generation of economies of scale and market expansion 
(Garnham, 2005). Historically, once those economies of scale have been put in motion, 
their advantages have been such that they have created barriers to entry to new 
competitors and favoured the creation of oligopolies that dominate the value chain 
(vertical integration), diversify their businesses (horizontal concentration of firms) and 
concentrate the biggest shares of markets. 
Finally, the level of uncertainty in consumption patterns presents other obstacles to 
obtaining returns. For example:  
1. Cultural industries have unstable patterns of consumption including a demand that 
reverses in cyclic ways (as fashion cycles) as well as the uncertainty that credence 
products carry, as their desirability depends on collective social behaviour (Kretschmer, 
Klimis, & Choi, 1999). 
2. Films constitute semi-public goods whose use by one individual does not prevent 
others from consuming them which has motivated companies to produce artificial 
scarcity through high prices, public screenings and digital right management devices.   
In sum, long timeframes, blockages to recoupment, large initial capital investments, 
barriers to entry and uncertain demand all lead to a lack of financial resources for many 
production businesses or organisations that have not generated economies of scale. They 
have also become risk factors reflected in the investment structures of the film industry 
(Picard, 2002). This risk puts off external investors and commercial banks. Only big 
conglomerates enjoying control of the whole value chain have their own financial 
divisions which can be backed up by financial institutions and resources, including the 
stock market. Independent production houses resort to other forms of financing such as 
state subsidies or crowdfunding. 
Maintaining a self-financing capacity in any film industry would require expanding “the 
audience to the maximum possible” (Garnham, 1990, p. 185) even for those depending 
on public funding following a commercial or not commercial logic to obtain social 
returns. It would also entail financial mechanisms that pursue “making the flow of 
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money from the widely-scattered box-offices [and other outlets] back to production as 
efficient and rapid as possible (thus accelerating the turnover time of capital)” 
(Garnham, 1990, p. 185). To which I would add, guaranteeing a fair redistribution of the 
returns to the producer for their reinvestment.   
Pools of specialised labour  
Film production is a labour-intensive activity, meaning that in order to produce a film, 
relatively large amounts of skilled and non-skilled workers are required (Scott, 2000a).  
However, it is imperative to have a production system with the ability to generate and 
maintain quality jobs as companies need access to a wide variety of workers in order to 
adjust their activity networks. This is due to the project-base model of production of 
films and the variability of relations among companies which creates a functional 
disintegration (Scott & Storper, 2003). State-owned film companies also depend on 
having access to or developing permanent or flexible workers. 
Maintaining jobs allows workers to acquire know-how, understood as the “relevant 
skills, experience and knowledge needed for competent performance” (Rowlands, 
2009b, p. 31). Most of the technical, creative and managerial skills involved in 
filmmaking are learnt on-the-job because of the high amount of tacit knowledge 
involved which cannot be codified in training sessions. But schools, industry 
organisations and guilds do play a role in catalysing the integration of some codified 
knowledge. Nonetheless, film workers careers have become individualised paths of jobs 
sequences through which the workers learn and upskill their craft (DeFillippi & Arthur, 
1994).  
The inability to maintain the production system could result in losing labour pools 
through emigration, as well as raise unemployment rates. In these hostile environments 
for workers, “the organisation of efficient high-skill local labour markets” such as 
unions or guilds, is crucial to keep nurturing production (Power & Scott, 2004, p. 10). 
This is more so in the era of flexible production characterised by workers’ mobility, 
short-term jobs and independent contractors (Storper & Christopherson, 1987). 
According to Allen Scott, “whenever groups of interrelated firms gather together {…} 
in geographic space, extended local labour markets invariably develop around them” 
(Scott, 2006, p. 6). Yet, as Scott argues, agglomeration is not enough and importing a 
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diversity of creative and technical workers alone, as proposed by Florida (2003), is not 
enough to explain industrial or urban development. On the contrary, specialized pools of 
labour “must be organically developed through the complex interweaving of relations of 
production, work and social life in specific urban contexts” (Scott, 2006, p.15). These 
last remarks are relevant in the light of the multiple dimensions that sustainability 
encourages.  
Creative sources 
Creativity occurs in the film industry in several respects. Creativity is the human ability 
to reinterpret and communicate a variety of human experiences with known or new 
configurations (Williams, 2001). However, films, like other cultural industries, have 
developed skills to transmit that experience so it can be literarily lived by others as they 
“command very powerful means of this sharing” (Williams, 2001, p. 24). 
Creativity could be seen as the input of creative film workers comprising informal 
know-how derived from the socialised and intensive working transactions, which in turn 
become processes of acculturation that endow workers with “instinct like capacities” 
(Scott, 2000a, p.25). For example, tacit knowledge influences “workers’ sensibilities 
(forms of empathy, feeling, awareness, imagination, expressiveness and so on) {…} 
which become manifest in final products in distinctive variable cultural codes, styles, 
conventions, fashions and all the rest” (Scott, 2000a, p.25). Creativity can also appear as 
part of the background of a cultural milieu. The latter is understood as, “the matrix 
within which the social machinery of production is entrenched and the main repository 
of the diverse cultural resources that are both consciously and unconsciously mobilized 
in the conceptualization and execution of cinematic projects” (Scott, 2000a, p.24). The 
cultural milieu gives film its distinctiveness as it mediates and infuses creative work 
with concrete character drawn from the frames of reference, visual styles, stories, and so 
on, which provide a “cinematic background vocabulary” (Scott, 2006, p. 26). It is not 
coincidental that film industries locate in cities which are centres of cultural and social 
life that are able to feed the industry in several ways: through synergies with arts and 
cultural industries, through the concentration of specialised workers, cultural 
institutions, aesthetic traditions and particular cultural ethos, as well as via the responses 
of film audiences’ idiosyncrasies and discernment (Scott, 2000a). 
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For GI authors, “the potentiation of local industrial creativity and innovation” (Power & 
Scott, 2004, p. 10) could result in a comparative advantage as it could generate a 
constant “stream of vibrant cultural externalities” (Scott, 2000a, p.25). However, “as 
important as these assets may be, they are apt to be inert until energized and reproduced 
through an actually working production system” (Scott, 2000a, p.25). 
Levels of productivity and the appropriate infrastructure 
Another measurement of positive outcomes for film industries is the annual volume of 
films produced (MacPherson, 2010). This is particularly important for international 
reports concerned with global cultural diversity and the origin of films made and spread 
around the world. For example, in recent reports of annual film production only a few 
countries manage to make more than 100 feature films per year: India (1,091), Nigeria 
(872), US (485), Japan (417), China (330), France (203), Germany (174), Spain (150), 
Italy (116), South Korea (110) with the United Kingdom producing 104 films 
(UNESCO, 2009, p. 3).  
It is fair to argue that countries with large populations have more opportunities to 
generate higher levels of productivity, but this is not always the case; countries like 
Denmark have more production per capita than other large-population countries 
(MacPherson, 2010). In addition to that, high productivity does not equal enjoying the 
advantages of having extended distribution through domestic and international networks 
(Sánchez Ruiz, 2003). In this regard, from the top countries with higher productivity, 
only US film productions have a global presence.  
Having adequate levels of productivity is important as it relates to the maintenance of 
jobs and upskilling processes; the development of audience taste for films (provided that 
they are rightly disseminated); and the spillovers for infrastructure (services and 
facilities). Having addressed the first two in the other sections I will expand on the need 
to have an appropriate infrastructure. 
The film industry depends on relationships with external services like hospitality, 
accommodation, and accountancy as well as  intra-sectoral services providing set 
designs, casting agencies, gaffers, special and visual effects, film studios, talent, casting 
and distribution agencies, post-production services, as well as distribution, exhibition 
and retail activities (Coe, 2001). There is also a set of institutional infrastructure 
provided by the public sector, the civil society, academic organisations and private 
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associations. As GI researchers argue, face to face contact, exchange of information, 
short- and long-term outsourcing as well as input and output flows are key to the 
creation of industrial complexes; and, more importantly, to their maintenance through 
the creation of interdependencies and spirals of increasing returns (Scott, 2000b). 
Market audiences 
 The film industry depends on economic returns and social rewards to maintain 
production cycles, and these are generally provided by audiences who participate as 
receptors or consumers. Expanding captive audiences is one of the conditions of 
existence of the film industry as they represent the demand required to generate 
economies of scale (Picard, 2002). This is the reason why some authors consider 
distribution to be such a powerful phase in the value chain (Aksoy, 1992).  
It is widely accepted that audience size―measured by cinema admissions, TV ratings, 
and units sold―is a quantitative indicator of positive financial and social outcomes of 
the film industry (MacPherson, 2010). Such figures are seen to capture commercial 
currency, social prestige and acceptance for film products. Despite the disadvantage of 
places with limited population, “small size can often find sustainable niches for 
themselves on world markets provided they offer sufficiently distinctive goods and 
services” (Scott, 2006, p. 13).  
Although high levels of audience attendance and home markets can be seen as 
competitive advantages for an industry (Scott, 2000a), some films and film industries 
face obstacles in achieving them. In many regions “cinema audience is largely in thrall 
to Hollywood” (MacPherson, 2010, p. 2). The strategic position on distribution of films 
has made US films dominant in the global market (Garnham, 1990). In 1973, the 
Motion Picture Association of America claimed that US films had 50% of the world 
screening time (Garnham, 1990, p.175). For the year 2000, it was estimated that “85% 
of the films shown around the world” had originated in Hollywood (UNESCO, 2000, p. 
18). In 2006, another report showed that in the majority of countries, “the top 10 films 
by admissions were of US origin” except for India, France, Japan and Morocco 
(UNESCO, 2009, p. 7). Therefore, the unequal representation of domestic versus US 
films has been a global concern. 
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As noted above, the uncertainty of audience demand can be explained by the inherent 
characteristics of film products and their relation to audiences. First of all, they are 
credence products whose quality cannot be determined before their consumption, nor 
even after it, as audience perception is a social construct based on the reputation of the 
product, which creates negative or positive social contagion: demand for films in the 
industry reverses in cyclic ways “once too many people enter a particular fashion, it 
ceases to be a fashion and, typically, the trend moves on” (Kretschmer et al., 1999, p. 
64). Secondly, films are perishable products meaning that their value is exhausted by 
seeing them once. Finally, they are highly substitutable products competing with other 
cultural products and leisure activities (Garnham, 1990; Kretschmer et al., 1999; Picard, 
2002). Even in Hollywood, studies have provided evidence that domestic box office 
conforms to a Paretian distribution curve where 20% of films account for 80% of 
revenue (De Vany & Walls, 1999). Therefore, there is “always a premium on expanding 
the audience to the maximum for each unit of production” (Garnham, 1990, p.185).  
However, there are obstacles to expanding market audiences such as blockages in 
distribution and the oversupply of products. Nonetheless, audiences are not only captive 
but also potential, meaning there are always possibilities to create new market audiences 
away from the existing ones (Biltereyst & Meers, 2012). 
It is a widespread belief that in mainstream media content production decisions are 
based on giving audiences what they want (Biltereyst & Meers, 2012). In this view 
audiences are irrational, emotional, and dependent, which in turn justifies producers’ 
resistance to risking on innovative, original or higher quality products which are more 
expensive. PEC and cultural studies’ academics have turned around such classical 
liberal views reminding us that audiences are not just given but made. Instead, 
audiences are rational, sovereign, active and autonomous as well as driven and created 
by corporate strategies (Biltereyst & Meers, 2012). In other words, “consumer wants are 
to an important extent determined by the system of production and consumption itself. 
{…} [Audiences desires are] shaped by what it is actually available for consumption” 
(Garnham, 2000, p. 136).  
Furthermore, audiences are not only consumers of commodities but the audience itself 
is a commodity produced by the media industries and sold to advertisers, sponsors, 
branding strategists and political propagandists―including tourism: “Because audience 
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power is produced, purchased and consumed, it commands a price and it is a 
commodity” (Smythe, 2006, p. 233). These characteristics help to understand why some 
types of audiences for certain types of products are fostered while others will remain 
potential in the mainstream context: “audiences with less material interests in common 
have been and will continue to be, less favoured” (Seaton as cited by Biltereyst & 
Meers, 2011, p. 425). This has implications with respect to the purpose for producing 
films and the purpose for producing audiences which, in turn, sheds light on the 
possibilities and constraints for audience development strategies. 
The Local and the Transnational 
The necessary and sufficient conditions mentioned above are also inevitably tied to 
specific places, as the interrelations that they entail potentiate positive outcomes. This is 
not only because workers and firms are circumscribed in space and time (Power & 
Scott, 2004, p. 7) but also because they “acquire a patina of {…} peculiar traditions, 
sensibilities and norms that hang {…} like an atmosphere over the local community” 
(emphasis added) (Scott, 2006, p. 7). It is not by chance that city-regions have 
accumulated competitive advantages as excellent producers of cultural industries 
attracting labour and businesses (Markusen, 1996; Power & Scott, 2004, p. 7). 
But most importantly, even if there are transnational flows, international mobility of 
workers, and audiences trespass borders, at the core of the film industry positive cycles 
are “inward investment for increasing returns” (emphasis added) (Power & Scott, 2004, 
p. 21). Therefore, the struggle over foreign versus domestic audience market share is not 
only a matter of nationalism, rather it follows the logic of capital flows and local 
reinvestment required to locally finance the industry (Garnham, 1990). The place in this 
broad sense becomes a source of unique competitive advantages. Places could be: 
1. Repositories of economic efficiencies which are potentiated by complex interactions 
in proximity that reduce costs of commuting, information exchange and search as well 
as costs of educational and training facilities (Scott, 2000a, p. 22).  
2. Reserves of cultural and creative externalities that enhance learning and acculturation 
processes by socialisation.  
3. The locus of human individual and community life, so the impact that film industries 
have on human quality of life and lifestyle are captured in specific places.  
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However, this “place-bounded” logic (Scott, 2006, p. 8) of film industry systems raises 
questions regarding changes in the definition of place in current transnational capitalism 
in the so-called era of globalisation. Economic geographers have already discussed that 
rather than eliminate the importance of the place, globalisation has accentuated it ( 
Scott, 1997). Although, the last two decades have seen the denationalisation of film and 
TV industries (O’Regan, 2013) it is worth determining what effects this has on local 
communities.  
Transnational firms and capital in the film and audio-visual industries are present in 
many phases of the value chain of regional film industries. Historically, trade and 
distribution of films has been held by transnational networks. Initially, rising exports 
accentuated the expansion of localized production activities (Power & Scott, 2004). 
Another focus of transnational activity is film production that has dispersed as the 
international division of labour has increased.  
It is worth noting that the imbalances in local and transnational flows and in players’ 
economic power present “political collisions over issues of trade and culture” (Power & 
Scott, 2004, p. 12), as well as industrial relations (Christopherson, 2006). If we factor in 
the social and cultural dimensions of a sustainable holistic perspective, it is easier to 
observe critically the impact of transnational activity on the local community life.  
The Normative Aspect of Sustainability: Access, Agency and Policy 
The film industry boundaries 
The use of the term self-sustainable to study a particular film industry presents some 
issues in the current transnational environment as it requires solid grounds to define the 
limits between the industry and the environment to be able to establish the reference of 
self. In the first place, this brings to light questions of community sovereignty in which 
each social unit in any region could politically and culturally define itself. It would be 
unethical to impose a universal definition of the boundaries of a film industry. 
Nonetheless, based on the theory reviewed in this thesis, some general boundaries can 
be suggested and explored as they are justified by the film industry’s endogenous 
economic dynamics and its socio-cultural implications to communities. 
On the one hand, I adopt the word community―whether urban, sub-national, national, 
regional, or transnational―as the minimum level of collective interrelatedness into 
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which film industries have immediate impact on people’s lives. UNCTAD suggests that 
the main reasons to support the principles of culturally sustainable development are “the 
contributions that artistic and cultural production, dissemination and participation make 
to empowerment, cultural enrichment and social cohesion in the community, in order to 
promote major social progress” (emphasis added) (UNCTAD, 2010, p. 26).  
This thesis also stands for the idea that there should be a place for the right of all 
communities to define themselves and even to overlap. In this sense, all cultures have 
the right to self-expression and cultural dissemination, as well as the recognition of 
cultural goods and services as vectors of social transformation, identity, values and 
meaning (UNESCO, 2002). 
On the other hand, based on the film industry theories discussed here, it could be argued 
that the sufficient and necessary conditions of the film industry put limits on its 
boundaries, although they do not determine them. For example, it has been argued that 
the cyclical mechanisms set in motion create inward synergies among the system 
components in close relationship to each other. This does not mean to neglect 
transnational networks established to canalise inputs and outputs, or dispatch packages 
of outsourced tasks from the industrial system to the environment and vice versa (Aksoy 
& Robins, 1992; Scott, 2006). Neither does it mean to ignore links with state funding 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, those transnational connections or public resources can only 
become part of a self-sustainable model provided that the film industry incorporates 
them in internal positive productive cycles.  
When those external links to the environment such as satellite investment or state 
subsidies fail to be canalised into inward investment they have established dependency 
relations that negatively shape the generation of endogenous interdependencies. As far 
as academic research has found, there are no satellite production centres whose external 
dependency has overcome structurally endemic issues to mobilise cycles of added value 
and increasing returns (Coe, 2001; Goldsmith & O’Regan, 2005): “An unanswered 
question thus far revolves around whether or not policymakers can really push the 
development of the film industry in any one of these satellite centers to the point where 
a virtuous circle of agglomerated growth is set in motion” (Scott, 2006, p.14). Such a 
question underlies the line of inquiry in this thesis and the empirical interest in the 
Wellington film district domestic and satellite production.   
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However, defining boundaries is a matter of understanding film industry dynamics as 
much as defining any community politically. The definition is therefore empirically 
flexible but difficulties in circumscribing the economic, social and cultural boundaries 
of impact, action and belonging can be reduced provided there is clarity on the social 
ends and the key factors that determine and condition the industry. For the purposes of 
this research, the self in self-sustainability refers to the sovereign definition that takes 
into account the long-term maintenance of the industry and its holistic extent (the 
interconnectedness of economic, sociocultural, and political aspects). The latter includes 
the concepts of inter- and intra-generational equality defined by Throsby (1997) as 
access to cultural participation, and by UNESCO (2002) as part of human rights. 
Access to production and consumption of films 
The concept of social access is attached to the definition of the film industry boundaries 
and the extent to which the film industry impacts on and is nurtured by the community. 
PEC has a long tradition of reflecting on the role of the media in contributing to social 
values (Golding & Murdock, 2000). The irony resides in the fact that, in capitalism, 
cultural industries are “mediated forms of communication [that] involve the use of 
scarce material resources and the mobilization of competences and dispositions which 
are themselves in important ways determined by access to scarce resources” (Garnham, 
1990, p. 6). In other words, people’s access to cultural production and consumption 
under capitalism presents fundamental issues of power inequality (Hesmondhalgh, 
2007), putting at risk the inter- and intra-generational equality associated with 
sustainable development (UNCTAD, 2010). What is at stake is culture as “an indicator 
of positive human growth defined in qualitative, but measurable terms, for example, 
access to opportunities, positive self-definition, the ability to participate in social 
activity and intellectual and cognitive capacities” (Council of Europe, 1997, p. 31).  
State intervention 
The main theories explaining the film industry and the international reports reviewed 
here agree on the call for state intervention in regulating the film industry to 
counterbalance market failures and resource misallocation in contemporary capitalism.  
As mentioned before, PEC authors characterise many cultural industries in the current 
capitalist economy as being in a state of imperfect competition. This environment has 
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generated problems of gaining access to production by new entrepreneurs, and creative 
and technical talent. In the same way capital concentration and artificial scarcity (see the 
section above headed “Financial capacity”) have created issues for consumer access 
through high prices and product homogeneity. In cultural industries these problems are 
intensified as they can affect cultural pluralism and diversity. For such reasons PEC 
authors have considered it necessary for states to intervene to regulate the economy of 
cultural and media industries. Other international regimes agree with this posture. 
Articles 9 and 11 of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity states that, 
market forces alone cannot guarantee the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity 
and there is need of cultural policies to create conditions conducive to the production and 
dissemination of diversified cultural goods and services through cultural industries that 
have the means to assert themselves at the local and global level. (UNESCO, 2002) 
By the same token, GI studies have arrived at similar conclusions. Based on endogenous 
growth theory, it characterises the capitalist economy as being in a continuous state of 
disequilibrium. This is mainly because production competition implies the active 
application of technology and labour in original and creative ways. The latter represents 
a hard type of competition that alters the economic conditions towards a moving 
equilibrium. For this reason, some industries will grow faster than others (Storper & 
Walker, 1989; Young, 1928). The social implications of this disequilibrium coincide 
with the ones mentioned in the last paragraph, as this creates “enormous disparities 
between different groups of individuals in different societies in regard to their command 
of cultural resources and forms of self-expression” (Power & Scott, 2004, p. 13). To 
counteract the negative effects of such disequilibrium, GI theorists studying the film 
industries justify state intervention. Their view is further strengthened by place-bounded 
cultural industries having the potential to generate regional development understood not 
only as economic growth, trade, and employment but also as “social well-being” (Power 
& Scott, 2004, p. 10). The following sections pinpoint potential and desirable cultural 
policy areas suggested by authors guided by PEC and GI. 
Structural measures 
Individuals involved in policymaking could learn from understanding the main 
mechanisms of how the film industries work or do not work in contemporary societies. 
In this way, interventions can be implemented along different points of the value chain 
where blockages operate. One structural foundation is that “in the film industry there is 
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no more important thing than wide distribution” (Garnham, 1990, p. 185). In this regard, 
any film production centre must “be capable of mounting effective systems of 
commercialization and distribution of their outputs. This, of course, is another area in 
which policymakers can play a decisive role” (Scott, 2006, p. 13). As Scott states, 
audience development is another structural measure as it targets the consumption phase 
of the value chain: “consumer choices and preferences are actively shaped along time 
through complex processes of socialisation and construction of personal needs” (Scott, 
2005, p. 170). Audiences can be included “if enough investment is made on effective 
distribution and promotional campaigns in the long run” (Scott, 2005, pp. 170–171). 
The other imperative argument outlined by the theory is the need to identify points of 
inward investment and externalities; that is, primary and secondary economies. For 
example, production companies are primary activities that propel service businesses that 
are secondary economies. I argue that that distinction is important to avoid expecting 
services to create wide externalities, which could create “severe problems of market 
failure and misallocation” (Scott, 2006, p. 2). In other words, there is a need for 
policymakers “to map out the collective order of the local economy along the multiple 
sources of increasing returns”  (Power & Scott, 2004, p. 9).  
Identification of competitive advantages 
Once policymakers have localised the structural blockages mentioned previously, there 
are a series of competitive strategies to be implemented. Researchers highlight the 
structural importance of “high-road” strategies that are based on quality rather than low 
cost competition (“low-road”) as they are more prone to work in the long-term (Jeffcutt 
& Pratt, 2002). These include: 
(a) specialisation strategies based on investment in human capital, technology to achieve 
a high degree of added value which is the institutional prize of creativity and innovation 
as sources of competitive advantage (Jeffcutt & Pratt, 2002);  
(b) differentiation as a strategy to intensify distinction from Hollywood or mainstream 
products and businesses models (Scott, 2005);  
(c) synergetic strategies with other multimedia content production in order to take 
advantage of pools of finance, cross promotion and ancillary markets; and 
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(d) strategies of scope with regards to the creation of new windows of 
commercialisation and niche markets that world-dominant centres do not control (Scott, 
2005). 
Another potential competitive strategy is collective coordination which involves,  
building collaborative inter-firm relations in order to mobilize latent strategies {…} [and] 
institution building in order to internalize latent and actual externalities within competent 
agencies and to coordinate disparate groups of actors. (Power & Scott, 2004, p. 10) 
It also includes enhancing training and learning processes (a form of labour 
specialization), and labour organisation, as well as infrastructure and technology 
upgrades. The key is having a productive system that can generate inward investment, 
create added value and comparative advantages (Scott, 2006).  
Strategic protection and regulation 
There are calls for the desirability of achieving a balance between private enterprise and 
public intervention (Golding & Murdock, 2000; UNESCO, 2002) with some authors 
commenting on the possibility of implementing combinations of different types of 
governance such as public, social and private funding in the production and 
dissemination of cultural industries (Pratt, 2005). In addition, some authors insist in the 
importance of protection devices such as strategic trade and industrial policies to 
compensate the undesirable effects of stronger competitors (Frau-Meigs, 2006; 
Pendakur, 1990; Sánchez Ruiz, 2003). Such policies have been practically extinguished 
in the context of free trade agreements and state retraction (Gazol Sánchez, 2004). In 
cultural policy areas many governments maintain subsidies for film production. 
However, countries that failed to include a cultural exemption clause in free trade 
agreements have been less likely to establish new subsidies or quotas for film imports. 
Finally, another area referred to by research into cultural industries is the appropriate 
regulation and enforcement of competition laws to break up market concentration and 
eliminate unfair competition (Pendakur, 1990).  
All these policy areas and possibilities carry economic and political costs in their 
implementation, as all policies do. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth 
mentioning that any policy proposal needs to consider hypothetical projections based on 
empirical data. However, this chapter has aimed to contribute providing a general 
theoretical framework to potentiate sustainability outcomes.  
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Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have argued that among other terms used by the literature to evaluate 
the film industry―such as developed, successful, self-sufficient and viable―the term 
sustainable encapsulates the long-term maintenance of systems, and captures the 
holistic interconnectedness of economic, political, cultural and social dimensions. Based 
on the work of Throsby (1997), as well as international cultural organisations such as 
UNESCO and UNCTAD, I propose a definition of a self-sustainable film industry as 
one with the ability to achieve the long-term supporting viability of the sociocultural 
aspects of film and the socio-economic aspects of its industry as well as the capacity to 
fend for itself. I have argued that sustainability as a normative and analytical framework 
is a relevant tool to understand the struggles faced by many film industries. This chapter 
has also addressed the question of how to give an account of sustainability in the film 
industry. 
In order to answer the question I drew on the explanatory cues of PEC and GI which use 
visual metaphors like “spirals”, and positive “cycles” to implicitly depict the long-term 
dynamics of self-sustaining systems. On the one hand, GI suggests that film production 
activities are primary economies that generate opportunities for other secondary 
economies or secondary activities to get involved such as film facilities and services. 
Relations between both primary and secondary economies are sustained when they 
establish the functional benefits of interdependencies and externalities, and propel new 
rounds of production in spirals of increasing commercial and non-commercial returns. 
On the other hand, PEC focuses on the articulation of the value chain in which the flow 
of resources from production, distribution and commercialisation are able to be 
reinvested in production. These positive cycles are the key to a sustainable film 
industry. The cyclical models of GI and PEC represent sufficient conditions for the 
reproduction of capital, but I also identified in the studies using those approaches a set 
of necessary conditions that are mutually constitutive of such cyclical models. Those 
conditions are film industries with the financial capacity for reinvestment, pools of 
specialised workers in a production system with the ability to generate and maintain 
quality jobs, the capacity to feed from creative sources and environments, adequate 
productivity levels and the appropriate infrastructure, as well as reaching captive 
audiences at both local and international levels. 
 50 
 
Due to the fact that workers and firms are circumscribed in a particular place and that 
inward investments lie at the core of the film industry’s positive cycles, places become 
repositories of economic efficiencies, cultural and social externalities as well as 
community life. Hence, film industries have direct impact on the community through 
jobs, income and symbolic representation. However, community access to cultural 
production, dissemination, and consumption―what UNESCO considers to be part of 
human rights―is compromised within the current imbalances of local and transnational 
flows. Social access to cultural production and consumption in capitalism is nonetheless 
determined by access to scarce resources and thus, GI and PEC theorists justify state 
intervention through structural measures, competitive strategies, strategic protection and 
adequate regulation. Here, I argue for the relevance of achieving a self-sustainable film 
industry, where the prefix self refers to a community’s sovereign definition of its film 
industry. There might be difficulties in circumscribing the economic, social and cultural 
boundaries of impact of a given film industry, but they can be reduced provided there is 
clarity on the social ends and an understanding of the internal mechanisms that set the 
film industry in motion. I contend for the desirability of a self-sustainable film industry 
whose inherent focus on the local community is not a matter of nationalism or localism, 
but rather a matter of following the logic of the internal, cyclical mechanisms of film 
production and the extent to which the film industry impacts on and is nurtured by the 
community. This does not mean neglecting the participation of transnational 
connections or public resources in a given film industry; however, these can become 
part of a self-sustainable model only when the film industry incorporates them into 
internal positive cycles.  
The chapter has established links between academic theories, the normative values of 
international organisations and their potential policy implementation to leverage the 
film industry which, otherwise, could remain vague and impractical. The following 
chapters will attempt to use this framework to delineate the New Zealand’s film 
industry opportunities and constraints to achieve sustainable outcomes according to 
international configurations, the articulation of its value chain and the relations of its 
film district.   
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Chapter 3  
Field Studies 
The main question of this thesis is: What are the film industry’s interrelations that 
enable its sustainability? To answer the question I conducted an empirical study of the 
film industry’s interrelations in Wellington to be evaluated in the light of sustainable 
criteria described in Chapter 2. The current chapter describes the wider theoretical 
concepts that inform the methodological steps taken to study the film industry’s 
interrelations.  
I consider the relations among film industry players in a specific industrial district a 
very complex object of study, due to the variety of players and interests involved in 
them. The integrative framework (see Chapter 1) allowed me to encompass such 
complexity through conducting a historical-structural, industrial and institutional 
analysis of the film industry in Wellington and New Zealand. Guided by the main 
theoretical approaches outlined in Chapter 1, I applied a critical realist methodology 
which I argue is the most appropriate to encompass the complexity of the study. This 
methodology combines qualitative with quantitative data and collects original and 
contextual data. The research involved an in-depth examination of the experiences, 
perceptions, practices, and relations of a group of 30 film industry stakeholders in 
Wellington. The qualitative information obtained was analysed by identifying emerging 
commonalities and patterns, and sometimes highlighting diverging accounts. In order to 
contextualise the findings, I complemented them with quantitative and qualitative data 
from other sources such as public and media reports. The contextualisation allowed me 
to capture integrative dimensions of social phenomena―social, cultural, political, and 
economic―as prompted by the political economy of culture (Hesmondhalgh, 2007) and 
accounts of sustainability (Throsby, 1997). 
In this chapter, I position my study within philosophical considerations and a broader 
theoretical framework. The assumptions presented in this chapter underlie how I 
perceive the phenomena I am studying, how I think they can be studied and understood 
conceptually. I also explain the appropriate steps and methods to collect and analyse the 
data. In addition, I explain the rationale for my selection of interview participants based 
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on a general conceptualisation of their roles as boundary spanners as well as the ethical 
considerations in conducting the research. 
Theoretical Stance 
Epistemological and ontological approaches: Philosophical considerations 
My object of study is the interrelationships of the film industry which, at a broad level 
of abstraction, could be seen as the relations between individuals and their social and 
material settings. A flexible interpretation of materialism, one of the most basic 
philosophical traditions, reflects how I perceive the object of my study. In general 
terms, materialism “assumes that there is an objective material world which exists 
independently of and predates human existence” while “Idealism, in contrast, maintains 
that the material world is totally dependent on, and has no reality apart from, human 
existence, discourse or consciousness” (Marsden & Littler, 1999, p. 341). Materialism 
encompasses my theoretical approaches, the purpose of my study and the socio-
economic factors I favour. My flexible interpretation of materialism avoids 
reductionism by acknowledging different forms of causality―material, ideal or 
both―depending on the dimensions and particular time frames I am referring to (Adler 
& Borys, 1993). In sum, philosophical traditions are overgeneralisations, but their 
stand‒points help me build coherence into what I am researching and how I might 
research it.  
There are many epistemological approaches―or ways to “understanding how we know 
things” (Mosco, 2009, p. 10)―under the materialist paradigm. One of them is the realist 
approach in which I position my work due to the nature of my object of study and the 
epistemological foundations of my main theories. As Mosco explained, the political 
economy of culture (PEC) is grounded in a realist epistemology which, 
calls for an approach to understanding that accepts as real both the abstract ideas that 
guide thinking as well as concrete observations or what our senses perceive. It thereby 
rejects the view, prominent in some theories, that only our ideas or only our observations, 
but not both are real. Political economy also rejects the position that there is no reality, 
that neither ideas nor observations are in any important sense real. Moreover, this 
philosophy means that reality is made up of many elements and cannot be reduced to one 
essence. Neither economics (e.g. money alone drives the media) nor culture (e.g. people’s 
values shape the media) provide the magic key to unlock our understanding of 
communication. (Mosco, 2009, p. 127) 
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The fact that PEC rejects essentialism “which would reduce all social practices to a 
single political economic explanation” makes it inclusive, that is, open to a diverse 
social field but also open to choosing certain concepts or theories over others as “our 
thinking and experience warrants giving them priority {…} but they are not assertions 
of the one best, or only, way to understand social practices” (Mosco, 2009, p. 10). 
Another characteristic is its constitutive epistemology that recognises the limits of 
causal determination and instead “approaches social life as a set of constitutive 
processes, acting on one another in various stages of formation” (Mosco, 2009, p. 10). 
Its critical characteristic stems from its view of knowledge as “a product of comparisons 
between research findings and other bodies of knowledge as well as with social values” 
(Mosco, 2009, p. 10).  
I also position my study within a realist ontological approach, that is a framework for 
“understanding the nature of being” (Mosco, 2009, p. 11). I consider of my object of 
study through a realist ontological perspective, as I conceive of the film industry as 
being composed by “real” sets of activities in the sense that they are based on social 
consensus. This consensus involves conventionalised social relations and practices 
around matters of aesthetics, copyrights, entertainment, markets, and so on. Despite the 
fact that these social practices are socially developed, they become more or less fixed 
structures as society establishes its institutions―common meanings, organisations, laws 
and habits. In this process, institutions are able to exert “real” power in societies. This 
matches PEC’s assumptions of structuration processes and human agency in which 
“social action takes place within the constraints and the opportunities provided by the 
structures within which action happens” (Mosco, 2009, p. 16). In turn, these ideas echo 
a dialectical understanding preoccupied by studying the interactions between human 
beings and their social and material environment (Marsden & Littler, 1999). In doing so, 
the dialectic principle regards social phenomena as processes rather than static events 
(as positivism does) and matches the constantly changing nature of my object of study. 
Through its dialectical scope, the political economy has focused “on structures as the 
business firm and government, by placing social processes and social relations in the 
foreground” (Mosco, 2009, p. 11). In other words, it has characterised processes instead 
of simply identifying relevant institutions. In sum, PEC’s dialectical perspective 
observes the constant human agent-environment interface as a structuration processes 
(Gottlieb, 1987, p. xvi); that is, it structures social reality as a relational totality 
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deploying a system of interactions in which human agency engages in wide historical 
structuration, di-structuration and restructuration processes (Sánchez Ruiz, 1991).  
An example of how the dialectic approach has been applied is the historical-structural 
methodology used by some political economists of culture in Latin America. For 
instance, the study by Sánchez Ruiz (2003) of the historical-structural factors that have 
shaped the global hegemony of the Hollywood film industry. He described Hollywood’s 
gradual development as facilitated by long-term or structural processes such as the US’ 
early and expansive capitalist development, its large domestic market, and its first-
mover advantage in cultural industries and technological innovation. Nonetheless, he 
also identified a series of short-term factors, both historical and circumstantial, such as 
the wars that weakened European competition, internal policies for market 
protectionism as well as external market expansion through free trade policies, and the 
emergence of big conglomerates, state institutions and private associations which 
lobbied to mobilise their global channels of film distribution (Sánchez Ruiz, 2003).  
Likewise, the kind of research proposed here calls for a methodology that pays attention 
to individual agency, historical change and, established social structures. The historical-
structural approach, which aims to understand social changes despite the existence of 
stable structures, proposes that social relations are crystallized into interconnected 
institutions that determine―enable and limit―the way in which individuals create and 
recreate social meanings and practices (Sánchez Ruiz, 1991).  
For the purposes of my study, the previous epistemological and ontological assumptions 
match the idea that within environmental constraints humans can have a limited but 
active role in the process of constructing and transforming their social and economic life 
with important implications for social praxis, for example, to film policies. This is of 
special relevance since underlying my research is the political principle that some socio-
economic activities can be transformed to have more positive social and economic 
outcomes such as better film jobs and increased access to production and reception of 
films.   
Institutional economics as a general theory 
In this section I discuss my topic at a lower level of abstraction: the field of institutional 
economics as a general perspective that links the philosophical assumptions mentioned 
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in the last section with the specific theories I am drawing from. Both PEC and GI 
explicitly acknowledge being rooted in institutional economics which provides a general 
framework of assumptions about socio-economic life (Herscovici, 2005; Scott, 2005). 
Due to space restrictions, I will mention only the general assumptions underlying 
institutional economics (or heterodox economics) and its opponent theory neoclassical 
economics (or orthodox economics) but more detailed analysis of the theories in each 
field can be found elsewhere (Cassidy, 2009; Mosco, 2009; Storper & Walker, 1989). 
In the last half of the nineteenth century, several developments cohered around what 
later would be called neoclassical economic theory, which became a dominant paradigm 
in economics and public policy to this day (Mosco, 2009). This theory proposed a 
natural state of equilibrium in the capitalist economic system based on its axioms of 
market rationality, perfect information and market competition on equal opportunities 
(Garnham, 2005; Herscovici, 2005; Storper & Walker, 1989). However, at the turn of 
the century, institutional authors observed the pervasiveness of monopolies and non-
competitive markets, that is, “a world in which the exceptions to the neoclassical world 
appeared to be the rule” (Mosco, 2009, p. 52). Then, institutional economics departed 
from “neoclassical economics by maintaining that the organisational structure of the 
economy, not the market, is the major force in the production, distribution, and 
exchange of goods and services” (Mosco, 2009, p. 52). Opposed to neoclassical 
assumptions, institutional authors saw limited market rationality, unequal access to 
information and disequilibrium as intrinsic characteristics of capitalist economic activity 
(Garnham, 2005; Storper & Walker, 1989).  
In its most basic form, the institutional paradigm replaced the neoclassical emphasis on 
markets as the measure of social worth and the solution to social problems with an 
understanding of the constraints imposed by social custom, social status, and social 
institutions on all behavior, including market behavior. (Mosco, 2009, p. 52) 
Those ideas resonated in the work of political economists of culture and geographical 
industrialisation theorists in the late twentieth century. Such ideas acknowledge the 
mutual constituency between the social and the economic spheres. Over the years 
institutional economics has developed the notion that institutional forms provide the 
codification of basic social relations (Boyer, 2005) that define the main arenas for 
human activity and organisations to operate in (Clegg, Kornberger, & Pitsis, 2011). As 
institutions produce conventionalised accounts and practices they embody governance 
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structures, conferring legitimacy on them and guidance through historical patterns 
which constrain and enable social actions (Scott, 2004). 
Social action is primarily explained by reference to institutional agents {…} whose 
interests are shaped contextually by their formal roles, interactions with other institutional 
agents, and their negotiation with macro level forces. This requires consideration of 
positions of formal authority, control of resources, and available channels of action. 
(Thompson, 2011a, p. 3)  
As the thesis progresses, I use the term institutions to connote self-regulated social 
entities like the New Zealand Film Commission. Institutions and institutional practices 
are self-regulating because deviations from them are economically costly; they risk 
social legitimisation, and they are cognitively challenging (Scott, 2004). Secondly, I use 
institutions to denote processes of institutionalisation; that is, the conventions and 
taken-for-granted-facts that set conditions on people’s actions (Phillips, Lawrence & 
Hardy, 2004). Within the processes of institutionalisation-deinstitutionalisation, 
institutional accounts (such as texts and practices) play a huge part as they create forms 
of regulation that have an important role in legitimising or delegitimising the texts of 
others, either to produce institutional continuity or change (Phillips, Lawrence, & 
Hardy, 2004). At other times, institutions mobilise resources and power “to ensure their 
texts are acknowledged and consumed” (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 648), or to prevent 
others’ texts from being influential. 
It is in this context that I understand my research sources as texts―documents and 
interviews―and the practices and accounts of my interviewees and other influential 
stakeholders. 
To illustrate the existence of institutionalised practices in the film industry, movie 
theatres, DVD retailers and video shops are institutions that frame conventionalised 
habits and establish rules that confer legitimacy to such organisations as outlets of 
commercialisation of films. This legitimacy contributes to their social reproduction and 
creates a tendency to resist change. Take, for example, the slow transition towards the 
online distribution of films around the world, and the assumption that other forms of 
distribution that deviate from the established rules (such as piracy forms) should be 
discredited and conceived of as illegal.  
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Critical Realist Methodology 
Consistent with PEC and GI research, as well as their realist epistemological and 
ontological assumptions, I used a critical realist methodology. This type of methodology 
uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative data by collecting data in natural 
settings as well as contextual data or secondary data as defined below. Critical realism 
employs methods which elicit participants’ “ways of knowing and seeing” such as 
interviews and document analysis (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). As a relatively recent 
methodological perspective ‘critical realism’ deals with relations between various 
elements of social systems in “multidimensional open systems” (McEvoy & Richards, 
2006, p. 70). And although it acknowledges the value of focusing on human perception 
it relates discourses to the underlying social structures that constrain or enable them 
(McEvoy & Richards, 2006).  
Critical realism assumes there is an “objective reality” but our ability to know it is 
imperfect and mediated by our perspective of it. Nonetheless, a critical examination of 
reality is possible (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). In other words, “we can get empirical 
feedback from those aspects of the world that are accessible” (McEvoy & Richards, 
2006, p. 69). For critical realists the value of credibility in best research practice entails 
not only rigorous research but also openness to revision and peer dialogue. Another 
research value is methodological triangulation, that is “using more than one method or 
source of data in the study of social phenomena” (Bryman & Bell, 2003, p. 291). 
Triangulation allows for confirmation to enhance the reliability and validity of findings, 
completeness to reveal different facets and provide various perspectives of examination. 
Similarly it facilitates retroduction which is logic of reasoning where “detail[ed] 
observations provide a platform for making retroductive inferences about causal 
mechanisms that are active in a given situation” (McEvoy & Richards, 2006, p. 72). 
Retroduction “involves moving from the level of observations and lived experience to 
postulate about the underlying structures and mechanisms that account for the 
phenomena involved” (McEvoy & Richards, 2006, p. 71). I argue that triangulation is 
relevant to my study as it allows me to contextualise my interviews as accounts of film 
industry interrelations within broader political, industrial and institutional structures. 
Therefore, critical realist methodology underlies the empirical analysis of my specific 
theories ―PEC and GI― as well as my own research.  
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Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
Type of data, methods, sources and tools  
As part of the integrative framework to examine the interrelations of the film industry in 
New Zealand, I drew on previous examples of studies to conduct a thematic analysis 
based on:  
 a historical-structural analysis of the value chain phases of New Zealand’s film 
industry such as the one conducted by Sánchez Ruiz (2003) analysing 
Hollywood; 
 an institutional analysis of policies, legal frameworks, and organisational 
structures; and  
 an industrial analysis focusing on patterns of labour, industrial, and geographic 
organisation.  
Both, the institutional and industrial analysis of the Wellington film industry are based 
on Scott’s (2000a) and Coe’s (2001) studies of film districts in Paris and Vancouver, 
respectively.  
Although my original research of the Wellington film district mainly used a qualitative 
method involving interviews, I also collected original quantitative data such as my 
count of production and distribution companies. I complemented this original research 
with both qualitative and quantitative secondary data, previously collected by others 
(O’Leary, 2010), such as data from media reports or official statistics.  
My sources of data collection included secondary sources which report or discuss 
empirical evidence (Wysocki, 2007) such as previous academic research. They also 
included primary sources which provide a “first-hand account” or direct evidence 
concerning a topic of investigation (Wysocki, 2007, p. 167), such as official documents 
(reports, policies and legislation); institutional reports; business’ documents (annual 
reports, companies’ websites and business news); artefacts and recordings (movies); and 
demographic and economic indicators found in census, official and consulting statistics 
such as the Screen Industry Survey of Statistics New Zealand.  
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Table 3 An integrative institutional and industrial analysis: Dimensions, data, sources and indicators 
Dimensions Type of data Sources Accountability and indicators 
Institutional 
organisation, 
policies and 
legislations 
QL/QN Official documents, media 
reports, informants’ 
perceptions, academic articles 
and books 
Comparison of self-proclaimed objectives of policies and legislations against 
their intended and non-intended outcomes. See how policies and laws 
interrelate. See how they satisfy the needs of a range of industry players, 
commercial and non-commercial organisations as well as public interests.  
Organisational 
structures 
QL Informants, organisations’ 
self-descriptions, academic 
articles and books 
Types of management structure. Career building. Forms of organisation 
(networks, project-based organisations, companies). 
Market structures QL/QN Official statistics, media 
reports, official documents, 
business reports, consulting 
agencies’ reports 
Sectoral indicators for production, distribution and commercialisation of films. 
Capital concentration or market share, investment figures (and origin), window 
sales. Percentage of domestic and foreign film revenue. Geographical networks 
of distribution. 
Patterns of labour QL/QN Official statistics, media 
reports, legislation, 
informants, academic articles 
and books 
Labour figures, types of labour, labour conditions, employment relations, labour 
specialisation and capability. Contrasting “reality” with normative statements 
from theory, informants and self-proclaimed policy objectives. 
Patterns of industrial 
organisation 
QL/QN Official statistics, media 
reports, legislation, business 
reports, consulting agencies’ 
reports, informants, academic 
articles 
Sectoral analysis (production volume, sectoral growth). The degree of 
articulation and profit sharing among the value chain. Industrial district firms’ 
characteristics (firms’ size, firms’ integration or disintegration). Relations 
among: firms, non-commercial organisations (government departments, film 
schools) and labour (independent contractors, unions and guilds). Relations with 
other industries and districts. 
Patterns of geographic 
organisation 
QL/QN Official statistics, media 
directories, academic articles 
and books 
Firms’ agglomeration, regional specialisation , agglomeration benefits 
(specialised services), urban benefits (infrastructure, creative and cultural 
environments). 
Social implications QL/QN Academic articles and books, 
official statistics, media 
reports, legislation, informants 
Social groups’ demands. Access to consumption (market share). Access to 
distribution channels (TV, DVD, and Internet). Annual theatrical attendance per 
capita. Local production figures.  
Note. Own elaboration.  
 
 
60 
 
My statistical analysis entailed my own systematisation of descriptive statistics. Overall, 
the sources were selected for their capacity to inform about issues such as industrial, 
institutional and historical-structural relations, as outlined in Table 4. The latter shows a 
summary of the type of analysis, data and sources that my selected approaches have 
utilised to conduct their case studies.  
The tool I chose for collecting original qualitative data was semi-structured interviews 
which gave me the flexibility to explore new insights as well as the structure to generate 
standardised data (O’Leary, 2010). The interviews were designed to deliver knowledge 
about the phenomena that my participants and my study were addressing. However, a 
cautious contextualisation and comparison of the accounts of the interviewees was 
undertaken during the analysis to check for reliability. The use of semi-structured 
interviews fits into the nature of my research as theory driven in some aspects, and also 
driven by open lines of inquiry without preconceived theoretical categories for other 
aspects.  
The interview questions were designed to shed light on diverse core issues such as: (a) 
participants’ background to contextualise their responses vis-à-vis their motivation, 
career experience and expertise (e.g., Can you tell me about your background?); (b) 
institutional practices (or participants’ working practices) in order to understand their 
job position and their available channels of action within the institution (e.g. What 
would a typical workday be like for you?); and (c) participants’ normative statements to 
evaluate their perception of the current film industry and their ideal film industry (e.g. 
In a perfect world, what would be the ideal Wellington film industry for you?).  
In addition, specific questions were addressed only to “key personnel” interviewees to 
gather information on institutional functions and relations (e.g. How does your 
organisation fit into the Wellington film industry?). Others were addressed specifically 
to “boundary spanner” interviewees regarding their brokerage and institutional relations 
(e.g. Based on your experience, who do you need to work with outside the 
organisation?) (Please refer to all the questions in Appendix B).  
Gathering the original data occurred in four stages:  
1. An exploratory interview with an expert on the film industry in Wellington who 
helped me to identify institutional players and interview candidates.  
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2. Pilot interviews with five film practitioners, allowed me to test the interview 
questions and analyse the pilot data before proceeding with the two main rounds of 
interviews. As a result I reduced the number of questions to better fit the interview 
timeframe which was 1–1.5 hours. I also took the opportunity to review the data 
obtained and assess them against my study purpose. For example, the pilot experience 
allowed me to identify the five boundary spanner categories and thus select candidates 
for the main rounds of interviews.  
3. The first main round of interviews took place with 12 key personnel—film 
practitioners with specialised insider knowledge within a film organisation—and that is 
detailed below. 
4. Then the second main round of interviews with 13 boundary spanners―intermediary 
roles linking the film organisation with the rest of the film industry―took place and that 
is also detailed below.  
Interview participants 
Recruiting informants required having previous knowledge of film industry players. I 
drew on secondary research and my own mappings of the film industry in Wellington, 
assisted by the aforementioned exploratory interview. Contact details for the candidates 
for participation were searched on media directories as well as through my informal 
connections with industry insiders. This latter process facilitated other contacts. 
Selection rested on a purposive sample―a non-random sample, selected with an a priori 
defined purpose (O’Leary, 2010)―determined by the range of institutions that play 
important roles in the film industry, whether main or marginal, as well as the boundary 
spanner categories (see below). The final sample was selected to attain a certain degree 
of diversity by balancing its member’s composition (e.g., career experience, large and 
small organisations, commercial and non-commercial organisations).  
First round of interviews with key personnel 
This round consisted of 12 interviews with key personnel working in some of the main 
organisations related to the film industry in Wellington. However, to protect 
participants’ confidentiality these organisations are not identified. As shown in Table 4, 
the general job descriptions attest that respondents worked in organisations along the 
three main phases of the value chain―production, distribution and 
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commercialisation―as well as private, public and social organisations―such as service 
companies, government bodies and professional associations. Participants also covered 
the main creative, technical, and administrative areas of film work. 
Table 4 List of key personnel interview participants (includes pilot participants) 
 KEY PERSONNEL 
1 Film producer/film director 
2 Service provider/crew 
3 Exhibitor 
4 Service provider 
5 Film producer  
6 Film director 
7 Public service facilitator 
8 Film director 
9 Training organisation staff/administrative 
10 Exhibitor 
11 Training organisation staff/ writer 
12 Public service facilitator 
13 Exhibitor 
14 Film producer 
 
Note. Own elaboration. 
 
Whilst questions for this round of interviews with key personnel were centred on 
institutional functions and relations, the round of boundary spanner questions focused 
on brokerage. Nonetheless, both key personnel and boundary spanner rounds shared 
entire sections of questions about their personal background and their evaluation of the 
film industry (see Appendix B). 
Boundary spanners’ round of interviews 
I decided that half of my interviewees would be boundary spanners. Those people have 
a “bird’s eye view” of their organisation and the film industry environment which made 
them key in studying the film district’s inter-organisational relations (Friedman & 
Podolny, 1992). Therefore, the boundary spanners’ round consisted of 13 interviews 
with people in managerial positions like producers, gatekeepers, service providers, 
policy advisors and representatives of advocacy groups. These interviews provided 
strategic vision and knowledge of the boundary spanners’ functions, as well as the type 
of relations among different players and institutions (see Appendix B).  
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Table 5 List of boundary spanner interview participants (includes pilot participants) 
 DESCRIPTION TYPE OF 
BOUNDARY 
SPANNER 
1 Film Producer Creative 
2 Film Producer Creative 
3 Film Producer Creative 
4 Funding body Gateway 
5 Public service facilitator Technical 
6 Rights Executive Gateway 
7 Funding body Gateway 
8 Public service advisor Advisory 
9 Service Provider Technical 
10 Exhibitor  Gateway 
11 Distributor Gateway 
12 Broadcaster Gateway 
13 Broadcaster Gateway 
14 Distributor Gateway 
15 Association representative Technical/Advocacy 
16 Association representative Creative/Advocacy 
 
Note. Own elaboration. 
Table 5 presents the list of interviewees according to the basic categories of boundary 
spanners found in the pilot phase. The specifics have been analysed elsewhere in more 
depth than I have space for here (Muñoz Larroa & Jones, 2013). The categorisation 
drew on details produced by Lingo and O’Mahony (2010) which examined the stages of 
the creative-project process. After a preliminary analysis of the data collected through 
the pilot interviews, five different categories of boundary spanners were distinguished: 
creative, gateway, advisory, technical and advocacy (Muñoz Larroa & Jones, 2013). 
The categorisation was based on the final outcome of the boundary spanning processes: 
producing a creative outcome, functioning as a gateway, providing advice, offering a 
technical service and advocating for groups of people (for the boundary spanners’ 
working processes stages please refer to Appendix C). This information was particularly 
useful as it guided me in the process to select interviewees.  
Ethical considerations 
Due to the small size of the industry in Wellington, personal and commercial sensitivity 
were important ethical concerns for this study. Ethics approval for this study was 
obtained from Victoria University after specifying that working positions in film-related 
 
 
64 
 
institutions (especially the boundary spanner roles) rely on trust and reputation. As such, 
they may be especially sensitive to any information that has not been treated with the 
appropriate level of confidentiality. Furthermore, employees’ freedom to express their 
points of view and concerns with regards to the organisational policies and industrial 
politics depended on making sure their identities remained confidential for their own 
protection. In addition, commercial organisations’ concerns about exposure to market 
competition also required caution and confidentiality for both individuals and 
organisations. Therefore, the research kept strict confidentiality which included the non-
disclosure of the participants’ organisational membership and ensuring participants’ 
names were not attached to any comments. Rather the reports were abstract and 
disclosed only in an aggregated way. For example, “a public servant interviewed 
mentioned the importance of {…}” (see Appendix A). 
Thematic analysis of original and secondary data 
When analysing the interview data, I looked for factual information. I contextualised 
“this subjective data by looking at the economic, political, organisational and cultural 
dimensions that shape and refract these experiences” (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011, p. 
7). In order to do so, I examined responses for internal coherence and compared them 
with the data derived from other informants and sources of information (triangulation). 
Particularly, I contrasted them with secondary data which was also systematised and 
analysed using the historical-structural approach in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
All the interviews were recorded and transcribed then examined according to a 
thematic analysis based on categories to code a specific pattern found in the data in 
which I was interested. Such codes can refer to either manifest or implicit content in the 
data. An example of manifest data would be a participant commenting on the 
impossibility of making film profits in New Zealand due to “its small consumer 
market”, coded as “Small market”. However, those same comments could exemplify 
implicit content, or what I consider to be conventionalised beliefs about the constraints 
on achieving sustainable outcomes; these were coded as “Mindsets”. Overall, the codes 
selected were determined by the purpose of my study to identify the interrelations 
relevant to sustainable outcomes: the articulation of the value chain (within a historical-
structural analysis), and interdependencies and externalities (within an industrial and 
institutional analysis). The aim was to systematically analyse the themes addressed in 
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the interviews according to several steps that were drawn from Burnard (1991) and 
Lapan and Quartaroli (2009) and which complement my own research needs. These 
were: 
1. The transcription of the interviews, which enabled me to become familiar with the 
data.  
2. The coding system was enhanced by NVivo 10 software that allowed me to create 66 
codes and sub-codes organised thematically and hierarchically in ‘parent’ and ‘child’ 
folders. The codes were drawn from existing theoretical ideas brought to the data 
(deductive or top-down coding). This type of coding was particularly useful to establish 
general codes or tags to organise the data: for example, “industrial relations”, “labour 
patterns” and “normative evaluations”.  
3. A series of sub-coding categories were also drawn from the raw information 
(inductive coding). This bottom-up coding consisted of my making annotations on the 
transcriptions to describe aspects of the content, recognising recurring ideas and 
compacting them into themes, and systematically regrouping and reviewing a final set 
of themes. This process helped me to organise ideas into coherent codes and, 
eventually, new NVivo nodes. For example, within the code “labour patterns” was the 
subcategory “voluntary work” stemming from the provisional labels suggested by the 
data itself, “free work”, “solidarity”, “unpaid work”.   
4. NVivo software allowed me to open one node (or theme) containing all the 
quotations under that code. This facilitated data analysis immensely. It enabled 
commentary and comparison, searching for patterns and interconnections, linking 
findings to the literature on the topic and drawing preliminary conclusions.  
5. In the final stage, opening NVivo nodes, memos and notes were equally useful for 
writing up thematic sections which presented the research findings, incorporated 
selected interview quotations and enabling further discussion. 
At the same time, a similar and intertwining thematic analysis was used to examine the 
secondary qualitative data (found in documents and academic research) as well as 
quantitative data which had been systematised through descriptive statistics.  
 
 
66 
 
The Critical Assessment  
The thematic analysis of original and secondary data was used to carry out the 
historical-structural, institutional and industrial analyses suggested by my theoretical 
framework. The historical-structural analysis allowed me to examine the outcomes in 
regard to their sociohistoric context which was essential to articulate the totality of the 
findings at that stage (see chapters 4–8). At that point, I had completed a descriptive 
panorama of the interrelations of the Wellington film industry and an explanatory 
account that prepared the ground for a discussion based on a critical assessment of the 
type of power relations they entailed, and their social repercussions.  
A critical assessment entails the “comparisons between research findings and other 
bodies of knowledge as well as with social values” (Mosco, 2009, p. 10). At this stage, I 
focused on sustainability criteria and linked back to the political underpinnings of my 
theoretical perspectives. These conceive of the human agency having the opportunity to 
influence the social reality. My analysis of the film industry in Wellington uncovered 
contradictions affecting the balance of interests of different social sectors. This 
occurred, for example, between the domestic and satellite models of production as well 
as conventionalised ways to “do” and “think” the film industry (for example, the belief 
in the immutability of the current economic arrangements of the film industry). Those 
contradictions and conventionalised mindsets were collated with normative statements 
of the desirability of sustainable outcomes. As a result of this critical analysis I 
pinpointed where transformation is necessary to achieve different paths of ‘doing’ and 
‘thinking’ the film industry. This was based on what my chosen theory, my informants, 
and examples from other regions suggested was necessary for transformation (see 
Chapter 9).  
The Scope of my Findings 
The qualitative nature of my research, together with a moderate sample, its method of 
selection and its low level of representativeness, prevents any form of simple 
generalisation of the findings to a broader population of film industrial districts. 
However, it aims to generalise the theoretical constructs and categorisations developed 
by my general observations. I also looked for dependability, that is, attest that methods 
were systematic. Furthermore, this research sought to learn from Wellington’s example 
and suggest the applicability of the findings to other cases (along with comparisons with 
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existing literature). In other words, this research considers there is the possibility of a 
cautious transferability (O’Leary, 2010) to other film industrial districts and national 
film industries. 
Table 6 Summary of research methodology 
SCIENTIFIC 
PARADIGM 
Philosophical & scientific 
tradition. 
Materialism  
 
PHILOSOPHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Epistemological and 
ontological perspective  
Realist epistemology (a variation of materialism): 
inclusive, constitutive and critical  
Realist ontology: Dialectical processes of structuration 
GENERAL THEORY  Broad explanations about 
socio-economic 
phenomena 
Institutional economics  
SPECIFIC 
THEORIES 
Specific explanations 
about object of study  
Theorisation and Critique: 
Political Economy of Culture 
Geographical Industrialisation Theory 
Mapping: 
The Production of Culture Perspective 
Organisational Studies 
 
METHODOLOGY Framework for research 
design and interpretation 
of findings 
Critical realist methodology: Factual data and source 
triangulation for confirmation, completeness and 
retroduction 
ANALYSIS Framework for thematic 
analysis (focus on what is 
said) 
1. Historical-structural analysis: long-term processes and 
short-term circumstances 
 
2. Industrial analysis: patterns of industrial and geographic 
organization 
 
3. Institutional analysis: patterns of labour and institutional 
organisation 
 
METHODS  Type of data  Qualitative method 
Complemented with quantitative data 
Primary data 
Original research of 
qualitative and to a lesser 
extent quantitative data 
 
Secondary data 
Indirect data collection of 
qualitative and quantitative 
data 
TOOLS Data collection Primary sources: semi-
structured interviews with 
key informants, media, 
official reports, policies, 
legislations, artefacts, 
recordings, business news 
 
Secondary sources 
Previous research 
Note. Own elaboration 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on how I conceptualised and addressed my object of study: the 
interrelations of the film industry or, in more abstract terms, the relations between 
individuals and their social material settings. Accordingly, the materialist philosophical 
paradigm assumes the existence of an objective material world independent of human 
individual existence. In turn, my specific theories are in line with a variation of the 
materialist stance, realism, which suggests epistemological and ontological 
reflections―such as our thinking being guided by abstract ideas as well as 
perceptions―and that reality is made up of many elements that cannot be reduced to 
one essence. In the same way, I consider that relationships within the film industry have 
multiple angles to be studied. Along with these philosophical considerations, 
institutional economics theory and a dialectical understanding of the film industry allow 
me to see the constant human agent-environment interface. For example, I conceptualise 
the film industry as entailing real sets of activities based on conventionalised socio-
economic relations and practices that, although socially developed, become fixed 
structures as society establishes institutions. Consequently, social action occurs within 
the constraints and opportunities provided by social structures.  
Within that philosophical and theoretical framework, my specific theories, PEC and GI, 
have developed historical-structural, industrial and institutional analyses of the film 
industry which, in turn, have guided my thematic analysis of film industry relations for 
this thesis. My empirical research was based on a critical realist methodology as it 
suggests triangulation, that is, the use of different sources and data to reveal several 
facets of the object of study as well as providing reliability of findings. Therefore, I 
have discussed the strategic advantages of conducting semi-structured interviews with 
key personnel and boundary spanners as a data collection tool, as well as its 
triangulation with other sources of information (see Table 6). In addition, critical 
realism proposes retroduction, logic of reasoning where observations provide the 
ground to make inferences about underling structures and mechanisms shaping the 
phenomena involved. Those methodological properties fit my intentions to study film 
industry relations―a form of social action―within wider socio-economic structures. 
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All these considerations allowed me to identify the social dynamics, players, levels of 
analysis, dimensions and relations underlying my topic. In the next chapters, I will put 
such considerations into practice to present the findings of my research. 
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Chapter 4  
New Zealand’s Standing in the International Film Industry 
The research question that this chapter addresses is: What are the international relations 
shaping opportunities of the New Zealand film industry with respect to achieving self-
sustainable outcomes? In order to answer it, this chapter explores three main areas in 
which the international context influences the film industry in New Zealand: 
international trade regimes, the new international division of labour in the film industry, 
and independent transnationalism. Each section purposes to open discussion about the 
potential implications of those arrangements for a sustainable film industry in 
Wellington. 
The recent growth in film production revenue in Wellington has been heavily influenced 
by the international landscape. However, according to some media and academic 
criticism (Conor, 2004; Jones & Smith, 2005; Rothwell, 2010) the rise of satellite 
productions hosted in Wellington as well as its specialisation in post-production 
activities have been overestimated by other media and government accounts in terms of 
its potential to develop a New Zealand film industry. The difficulty the Wellington film 
industry faces in establishing a sustainable domestic industrial complex raises questions 
about the convenience of satellite production as a model of development. Studying the 
international context of the film industry will provide a more realistic account of the 
Wellington film industry’s position in the world and the conditions that hinder or enable 
the accomplishment of its sustainability than the celebratory statements provided by 
media and government. This chapter also informs following chapters on the relations 
between the satellite, domestic and independent transnational film industries based in 
Wellington.  
Using the theoretical approaches of political economy of culture (PEC) and 
geographical industrialisation (GI), this chapter gathers evidence of the socio-economic, 
political, cultural and technological dimensions influencing international arrangements 
in the film industry. When appropriate, the New Zealand case will be compared with 
other production centres, mainly in the Asia-Pacific region. The information presented 
here is not only a background but a discussion of the determinant forces that enable and 
limit the development of sustainability in Wellington, as it will be addressed in Chapters 
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7‒9. This chapter draws on empirical data from primary sources such as industry 
statistics (economic census and business surveys), media releases, news, business 
reports, and policy documents. It also draws on secondary sources like journal articles, 
books, and media reports. The analysis of these data entailed elaborating comparative 
systematisations of statistics, facts and qualitative information as well as establishing 
links with the theory presented in Chapter 2. 
The International Film Industry 
The film industry in New Zealand is embedded in a regional and international context. 
Policy regulations and market environments shape the flow of films, audio-visual 
products, services, financial resources, and film and creative workers in and out of the 
country. Like many other local film industries around the world, New Zealand’s is 
linked in one way or another to Hollywood’s global supremacy, firstly in the market 
place and, secondly, in the production sphere (Scott, 2005). In this chapter, I argue that 
the New Zealand film industry relates in three important ways to the international 
context: 
1. In the second half of the twentieth century, Hollywood targeted the world as its 
consumer market for films. It built extensive channels of distribution through aggressive 
policies on the market front aided by its oligopolistic concentration and the United 
States Department of Commerce (Aksoy and Robins, 1992; Scott, 2005). Since the 
1990s this tendency towards transnational trade has grown as many more countries join 
international free trade agreements led by United States lobby. 
2. Since the 1990s, satellite productions―the allocation of specialised tasks along the 
film industry value chain to different regions―from Hollywood increased significantly. 
In the 2000s, this became a global trend4 (Goldsmith & O’Regan, 2005) as the number 
of runaway productions from Hollywood rose in what Christopherson (2006) called a 
new international division of labour. In this new arrangement, large transnational 
conglomerates established networks of productive alliances and joint ventures to 
capitalise on other regions’ state subsidies, lower costs, as well as make use of the 
competitive advantages of diverse clusters of talent, or specific market niches (Hess & 
                                                 
4 Hollywood majors have always resorted to other locations outside California to shoot films (Klein, 
2004; Scott & Pope, 2007).  
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Ezra, 2006). The domination of power relations by the major Hollywood studios can be 
seen at the financial, distribution, and lobbying levels.  
3. In addition, cooperative relations have developed among different countries. This 
independent transnationalism is evident in partnerships for co-productions and 
organisation of film markets, where small or independent local companies are integrated 
into global circuits of cooperation or dissemination (Hess & Ezra, 2006). This 
collaboration also targets innovation, know-how, and regional grants. Independent 
transnationalism contrasts with the tendencies mentioned previously, which are mainly 
based on corporatist transnationalism where Hollywood is a big player.  
According to researchers, the three trends mentioned above are only part of more 
complex phenomena: the flexible specialisation of economic production (Scott, 2005) 
and the internationalisation and transnationalisation of contemporary capitalism 
(Rosenberg, 2005). In the matter of trade, cultural industries have been regarded as 
pioneers in the processes of internationalisation (Bustamante, 2003). The economic 
characteristics of audio-visual products―such as low distribution costs and their quality 
as semi-public goods―exacerbated mass production and market expansion in the form 
of audio-visual exports (Bustamante, 2003). Mass production was historically captured 
by consolidated producers from countries with large markets and earlier capitalist 
environments. The expansion of Hollywood’s film industry in the first half of the 
twentieth century is a good example of this first-mover lead. However, it was not until 
the neoliberal policies and technological changes of the 1980s that international trade in 
cultural industries grew exponentially as countries opened their borders to cultural 
products (Arizpe & Guiomar, 2001; Galperin, 1998). 
Likewise, Hollywood’s major studios expanded satellite production and subsidiaries 
around the globe. According to PEC they represent vertical and horizontal integration 
strategies to gain economies of scale, minimize risk, maximise profit and expand 
markets, which are the natural tendencies of capitalism (Aksoy & Robins, 1992; 
Christopherson, 2006; Conor, 2004). GI authors also argued that satellite productions 
were part of a new production paradigm of flexible specialisation that had generated a 
partial dispersal of Hollywood’s power (Conor, 2004). Flexible specialisation was 
characterised by economies of scope or variety goods through the use of specialised 
technology and service providers as well as a skilled labour force that could quickly 
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adjust to change (Hirst & Zeitlin, 1997). As a consequence, GI authors observed the 
disintegration and de-concentration of the activities of the major companies in favour of 
local companies, local service providers, and overseas destinations (Conor, 2004).  
The dialogue between PEC and GI has given way to a nuanced approach that sees the 
coexistence of power relations of both subordination and collaboration between 
Hollywood majors and other film industries in actual film districts. As Markusen (1996, 
p. 296) defines it, the “satellite district” is “an assemblage of unconnected branch plants 
embedded in external organisation links.” Following Coe’s research (2001), I use the 
satellite district as an appropriate construct to theorise the regions hosting Hollywood 
runaway productions. However, this type of district can also coexist with others which 
are embedded more locally like the “state-anchored” district which is focused “on one 
or more public-sector institutions” (Markusen, 1996, p. 296). As a later discussion, New 
Zealand and the majority of the countries mentioned here are characterised by the state 
providing governance to their film districts.  
Through examining corporate concentration and flexible specialisation, PEC and GI 
have succeeded explaining a changing balance of power in the world’s audio-visual 
trade and the new international division of labour in the film industry. The next sections 
will provide an overview of the sociopolitical and economic factors underlying those 
transformations. It will set the backdrop for the thesis to study the film industry in 
Wellington as an example that captures the complexity of the international and local 
variables at stake in the contemporary film industry. 
New Zealand in International Trade Regimes 
The audio-visual sector’s free trade imbalances 
By the end of the twentieth century, a series of historical factors had allowed the US to 
control 75% of the international trade of cultural products (Galperin, 1998). In 2008, the 
US had a surplus in its audio-visual trade balance of $US 11.7 billion due to its 
significant exports and low amount of imports (UNCTAD, 2010). Therefore, removing 
trade tariffs internationally represented a priority to maintain and expand economic 
benefits rather than to pose a threat to US cultural industries (Galperin, 1998).  
The main international mechanism used by the US to promote trade was the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
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Although GATT excluded service sectors, the film industry was included but was 
subject to domestic quotas. In 1979, during the Tokyo Round, the US attempted 
unsuccessfully to incorporate services into free trade commitments. However, it 
succeeded in the Uruguay Round of 1994 which considered services as subject to 
liberalisation in the General Agreement on Trade in Services, known as GATS (Arizpe 
& Guiomar, 2001). This implied the following trade principles: (a) market access, which 
involved, removing tariffs and quotas, as well as eliminating restrictions to businesses 
of member states regarding employment, organisational structures, property or 
investment; (b) national treatment for businesses of foreign member countries; (c) the 
principle of the “most favoured nation” was introduced by which members agreed to 
make previous bilateral commitments multilateral (Acheson & Maule, 1994). In 
addition, the Agreement on Trade and Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) was set to enforce and resolve intellectual property disputes through WTO 
proceedings and sanctions (Freedman, 2003). 
These changes were accompanied by debates about the propriety of treating cultural 
industries as any other good or service in international free trade forums. One side of the 
debate was represented by the Canadians and Europeans who stood for the so-called 
“cultural exemption.” The position had a demarcation value which considered that 
leaving cultural products to the free market―already dominated by the US―would 
reduce cultural diversity. According to this view, public policies were needed to balance 
market failure through subsidies, funds, tax breaks, and positive discrimination―or 
quotas to foster local products (Frau-Meigs, 2006). The other side of the debate 
consisted of free trade advocates like the US and Japan. They considered cultural 
industries as entertainment goods and proposed that the free flow of information created 
cultural pluralism while protectionism restricted competition, wasted public resources, 
and limited freedom of expression and consumption (Frau-Meigs, 2006).  
It was in this context that New Zealand’s GATS negotiations on its audio-visual services 
took place from the late 1980s to 1994. A Historical Note of the Ministry of Commerce, 
recounts the highlights of the negotiations (Kelsey, 2003). In 1991, the document 
reported pressure from Canada and the European Commission to exempt New Zealand 
cultural products. However, “New Zealand joined the US in opposing these proposals” 
(Kelsey, 2003, p. 5). 
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The first drafts from New Zealand trade officials offered modest commitments (Kelsey, 
2003): broadcasting quotas were to be allowed, foreign ownership of broadcasting 
would be limited to 15% and there would be protection for employment for New 
Zealanders in granting foreign workers’ visas. In exchange, officials offered fewer 
subsidies for the production, distribution, exhibition and broadcasting to New 
Zealanders and local businesses. However, the new drafts by the Ministry of Commerce, 
removed the limitations for quotas and ownership and made only a reference to granting 
working visas with special procedures (Kelsey, 2003). The new version was eventually 
signed by the National-led government in 1993. In the memorandum, New Zealand 
reserved the right to allocate funding for Māori TV programming and to support the 
film industry via the New Zealand Film Commission. Officials commented that the 
commitment would 
preclude certain policy options such as the introduction of compulsory local content 
requirements. Should we pursue a more restrictive approach in these areas, we would be 
breaking our GATS obligations and would be exposed to dispute settlement procedures – 
and possibly the requirement to offer compensatory benefits in other areas {…} Once 
engrossed, they will become binding legal commitments at international law. They will 
effectively lock in the present state of openness of these service sectors (as cited in 
Kelsey, 2012, p. 6). 
In other words, New Zealand’s GATS commitments limited the possibility of 
significantly changing the existing subsidy schemes or to establish local content quotas 
in the audio-visual sector in the future. New Zealand had never had local film quotas 
except for the British and Commonwealth film quotas which were in place from the 
1930s until 1976 (see Chapter 5). New Zealand had never had local television quotas 
either. However, a couple of years after signing the GATS, New Zealand did find a 
loophole to access Australian film and television content quotas through the bilateral 
trade agreement with Australia (Lealand, 2006, p. 227; NZPA, 2000). 
The Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement between Australia and New Zealand 
(1983) included the Protocol on Trade in Services (1988) which liberalised 
telecommunications in 1995 (Australian High Commission, 2014). In the same spirit of 
free trade, Project Blue Sky was formed in 1993 as a public-private screen sector 
initiative in New Zealand to create a common market in the trans-Tasman region. The 
project aimed “’to develop and maintain a strong, viable and stable domestic base of 
production’ and ‘increase the amount of foreign exchange being invested and earned by 
the industry’” (Project Blue Sky, as cited in Lealand, 1996, p. 224). Blue Sky advocates 
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lobbied for a redraft in Australian legislation to include New Zealand TV programmes 
as local content to comply with CER. One of the arguments was the disparity between 
Australian-New Zealand audio-visual trade relations at the time, where New Zealand 
imported the majority of products (Lealand, 1996). 
In 1998, the High Court in Australia “ruled that Australia's international treaty 
obligations {…} [overrode] the ABAs [Australian Broadcasting Authority’s] domestic 
rules for Australian commercial television” and, therefore, New Zealand television 
programmes should be included in the 55% of local content quotas (Australian Film 
Commission, 1998; Kaufman, 1998). The decision was opposed by Project True Blue 
representing Australian television and film industry practitioners (Australian Film 
Commission, 1998). The opposition feared that because acquiring programmes is less 
costly than making them, TV “networks would eventually find the cost savings 
irresistible” and rather buy New Zealand-made programmes (Martin, 1998). 
Furthermore, they feared that Hollywood would “cash in on it” with programmes shot in 
New Zealand like Xena: Warrior Princess or Hercules: The Legendary Journeys 
(Martin, 1998).  
The audio-visual sector’s lock-in on free trade 
The previous events illustrate New Zealand’s available channels of action in 
international regulatory frameworks at a macro level. In other words, free trade 
regulation influences the possible scenarios for: (a) film policymaking, for example, 
with regards to major modifications to subsidies, tariffs or quotas along the value chain 
phases of screen production, distribution and consumption; and (b) economic 
development as it also restrains New Zealand’s control of transnational dynamics in 
every phase of the value chain. 
Particularly free trade opens the domestic sector to unrestricted competition from 
foreign products and services, to which New Zealand audiences are already captive (see 
Chapter 5). As a consequence free trade regimes created a favourable framework for 
foreign companies in film distribution, exhibition and broadcasting sectors. Such 
companies benefit from the lack of a capital gains tax, limitations on the repatriation of 
profits, and the absence of constraints on the operation of companies totally under 
foreign ownership (Huffer, 2012). Consequently, to this point, the  earnings of 
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transnational companies from film distribution and exhibition are transferred to the 
overseas headquarters of those companies (Huffer, 2012).  
In New Zealand, free trade rules engendered restrictions on broadcasting policies. I 
incorporate such events in this discussion as the broadcasting context has indirectly 
influenced the film industry with regards to limiting synergies at the level of screen 
production companies (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, television affairs set a precedent 
for potentially equivalent initiatives in the film industry.  
After signing the GATS, subsequent New Zealand governments attempted to get advice 
about the possibility of establishing local quotas. In 1998, the Ministry of Commerce 
provided legal advice to the National government that stated “compulsory local content 
quotas would clearly breach New Zealand’s GATS commitments” (Kelsey, 2003, p. 7). 
As a result of this ruling, a study conducted by New Zealand On Air (NZOA) in 1999, 
found that, compared to other developed nations, New Zealand had the lowest local 
content on television, only 24 %. By contrast, Ireland had 41 %, Australia 55%, Britain 
78 %, and the US 90 % (Perry, 1999). 
In 1999, the Labour Party’s prime ministerial candidate, Helen Clark, promised to 
establish local broadcasting quotas. Once in power, her Broadcasting Minister, Marian 
Hobbs, acknowledged the free trade obligations but expressed that New Zealand culture 
was “more important than the agreements” (NZPA, 2000) and stated her intention to 
take legislative action to establish the quotas (NZH, 2003). This decision however, 
encountered inter-ministerial scepticism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
noted that modification or withdrawal of GATS commitments would risk international 
sanctions (Bingham, 2000). The Minister of Culture and Heritage observed that because 
of CER, Australian programmes would have to be allowed in under any quota system in 
New Zealand (NZPA, 2000). Furthermore, the initiative faced industrial opposition:  
commercial broadcasters TV3, Prime and Sky Television formed a coalition in mid-2000 
to fight the introduction of any compulsory quota, primarily attacking a quota model put 
up by the Screen Production and Development Association, the flag-bearer for 
independent producers (NZH, 2003). 
According to Kelsey (2003), the New Zealand government had options available, such 
as: “(i) to implement the quotas and see whether any WTO member lodged a complaint 
or (ii) seek to modify or withdraw the relevant commitments under GATS and address 
any objections” (Kelsey, 2003, p. 9). The government would need to compensate by 
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further liberalisation in other sectors, “something that other exporters and certainly the 
country’s farmers would object to” (Kelsey, 2003, p. 9). Kelsey also identified the US, 
Canada and Australia as the origin of the majority of foreign audio-visual companies in 
New Zealand and, therefore, the most likely to raise a complaint if dissatisfied with the 
compensation. Nonetheless, they would be required to prove ‘tangible losses’ of their 
firms to justify the costs of bringing the dispute. Even in that case, Kelsey considered 
that “the risk of significant sanctions being authorised seem[ed] minimal” (Kelsey, 
2012, p. 9). Furthermore, Kelsey argued that opposition from the Australian public 
towards treating New Zealand content as local would favour the renegotiation of 
cultural services in the agreements. 
In 2003, Helen Clark reconsidered her position and conceded that concerns around 
GATS were valid. Instead, as a solution, the government promoted voluntary quotas 
with broadcasters and main players―TVNZ, TV3, SPADA and NZOA (Kelsey, 2012, p. 
8). The Television Local Content group set their objectives for local content in 2003: 
TV1 53%, TV2 17 % and TV3 20% (Kelsey, 2003, p. 8; NZPA, 2003). By 2012, the 
targets had remained similar and local content accounted for a total of 32% across the 
six free to air channels (NZOA, 2012). According to Kelsey, despite the liberalisation, 
the New Zealand government had available channels of action “it just does not have the 
political will to use them” (Kelsey, 2003, p. 9). Moreover, I argue that free trade became 
institutionalised and the government considered the political and economic costs 
involved in changing the regulation were too high to justify the changes.  
Free trade regulation and sustainability 
In this section, I discuss how the free trade regulations presented above might limit or 
enable the development of sustainable outcomes for the film industry. Over the years, 
New Zealand’s lock-in on international free trade regulations has made it difficult to 
control transnational forces or to even consider the possibility of doing so. For example, 
the entry of vast quantities of foreign audio-visual products have dominated the 
commercialisation slots over the years and have developed local captive audiences. 
Foreign audio-visual products comprise 68% on free-to-air television programming and 
97% of films released to theatres for 2012. As a result, local audiences are hitched up to 
foreign audio-visual value chains. This has a major impact on the commercialisation 
phase of the local products’ value chain, as they are unable to compete with foreign 
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ones (see Chapter 5). Despite the existence of other reasons underlying the lack of 
competitiveness, as the previous figures show, the availability argument is a compelling 
one. New Zealand is characterised by a deficit in its trade of creative goods. For 
instance, in 2008 New Zealand exported $NZ275 million while importing $NZ1.2 
billion in creative goods5 (UNCTAD, 2010).  
Another consequence of the unrestricted transnational forces is the repatriation of film 
industry distribution, exhibition and broadcasting companies’ earnings. The outflow of 
capital overseas hinders the financial capacity of the local screen industry and its ability 
to reinvest locally. In other words, macro-level regulatory forces impact on structural 
issues over the value chain affecting the long-term viability of the local film industry. 
As I argue in this thesis, those regulations influence criteria related to sustainability such 
as limiting financial capacity, mobilisation of local creative sources, audience 
development for local products and access to production by diverse local groups. 
Having said that, according to research there are other options to optimise the current 
arrangements, such as creating competitive advantages based on product differentiation 
and economies of scope to avoid direct competition with foreign products (Scott, 2005). 
Nevertheless, achievements in this area would not succeed without the capacity to 
distribute and promote products on a wider scale (Scott, 2005). Therefore there is a need 
to think of structural measures (see Chapter 2).  
New Zealand and the New International Division of Labour in the Film 
Industry 
Hollywood’s new demand and digital technologies 
Another main area of influence in which the international context shapes the film 
industry in New Zealand is the expansion of satellite film production and post-
production activities, especially from Hollywood. In this section, I outline the 
international environment in which New Zealand must compete to attract satellite 
production and post-production (which includes digital animation and visual effects 
[VFX]) which are being decentralised from Los Angeles.  
                                                 
5 Creative goods include arts and crafts, audio-visuals, design, new media, performing arts, publishing 
and visual arts. 
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Hollywood satellite production centres have been extensively examined in recent years 
(Coe, 2001; Goldsmith & O’Regan, 2005; Scott & Pope, 2007). Although the 
Hollywood majors resorted to other locations outside California to shoot films 
throughout the twentieth century, in the 1990s runaway productions became structural 
within Hollywood production (Klein, 2004; Scott & Pope, 2007). The reasons for this 
were varied, from Hollywood’s need for locations with different landscapes and 
weather, to cheaper costs of production (Christopherson, 2006; Klein, 2004).  
The United Kingdom, for example, has historically attracted Hollywood satellite 
productions based on its reputational advantages of creative status, access to markets, 
and Hollywood’s familiarity with London’s production and post-production facilities 
and crew. Another example is Prague in the Czech Republic which became an attractor 
of runaway productions in the 1990s based on its architectural styles, substantial 
infrastructure and cost-effective, non-unionised labour pools. By that time, Canada 
challenged the UK as a principal location for Hollywood runaway productions as a 
result of geographical proximity, government subsidies, and building studios. Similar 
government strategies were used by Australian states. However, all these places have 
experienced cyclical periods of foreign investment (Goldsmith & O’Regan, 2005). As 
Aksoy and Robins observed, satellite production complexes might have “a precarious 
existence” (1992, p. 19). 
Yet, I argue there is a new variation of that trend. Nowadays, super-productions and 
franchise films like The Lord of the Rings (Jackson, 2001, 2002, 2003), Avatar 
(Cameron, 2009) or Iron Man (Black, 2013),  are examples of the current tendency of 
taking not only production but post-production activities to many regions in the world 
including New Zealand and other competitor countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Such 
films characterise the “New Hollywood” era in which “size matters”: major studios are 
owned by gigantic media conglomerates and they produce “event” movies that become 
“digital attractions” to capture bigger audiences (Gurevitch, 2010; King, 2002).  
Scott and Pope (2007) anticipated that changes in technology and communications as 
well as the specialisation of film workers in other regions would eventually eliminate 
the constraints to decentralising post-production activities from Los Angeles. Countries 
like New Zealand, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia are in one way or 
another technology-oriented industrialised or service economies which made it easier 
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for them to engage in labour-intensive film digital post-production opened up by New 
Hollywood’s needs. For example, a film location office manager declared: “New 
Zealand has become the home of the blockbuster movie” (Film New Zealand, 2012). In 
fact, the domestic or satellite film industries in some Asia-Pacific countries have 
deliberately focused on developing VFX-driven blockbusters in an attempt to 
“globalise” their contents (Kong, 2000; Pang, 2009; Yecies, Goldsmith, & Shim, 2011).  
Although 3D animation and computer graphics were used since the 1990s, it was only 
around the mid-2000s that digital technologies allowed digital film production on a 
larger scale outside the US (Yecies et al., 2011, p. 137). In the ongoing digital 
revolution, technologies have dramatically increased the capacity to transform, store and 
communicate information (Hilbert & López, 2011). These advantages propelled the 
decentralisation and transnationalisation of film production, and especially, film post-
production. First, the enhanced computational capacities provided the possibility to 
manipulate images through design; for instance, VFX through animation and computer 
graphics. Secondly, compression files facilitated the storage and transferring of audio, 
images and video files “over global broadband networks” (Yecies et al., 2011, p. 137). 
Finally, improved telecommunication systems leveraged the transmission of information 
to overcome distances and in turn resulted in the development of more flexible 
workflow processes (Hilbert & López, 2011, p. 61).  
In other words, digital changes have made it possible to produce VFX in multiple 
locations and regions as they  “increased the opportunities for film-makers to work with 
foreign investors, partners and service companies” (Yecies et al., 2011, p. 137). This has 
suited Hollywood whose movies release patterns have specific dates on a global scale. 
Since slots in theatres are booked in advance there are strict deadlines to comply with. 
Digital technology facilitates the work of hundreds of VFX workers around the world at 
the same time enabling them to deliver on specific dates. In addition, local business in 
the Asia-Pacific region gained access to the industry because of the radical drop in 
production costs which included more affordable digital cameras, editing suites, or VFX 
software (Yecies et al., 2011). The cost decline has also enabled mature companies to 
relocate or outsource work to other regions to save on labour costs and props from art 
departments. 
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Rise in production and post-production in New Zealand and the AP region  
The recent growth of film production revenue in the Wellington region is driven by 
post-production activities, particularly, digital animation and VFX which doubled 
$NZ362 million during the period 2007-2009 (SNZ, 2010a). New Zealand is not an 
isolated case: in the last couple of decades the Asia-Pacific region has experienced a 
similar increase of satellite production and post-production service work. Although the 
US, Canada, and the UK have the largest number of VFX companies (Squires, 2012), 
post-production and “shooting in Asia have usually had more to do with tapping into 
growth markets and low costs” (Noh, 2008). As discussed below, the region provides a 
series of policy strategies based on cost-effective economic factors.  
The Creative Industries policy  
There are political factors making the Asia-Pacific region attractive to Hollywood 
outsourcing production and post-production activities. For example, in New Zealand 
these activities have benefited from the appropriate environment where the creative 
industries have achieved a special place in policy agendas. This is similar to what 
happens in other countries around the world―including Asia (Cunningham, 2009). 
The creative industries, as a mainstream political construct, consolidated in the UK in 
the late 1990s (Garnham, 2005). Eventually, it passed from having a marginal position 
within the affairs of the ministries and departments of culture, to become part of core 
economic strategies for many governments. From then on, the creative or cultural 
industries were regarded for their potential to generate economic growth in the form of 
job creation, revenue and trade (UNCTAD, 2010).  
To better understand the place of New Zealand in Asia-Pacific, where many of its 
competitors and collaborators are located, it is important to make some distinctions. 
Asia-Pacific countries mentioned here can be gathered into three different groups.  
1. Developed nations like Australia and New Zealand which transferred the creative 
industries policy from the UK experience around 2000‒2004 (Cunningham, 2009; 
Prince, 2010; Volkerling, 2001).  
2. The cities of newly industrialized economies (NIE’s) like Hong Kong, Seoul and 
Singapore which introduced cultural industries policy since the 1990s aspiring to 
achieve “world city” status (Kong, Gibson, Khoo, & Semple, 2006, p. 174). But it was 
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not until 1999 that the term “creative industries” appeared to be crucial to the economy 
for South Korea; and similarly, in the year 2000 for Hong Kong and Singapore (Kong, 
2000; Kong et al., 2006).  
3. Finally, China, the prime example of developing countries in the region, explicitly 
incorporated the concept of cultural industries in 2009 as a key element of the national 
economy. This strategy was built upon previous plans to industrialise cultural and 
creative practices after China’s incorporation to the WTO in 2001 (Keane, 2013).  
Creative industries policy was not adopted in all these regions in identical ways. On the 
contrary, the adoption process presented “different nuances and areas of emphasis” 
(Kong et al., 2006, p. 178). However, such policies generally centre in the 
industrialisation of culture and creativity as key to local economic development. In this 
process, research has described the dominance of economic over cultural aspects 
(Garnham, 2005; Kong, 2000; Lee, 2004). The economic imperative has driven creative 
industries policies to focus on foreign investment strategies, tourism, and branding, 
especially in relation to film (Garnham, 2005; Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005; Kong, 
2000). For example, official documents in New Zealand are constantly justifying 
subsidies to international productions coming to the country as they will increase 
“tourism from the use of New Zealand locations in large budget productions” (MED, 
2009b, p. 3).  
Low-road regional competition  
In order to compete for Hollywood or other international outsourcing, New Zealand and 
most of the Asia-Pacific countries mentioned here have established low-road (Jeffcutt & 
Pratt, 2002), cost-effective strategies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to their 
film industries (see Table 7). 
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Table 7 Chart of financial and tax incentives available for foreign productions in some Asia-Pacific countries and regions 
NEW ZEALAND AUSTRALIA CHINA HONG KONG SINGAPORE SOUTH 
KOREA 
Large Budget Screen 
Production Grant 
(LBSPG) (2003, reviewed 
2013) Income tax refund: 
20-25 % off 
Post, Digital and Visual 
Effects Grant (PDVG) 
(2007) 
-Post-production, digital 
and visual effects 
(same criteria as for the 
LBSPG) 
Screen Production 
Incentive Fund (SPIF) 
(2008) 
Funding grant for projects 
with significant NZ 
content. 
-40 % off 
Division 10BA and 10B 
(1999) replaced by 
Producer Offset 
(2006). 
Refundable tax offset: 
-40% of a Qualifying 
Australian Production 
Expenditure (QAPE) for 
feature films and 20% 
for others 
Location Offset (2001, 
reviewed 2006) 
For producers of large 
budget films to locate in 
Australia 
-15%  off 
PDV Offset 
-Post-production 
-15 % refund 
 
No specific tax laws governing the film 
industry. General tax provisions apply. 
 
Joint Productions, 
Foreign and Chinese investors fund a 
production and share rewards and risks. 
The film might be distributed and 
exhibited in China. 
 
Assisted and contracted co-
productions with a foreign investor 
providing the capital and the Chinese 
participant to assist with equipment, 
labour and services or a Chinese 
contactor to perform certain tasks. The 
foreign investor solely enjoys the 
rewards and compensates the Chinese 
party for undertaking the production. 
The films cannot be distributed or 
exhibited in China. 
No specific tax 
laws governing the 
film industry. 
General tax 
provisions apply. 
 
Film Development 
Fund (FDF) (1999 
revised 2007) 
-35% off 
 
 
 
Film in Singapore 
Scheme (2004) 
-50% off 
New Feature Film 
Fund (NFFF) 
-Supports emerging 
directors (citizens or 
residents) in 
collaboration with a 
production company 
with minimum 30% of 
local shareholding 
 
Seoul Location 
Incentive 
Program. 
Production Cost-
Support (2007, 
reviewed 2012) 
-25% off 
Location 
Scouting-Support 
(2007, reviewed 
2012) 
-Round-trip airline 
tickets for 2 people 
and 
accommodation in 
Seoul for foreign 
producers and staff 
 
 
 
Note. Hong Kong Film Development Council (2013); KPMG (2009); Seoul Film Commission (2007) 
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Tax and financial incentives in the film industry are part of the policies governing the 
creative industries but they have also been a consistent step in terms of the economic 
policies of some Asia-Pacific countries. In New Zealand, for example, economic 
development policies have “relied heavily on foreign direct investment” (Scott-Kennel, 
2004, p. 41) accounting for 49% of the GDP in 2002. Singapore and Hong Kong are 
similar examples with FDI comprising 30% of their GDP (Stiglitz &Charlton, 2005). It 
is not surprising that New Zealand, Singapore, and Hong Kong film industries have also 
been characterised by their attraction of FDI as can be seen in Table 7 (Conor, 2004; 
Kong, 2000; Pang, 2009).  
A diverging example is South Korea’s industrial model which has focused on “large 
domestic corporate conglomerates and actively restricted flows of foreign direct 
investment” which amounts to only 5% of its GDP (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005, p. 15). 
Accordingly, Korea’s film industry has not relied much on FDI, but its film production 
has consolidated domestic sources of funding and domestic markets as well as having 
an export sector. In China FDI accounted for 2.5 % of its GDP in 2010 and it has 
restricted foreign investment in production and distribution of films (祁澍文, 2010). 
However, in 2003 a provision was made whereby “a foreign investor may incorporate a 
film production company in the form of equity joint venture or cooperative joint venture 
with state-owned film studios in China” (KPMG, 2009, p. 117). 
Another form of regional competition is having favourable currency rates. This is key to 
satellite productions that are driven by a desire to maximise revenue. One way to look at 
the volatile influence of currency rates is to observe their history and compare them 
with the amount of satellite production in particular regions. Figure 7 shows the 
currency fluctuations of Canadian and Australian dollars whose upward trends 
coincided with decreasing satellite investment. Canada as a host region for Hollywood 
films was receiving “more than 80 per cent of all runaways in the late 1990s” (Klein, 
2004). However, when the Canadian dollar became stronger against the US dollar, 
satellite production declined and forced the establishment of more local incentives since 
it had to compete more and more with regions like Czech Republic, South Africa and 
New Zealand (CEIDR, 2006; CHAC, 2005; Klein, 2004). Likewise, in Australia: “{…} 
the damage done to the local industry by the robust [Australian] dollar {…} shows 
[that] an average of just $2 million a year was spent by foreign productions in the first 
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two years of this decade [2010s], compared with an average of $137 million a year in 
the previous decade [2000s]” (Quinn, 2013). 
Figure 7 Comparison of Canadian-US currency rate with other countries’, 1995-2012 
 
Note. Onda (2013). 
Another form of competition that attracts FDI in the form of satellite productions is 
labour costs. With the exception of New Zealand and Australia, minimum wages in the 
Asia-Pacific countries were below the $US7 minimum wage in the US during 2012-
2013 (see Table 8). Comparison of the medians of salaries in some film occupations by 
country show the wage gap differential. In jobs like Computer Graphics and 3D 
Animation, Film Editors, Production Managers and Set Designers, US film workers 
earn from $10 to $15 thousand dollars per annum more than their counterparts in other 
Asia-Pacific countries, except for Australia (see Table 9). In China, “companies such as 
Base FX [are] offering their services for sometimes a third of their U.S. counterparts, 
[and consequently] more American studios are outsourcing post-production work to 
China” (Jaffe, 2012). 
Labour relations and working conditions are also factors influencing film costs in the 
region. Film requires large numbers of workers and long working hours are considered 
necessary, which increases costs. Some producers’ cost-effective strategies have led to 
reducing the quality of working conditions and avoiding overtime compensation. New 
Zealand attracts FDI by advertising a non-unionised film industry (Jones & Pringle, 
2013), and its 2010 legislation defines the status of independent contractors and 
precludes them from engaging in collective bargaining agreements (McAndrew & 
0
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Risak, 2012). Similarly, there are no unions in China (Jaffe, 2012). In South Korea, the 
story is quite the opposite. In 2013, the Federation of Korean Movie Workers’ Union, 
after years of unstable employment status, achieved an agreement in which 
all production companies should adopt a standardised contract guaranteeing better income 
as well as subscription to the national pension, national health insurance, unemployment 
insurance and industrial accident compensation insurance for film crews {…} Companies 
that do not abide by the guidelines will be banned from releasing their films and will be 
excluded from government investment, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism said 
{…}. (Ji-Sook, 2013) 
Yet digital media workers, like animation and VFX professionals, are not unionised 
anywhere around the globe (Middleton, 2010). The most concerning issues are massive 
overtime and unpaid work which are related to film exhibition release patterns and a 
problematic business model (Squires, 2012). In this business model, major studios 
“insist on fixed bids from VFX providers which can lead to a lot of unpaid extra work 
when a director decides he doesn’t like the look of certain shots” (Strauss, 2013). As a 
result, several VFX companies have gone bankrupt and workers have been laid off and 
not been compensated. With the major studios having a monopsony, or only buyer, 
advantage and so many VFX businesses competing at an international scale, it is 
difficult to change the business model: “There are just cheaper countries in Asia and 
elsewhere to get the work done, which studios can also play off against L.A. facilities” 
(Strauss, 2013).  
Table 8 Comparison of minimum wage per hour, 2012-2013 
Country National Currency USD 
Australia  Australian Dollar 
16 14.79 
Korea  Won 4580 4.09 
New Zealand  New Zealand Dollar 
13 10.26 
United States  US Dollar 
7 7 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Dollar 
30 3.86 
China  RMB 
8.5 1.38 
Singapore Singaporean Dollar  No 
minimum 
wage  - 
Note. Hong Kong Labour Department (2013); Lexology (2013); OECD (2013); XE (2013). 1 NZD= 0.78 
USD; 1 HKD =0.12 USD; 1SGD= 0.79 USD; 1 KRW= 0.00089 USD; 1AUD= 0.92 USD.    
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Table 9 Comparison of annual median wages in film occupations by country 
Country Animator (CGI, 3D) Film Editors Production Manager 
Film/Video 
Set and Exhibit 
Designers 
Pay  in 
local 
currency 
Equivalent 
in USD 
Pay in 
local 
currency 
Equivalent 
in USD 
Pay  in 
local 
currency 
Equivalent 
in USD 
Pay  in 
local 
currency 
Equivalent 
in USD 
US 52, 224 
USD 
52, 224 
 
45, 274 
USD 
45, 274 
 
53, 925 
USD 
53, 925 36, 900 
USD 
36, 900 
NZ 52,000 
NZD 
40, 883 36, 539 
NZD 
28, 713 
 
32, 500 
NZD 
25, 540 
 
____ ___ 
HK 203, 999 
HKD 
26, 297 
 
168, 000 
HKD 
21,656 
 
249,221 
HKD 
32, 127 
 
____ ____ 
SG 35, 060 
SGD 
27, 750 33, 223 
SGD 
26, 292 
 
63, 599 
SGD 
50, 331 
 
29, 980 
SGD 
23,727 
 
SK 16, 000 
KRW* 
14.276 
KRW 
___ ___ ___ ___ ____ _____ 
AU 62,634 
AUD 
57, 708 
 
52, 000 
AUD 
47, 909 
 
50, 615 
AUD 
46, 639 
 
58, 500 
AUD 
53, 909 
 
Note. *2D Animator. PayScale (2013); XE (2013). 1 NZD= 0.78 USD; 1 HKD =0.12 USD; 1SGD= 0.79 USD; 1 KRW= 0.00089 USD; 1AUD= 0.92 USD. 
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Trade-offs of satellite production: Building capability  
Christopherson’s analysis (2006) of satellite production centres in the new international 
division of labour in the film industry identified two major reasons underlying 
Hollywood’s transnational companies use of international outsourcing. The first reason 
is to reduce overall production costs, and the second is to address their need for 
specialised labour in the production process (Christopherson, 2006). By the same token, 
Ruth Hauer from Walt Disney Company explained satellite productions, “don’t (move) 
[…] based just on the numbers […]. It’s filmmaker driven, location driven, we’re 
looking for the best houses that do a certain type of work” (Heusser, 2012). So far, Asia-
Pacific has offered global profile film-makers, high quality and innovative VFX such as 
those found in Wellington.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, most film work skills are learnt on the job (DeFillippi & 
Arthur, 1994). Satellite productions are seen to transfer accrued knowledge from 
Hollywood to local workers and firms. The argument of benefiting from building human 
and organisational capacity has found an echo in many policy documents justifying 
financial incentives to attract FDI to the Asia-Pacific region. In New Zealand, for 
example “in establishing the grants [for big budget foreign productions and VFX], the 
Government recognises that {…} [they] contribute to New Zealand’s economic 
development by providing {…} employment and skill development opportunities” 
(MED, 2011b, p. 3). 
The establishment of satellite productions in New Zealand took advantage of digital 
technologies in post-production activities which had become cheaper, portable and 
personal, making experimentation and innovation easier to attain. Weta Digital, the VFX 
firm with the highest capability in the Wellington region, achieved an international 
reputation in a short time for their work on computer graphics, winning Academy 
awards for several projects (MED, 2012a). Weta is part of director Peter Jackson’s 
complex in Wellington, which has attracted service work from the most ambitious film 
projects in Hollywood (see Chapter 7). The state-of-the-art technologies in VFX and 
live action have maintained the attractiveness of Wellington as a satellite centre. But 
remaining competitive in terms of technological innovation and know-how is a big 
challenge, as it can be easily transferred to other satellite centres. For example, the bid 
between New Zealand and China to host Avatar 2 which led the New Zealand 
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government to increase tax incentives from 15 to 25% (see Chapter 6) (Hartmann, 
2012b). Nonetheless, studio activities can be easily transferred to different regions, 
where specialisation in high quality post-production offers more stability: “while 
production can bring specialized crew and equipment with them for a shoot, visual 
effects requires local infrastructure and talent” (Heusser, 2012). 
New Zealand has definitely pioneered the specialization in cutting-edge technology in 
the film industry in the region. However, Asian countries have quickly become aware of 
the importance of innovation and leveraging know-how in this industry. As the Nobel 
economist Joseph Stiglitz observed, the Asian countries have a tradition of “high rates 
of investment in physical and human capital” and governments have acted as catalysts 
which has “helped markets by providing the requisite physical and institutional 
infrastructure” (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005, p. 15). Countries like South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and China have strategised the knowledge transfer in film 
industry activities by competing to host Hollywood productions. However, major 
Hollywood studios with satellite activities and subsidiaries are confident that their 
competitive advantage is storytelling, and that the jobs they are outsourcing to China 
and to other Asia-Pacific countries are purely technical and do not involve intellectual 
property: “In terms of what we do, anyone and everyone can have a paintbrush. But that 
doesn’t mean they can be a painter. That requires great storytelling” said the chief 
executive of the Hollywood subsidiary Dream Works Animation in China (Barboza & 
Barnes, 2012). Although in New Zealand Peter Jackson’s satellite movies have local 
scriptwriting credits, storytelling is also a matter of general concern to the Wellington 
film industry (see Chapters 8 and 9). 
Satellite production and sustainability 
Governments’ enthusiasm to attract foreign direct investment in the form of satellite 
productions mainly from Hollywood, reflects the belief that runaway productions could 
be a window of opportunity to develop domestic film industries. This could occur, for 
example, through building a base of local revenue; leveraging working skills; and 
creating infrastructure (McAnany & Wilkinson, 1996). But so far, based on the 
experience of satellite hosting regions, researchers wonder if satellite centres would be 
able to set up sustainable local industries (Scott, 2006). The UNCTAD (2010) report on 
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Creative Industries described the failure of these types of creative industries initiatives 
in Asia-Pacific countries: 
Often those economic activities fail to maintain the economic growth foreseen in the 
projects as soon as external support stops either because of constrains in terms of 
infrastructure or inadequate funding. It is gradually being understood, therefore, that a 
comprehensive development strategy is needed to realize the potential of these 
industries for economic development. (UNCTAD, 2010, p. 47) 
Research in Canada has noted that dependency on external sources, the maintenance of 
macroeconomic conditions, competition with lower-cost regions and government 
subsidies make this type of development vulnerable in the long run (Coe, 2001). In 
financing satellite productions, major studios can always threaten to leave to other 
countries to put pressure on the satellite regions to maintain favourable legal and 
political frameworks (Pendakur, 1990). Chapter 6 provides examples of this in New 
Zealand’s employment legislation and tax incentives schemes (for instance, The Hobbit 
dispute and the Avatar bid). These are examples of the altered balance of power 
between transnational companies, labour and regional states in the new international 
division of labour in the film industry (Christopherson, 2006). 
Furthermore, satellite productions are temporary, project-based endeavours; they lack 
investment in domestic fixed capital, and the major studios keep complete control over 
the creative and financial aspects of the project, such as: intellectual property, financial 
capability, distribution and commercialisation networks and even key technologies 
(Coe, 2001; Huang, 2013). In other words, the governance of the industry is exercised 
by big conglomerates in California. The creative and financial aspects of the project are 
the core structural activities to recapitalise and reinvest revenue in positive cycles of 
sustainability. Satellite regions can only offer advantages in one part of the productive 
process, say cost-efficiency in production or post-production, but not in the whole value 
chain (McAnany & Wilkinson, 1996). In other words, according to the theory outlined 
in Chapter 2 and the information contained in this chapter, it can be argued that satellite 
activities have exclusively entailed outsourcing of production or post-production 
services, which are secondary economies which have limitations when it comes to 
generating industrial development. On the contrary, it is primary economic activities 
that could become the motor which produces externalities in cycles of reinvestment with 
increasing returns.  
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Furthermore, although in isolated cases some New Zealand companies and local 
policies have engaged in high-road strategies which aim to compete through quality, 
innovation, product differentiation and creativity (see Chapters 7 and 8), low-road 
strategies are dominant. As mentioned before New Zealand has focused on cost-
effective competition to attract FDI. According to previous research (see Chapter 2) the 
high-road strategy has the greatest likelihood of being a window of opportunity to 
develop long-term film industries. 
The positive impact of satellite activities in relation to sustainable criteria are the 
generation of technical labour pools, low-end know-how and technology transfer as well 
as, in the case of post-production houses, investment in infrastructure and fixed capital. 
However, the limitations to industrial development faced by satellite activities include 
the inability to reproduce financial capacity from film production, the lack of significant 
use of local creative sources and talent, and a lack of interest in developing audiences or 
providing access to production by diverse local groups. 
New Zealand and Independent Transnationalism 
Regional collaboration  
After the debate in the 1990s on trade and culture, a nuanced position between free trade 
advocates and supporters of cultural exemption was included in the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2002) to counterbalance WTO’s free market 
position. Issues of inequality in the cultural economy of the world were acknowledged 
and cultural practices were recognised as human rights. In this view, cultural diversity is 
seen to favour intellectual, affective, moral and spiritual life as well as economic 
development. Consequently, cultural goods and services are “vectors of identity, values 
and meaning, [which] must not be treated as mere commodities or consumer goods” 
(UNESCO, 2002). The Declaration states that each state should guarantee plural and 
equal access to the creation and circulation of cultural goods and services through 
cultural policies in the form of direct support or regulatory frameworks.  
Around 2001, New Zealand had reconsidered its previous position on the GATS 
negotiation supporting free trade of cultural goods and it “voted for the UNESCO 
declaration {…} whereas USA, Australia and Israel voted against it” (Kaino, 2007, p. 
52). Of special interest for the issue addressed in this thesis is Article 10, which states: 
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In the face of current imbalances in flows and exchanges of cultural goods and services at 
the global level, it is necessary to reinforce international cooperation and solidarity aimed 
at enabling all countries {…} to establish cultural industries that are viable and 
competitive at national and international level[s]. (UNESCO, 2002) 
Accordingly, New Zealand developed a Cultural Diplomacy International Programme in 
2006 that considered cultural exchanges with “Asia, especially, China, Japan and 
Korea” to be a priority (Kaino, 2007, p. 58). In the last couple of decades the Asia-
Pacific region developed international organisations to foster links and cooperation 
within the film industries in the region. Examples of collaboration were international 
events (such as film festivals, forums, and symposiums), and the establishment of 
government film agencies with international branches and co-production treaties.  
Some of these events have helped build networks of film-makers and business people as 
well as establishing collaboration between governments. Such events have included the 
Busan International Film Festival, the Shangai International Film Festival, the Hong 
Kong International Film and TV Market (FILMART), the Asia Cultural Co-operation 
Forum in Hong Kong (UNCTAD, 2010), and the Asia-Pacific Producers’ Network 
symposium. Some itinerating events also provide a showcase of the hosts country’s 
facilities (Tan, 2011). The region has also generated a rich network of bi-national 
official co-production treaties (see Table 10). These co-production deals are 
mechanisms that allow film producers to attract funding and film workers from other 
regions and gain access to wider audiences. Such treaties “extend to official co-
productions the funding, tax incentives and distribution arrangements available in either 
country, as well as making it easier to import crew and equipment” (Crewdson, 2010). 
New Zealand has signed official co-production treaties with Asia-Pacific countries such 
as China, Singapore, Korea and Australia (NZFC, 2014a). Its co-production treaty with 
China extends the benefits to Hong Kong and Taiwan as the three of them are members 
of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement or CEPA (Pang, 2009). This allows 
Hong Kong and Taiwan to escape China’s film importing quotas of 20-34 foreign films 
per year. Furthermore, New Zealand signed an Economic Co-operation Agreement 
(ANZTEC) with Taiwan in 2013. It stipulates the elimination of duties for New Zealand 
exports in the following four years. And it will “set the framework for television and 
film co-productions, which could allow backdoor access to the restricted Chinese 
cinema market, with Taiwan exempt from the restriction of foreign films entering 
China” (Rutherford, 2013b).  
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Table 10 Official co-production treaties and free trade agreements with Asia-Pacific 
countries 
 China Hong 
Kong 
Taiwan Singapore Korea Australia New 
Zealand 
China  1979 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
2010 Temptative  
2013 
2008 2010 (TV 
included 
2014) 
Hong 
Kong 
  China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
Taiwan    China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
2013 
ECA 
China-
HK-
Taiwan 
CEPA 
2004 
Singapore     2007 2007 2004 
Korea      - 2008 
(excludes 
TV) 
Australia       1994 
New 
Zealand 
       
Note. NZFC (2014a); Screen Australia (2013); Singapore Government (2013). CEPA= Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreement 
So far these film co-production possibilities with Asia-Pacific countries have not been 
used except for The Tatooist (2008) with Singapore. Official co-productions are used 
more with European and other Commowealth countries. New Zealand has official co-
production treaties with South Africa, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland and 
Spain (NZFC, 2014a). From 2000 to 2012, New Zealand participated in 11 co-
productions, seven of them with the UK, and the rest with UK-Canada, Germany, 
France and Singapore (NZFC, 2014c). Although it is too soon to see the outcomes of 
official cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries, New Zealand is well linked with those 
countries (see Table 10). Furthermore, data from Statistics New Zealand that includes 
non-official co-productions states that in 2011 from 30 businesses with co-production 
partners, 15 of them were in Asia, 12 in Australia, 15 in North America, nine in the UK, 
and three in Europe (SNZ, 2013c). However, independent transnational links, 
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established among equals is not coincidental; there are evident agendas accompanying 
these forms of collaboration.  
The trade-offs of collaboration 
Innovation and knowledge transfer 
Countries like South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China have specially 
strategised the knowledge transfer in film industry activities by collaborating with each 
other and with developed nations like Australia and New Zealand. For example, in the 
last couple of decades South Korea has been able to develop popular films with 
universal story lines exported especially to Asian countries. In recent years, it has 
received significant input from Australian and New Zealand post-production services, 
including Weta Digital and Park Road Post in Wellington. This has allowed the Korean 
film industry to achieve high production values: “Since 2007, Korean digital and visual 
effects companies have moved outside the local market and have worked on major 
international features and television productions” (Yecies et al., 2011, p. 141) including 
US, Chinese, and Taiwanese productions. 
The internationalisation of the Korean cinema is clearly not a one way process. Not only 
have Australian practitioners played a role in it but Koreans are presently doing the same 
in China {…} Film-makers in greater China are looking to partner with members of the 
Korean film industry in order to advance aspects of digital film production. (Yecies et al., 
2011, p. 141) 
In addition, the flow of Hollywood film workers to work in the Chinese film industry 
corresponds to having more opportunities to upgrade skills and positions, and even to be 
involved in more creative and managerial tasks during the workflow process. As one 
article reported, “with more than 500 movies shot here [in China] annually, there is huge 
demand for Hollywood expertise” (Jaffe, 2012). As the vice president at Chinese CTC 
Entertainment explained "The goal is to bring over U.S.-trained supervisors to train 
young people here” (Jaffe, 2012). 
China’s recent concessions in the form of co-production treaties, joint ventures and 
bigger shares of box office revenue to imported films have more in mind than a simple 
trade-off to affix Chinese names to the films’ credits as some patronising media 
coverage suggested (G.E., 2012). At the core of these Chinese concessions is the desire 
to secure creative technology and know-how to the film and screen industries (Keane, 
2013, p. 192). In this sense, the Chinese “government wants to turn the country into a 
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cinematic titan, and sees co-productions as a way to reach global audiences” (Crewdson, 
2010).  
In the midst of negotiations to sign a co-production deal between China and New 
Zealand, Weta Digital general manager, Tom Greally said “New Zealand could help to 
satisfy China’s desire for higher standards including innovation, creativity and quality” 
(Crewdson, 2010). Even though the Chinese film industry has become more 
comfortable with their technical skills over recent years, one of the problems they face 
is storytelling. This is a drawback shared to some extent with other Asia-Pacific 
countries, including New Zealand (see chapters 8 & 9). The head of the Shangai 
Animation Film Studio said, “Chinese animation has not become strong enough to 
block out foreign competition yet {…} I am very confident that at the level of art and 
design quality our films have reached the international level. Time will tell whether our 
story telling will appeal to a Western audience” (French, 2004). Entrepreneurs in China 
are aware of their weakness and as a representative of Global Digital Animation 
Holdings said, “Our goal, within 5 or 10 years, is to be much less involved in the 
production side, and much more in the creative side, in order to get this industry off the 
ground in China” (French, 2004). 
The change of gravitational centre and access to new markets  
At the turn of the new millennium, China emerged as a new superpower having the 
fastest economic growth in the world and the biggest potential market of 1.34 billion 
inhabitants captivating the attention of the rest of the business world (UNESCO, 2012a). 
The trend was even clearer in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that left the US 
and Europe with unemployment, deficit and stagnation while Asia recovered faster than 
other developed nations, including New Zealand and Australia (see Table 11). The 
change in international economic dynamics had an impact on the international film 
industry with respect to the regions’ ability to attract satellite productions. Asia, being 
less vulnerable to the crisis, was able to compete in growing technological infrastructure 
and employment capability. And while Asia kept lower-value currencies against the 
dollar, stronger Canadian, Australian or UK currencies, made these countries less 
attractive as satellite production centres, as per Figure 8 (Goldstein & Xie, 2009). 
The impact of the crisis on the US economy and the consolidation of China’s economic 
power also started to shift the gravitational centre away from the US, as one article 
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reports: “While box office revenue is falling off in North America, China's ticket sales 
rose by one-third last year—and now many media companies are trying to get a 
foothold in the country” (Hartmann, 2012a). The financial power of Chinese companies 
was reflected in the acquisition of some visual effects studios in Hollywood that were 
“running out money instead of a lack of orders” (Huang, 2013).  
Table 11 Historical gross domestic product by country (in percentages) 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
New Zealand 4.349 3.124 3.045 3.499 -0.808 -1.637 1.753 1.418 2.537 2.742 
Australia 4.089 3.11 2.723 4.633 2.67 1.419 2.617 2.436 3.579 2.961 
Hong Kong 8.7 7.388 7.033 6.465 2.128 -2.459 6.793 4.85 1.442 2.958 
Korea 4.619 3.957 5.179 5.106 2.298 0.319 6.32 3.634 2.022 2.845 
Singapore 9.159 7.37 8.623 9.02 1.748 -0.787 14.781 5.16 1.319 2.012 
China 10.085 11.31 12.677 14.162 9.635 9.214 10.447 9.295 7.8 8.038 
US 3.468 3.07 2.658 1.913 -0.337 -3.069 2.391 1.808 2.211 1.851 
Note. International Monetary Fund (2013). Estimates start in 2011. Light grey highlight= around the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
 
However, opening state-controlled Chinese film production to private companies 
inherited structural difficulties, such as: lack of credit (UNCTAD, 2010); low 
international competitiveness (Keane, 2013);  thematic exhaustion due to censorship’s 
“safe narratives” (Keane, 2013, p. 185); piracy; and, a high 40% of production of 
service work or outsourcing (Keane, 2013, p. 185). 
These challenges contradicted the “catching up” strategy of the central planning policy 
in China which aimed to revitalise its cultural industries and “reform the cultural system 
as a precursor of the soft power movement” (Keane, 2013, p. 178).6 The idea was to 
move on from “made in China” to “created in China” in an attempt to become an 
innovative nation by 2020 (Cunningham, 2009; Keane, 2007). The challenges increased 
with pressure to open the market to foreign films. For instance, after China’s accession 
to WTO, a concession in the form of film quotas was established to allow the “import 
[of] 20 films a year for release on a revenue-sharing basis” (KPMG, 2009, p.17). The 
Chinese audience’s historical fascination for Hong Kong, Taiwanese, Japanese, Korean 
movies and Hollywood blockbusters has evidenced the vulnerable state of Chinese 
content. Keane reports that in 2012, 73% of films released in China were foreign as well 
as 90% of the biggest box office movies (2013, p. 190). 
                                                 
6 Soft power is defined as “the attractiveness of a nation’s culture” (Keane, 2013, p. 182). 
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Figure 8 Historical currency rate comparison with USD by country in Asia-Pacific 
 
Note. Onda (2013). 1 August 1994-11 July 2013. 
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In order to deal with these difficulties, China implemented structural reforms “involving 
the Bank of China and the Export-Import Bank [of China] to finance projects” 
(UNCTAD, 2010, p. 48), and to support animation, movies, and TV. These financial 
products were aimed at financing supply chains, expediting exports and promote 
mergers (UNCTAD, 2010). As mentioned, another Chinese strategy has been learning 
through collaboration with other countries, via co-productions and providing service 
work for film, TV and video games (Keane, 2013). In turn, the attractiveness of China 
as a financier and potential consumer market is widely acknowledged. In 2013, Chinese 
screens accounted for 35% of all the screens in Asia-Pacific (see Figure 9). The interest 
of other countries in establishing informal co-productions with China responded to this 
opportunity. 
Figure 9 Share of cinema screens in Asia-Pacific region 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on Screen Digest (2010c). 
Excitement was evident in New Zealand with media reporting “China’s box office grew 
62% last year and the country is set to become the second biggest movie market behind 
the United States” (Tan, 2011). Looking to capitalise from the shift of the world 
economic power to Asia in recent years, Michael Brook, head of Film Auckland 
explained, “New Zealand is well placed to seize new opportunities the region offers” 
(Tan, 2011). By the same token, and looking outside Hollywood to provide service 
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work, Cameron Harland, General Manager of Park Road Post-production said, “we are 
smart to get in here [in China] as early as we can {…}”(Crewdson, 2010). Hoping to 
achieve economies of scale Michael Stephens, a Wellington entertainment lawyer 
commented “‘true opportunity for’ kiwi film-makers in China, lies in developing joint 
projects suitable for international markets” (Crewdson, 2010). Also in 2012, the annual 
conference of the Screen Production and Development Association of New Zealand 
(SPADA) programmed a series of roundtables and presentations about partnering with 
Hong Kong, a hub for foreign companies seeking to benefit from mainland China’s 
market (Lim, 2006).  
New Zealand is not the only country where investors and financiers are attracted to 
China; Hong Kong, Japan (Pang, 2009), Korea (Yecies et al., 2011) and the US see it as 
“a tempting market” as well (Barboza & Barnes, 2012). Major US studios, through the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), have been pushing for negotiations to 
open the Chinese theatrical market: “The decision to allow the importation of 14 more 
3D or large-format films per year and a profit-sharing increase from 13% to 25% for 
foreign film companies is a major victory for U.S. negotiators” (Abrams, 2012). During 
the last few years, Hollywood studios have been looking for financial investment 
through co-production deals with Chinese companies as this will allow them to obtain 
more returns than going through the import quota; that is, an increase from 25% to 45% 
of the box office. “The gravitational pull of the Chinese movie market, non-existent less 
than a generation ago, is now an undeniable force, sucking in all Hollywood 
blockbusters (and lesser projects) that venture within its event horizon” (G.E., 2012). 
Independent transnationalism and sustainability 
According to this analysis, it is independent transnationalism that represents the most 
opportunities to develop structural and peripheral aspects of a sustainable film industry 
in Wellington. This is because regional collaboration allows a wider control of 
transnational flows through selective strategising to target areas of concern. For 
example, as discussed in Chapter 9, Wellington’s areas of concern are to maintain 
innovation, and to develop local businesses, storytelling, market audiences and financial 
resources. Although co-productions are commonly one-off and short-term projects, they 
do entail partnering among primary economies which in theory can generate industrial 
spin-offs. In relation to sustainability criteria, co-productions facilitate financial 
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resources and returns, they generate technical and creative labour pools, provide 
opportunities for learning and knowledge transfer, use creative sources and 
infrastructure, and open market audiences. 
The isolated cases of high-road innovation and quality―for example the state-of-the-art 
VFX―have already given Wellington and New Zealand bargaining power to 
collaborate with other regions in exchange for opening new markets, which eventually 
translate into financial sources. New Zealand could benefit from making the most of its 
co-production deals and maintaining ties with European countries, Australia, and US 
independent projects. Of the Asia-Pacific countries studied in this chapter, South Korea 
and China are of significant interest to New Zealand. Korea’s film industry has a 
healthy domestic and international market built from a film quota system (Jin, 2006) 
and creative and storytelling development (Yecies et al., 2011). This gives South Korea 
bargaining power to transfer know-how in exchange for opening new markets. China is 
the country with most bargaining power in the region because of its economic 
performance, its huge market size, years of protectionism and the film quota system. 
Despite its low-road, cost-effective conditions and issues of censorship, its government 
and business strategies include the structural development of sources of funding and 
high-road leverage of core technical and creative capabilities in film and screen 
industries. In exchange for markets and financial resources, New Zealand could trade 
off innovation capability and provide a link to overcome cultural barriers offering 
familiarisation with Western cultural sensibilities. Furthermore, New Zealand could also 
benefit from learning and collaborating in policymaking areas with other Asian and 
European countries. In conclusion, as the co-founder of Pacific Data Images, Richard 
Chuang commented, “in order to survive and thrive, {…} [it is necessary] to move up 
the food chain from providing technical support to making original content {…} The 
growing appetite for local content in the region, especially on the mainland [China], 
could support the industry” (Nip, 2013).  
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Conclusions 
This chapter addressed the question: What are the international relations shaping the 
opportunities of the New Zealand film industry with respect to achieving sustainable 
outcomes? I have argued that transnational relations have influenced the country―and 
therefore the film district in Wellington (see Chapter 7)―in three main areas. Firstly, 
free trade regulations have fenced in New Zealand’s audio-visual trade deficit, fixed 
New Zealand’s role as a net consumer of foreign screen products, and facilitated the 
establishment of audio-visual transnational companies and their flow of capital to 
overseas headquarters. This in turn, has hindered the articulation of the local value chain 
at the commercialisation phase affecting its sustainable cycles of reinvestment. 
Secondly, New Zealand has played an important role as a satellite centre―as 
exemplified by Wellington film activities―providing production and post-production 
service work for major Hollywood transnational companies. New Zealand’s film 
policies have emphasised a branding strategy selling the film industry as a facility and 
the country as a location and tourist destination. Although mainly based on low-road 
strategies (see Chapter 6), New Zealand has also resorted to high-road strategies (see 
Chapter 7). Unfortunately, satellite activities are secondary economies with limited 
ability to set spirals of increasing returns as examined in Chapter 2. These positive 
cycles are key to self-sustainable industries. Thirdly, New Zealand’s role as a high-
quality satellite film centre has conferred upon the country the persuasive power to 
collaborate with the Asia-Pacific region and other European and Commonwealth 
countries. Independent transnational collaborations entail primary economies (see 
Chapter 2) where key finance pools, access to markets and high-end creative and 
technical learning take place. Furthermore, the global financial crisis and the role of 
China as an emerging economic superpower overtaking economic performance in 
Western countries are two major historical events also reshaping the international role of 
New Zealand and Asia-Pacific in the film industry. Those shifts could represent an 
opportunity to redirect New Zealand’s objectives towards its international position to 
canalise flows towards a self-sustainable film industry. 
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Chapter 5  
Analysis of the Value Chain: Distribution and Exhibition 
Chapters 5 and 6 address the question: What are the relations among the phases of the 
film industry value chain in New Zealand and what do they mean to its sustainability? 
In other words, it targets the relations between production, distribution and consumption 
of films in New Zealand. As mentioned in Chapter 2, value chain articulation is the core 
of the political economy of culture’s explanatory cue to understand film industry 
development. In order to answer the research question, in Chapter 5 I centre on the 
value chain phases of distribution and consumption of films, while Chapter 6 focuses on 
the production phase. Both chapters present each value chain phase looking at three 
different areas that complement each other: industrial development, policy accounts and 
sectoral economic indicators. This overview allows me to provide a general analysis of 
the value chain relations in New Zealand and make remarks about their influence on the 
Wellington case in Chapter 8.  
Despite being connected, the phases of production, distribution, and consumption 
respond to a different logic. First of all, production and postproduction subsectors are 
capital and labour intensive activities focused on content creation of films. Secondly, the 
distribution phase is an intermediary activity consisting of acquiring, managing and 
administering licenses to promote, lease, wholesale or disseminate films and video. 
Finally, the film consumption phase (also referred to as dissemination or 
commercialisation) entails mainly services with direct contact with consumers to market 
or disseminate films to be consumed in several windows such as cinema theatre 
exhibition, physical and online rentals, and retail, television broadcasting (Scott, 2005; 
SNZ, 2006). In this chapter, I expand on the development of distribution and 
consumption of films in New Zealand. 
The chapter presents a brief historical overview followed by discussion of the current 
environment shaping the distribution and commercialisation sectors, particularly 
characterising the contemporary transnational period (that is controlled by transnational 
companies and foreign supply). I expose the interplay among each sector’s industrial 
organisation, economic indicators, and policies and regulations. By taking a historical-
structural approach, I identified the existence of long-term, entrenched relations among 
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various stakeholders in the film distribution and commercialisation phases in New 
Zealand. Major stakeholders in those phases have become a de facto economic power 
and their relations have been institutionalised influencing the possibility of generating 
sustainable outcomes. Yet a closer look shows distribution and commercialisation 
sectors are also dynamic, and contingent upon social and political action.  
Despite their importance, the study of film distribution and consumption in New 
Zealand has been neglected. Two exceptions are the work of Churchman (1997) on the 
history of distribution and exhibition in the country until the 1980s and the recent 
analysis of exhibition in Wellington by Huffer (2012). This chapter draws on these 
studies and builds on statistical sources.  
Historical Overview: Industry and Policy 
For the purposes of this research I suggest a historical periodisation of the three sectors 
of the film industry in New Zealand (see Table 12). The periodisation is based on 
economic and political developments; for example, the level of industrialisation, the 
origin of ownership of dominant capital, and the general policy models influencing 
industrial outcomes. Under these criteria the history of the distribution and consumption 
(particularly, cinema exhibition) sectors can be classified into two main periods: (a) a 
first stage from 1896 to the late 1920s comprising a pre-industrial and semi-artisanal 
phase; and (b) a second stage from the late 1920s up to the present consists of an 
industrial phase. The following sections describe these periods to better understand 
similarities or disparities in past and current trends. In doing so, I identify the overall 
effects of such configurations on the value chain articulation and pinpoint their 
influence on sustainable outcomes. 
Pre-industrial period 
Exhibition was the first sector to develop industrially in New Zealand. The gradual 
introduction of film exhibition technologies to New Zealand was done by small itinerant 
shows or vaudeville spectacles in established theatres. Eventually, some travelling 
showmen started running permanent theatres and even constructed purpose-built 
theatres (Churchman, 1997).  
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Table 12 Periodisation of the film industry in New Zealand 
PERIODISATION OF THE FILM INDUSTRY IN NEW ZEALAND 
1896 l  1900 l 1910 I 1920 I1930 l  1940   l  1950 l    1960 l   1970 l 1980 l 1990 l 2000 l 2010              
EXHIBITION 
SECTOR 
Pre-industrial phase Industrial Phase 
National International Transnational 
DISTRIBUTION 
SECTOR 
National 
 
 International Transnational 
PRODUCTION 
SECTOR 
      Pioneer period Crisis period Welfare 
State 
period* 
Growth-
Model 
period* 
Note. Own elaboration. * Based on King (2010) and Potts & Cunningham (2008). 
On the film distribution side, the supply of shorts and features came mainly from 
overseas sources. Cinema, being an imported technology, meant that the films exhibited 
came from the regions where such innovations had been developed and which had the 
first-mover advantage. Around 1910, an unofficial second-hand market of film stock 
started up in New Zealand. It was initiated by a former travelling showman who bought 
other exhibitors’ unwanted material to rent it for a profit (Churchman, 1997). Driven by 
competition to acquire first-run films, two local successful exhibitors, Hayward and 
Fuller, merged in 1913 and tackled film distribution with the company New Zealand 
Picture Supplies (NZPS). However, seven years later NZPS ceased operations as 
“Hollywood studios began concerted efforts to control film distribution around the 
world with their own local exchanges and forcing exhibitors to accept films on their 
terms” (Churchman, 1997). From then on, major Hollywood studios have dominated the 
New Zealand film market through their distribution branches. 
But the exhibition business kept growing through the 1920s when the cinema-building 
boom occurred. For example, many of the old theatres in the city of Wellington were 
built at that time. The 1920s marked the constitution of big theatre chains that operated 
in a competitive environment of mainly independent exhibition businesses; this, 
however, would change. 
The industrial period 
The second period symbolically commenced with the first talkie movie shown in New 
Zealand in 1929. This opened up a new industrial era which coincided with quick 
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expansion and capital concentration of few dominant exhibition businesses which were 
first nationally owned and later internationally and transnationally owned.  
The introduction of sound, under the monopoly of American Western Electronics, 
imposed high prices on technology conversion; this coupled with the economic 
depression of the late 20s, felt also in New Zealand, created barriers to entry to new and 
existing businesses (Churchman, 1997). This stage was intensified with the 
consolidation of economies of scale among successful businesses resulting in capital 
accumulation and sometimes in unfair competition practices. As a result, a loose 
combine to coordinate hiring and screening of films was formed by four major national 
chains: Fuller-Hayward, Kemball, Williamson, and Kerridge (Churchman, 1997). The 
major chains’ strategy was to focus on buying independent businesses. As Churchman 
(1997) documents, Kemball and Kerridge used dirty tactics: independents that were 
unwilling to sell to or join the combine would be threatened with the deprivation of 
good movies controlled by the combine or made to believe that a new cinema would 
open nearby. This last measure pressured independents to accept the deal to sell 50% of 
their profits in order to buy off the proposal of a new competitor. These unfair 
competition practices were reflected in the government intervention of 1932 when the 
Minister of Industry and Commerce, Hon. R. Masters, was empowered to scrutinise all 
proposals for new cinemas. Accused of government interference in free enterprise and 
competition, the Minister claimed that certain traders “were behaving no better than 
gangsters” (Churchman, 1997, p.20).  
On the distribution side, around the talkie era, the government identified unfair practices 
as recognised in the Cinematograph Films Act 1928 and its Amendment in 1934. The 
Committees of Inquiry and eventually the Act, addressed the question of fair trade 
identifying two dubious practices: block-booking, where to obtain the best Hollywood 
films, exhibitors were forced to also buy the worst films; and blind booking, where 
exhibitors were forced to commit in advance to screen films before they could see them 
or even before they had been produced; sometimes they ended up being big flops 
(Churchman, 1997). John O’Shea quoted entrepreneur Nathan Scheinwald’s words 
about the distribution business in the 1930s when he called it “the most corrupt industry 
around” (Dennis & Bieringa, 1996, p. 22). British films in New Zealand had also been 
affected by Hollywood tactics which led the government to establish 20% screen quotas 
gradually from 1834 to 1939 for British, and later on, Commonwealth films 
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(Cinematograph Films Act, 1928).7 With the quota requirement exhibitors were allowed 
to reject at least 5% of the low quality or unwanted films from big distributors 
(Churchman, 1997).  
In 1936, the independent exhibitor Moodabe’s Amalgamated Theatres had expanded 
fast through successfully transforming the business model. Moodabe had built cheaper 
one-floor theatres and had integrated with Hollywood major, 20th Century Fox, which 
gave it financial back up and guaranteed supply of films. Following the government’s 
intervention and Moodabe’s competition, the combine dissolved. The 1940s saw a 
further concentration of capital with Kerridge’s acquisitions of the Kemball, Fuller-
Hayward and Williamson theatres. Kerridge also emulated Moodabe’s alliance with 
foreign capital, in this case with UK-based Arthur Rank Odeon Holdings to form the 
Kerridge-Odeon chain (Dennis & Bieringa, 1996). By 1946 Kerridge-Odeon and 
Moodabe’s Amalgamated Theatres were the only competitors controlling 29% of 
theatres but also the most profitable and well located ones (Churchman, 1997). Another 
Committee of Inquiry recommended that the two chains were not allowed to grow any 
larger, but their “control” was “unbreakable” (Churchman, 1997, p. 22).  
With the introduction of television in the 1950s, cinema around the world entered into a 
crisis period. In New Zealand, by the 1960s, many theatres had closed down, especially 
in Wellington. The two major theatrical chains in New Zealand were completely or 
partially acquired by foreign capital. From the 1950s to the 1980s Amalgamated 
Theatres were entirely owned by 20th Century Fox while in the 1980s Pacer (with New 
Zealand capital) bought Kerridge-Odeon only to go into receivership (Churchman, 
1997; Watson, 1988, p. 93). Since the 1980s, exhibition in New Zealand entered into a 
new phase of transnational reconfiguration characterised by the entry of big 
conglomerates formed by mergers, alliances and acquisitions. This coincided with the 
renovations and construction of multiplex theatres. Amalgamated Theatres was sold to 
Australia’s Hoyts Cinemas, and some Pacer-Kerridge theatres became the property of 
Australia’s Hoyts while others became the property of Australian Village Roadshow’s 
alliance with New Zealand-based Force Corporation (forming Village Force). In 2000, a 
                                                 
7
 The quotas for Commonwealth films were abolished by the Cinematographic Films Act 1976 (IRD, 
1988) but by 1981 the film hire tax gave preferential rates to Commonwealth films compared to a rate of 
10% of net receipts for other foreign films (IRD, 1988). Such taxes were then repealed by the New 
Zealand Income Tax Act in 2012 (CCH New Zealand Limited, 2013; Taxation Act, 2012). 
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joint venture was established between Village Force, its sister company Village Rialto, 
and Hoyts which then controlled two thirds of the box office in New Zealand (Scherer, 
2000). The New Zealand Commerce Commission was increasingly concerned and the 
companies voluntarily split a year later (Village Roadshow Limited, 2000). In 2001, 
New Zealand Force Corporation was acquired by Skycity Entertainment Group to form 
Village Skycity (Drogemuller, 2001; Skycity, 2013). This entity then became a 
subsidiary of Australian Amalgamated Holdings in 2010 which had rebranded their 
theatres as Event Cinemas (NZPA, 2010; NZPA-Reuters, 2009; Rutherford, 2009). The 
latter is a combine that also owns Rialto Cinemas in New Zealand (Businessweek, 
2013). As a result, Australian Amalgamated Holdings and Hoyts became then the two 
biggest cinema chains in the country.  
The information presented so far attests that distribution and exhibition in New Zealand 
became, throughout the twentieth century, profitable businesses highly tending to capital 
concentration, first from national and subsequently international and transnational 
sources. This historical path generated entrenched economic interests and power 
relations among film distributors and exhibitors of various kinds, as well as 
conventionalised practices such as business models and audience consumption habits 
familiarised with Hollywood products. The next section will explore the current 
configuration of the distribution and consumption sectors in more detail to better 
understand the relations among various industry stakeholders, their economic dynamics 
and the regulatory environment. 
Current Environment 
Economic indicators: Distribution 
At the end of the twentieth century, the distribution business in New Zealand was 
growing at a fast pace. Since 1995, distribution had doubled its annual revenue; it had 
grown 104% in the last two decades. From 2009-2012, the average annual revenue of 
the sector was $NZ100 million (Screen Digest, 2013). The distribution sector also 
generated $NZ48 million of value added to New Zealand’s GDP, directly created 197 
jobs and provided $NZ6 million of labour income (PwC, 2012). However, it is worth 
asking, what does all this mean to the opportunity for New Zealand films to be 
distributed? What does this mean to the cultural diversity of films available to New 
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Zealanders? Or what does this mean to the prospect of generating spillover finance to 
produce films in New Zealand? 
From an early stage, film distribution in New Zealand became a profitable business 
concentrated by major Hollywood distributors which had not only the advantage of 
early development in the US, but also employed aggressive tactics to place products in 
New Zealand. Although tactics have changed, Hollywood’s interests in New Zealand 
continue to hold a big share: in 2012, Hollywood majors released 108 films of a total of 
290 films released in New Zealand. My own calculations, based on data available for 
New Zealand and Fiji’s total box office, show major Hollywood companies and their 
subsidiaries concentrated 73% of the market share in 2012 (IMDB, 2014b).8  
Figure 10  Number of distribution businesses in New Zealand, 2005-2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b). 
In this section I argue that, apart from having captivated international audiences, 
Hollywood’s supply and demand-side network economies of scale today have continued 
to favour the global consolidation of its oligopoly. In addition to other historical factors 
(Sánchez Ruiz, 2003), economies of scale have allowed the once-pioneer then major 
Hollywood studios to control film distribution worldwide for almost 90 years 
(Garnham, 2005).  
                                                 
8 This was calculated based on yearly statistics by title and distributor. In these statistics total box office 
for NZ and Fiji in 2012 was $US140, 907, 853, and the box office revenue for the majors and their 
subsidiaries was $US103, 150, 583. The total box office figures reported by MPDA in New Zealand that 
year were $NZ167 million (Gibson, 2012) and $NZ173 million (MPDANZ, 2013a). 
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Table 13 Top 10 box office films released in New Zealand by distributor in 2012 
 Title Distributor Released Lifetime Box Office 
1 The Avengers Walt Disney 25/04/2012 8,820,927 
2 Skyfall* Sony Pictures 22/11/2012 6,416,063 
3 The Hobbit: An Unexpected 
Journey*1 
Warner Bros. 12/12/2012 6,082,013 
4 The Hunger Games Roadshow 22/03/2012 5,796,417 
5 The Dark Knight Rises Warner Bros 19/07/2012 5,703,716 
6 The Best Exotic Marigold 
Hotel 
20th Century Fox 22/03/2012 5,374,584 
7 The Adventures of Tintin  Paramount 26/12/2011 5,341,671 
8 Twilight Saga: Breaking 
Dawn Part 2 
Hoyts/ 
STUDIOCANAL 
15/11/2012 4,976,773 
9 Ice Age Continental Drift 20th Century Fox 28/06/2012 4,564,065 
10 Ted Paramount/Universal 11/07/2012 4,268,154 
TOTAL 57,344,383 
Percentage of Total Box Office 20122 34% 
Note. MPDANZ (2012) Total statistics added. * Still in release by the time the report was created 
26/12/2012. 1 By January 23, 2013, The Hobbit had already grossed over $NZ10.6 million since opening 
(MPDANZ, 2013a). 2 Total New Zealand box office in 2012 was $NZ167 million (Gibson, 2012). The 
percentage would be 32% if taken as a point of reference the total box office of $NZ173 million 
(MPDANZ, 2013a).  
 
According to Statistics New Zealand, there were 75 film and video distribution 
businesses in New Zealand in 2012 as shown in Figure 10 (SNZ, 2013c). However, this 
number includes not only distribution companies but “also includes agents mainly 
engaged in leasing and wholesaling films and videos to organisations” (emphasis added) 
(SNZ, 2007, p. 49) as defined in the category “Film and video distribution”. By 
contrast, other sources, such as Screen Digest (2013), talk about a yearly average of 17 
active distributors during the 2000s. Taking this number as a basis, each distributor in 
New Zealand released an average of 14 films per year, mainly foreign films. From 1998 
to 2009, each distributor in New Zealand received an average of $NZ406 000 revenue 
per release. The mean of each distributor’s income in this period was approximately 
$NZ6 million (Screen Digest, 2013). However, these average figures need to be treated 
carefully as asymmetries in the sector are high and the highest revenues are 
concentrated in a very few distribution companies. 
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For instance, from the top 10 highest box office films in 2012, nine were produced and 
distributed by the six major Hollywood studios; the other film was distributed by one 
big Australian company. This top ten represents only 3% of the total number of films 
released in the country that year (approximately 300), but accounted for 34% of the 
domestic box office as shown in Table 13 (MPDANZ, 2012). This contrasts with 12 
New Zealand films released commercially in 2012 and their 2.2% share of the domestic 
box office (NZFC, 2013c). 
My calculations estimate9 the existence of 40 distribution companies operating in New 
Zealand with offices in Auckland and Australia (IMDB, 2014b, 2014c; NZFC, 2012; 
The Big Idea, 2012). These companies distribute mainstream Hollywood films, foreign 
or local independent films for broadcasting on television, exhibition on cinemas, video 
retail and rental and online markets. Some of them specialise in niche markets: classic 
movies, art-house movies, mature audiences, among others. 
Figure 11 Origin and size of distribution companies operating in New Zealand, 2013 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on The Big Idea (2012), NZFC (2012), (IMDB, 2014b, 2014c) and several 
online websites to update companies’ status and profiles. Notes: NZ, New Zealand; US, United States; 
AU, Australia; Fr, France; JP, Japan; CA, Canada; FI, Fiji. 
 
Figure 11 shows the number of distribution companies operating in New Zealand 
according to their size and origin. The majority of distributors in New Zealand are based 
in Australia (20), followed by New Zealand local companies (9) and the US (7). Having 
so many Australian distributors operating in New Zealand can be explained by 
                                                 
9 Based on online directories, yearly box office ranks, and the revision of companies’ websites to check 
their status and profiles. 
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Australian distributors having extensive network economies of scale in the region due to 
Australia’s bigger market size. The US presence reflects Hollywood’s dominant 
position around the globe. Overall, the prominence of foreign distribution companies in 
New Zealand is also a reflection on the lax regulations around attracting foreign 
investment after the New Zealand’s neoliberal shift in the 1980s, as Huffer (2012) 
explains. For instance, the lack of a capital gains tax, the limitation on repatriation of 
capital or profits, and the absence of constraints on the operation of fully foreign-
ownership companies in the film distribution sector (Huffer, 2012; Lawn, 2006; 
Reading International, 2003).  
In general, local and foreign distributors operating in New Zealand vary according to 
size which is defined here by companies’ financial capacity and the territorial scope of 
their activities. There are eight major companies (which are distribution divisions, joint 
ventures or subsidiaries of the largest transnational media conglomerates), two big 
companies (which form part of big companies operating internationally), seven 
medium-sized companies (which are distribution companies operating in the trans-
Tasman region) and 23 small companies (which are independent companies focused on 
niche markets) (see Figure 11).  
The big companies such as Village Roadshow (AU) and Hopscotch (eOne 
Entertainment, CA) are multi-territory distribution companies and divisions of bigger 
entertainment corporations that distribute either independent films or sub-distribute 
films for Hollywood majors. The medium and small distributors are mainly independent 
companies that work at a regional (Australasia) or local level (New Zealand) and 
specialise in niche markets for example formats (online, DVDs, broadcasting), types 
(art-house, classic movies), and geographic origin (Indian or Chinese films). However, 
“major distributors and exhibition chains also retain a foothold in this ‘independent’ 
market via” their subsidiaries like Transmission (Paramount Pictures) and Rialto (“one 
third owned by Reading International”) (Huffer, 2012, p. 257). According to the 
information compiled here, eight of the nine New Zealand-owned distributors are small 
businesses (Vendetta, Metropolis, Curious, Inside Section, Rep Film, Saggi, Incubate) 
and one of them―Rialto Entertainment―is a medium-sized firm that is mostly New 
Zealand owned. Together, big, medium and small independent companies from various 
countries shared 27% of the New Zealand and Fiji’s box office in 2012 (IMDB, 2014b). 
There is no available data for revenue for other outlets. Last but  not least, major 
 
 
115 
 
companies correspond to the joint ventures (United International Pictures) and 
subsidiaries of Hollywood studios based in the US, including Sony and Vivendi’s 
Studiocanal (from Japan and France respectively) who concentrated 73% of the box 
office in 2012 (IMDB, 2014b). 
Considering that most of the firms that are released are foreign, and the majority of 
distribution companies are international or transnational businesses, the amount of 
capital outflow through royalties and income from New Zealand is considerable. In 
2012, the annual revenue of national distributors was $NZ4.6 million a share of only 
3.3% of the box office  (IMDB, 2014b). 
Figure 12 New Zealand and Fiji box office market share by type of distributor, 2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on (IMDB, 2014b). 
The Motion Picture Distributors’ Association of New Zealand (MPDANZ) represents, 
among others, the six largest transnational distribution companies in the world with 
headquarters in Hollywood: Sony Pictures, Walt Disney Studios, 21st Century Fox, 
Paramount Pictures-Viacom, Universal Pictures and Warner Bros. All of them are 
members of the MPAA and form part of the largest media conglomerates in the world. 
In conjunction with Village Roadshow, major Hollywood distributors are also 
represented in The New Zealand Federation Against Copyright Theft (NZFact), 
renamed New Zealand Screen Association in 2013, a lobby group to research and 
promote copyrights. Hollywood majors vertically integrate production and distribution 
of films (that is, they have divisions and subsidiaries through ownership along the value 
chain). They are also horizontally integrated―or disintegrated via outsourcing, alliances 
73%
27%
Distributor market share
Major Independent
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and joint ventures―in a wide range of media and entertainment products and services 
(see Table 15). By the new millennium, between 80 to 90 % of commercial films around 
the world were distributed by the majors who retained 30% and 45% of the US and 
international box office, respectively (King, 2002). 
Distributors’ relations with exhibitors in New Zealand: Demand-side 
economies of scale 
To explain Hollywood studios’ historical international expansion, researchers have 
argued that the majors’ unfair competition and aggressive monopolistic practices to 
control exhibition10 were important factors (Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Scott, 2002; 
Wasko, 1995). However, there is a lack of exploration of how and why such practices 
have coexisted with voluntary association between the regional exhibition players and 
the major Hollywood distributors in mutually beneficial (although unequal) relations.  
Although, monopolistic and discriminatory practices like conditioning supply, such as 
the aforementioned block-booking, were illegal in New Zealand in the 1930s 
(Churchman, 1997) they are still common practice in Hollywood’s current international 
distribution business model. Such practices have been the focus of legal disputes in 
other countries during the twentieth century. For example, in Canada they were 
considered illegal but disputes resolutions stated a lack of evidence as such practices 
were non-contractual tacit agreements between distributors and exhibitors (Pendakur, 
1990). Another example is the illegality of those tacit or contractual practices in México 
under the Cinematographic Federal Act of 1998 (Muñoz Larroa & Gómez García, 
2011). I argue that according to interviews conducted for this and previous studies 
(Muñoz Larroa & Gómez García, 2011), independent and major chain cinema exhibitors 
in Mexico and New Zealand accept those practices voluntarily as business conventions. 
In other words without coercion from distributors, economic pressures increase 
                                                 
10 Before 1948, Hollywood majors used to control the whole value chain from production and distribution 
to exhibition of films. Their control of the exhibition sector in the US and other countries developed in 
part through price discrimination or price imposition on independent cinemas, exclusivity deals, blind or 
block booking and, in some extreme cases, research has reported mafia like tactics such as threats to real 
estate owners to deny lease of venues to independent cinemas (Churchman, 1997; King, 2002; Pendakur, 
1990). Despite the antitrust regulation that forced major Hollywood studios to divest from their exhibition 
businesses, the Paramount Decision (1948), they still control film production and distribution. They also 
established joint distribution efforts such as United International Pictures (UIP) a distribution arm 
between Paramount and Universal. This practice is forbidden within US territory by the antitrust Sherman 
law (1890). However, through the Web-Pomeran Export Act (1918) majors are allowed to establish 
alliances among themselves to distribute films in international markets (Scott, 2005). 
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exhibitors’ dependency on major Hollywood films and the voluntary adoption of the 
conventional practices dictated by their distributors. For instance, in 2008 an 
independent exhibitor in Mexico mentioned that major distributors set conditions on 
film supply with an advance payment for twice the cost of the print, which is illegal 
according to Mexican law. Nonetheless, the Mexican independent exhibitor said, “it is 
complicated to survive when we don’t have mega blockbusters”. Another independent 
exhibitor dealing with major distributors to obtain art-house films said, “sometimes they 
say ‘well, we have this movie but you have to screen this other one as well’, often one 
that hasn’t perform[ed] that well, but we also say, ‘well, give me the first one and later 
on we’ll program the second one’, we have to negotiate with them. {…} One doesn’t 
survive without the other.” In New Zealand a major distributor also mentioned 
establishing a partnership relation with exhibitors to let them know information about 
titles being released as early as possible:  
With a lot of films, up to two or three years out, we know what is coming in advance 
{…} the key thing is dating the films cause we are in a competitive environment so what 
we have to do is make sure that it is the best date possible like the holidays {…} 
exhibitors come to us ‘well, what kind of year are we having?’ because they need to do 
their budgets as well {…} so they can…, not guarantee but, have a reasonably reliable 
stream of income so they can invest {…} It gives them a lot of certainty.   
Another independent exhibitor in New Zealand said that distributor-exhibitor relations are 
different from other businesses  
where you have a customer-supplier relationship, where I think the customer {…} is 
really looked after by their suppliers. I think with film is just {…} a different relationship 
where they’ve got this content, ‘do you want it?’, ‘Here are the terms. {…} all those 
things, but you [exhibitors] are at the bottom… you are at the end of the queue {…} so I 
certainly think {…} it is a little bit taken for granted by distributors {…} it is not like a 
true supply-customer type relationship, I think, to be honest. 
The question is, how did this sui generis relation and fixed patterns of voluntary 
association and codependency come to be? Like other distribution activities, film 
distribution generates economies of scale11 in the form of widespread networks in which 
the bigger market audiences participate in the distribution system, the lower are the 
distributor’s marginal costs for delivering the film to each consumer. The network 
economies of scale were generated by Hollywood majors’ “strong central management 
                                                 
11 Distribution economies of scale are different from production economies of scale, although both refer 
to a decrease in marginal costs per unit distributed or produced. The film industry has enjoyed both and 
nowadays production and distribution of films can also add more economies of scale derived from the 
near-to-nill marginal costs of the digital copy (Garnham, 2005). 
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and widely diffused regional offices” which in turn created high levels of market share 
concentration (Scott, 2002, p. 969). For example, Warner Brothers has offices in 30 
countries and distributes films in 120 countries. It also distributes its extensive library of 
films, its slate of 18-22 blockbusters per year and around 250 films from foreign 
countries (Warner Bros., 2013). 
However, these network-effect economies of scale do not occur only on the supply side 
increasing value for major distributors, but they also increase value for exhibitors who 
capitalise from demand-side economies of scale. In other words, there are certain goods 
and services whose value to users depends not just on their intrinsic merits but on the 
number of other users connected to the network (Cassidy, 2009). This is the logic of 
network effects in many telecommunications and technology sectors, for example, 
railways, postal services, telephones, social media webpages, software and hardware. As 
an illustration, each Apple user “benefits from a larger network since this facilitates the 
exchange of files and tips, encourages software houses to devote more resources to 
develop software for” Apple (Shapiro & Varian, 1999, pp. 13–14).  
I argue that the greater number of cinema exhibitors or commercialisation outlets 
participating in majors Hollywood distribution networks, the more value the majors’ 
films acquire for each of them. This is even more so in the franchise-blockbuster model 
as it entails a pre-established fan base and “high intensity saturation marketing and 
distribution” strategies whose costs become equal to or greater than production costs 
(Scott, 2002, p. 959). These distribution strategies are cross-media promotion in 
different outlets horizontally integrated by media conglomerates as well as worldwide 
film release patterns. Therefore, for cinemas considering exhibiting a film, the scale of 
the distribution network behind it as well as the greater the number of other exhibitors 
engaged in commercialising it, becomes crucial as the product becomes more attractive 
to audiences, considering also the reputational characteristics of credence products like 
films. These dynamics reinforce the business model.  
Based on economist Brian Arthur’s arguments, Cassidy explains,  
before very long, markets of this nature tend to ‘tip’ in the direction of a single product, 
which acquires a monopoly or a near-monopoly position {…} (or ‘locks in’ to a position 
of greater power). Once this has happened, even rival goods that are cheaper or offer 
better features struggle to find a foothold (Cassidy, 2009, p. 131).  
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These arguments contribute to previous research to explain why “distribution is the 
segment of the [film] industry where oligopoly is most in evidence” (Scott, 2002, p. 
969). Specifically, it sheds light on exhibitors’ voluntary compliance with distributors’ 
terms and conditions. It also links film distribution with a wider economy where, 
“increasing returns reinforced through demand-side and supply-side economies of scale 
{…} form the backbone of the New Economy with fast-growing network industries and 
highly profitable monopolistic or oligopolistic companies” (Gottinger, 2003, p. xvi). 
However, putting aside the economic characteristics of film distribution, there are other 
political factors that help to explain the power of the oligopoly. For instance, through 
the MPAA and its equivalents in foreign regions, like the MPDANZ, major distributors 
have lobbied the US and foreign governments to favour their interests regarding 
copyright legislation and enforcement, syndication and anti-trust regulation, as well as 
establish free trade agreements (Hesmondhalgh, 2007; King, 2002; Scott, 2005). 
Table 14 Top 10 box office New Zealand films by distributor, 2003-2013 
 Title Distributor Released Lifetime Box Office 
1 Boy Transmission/Madman 2010 9,322,000 
2 The World’s Fastest Indian Beckers 2005 7,047,000 
3 Whale Rider Buena Vista/Disney 2003 6,400,000 
4 Sione’s Wedding SPP 2006 4,075,000 
5 Second-Hand Wedding Metropolis 2008 1,919,000 
6 Sione’s 2: Unfinished 
Business 
Sony and SPP 2012 1,817,000 
7 The Topp Twins: 
Untouchable Girls 
Rialto 2008 1,813,572 
8 In My Father’s Den Icon 2004 1,505,842 
9 Mt. Zion Sony 2013 1,216,285 
10 Out Of The Blue Dendy 2006 1,135,685 
Note. Own elaboration based on Top 15 NZ Movies compiled by MPDANZ (NZFC, 2013c).
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Distributors’ relations with local production in New Zealand 
International film distribution depends on national copyright legislation,12 and 
international marketing conventions like digital rights management (encryption and 
watermarking) “to prevent unauthorized access to and use of copyrighted works” 
(Herman, 2012, p. 168). For instance, New Zealand is considered part of Australasia 
with region code 4 for DVD films and B for Blue Ray films. There is also geo-blocking 
for online accounts in platforms like iTunes. This allows major companies to control the 
release dates and copyright of their products. However, it complicates international film 
distribution for smaller players like local distributors and producers. They require the 
financial, administrative, managerial, and infrastructural capacity of reputational 
networks to make deals with distribution agents or copyright holders from different 
territories. In order to do so they need to establish networks with mainstream 
distributors or search for alternative distribution to compete with the majors’ extensive 
infrastructure and market saturation.  
Interviews conducted for this research demonstrated the difficulties New Zealand films 
face in getting good distribution deals (see Chapter 8). From the NZFC directory of 13 
distributors, nine are “willing to receive unsolicited proposals from experienced [New 
Zealand] producers”, and four of them are major distributors (NZFC, 2012). But in fact, 
few major distributors have shown interest in New Zealand films; only three of the top 
10 New Zealand films released between 2003-2013 were distributed by the major 
distributors, Sony, Paramount (Transmission) and Disney as shown in Table 14 (NZFC, 
2013c). Rather it is independent distributors which have committed to distributing local 
films. The NZFC made efforts in the past to distribute films that it supported through 
NZ Film (its sales agency), but it has changed its strategy to help “facilitating contact 
with local distributors, advising on release strategies and providing a subsidy for 
theatrical releases” (NZFC, 2012). Despite such support, compared to the scale of 
NZFC budgets and efforts allocated to production, distribution support falls short. For 
instance, production and development take around 75% of the annual NZFC budget 
while expenditure on sales and distribution accounts only for around 10% (NZFC, 
2011). 
                                                 
12 Despite the Berne Convention to WIPO Copyright Treaty and WTO’s TRIPS. 
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Other distribution and commercialisation windows 
Some regulatory and environmental conditions have dis-incentivised local independent 
distributors and commercialisation windows. For years, retailers have found that 
censorship regulations have obstructed supply and consumer choices (Armitage, 2010). 
In 2009, Wellington’s Aro Video store and other interested players launched a campaign 
to reform The Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act of 1993 because of the 
“economic censorship” it represented (Croot, 2010). Under this legislation, the costs of 
classifying films and DVDs to be released (for sale or hire) in New Zealand amounted 
to $NZ1,100 per unit.13 According to the campaigners, the law “unfairly disadvantaged” 
independent theatres, video rental stores, retailers, online retailers, university libraries 
and public libraries, as well as private traders (Armitage, 2010; Croot, 2010). 
Campaigners were concerned with the double standards between the Films and Videos 
Act and the Broadcasting Act where censorship is self-regulated meaning that broadcast 
and cable TV could show any material without the need to receive a classification. The 
law does not affect either Internet media sourced from offshore or international retailers 
such as Amazon. Although the Classification Office offered fee waivers for artistic 
value films, allowing interested players to submit collective lists and reduced the costs 
by establishing digital labels, campaigners thought they were insufficient measures. It 
was “the impractical”, “cost-prohibitive” and “uneven playing field” that concerned 
local small and medium-sized distribution and commercialisation outlets (Armitage, 
2010). 
In spite of the fact that online film distribution lowers costs and is safe from capacity 
constraints when compared to cinema and video shops limited releases, online markets 
have developed with difficulty in many countries, except for the US. There are several 
reasons for this: costs involved with copyright clearances; files’ conversion and 
encoding; broadband and other technological impediments; the high barriers to entry 
due to the creation of new oligopolies that concentrate libraries (for example, iTunes, 
Netflix, and Amazon Prime); and “a new breed of content aggregators” which are filters 
or gatekeepers in charge of bundling content for online services (Lobato, 2009, p. 174). 
The ban on parallel imports (that is a ban on the import of films for nine or five months 
after of their release date) coupled with the data cap of Internet providers in New 
                                                 
13 Unless they had already been classified in Australia or the UK, which allows for cross-rating and 
diminishes costs dramatically. 
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Zealand have disincentivised film distribution through online outlets (Kebbell, 2013). 
But despite the Internet being a potential alternative market for emerging local 
companies and local film-makers, in the context of the current film market economy, the 
experience of other regions has raised some questions about this possibility. In his study 
of the emerging Australian film Internet market, Lobato (2009, p. 170) concludes that 
“online movie distribution is integrated with and reliant upon the commercial 
infrastructures of conventional film distribution.” 
An example from New Zealand is, as John Barnett, CEO of South Pacific Productions 
explained: iTunes “‘doesn’t deal with single-title producers’. Apple will only deal with 
consolidators who handle thousands of titles. ‘And mostly those consolidators are the 
US studios who are pushing their own titles” (Keall, 2012). For instance, the New 
Zealand film Sione’s Wedding is handled by Buena Vista for Australian distribution 
rights and Sony for New Zealand but none of them “wants to cede revenue arising from 
a trans-Tasman platform” (Keall, 2012).   
Despite these limitations, the newness of online retail means barriers to entry for the 
domestic market are still low, so it could represent a window of opportunity to develop 
local businesses. It could also be a cost-effective commercial or non-commercial 
alternative for domestic production to access bigger audiences, develop a taste with 
consumers and increase cultural diversity. This is more significant when alternative 
content on TV, retail and exhibition is scarce in traditional outlets. 
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Table 15 Profile of major distributors and their parent transnational media conglomerates 
Major studio & 
distributor 
WALT 
DISNEY 
STUDIOS 
WARNER 
BROS. 
21st CENTURY 
FOX 
PARAMOUNT 
PICTURES 
UNIVERSAL 
PICTURES 
COLUMBIA 
PICTURES 
Funding Year and 
Place 
1926 LA 1918 LA 1915 LA 
 
1914 LA 1912 NY 1919 LA 
Parent Company and 
Headquarters 
Walt Disney 
Company (LA) 
Time Warner 
(NY) 
News Corporation 
(NY) 
Viacom (NY) Comcast, NBC 
Universal (PN)  
Sony Group (Tokyo) 
Financial 
State 
 
(US$) 
Net 
Income 
8 billion 3.5 billion 4.5 billion 2.3 billion 6.8 billion 1.2 billion 
Total 
Assets 
84.1 billion 68.3 billion 54.7 billion 22.2 billion 158 billion 148 billion 
Total 
Equity 
44.9 billion 29 billion 17.4 billion 7.4 billion 51 billion 21 billion 
Employees 180,000 34,000 27,000 10,580 136, 000 140,990 
Activities Film, TV 
broadcasting, Pay 
TV services, 
Music, 
Publishing, 
Theme Parks, 
Radio, Web 
Portals 
Film, TV 
broadcasting, Pay 
TV services, 
Publishing, Theme 
Parks. 
Film, TV 
broadcasting, Pay 
TV services, Music, 
Publishing, Direct 
Broadcast Satellite 
TV 
Film, TV 
Broadcasting, Pay TV 
Services, Radio 
Publishing, Movies, 
Web Portals 
Film, TV 
broadcasting, Pay TV 
services, Theme 
Parks, Radio, Web 
Portals, 
Telecommunication 
Services 
Film, TV broadcasting, 
Pay TV services 
Electronics, Game, Music, 
Financial Services 
Note. Own elaboration based on 21st Century Fox (2013); Comcast (2014); Paramount Pictures (2013); Sony (2014); The Walt Disney Company (2008), (2014); Time Warner 
(2013, 2014).
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Economic indicators: Consumption 
The film industry consumption sector in New Zealand comprises several non-
commercial or market outlets that constitute the various dissemination windows for a 
film. Such outlets are cinema exhibition, video retail, video rental, online video, pay 
television (satellite, cable), and free to air television.  
There is, however, no available information about consumption of New Zealand films 
other than cinema and to a lesser extent television. Cinema theatre exhibition is a good 
indicator of commercial film consumption, not only because it is usually the first market 
window but because other commercial media outlets decisions are based on theatrical 
performance. Based on the Screen Industry Survey, cinema exhibition revenue in New 
Zealand, including local and foreign films, grew 12.5% from 2005 to 2012 (SNZ, 
2013c). New Zealanders’ attendance at the cinema has nonetheless decreased from 4.3 
visits to cinema per capita in 1999 to 3.8 in 2009.14 
 According to PwC, film exhibition, video rental and video retail subsectors altogether 
contributed $NZ147 million to New Zealand’s GDP, employed 3152 people and 
generated a labour income of $NZ111 million in 2012 (PwC, 2012). Aside from the 
windows mentioned above, there is also television broadcasting which is the largest 
market outlet (see Table 16) but local feature films represent a minor slate on TV 
programming. For example, in 2012 television programming of local films was an 
infrequent practice. Māori Television, a free-to-air public broadcaster, showed less than 
15 hours of New Zealand classic and first run feature films. The commercially oriented 
state-owned broadcaster, TV3, also repeated of a handful of bigger budget and more 
commercial local films (NZOA, 2012). In 2014, another state broadcaster, TVNZ 
Heartland, was regularly disseminating local feature films each week although the 
broadcast was available only through pay satellite TV, Sky (TVNZ, 2014).  
Data about local films consumed through physical or online windows is hard to obtain 
as these subsectors commercialise other screen products, not exclusively feature films. 
The reason I include television and video indicators in this analysis is not for its great 
significance but to show the profitability, market and dissemination window potential of 
these subsectors. 
                                                 
14 These are my own calculations based on information provided by Statistics New Zealand (2013a) and 
Screen Digest (2010b). UNESCO presents a 4.9 attendance per capita, a slightly different data for 1999 
(UNESCO, 2012b). 
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Table 16 Contribution of film market to New Zealand economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on PwC (2012). 
The number of exhibition and television broadcasting businesses has increased in recent 
years. The units that engage in theatrical and video commercialisation were 87 in 2012, 
whereas there were 48 television broadcasters (SNZ, 2007). Please refer to Figure 13. 
In terms of revenue, both film and TV markets have grown since 2007 but the television 
market has twice the revenue of other film markets. This is a reflection of the different 
consumption patterns in the form of widespread television sets in homes versus public 
performance at cinema theatres and sales or rental points (see Figure 14). Figure 15 
provides a breakdown of the different revenues of media outlets that comprise the film 
market category in which video retail and rental are slightly above cinema box office. It 
is likely that video rental will decrease as video shops have closed down in the last 
couple of years as a result of new online competition that increased 55% from 2010–
2011 with total sales of $NZ1.7 million. But, as reports comment “the employment and 
GDP impact (of online businesses) to the New Zealand economy is likely to be 
minimal” (PwC, 2012, p. 17). 
 
Value added (m) 
Labour income 
(m) 
Employment ( Full Time 
Equivalent, FTEs) 
Film 
Exhibition 
66 47 1365 
Rental 
58 46 1287 
Retail 
23 18 500 
TOTAL 
147 111 3152 
Television 
Broadcasting 
512 124 2779 
TOTAL 
659 235 5931 
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Figure 13 Number of film exhibition and television broadcasting companies in NZ, 
2005–2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b).  
 
 
 
Figure 14 Gross revenue of film and TV broadcasting markets in NZ, 2007–2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b) and PwC (2011). 
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Figure 15 Gross revenue of film market by different media outlets in NZ, 2007–2010 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on PwC (2012). 
Cinema exhibition is the oldest film commercialisation window, but it has nonetheless 
been able to keep itself up to date and competitive with other windows. For example, 
the adoption of multiplexes in the 1990s, the improvements in digital sound quality, and, 
more recently, new digital screening and 3D technologies. In New Zealand there were 
around 120 cinema complexes with 407 screens in 2013 (MPDANZ, 2013a; New 
Zealand Parliament, 2013a). Also, since 2003, the sector has been slowly transitioning 
to digital projection with 43% of screens remaining up to 2013 (MPDANZ, 2013a).  
The New Zealand exhibition sector is comprised of a handful of big cinema chains and 
a plethora of independent cinemas.15 They are represented by the New Zealand Motion 
Picture Industry Council (NZMPIC) that also groups distributors (Lido Cinema 
Hamilton, 2011). The country has high quality mainstream cinemas with high levels of 
market concentration. For instance, Event, Hoyts, Rialto, Berkeley and Reading 
cinemas are the top five cinema chains, and, together in the last decade, they 
concentrated an average of 56% of the box office (Screen Digest, 2013). Market 
concentration is even greater considering that Rialto Cinemas are co-owned by Event 
Cinemas and Reading International (Huffer, 2012; Event, 2014); and Hoyts acquired 
Berkeley Cinemas in 2010 (Gibson, 2010). In turn, Event Cinemas is owned by 
Australian Amalgamated Holdings Ltd, Hoyts is owned by Australian Pacific Equity 
                                                 
15 For example: Downtown Cinema, State Cinema, Lighthouse, Deluxe Cinemas, Art House and Bay 
City. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
2007 2008 2009 2010
M
ill
io
n
s
Film Commercialisation Outlets
Box Office
Physical sell-through
In store rental
Cinema Advertising
 
 
128 
 
Partners and Reading Cinemas is owned by US Reading International (ABC News, 
2007; Huffer, 2012). Data from 2010–2011 indicate that those three foreign companies 
had 70% share of the New Zealand box office (Huffer, 2012). 
Nonetheless, New Zealand is also enjoying an expansion of boutique cinemas and 
upscale, smaller independent cinemas focused on niche markets with discerning 
audiences (as described by a number of representatives of independent and major 
exhibitors interviewed for this research). These are the cinemas that struggle the most to 
keep afloat in the current digital transition but through the Independent Cinemas 
Association of Australasia (ICAA), some of them have access to equipment installation 
and maintenance through bulk buying using the money collected from the Virtual Print 
Fee (VPF). The VPF is a temporary subsidy paid by distributors to exhibitors to help 
them convert to digital; it represents distributors’ savings in manufacturing and shipping 
prints’ costs thanks to digital technology (MKPE Consulting, 2012). The ICAA 
agreement followed the one established between major cinema chains and studio 
distributors in the region which had excluded independent cinemas (Screen Digest, 
2010a).  
As mentioned in the last section, demand-side network economies of scale have created 
a mutual dependency between exhibitors and major Hollywood distributors favouring 
their own films. This dependency is not exclusive to mainstream exhibition chains, but 
occurs also in independent cinemas. In its study of Wellington exhibition Huffer (2012, 
p. 257) found that:  
Market forces also ensure these [independent] cinemas’ dependence upon transnational 
distributors, revealing some of the limitations of such local [independent exhibitor’s] 
success. {…} The result of this is that much of the takings for films screened in 
Wellington’s independent cinemas make their way overseas [maximised by New 
Zealand’s generous policy on transnational earnings]. 
The distribution and exhibition market concentration also has effects on the diversity of 
films released by the country of origin and their revenue. From 1999 to 2012, New 
Zealand released an average of seven films per year which collected an average of 
$NZ6 million revenue per year. In contrast, a mean of 219 foreign films were released 
each year, mostly from the US, and they accounted for an average of $NZ147.3 million 
revenue per year (Screen Digest, 2013). Table 17 shows that in 2012, there were eight 
New Zealand films commercially released representing 3% of 290 movies that year. It 
also shows the dominance of US films (107) which accounted for 37% of the total. This 
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was followed by films from India (11%), UK (10%), Europe (6%), Asia (4%), China 
(2%) and Australia (1%).  
Table 17 Country of origin for films released in 2012 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
Number of films 
released 
Per Cent 
US 107 37 
India 32 11 
UK 28 10 
Europe1 18 6 
Asia2 12 4 
NZ3 8 3 
China 5 2 
Australia 3 1 
Other countries 6 2 
Co-productions 69 24 
NZ Co-productions 2 1 
Total 290 100 
Note. Own elaboration based on data from (IMDB, 2014b). It includes Fiji and New Zealand territories. 1 
Except the UK. 2 Except China and India. 3 In a different source (MPDA-NZFC, 2013) NZ released 12 
movies in 2012.  
 
 
However, the dominance of US films is more evident when looking at their share of the 
annual box office. All US films represented 37% of the films released in New Zealand 
but they concentrated 53.5% of the revenue. By contrast, New Zealand films accounted 
for 3% of the films released and accumulated 1.9% of the revenue. The rest of the box 
office (44.6%) corresponded to films from other countries. 
As Lobato argues “the potential for oligopoly is (also) distressingly high in online” 
video on demand (VOD) market (Lobato, 2009, p. 176). After all, network economies of 
scale also operate in the online market, especially since there are so many copyright and 
filtering costs involved; for example, the need to raise audience awareness for 
promotional reasons. Distributors will only make this financial “effort for films that 
have demonstrated the ability to make money back […] As a result, the pool of films 
[…] will overlap to a very large extent with those that are theatrically released” (Lobato, 
2009, p. 174).   
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Table 18 Box office revenue by country of origin in 2012 
COUNTRY 
Box Office 
Revenue 
(m) 
Per 
Cent 
US 75397134 53.5 
NZ 2638479 1.91 
Other 
Countries 62872240 44.6 
TOTAL 140907853 100.0 
Note. Own elaboration based on data from (IMDB, 2014b)1 Slightly different to 2.2% in other source 
(MPDA-NZFC, 2013).  
 
 
New Zealand data from 2011 for online film content subscription or VOD show that 
revenue for online retail (downloads) accounted for $NZ1.2 million while online rental 
(streaming) represented $NZ0.5 million. The online services available are mainly 
foreign, such as European Movieurope, Australian Quickflix, and US-based iTunes 
store, MovieFlix, Movieway, MUBI and Zune Video. “CASPA OnDemand [is] a New 
Zealand-Australian joint venture between TVNZ and Australian company Seven Media 
Group” (PwC, 2012, p. 17). And in 2013, Hamilton-based, Indie Reign was launched as 
an online service for independent films, with offices in India and the US (Keall, 2012). 
Only time will tell how these websites perform. 
A report by PwC (2012) commissioned by NZFact, founded by major studios’ 
distributors, argued that “because online movie services are largely based overseas and 
concentrate on providing overseas-originated content to New Zealand consumers, they 
are likely to have a relatively limited effect on the New Zealand economy” (PwC, 2012, 
p. 17). Ironically other film market windows, as shown in this chapter, are also largely 
based overseas and provide overseas content. Although it is true that film exhibition and 
retail generate a higher number of jobs, these are low-pay, non-skilled jobs.  
The silent debate 
Except for fiscal deregulation, other public policies and government sectoral reviews in 
New Zealand hardly ever address the distribution and exhibition sectors. The NZFC 
barely touches this area as it allocates only less than 10% of its budget to support local 
films in distribution and sales. And only at the initiative of some programmers of public 
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broadcasters (TVNZ Heartland and Māori Television) a modest number of local films 
are broadcasted. 
Nonetheless, in 2003 the government was involved in a piece of legislation concerning 
commercial distribution and exhibition of foreign films. Theatrical releases from 
overseas had traditionally been delayed several months before being shown in New 
Zealand. One reason behind this was the distributors’ marketing strategy to test movies 
in other countries to decide if the film was successful enough to bring it to New Zealand 
(Kebbell, 2013). Another reason was the unavailability of film prints and New Zealand 
had to wait for second-run prints (Macnab, 2012). However, in 2003 digital screening 
technologies were being introduced and the conversion of cinemas to the new 
technology made costly prints no longer necessary. To help with the expenses of the 
digital switchover (estimated around $NZ100, 000 per screen), the government passed a 
temporary clause on the Copyright Bill that same year which favoured exhibitors’ 
recoupments (New Zealand Parliament, 2013b). The so-called ban on parallel imports 
prohibited films being imported from overseas distributors being resold within the first 
nine months from the first market theatrical release. And the ban was extended in 
subsequent reviews in 2008 and 2013.  
Although, the government and parliament have justified the ban as necessary to help the 
digital conversion of rural and provincial independent cinemas, another major argument 
was the discrepancy between US and New Zealand holidays, given that holidays are a 
favourite time for cinema releases. In other words, the ban was also justified in terms of 
allowing major film distributors to delay releases in New Zealand, to play with the 
optimal times, such as holiday periods that differ from the US, and still have control 
over the timeframe to benefit from additional revenue from other windows waterfall 
after cinema release such as video, online, pay and free TV―see Table 19 (Kebbell, 
2013). This fit Hollywood’s blockbuster release model perfectly.  
On the one hand, the ban mainly benefited major US distributors, exhibitors who 
depended on these types of products, and, small or medium, local, authorised 
distributors who did not have to compete with overseas distributors. It could be argued 
that it also helped independent distributors and exhibitors with focus on art-house films 
and festivals although their timeframes are usually different from holiday films. 
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Indirectly, it also benefited international retailers (such as Amazon) with respect to 
personal imports as these were not affected by the ban.  
On the other hand, players negatively affected were video rental, physical and online 
retailers (like The Warehouse, JB Hi Fi, Video Ezy or Quickflix) that had to wait for the 
local authorised distributors to release the products. While they waited they faced 
competition from consumer personal imports from overseas retailers and piracy. 
Consequently, according to an MBIE review of 2013, customers had limited options and 
online retailers were underdeveloped as they had no incentives to compete and benefit 
from the legal framework (Kebbell, 2013).  
The revision of the temporary ban which was due to expire in October 2013 generated 
an interesting debate. Industry beneficiaries, such as the Hollywood studios represented 
by MPDANZ (2013b), and opponents, such as Consumer New Zealand (2013) and 
Creative Freedom Foundation (New Zealand Parliament, 2013b), presented submissions 
defending their interests. The government officials, as indicated by the ministerial 
review, inclined towards eliminating the ban (Kebbell, 2013). However, the government 
proposed a fast-track initiative to reduce it to five months and to extend it three more 
years to 2016 (New Zealand Parliament, 2013a). Discussions in Parliament led to the 
support of the government proposal by the majority, including the opposition Labour 
Party. Their main argument was that cinemas would still have a period of protection, 
which would help to support the 40% remaining screens in small towns in their 
conversion to digital. Local authorised distributors were more affected as their 
protection was reduced from six to two months (see Table 19). On the contrary only the 
Green Party, Mana, and independent MP, Brendan Horan, opposed the law. Gareth 
Hughes from the Green Party criticised the ‘holiday season’ argument as a justification 
to establish a statutory monopoly to protect holiday season films. If provincial cinemas 
were at the core of the concerns and if 10 years had not been enough to convert to 
digital, 
the most effective {…} way {…} the government could support the digital transition 
[he said] is actually cash support {…} financing support. We have seen it in other 
sectors of the economy. {…} the industry should be asking for transparent support 
mechanisms that do not disadvantage other industries, other competitors. (New Zealand 
Parliament, 2013b) 
Hughes then questioned ignoring the recommendation of government officials in what 
seemed to him “another special deal for the Government’s mates. We have seen that 
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with Warner Bros. [alluding to The Hobbit dispute―see Chapter 6], we have seen it 
with Skycity” (New Zealand Parliament, 2013b). In the last quotation, ‘government’s 
mates’ alludes to major transnational corporations benefited by government policies. 
Table 19 Regulatory and conventional release patterns of different window formats 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
INTERNATIONAL FIRST 
MARKET  
THEATRICAL 
RELEASE 
DVDs are 
not 
available 
in any 
region 
DVDs 
RELEASE 
 
NEW ZEALAND   
 
5 MONTHS BAN 
 
(2013-2016) 
WINDOW 
FOR NZ 
THEATRICAL 
RELEASE  
STARTS 
 
 Window for 
local 
authorised 
DVD 
distributors 
could start 
 
Personal 
imports 
allowed 
INTERNATIONAL 
IMPORTS 
ALLOWED FOR 
RESALE 
 
NEW ZEALAND  
 
9 MONTHS BAN 
 
(2003-2013) 
WINDOW 
FOR NZ 
THEATRICAL 
RELEASE 
STARTS 
 Window for local authorised DVD distributors could 
start 
 
Personal imports allowed 
INTERNATIONAL 
IMPORTS 
ALLOWED FOR 
RESALE 
Note. Own elaboration based on Kebbell (2013). The table illustrates the timeframes for each potential 
activity according to regulation and industry conventions; it does not provide exact dates for the windows 
as they depend on each film. 
The debate about the review was not mentioned in the media and hardly considered by 
the public opinion. Despite its crucial structural importance, distribution and exhibition 
policies do not command the same attention as film production in the media, 
government policies or screen agencies.  
Decision-making in this case followed a policy process that showed a non-linear 
directive. Adhering to Thompson’s model (2011a) of media policy development, it 
could be said that the ban’s extension showed contesting positions and institutional 
interplay within the government―MBIE’s advisors versus regulators, and differences 
between parties frequently allied in Parliament― as well as negotiation to address the 
different interests of the stakeholders, hence the selection of the middle-ground 
scenario. This by no means implies the exclusion of power relations in the interaction 
among regulators, policymakers, industry players and macro-level forces (Thompson, 
2011a). For example, government regulators’ power to ignore ministerial advice and to 
shape circumstances, like speeding up the legislative process, have become a recurring 
feature in the National-party government’s pragmatic attitude towards film industry 
policy (see Chapter 6). Moreover, despite the opposition within and without the 
government, the regulatory decision has the intentional (or unintentional) effect of 
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benefitting transnational interests, specifically the distributors of the major Hollywood 
studios capitalising on holiday season films in New Zealand. 
Conclusions 
This chapter addressed the question: What are the relations among the phases of the film 
industry value chain in New Zealand and what do they mean to its sustainability? The 
chapter examined the value chain phases of distribution and consumption of films in 
New Zealand based on its historical and current industrial, policy and sectoral economic 
developments. I have also discussed the impact these developments might have on the 
production of films in the country and this will be expanded in Chapter 6. The 
implications of these national configurations on distribution and consumption have 
Wellington-specific issues that would be discussed in Chapter 8. 
I have argued that film distribution and exhibition sectors have followed an early 
industrial and commercial path. Both were also prematurely geared to the supply of 
foreign, mainly Hollywood films. Therefore, it is not unexpected that early government 
regulations were concerned as early as the 1930s with market saturation of foreign 
films. They were also worried about unfair competition and monopolistic practices. 
Hence the prohibition of block-booking as well as the establishment of ‘local’ (British 
and Commonwealth) content quotas. Since the second half of the twentieth century, 
international and transnational companies developed an invested interest in New 
Zealand distribution and exhibition sectors.  
Considering that New Zealand-owned distribution businesses are modest, that better- 
positioned distributors have stronger links to international commercialisation outlets and 
that major Hollywood distributors dominating the New Zealand market favour the films 
made by their parent studios, New Zealand local films face the difficulty of finding 
good distribution deals for local and international markets. This difficulty was suggested 
in the secondary sources and confirmed in interviews conducted for this research (see 
chapters 6 and 8).  
This is an issue shared with other regions in the world: “conventional film distribution 
structures are notoriously ineffective at returning revenues to film-makers, [and] it is a 
mistake to presume that online alternatives will necessarily perform better” (Lobato, 
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2009, p. 175). This is at least so in the current oligopolistic, free market regulation in 
New Zealand.  
Distribution and cinema exhibition sectors are highly concentrated, which presents an 
oligopolistic environment for a few transnational companies. This in turn creates a 
barrier to opportunities for new business entry and smaller business growth that cannot 
compete on that scale. As I discussed earlier, this also has an impact on the level of 
diversity of films that can be shown and be profitable in the country, due to the 
codependency that demand-side economies of scale generate between major Hollywood 
studios’ distributors and commercial outlets, especially, exhibitors. However, as 
presented in Chapter 6, the local film production sector remained disenfranchised. I 
propose that this, among other factors, explains why the local production sector 
continued to be unable to disseminate products and to participate in positive cycles in 
the existing value chain. This, impacts directly on the sustainability of the local film 
industry. 
The historical and recent dominance of foreign film distributors and exhibitors in New 
Zealand is favoured by the regulatory environment. Lax fiscal and foreign investment 
schemes have limited “the extent to which the people of New Zealand benefit 
economically from such foreign investment” (Huffer, 2012, p. 255). Another example of 
a favourable regulatory environment for foreign firms is the case of the ban on parallel 
imports. The logic behind it considered film distribution and exhibition sectors as 
internally homogeneous. Government intervention has been legitimised in terms of 
protection to small local cinema exhibition businesses for their potential to provide 
cultural diversity. However, as I have argued here, the distribution and exhibition 
sectors are heterogeneous, evidencing structural asymmetries; they are composed of 
vulnerable players but also by very powerful transnational players that certainly do not 
justify such special treatment. By blurring these differences, these homogenising 
policies work best for corporatist transnationalism influencing the regulation of the local 
environment in New Zealand. This environment suits the capital concentration of 
Hollywood majors but negatively affects opportunities to develop a sustainable 
domestic film industry. The ban on parallel imports facilitates market saturation of 
Hollywood films, the lax fiscal laws expand the ability of transnational companies to 
expatriate profits whereas local products have reduced access to distribution and 
commercialisation outlets and miss the opportunity to enjoy profits and reinvest them. 
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The ban and the “economic censorship” create a non-competitive environment that 
discourages smaller distribution and commercialisation players to risk in investing in 
diverse products, including local films. 
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Chapter 6  
Analysis of the Value Chain: Production 
In a similar way to the previous chapter, this one addresses: What are the relations 
among the phases of the film industry value chain in New Zealand and what do they 
mean to its sustainability? However, in this chapter I shift from a focus on the phases of 
distribution and commercialisation of films to film production. I continue to assess the 
value chain articulation as suggested by PEC, and make some final remarks about the 
influence this has on its sustainability. In doing so, this chapter complements the 
previous one and will integrate its findings. The national film policies and state of the 
national production sector are determinants as they enable and limit the development of 
the film industry in Wellington. Therefore, they inform the integrative analysis of the 
interviews and secondary qualitative data presented in Chapters 7–9 which are 
dedicated to Wellington.   
I will look again at three different areas that complement and influence one another: 
industrial development, policy accounts and sectoral economic indicators. The objective 
of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the production sector in New 
Zealand, to describe its current environment, and examine its economic variables.  
Unlike distribution and exhibition, the study of the film production sector policies and 
industrial outcomes in New Zealand has been researched extensively in numerous 
academic and policy reports. This chapter draws on such accounts and also presents 
original findings from document analysis to integrate a comprehensive overview. The 
chapter includes an analysis of sectoral economic indicators from primary and 
secondary sources. In this area, a major problem with official and non-official statistical 
information is the limitations within the sources. These include confidentiality due to 
commercial sensitivity and lack of continuity in the measurement of variables; the 
aggregation of subsectors (such as film production and post-production), formats (such 
as film, television and commercials), and other categories (like the combination of 
production with auxiliary service businesses). I have paid attention to the organisation 
compiling or commissioning the statistical reports because, although difficult to 
demonstrate, it could be inferred that commercial and political decisions might be 
involved in the way that data is or is not reported and presented. Nonetheless, when 
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critically examined, I consider those sources helpful for observing certain industry 
trends. 
Historical Overview: Industry and Policy 
The dissociated historical relation between production, distribution and 
commercialisation sectors in New Zealand suggests the need to apply a different 
periodisation for the production sector. Unlike the film distribution and exhibition 
business success, film production in New Zealand was quickly relegated by an 
oversupply of foreign films. Its more recent development has been significant but 
knitted tightly to cultural policies. 
Table 20 Periodisation of the film industry in New Zealand 
PERIODISATION OF THE FILM INDUSTRY IN NEW ZEALAND 
1896 l  1900 l 1910 I 1920 I1930 l  1940   l    1950 l    1960 l   1970 l 1980 l 1990 l 2000 l 2010              
EXHIBITION 
SECTOR 
Pre-industrial 
phase 
Industrial Phase 
National International Transnational 
DISTRIBUTION 
SECTOR 
National 
 
 International Transnational 
PRODUCTION 
SECTOR 
      Pioneer period Crisis period Welfare 
State 
period* 
Growth-
Model 
period* 
Note. Own elaboration. * Based on King (2010) and Potts & Cunningham (2008). 
Again based on the level of industrialisation and film policies, I suggest the 
periodisation of the history of the production sector in New Zealand can be divided into 
three main periods:  
1. A pioneer phase, characterised by the early production of shorts and feature films, 
followed by a period of crisis when production decreased almost entirely. 
2. The second phase, which I call the “welfare-state period”, was distinguished by 
government intervention and commitment to developing local production. 
3. The third phase, or the “growth-model period”, identifies a marked orientation 
towards economic growth policies attracting foreign capital (King, 2010). Film 
production in New Zealand continues in this phase today.  
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The following sections provide a description of the historical developments of each 
period to set up the analysis of past and current trends in the sector and the sector’s 
relations with the rest of the value chain.  
The pioneer and crisis periods 
The pioneer period commenced around 1898 when the first film was shot in New 
Zealand (Watson, 1988). From 1914 to 1926 there was  a prolific period of commercial 
feature-length films which were “distinctively colonial”, mainly epics of European roots 
and Māori themes as well as depictions of Māori-Pakeha cross-cultural relations  
(Watson, 1988, p. 80). Many film-makers in the first half of the twentieth century, like 
the iconic Rudall Hayward, would spend their personal fortunes on their film projects 
and combine their filmmaking with other professions and make hardly any money from 
films (Churchman, 1997, p. 50). The only constant source of work and training came 
from producing newsreels for cinemas or for state propaganda―tourism or war 
documentaries―through the Publicity Office and, later on, the National Film Unit or 
NFU (1941–1991). The latter became heavily criticised for government editorial control 
and its monopoly on film processing. At the time the private sector had been forbidden 
to acquire processing equipment. Some independent film companies existed between 
the 1930s and the 1970s but “economics restricted them {…} to short films and 
commercial work” (Churchman, 1997, p. 58). One of them, Pacific Films, was founded 
in 1948 by ex-NFU workers who were critical of the politically motivated editorial 
control at NFU and produced a few features, many documentaries and television 
commercials (Watson, 1988). In sum, the economic depression, the high cost of making 
features and talkies, the competition with vertically integrated television―with 
internalised production―and the disenfranchisement of commercial distribution and 
exhibition sectors, “combined to negate the commercial viability of New Zealand film 
production” (Churchman, 1997, p. 54). As a result the pioneer period entered into crisis 
in the 1930s and from 1940s to the 1970s only three feature films were made (Watson, 
1988).  
The welfare state period 
The year 1977 was a watershed year marking the beginning of the transition towards the 
“welfare state period”. “In that year, Roger Donaldson’s Sleeping Dogs, underwritten by 
the Art’s Council and with completion guarantees from Television New Zealand, proved 
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to be a domestic box office success.” (King, 2010, p. 158). This period marked the 
renaissance of local feature production, and the beginning of the New Zealand Film 
Commission era. However, this breakthrough was preceded by gradual changes in 
cultural policy since the creation of the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council (QEIIAC) in 
1963.  
The creation of the QEIIAC entailed a welfare state approach to arts and culture in New 
Zealand, meaning that the state was willing to pay an economic cost to encourage and 
support artistic and cultural creation understood as ‘high culture manifestations.’ The 
objectives were to make New Zealanders ‘cultured’ as well as to gain maturity and 
status as a nation. More than ten years later, the Arts Council moved from thinking of 
New Zealanders as spectators to think of them as participants (Skilling, 2005).  
In 1970, the QEIIAC commissioned the Arts Conference which in turn recommended 
establishing a government organisation to train workers, finance, export, and archive 
New Zealand films. After eight years of government-commissioned research and 
advocacy, the New Zealand Film Commission was created through the NZFC Act of 
1978 (Waller, 1996). The bill was passed with the support of major parties (Blomkamp, 
2012). Created by statute as a crown entity and governed by an independent board 
appointed initially by the Department of Internal Affairs (and now by the Ministry of 
Culture and Heritage), NZFC has since been a pillar for domestic production. Its broad 
functions include: “to encourage and also to participate and assist in the making, 
promotion, distribution, and exhibition of films {…} [and] to encourage and promote 
cohesion within the New Zealand film industry”  (New Zealand Film Commission Act, 
1978, p. 18). The NZFC established a set of criteria to define the New Zealand film 
industry in terms of narrative and thematic concerns, authorship, ownership and diegetic 
referent16 (Waller, 1996). 
The idea of cultural nationalism underlies the arguments that legitimised the creation of 
NZFC (Blomkamp, 2012). For example, the creation of the NZFC followed concerns 
about the foreign dominance in the marketplace (Waller, 1996). The NZFC was 
intended to be “a vehicle for the development of a national film culture” and was 
“targeted to productions with significant New Zealand content” (New Zealand Film 
                                                 
16 Diegetic referent refers to subject, shooting locations, site of technical facilities, the nationality and 
residence of investors, copyright holders or film-makers including the producers, writers, and actors. 
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Commission Act, 1978). Drawing on Potts and Cunningham’s  models (2008), King 
(2010) highlighted the correspondence of the NZFC principles with the broader 
“welfare model” of cultural policy at the time: “‘New Zealand content’ and ‘national 
film culture’ were assumed to be merit goods, which should therefore be subsidized 
from public funds” (King, 2010, p. 158). Yet, in the creation of the NZFC, it was 
assumed that its role in a market and industrial environment was that of “an industry 
facilitator, offering an investment aimed at gathering income” (Blomkamp, 2012, p. 
633). But even though the terms of the Act did “not envisage any market-driven role” 
(King, 2010, p. 158), the path that the NZFC followed in the next decades became 
highly shaped by market rationalism.   
The impact of the NZFC was clearly evident: local production took off and 63 feature 
films were produced between 1977 and 1992 (Waller, 1996). This boom was further 
propelled by a loophole found by lawyers, bankers and the NZFC “whereby investors 
couldn’t lose if they invested in a film regardless of its success or failure” (Jones et al., 
2003, p. 36). It allowed private investors to have immediate write-offs and even to claim 
liability for money contributed by the NZFC (Waller, 1996). The tax loophole was 
closed in 1985 after being abused by foreign investors (Jones et al., 2003).  
In the late 1980s Labour increased government grants to the NZFC and although in 
1991 the National government cut the agency’s budget by 20%, resources derived from 
the lotteries increased. However, in this period the justification to support the film 
industry shifted from cultural nationalism to economic rationalism. The demands of 
economic rationalism could be seen, for example, in the NZFC’s increased focus on 
commercial films, the requirement that projects demonstrate market interest, and 
institutional obligations to comply with performance measures and accountability 
guidelines. Several authors (Blomkamp, 2012; Jones et al., 2003; Skilling, 2005) have 
observed that this period saw the beginning of the need to align cultural and film 
policies with the dominant economic discourse to overcome marginalisation in policy 
debates. Although the 1990s saw no debate about arts funding due to the clash of the 
cultural and commercial frames (Albiston, 2000), at the end of the decade another tax 
loophole had attracted Hollywood producers and investors of The Lord of the Rings 
trilogy (TLOTR). However, this loophole was closed in 1999 as “the risk of failure to 
the taxpayer was too high, and it fostered tax avoidance rather than genuine investment 
in the local economy” (Jones et al., 2003, p. 37). 
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Current Issues and Policies: The Growth-Model Period  
Helen Clark period: the industry divide 
For methodological purposes, I suggest the conceptualisation of a “growth-model 
period” in the history of film production in New Zealand emerging around 1999. This is 
based on King’s (2010) observation of the introduction of the growth-model in creative 
industries policies in New Zealand. According to Potts and Cunningham (2008) in this 
model the creative industries are seen to “facilitate the adoption and retention of new 
ideas or technologies to other sectors”, and consequently, policies regard creative 
industries as a “‘special sector’ not because it is economically significant in itself, but 
because it powers the growth of other sectors” (Potts & Cunningham, 2008, pp. 237–
238).  
The growth-model ideas correspond to the policy discourse studied in New Zealand by 
different authors as they analysed the fifth Labour government’s cultural agenda, which 
was reframed as a ‘creative industries policy’ (Volkerling, 2010). As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, creative industries policies originated in the UK; in New Zealand, such ideas 
were transferred and translated into the country’s specificities (Prince, 2010). In a 
similar way to the UK, they became central to economic policy discourses and part of a 
broader “third-way policy” approach attempting to overcome the paradigms of the 
“first-way” (the welfare state) and the “second-way” with its market driven polices 
(Prince, 2010; Skilling, 2005).  
However, scholars have observed that in New Zealand the third-way creative industries 
policies were dominated by neoliberal economic and political rationality. A set of 
authors perceived such rationality as a political metanarrative in which neoliberal traits 
of market-driven aspects dominated over cultural aspects (Blomkamp, 2012; Conor, 
2004; Skilling, 2005). In Blomkamp’s words while “creative industries discourse seems 
to accommodate both cultural nationalism and economic rationalism, the latter frame 
retains more legitimacy in public policy in New Zealand” (Blomkamp, 2012, p. 640). 
Another set of authors perceived neoliberal rationality as the result of institutional 
practices, mechanisms of rewards, and the interplay of institutional interests (Campbell 
& Jones, 2009; Thompson, 2011a). As Campbell and Jones (2009) observe this period’s 
film initiatives and policies were constantly challenged, criticised and contested in 
numerous debates by different stakeholders. Like the developments of broadcasting 
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policies (Thompson, 2011a), film industry polices also experienced inter-ministerial 
tensions among the Ministry of Culture and Heritage (MCH), the Ministry of Economic 
Development (MED) and the Treasury. This shows the complexity of interests 
mobilised by the industry, as well as the heterogeneous formation of government 
policies. It shows the accommodation and struggle around de facto economic powers 
faced by different institutional players and the interests at stake in the private, public 
and social spheres. 
I suggest here that, as a reflection of the third-way policies, two kinds of film policy 
took shape during this period: (a) a central policy focused on subsidies to attract 
external allocation of resources (FDI) and whose economic justification fitted under the 
influence of the Ministry of Economic Development; and (b) a peripheral policy 
focused on the local industry, culturally justified but still accompanied by a commercial 
imperative. The second type of film policy, under the influence of the Ministry for 
Culture and Heritage, continued with the NZFC subsidies schemes and created a new 
film fund as a result of the advocacy of local industry representatives over several years. 
The evolution of this bifurcation is noticeable in the film initiatives undertaken during 
Clark’s government. 
Overall, this period was the most prolific in the feature film production history of New 
Zealand. During the tenure of the Labour Government 120 feature films were made: 
satellite, domiciled and international co-productions (New Zealand Parliament, 2010b). 
Since the electoral campaign of 1999 the Labour party had produced Uniquely New 
Zealand, a document that promised to reinvigorate the arts as elements of sustainable 
employment and economic growth (Prince, 2010). Once in power in 2000, Prime 
Minister Helen Clark “declared herself the Minister for Culture and the Arts” putting the 
arts and cultural sector at the core of the government (Conor, 2004, p. 64).  
That year, the government began consultations with the cultural and public sectors 
(Prince, 2010). In addition, the government commissioned the Hot Nation Project Team 
to elaborate a cultural policy plan. The team prepared the report The Heart of the 
Nation: A Cultural Strategy for Aotearoa New Zealand which defined the creative 
industries along the lines of the British definition as “a range of commercially-driven 
businesses whose primary resources are {…} intellectual property {…} individual 
creativity, skill and talent” (Hot Nation Project Team, cited in Prince, 2010, p. 178).  
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External allocation focus 
In 2000, the Heart of the Nation report recommended dismantling Creative New 
Zealand (CNZ) and forming a new creative industries agency to develop markets, 
careers and products for the sector. These recommendations were rejected by the 
government as they were too costly and contradicted the government view of a self-
capable sector that needed no state intervention (Prince, 2010). Although this rejection 
safeguarded CNZ’s support to traditional arts, I propose that this decision symbolised a 
milestone in policymaking. Contrary to the government’s view of the cultural industries 
as a self-capable sector, as the report circulated in the MED, the creative industries 
stopped being conceived of as economically viable, as depicted in the report. Instead, 
they became important inputs and value added for other economic sectors and branding 
(Prince, 2010). This was reflected in the 2002 economic plan Growth and Innovation 
Framework (GIF) (Conor, 2004) that saw the creative industries as one of the three key 
knowledge-intensive economic sectors―including biotechnology and information-
telecommunications―which acted as enablers to other sectors and liable to receive 
policy intervention (Campbell & Jones, 2009) . I also suggest that the cost-effective 
rhetoric that led to the rejection of the report set a precedent for the government to make 
policies directed at attracting foreign capital with the logic of creating spillovers to other 
sectors. 
In 2003, GIF suggested the creation of the Screen Production Industry Taskforce (SPT) 
to identify the barriers to growth in foreign exchange earnings in the screen industry 
(Campbell & Jones, 2009). That same year SPT released a report through the MED that 
recommended establishing a Screen Council, to sign film co-production treaties, and to 
change government agencies’ policies of recoupment to allow producers to reinvest. It 
also recognised that public funding had “limitations, financially, commercially and 
creatively” (SPT, 2003, p. 8). The Screen Council was formed by members of the 
industry and its objectives were to oversee the five-year growth targets pinpointed by 
SPT (Conor, 2004). Initially, NZFC opposed the establishment of the Screen Council as 
it considered the Council duplicated NZFC functions. These tensions also came from 
SPT’s criticism of the industry’s dependency on NZFC and its “inhibiting cultural 
imperatives” (Campbell & Jones, 2009, p. 17).  
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Another concern of the SPT report was the lack of government incentives to attract 
foreign capital after the completion of TLOTR (Campbell & Jones, 2009). In 2003, the 
New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) and Pinflicks Communications 
released the report Capability study: The New Zealand Screen Production Industry 
which warned against attracting satellite productions since foreign producers could hold 
a strong bargaining position as well as increase production costs. However, they also 
noted that excess capacity―that is, workers and service providers―might be able to 
absorb inflationary costs (Campbell & Jones, 2009). Meanwhile, Peter Jackson and 
SPADA had fruitlessly lobbied the government to consider tax incentives for foreign 
productions. But in 2003, the New Zealand government launched the Large Budget 
Screen Production Grant (LBSPG) based on the Australian grant (KPMG, 2009). It 
offered 12.5% return on the costs of productions spending more than $NZ50 million as 
well as to projects spending between $NZ15 to $NZ50 million (Campbell & Jones, 
2009). It was increased to 15% in 2007―following the Australian review in 2006―and 
increased again in 2013 to 25%. In 2007, the Post, Digital and Visual Effects Grant 
(PDVG) was created to offer incentives to attract projects to undertake post-production 
and VFX in New Zealand.  
The grants were provided by the MED but administered by NZFC and the Treasury was 
then, reluctantly, positioned as an important player to subsidise such tax incentives. 
Disputes among Treasury and MED officials date back to 2003. As media reported in 
that year: “A $40 million-a-year scheme subsidising Hollywood blockbusters made in 
New Zealand will have a minimal effect on the economy and could even set it back $5 
million, Treasury papers say” (Berry, 2003). With the Minister of Economic 
Development, Jim Anderton, replying: “Those projects could result in a $300 million 
investment in this country and the scheme overall would result in a net economic 
benefit” (Berry, 2003). Similar news continued to come to light through Official 
Information Act requests for a Treasury evaluation in 2005 which stated “the baseline 
net economic impact of the scheme was a loss of $9m” and MED’s position that the 
Treasury’s “2005 sample was too small” (Campbell, 2010).  
The local film industry 
The post-electoral political will towards the cultural sector was capitalised at an early 
stage in 2000. Based on social cohesion, national culture, and economic growth 
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justifications Helen Clark announced a Cultural Recovery Package of $NZ80 million 
(Conor, 2004). In addition to the NZFC funding, a Film Production Fund was created 
with a budget of $NZ19.5 million to support local films with larger, commercial and 
more complex budgets (King, 2010).   
In 2003, the state of production seemed promising: 
Whale Rider and The Two Towers {…} [were] delighting audiences, the TVNZ 
reorganisation was heralding a new role for a culturally-oriented state broadcaster, the 
MTS [Māori Television]  plans were advanced, the commercials sector was busy, and 
more New Zealand feature films and offshore projects were in the offing. (Wrightson, 
2003a, p. 2) 
 
However, as Campbell and Jones (2009) document, back in 2003 some members of the 
local community including producer John Barnett, SPADA, writers, technicians, actors 
and directors’ guilds complained that the LBSPG excluded the local industry by 
establishing high-budget barriers (above $NZ15 million threshold) and by rejecting 
projects with multi-agency funding. The scheme’s focus on foreign capital was also 
criticised for benefiting crews and service providers at the expense of local producers, 
directors and writers. Additionally, some service providers criticised the scheme for not 
requiring overseas productions to hire local service providers and build up 
infrastructure. However in 2004, the MED rejected the demands of the local industry as 
not being cost-effective. As Thompson noted despite Labour’s commitment to social 
policy goals, “their scope was circumscribed by unchanged macroeconomic 
commitment to the monetarist framework” (Thompson, 2011a, p. 4). 
The Screen Council itself urged the government in 2005 to incorporate local industry 
demands. By this time SPADA was also supporting the recommendations of SPT and 
Pinflicks & NZIER to change the NZFC policy of recoupment to ease the downstream 
revenue to the producer and cut out their dependence on the Commission (see Chapters 
8 and 9). Local demands―as represented by SPADA, Equity NZ, and the Screen 
Directors Guild―to support local producers remained unheard (Campbell & Jones, 
2009).  
In 2007, Australia launched a producer offset scheme which made the New Zealand 
government fear a brain drain to the neighbouring country (The Independent, 2008). As 
a response, the Screen Production Incentive Fund (SPIF) was provided by MCH and 
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administered by NZFC. This fund finally met local producers’ demands to create a grant 
for projects with significant New Zealand content. The funding covered 40% of the 
qualifying expense for lower budget projects ($NZ5 million and later $NZ4 million) and 
allowed multi-agency funding. But, SPADA complained about the short consultation 
period prior to creating SPIF, and New Zealand Actors Equity demanded that SPIF 
projects that did not hire New Zealand performers be excluded from obtaining funding 
(Campbell & Jones, 2009). SPIF was the result of the advocacy of the local film 
community and its representative organisations, but the government strategies for 
competing with Australia were decisive. From 2008 to 2011, nine feature films and four 
television series had qualified for SPIF funding (MCH, 2012a).  
As Blomkamp explains, despite the fact that “social cohesion and national identity 
remained inherent albeit thorny justifications for state funding of film” during this 
period, these policies were “only considered legitimate when framed within an 
economic discourse. This is epitomised in a speech from Harley (CEO of the NZFC in 
1999), where she asserts: ‘Film creates culture, builds identity and markets that identity 
to the world’” (as cited in Blomkamp, 2012, p. 639). King (2010, pp. 161–162) also 
notes that the transition from a welfare ethos to a growth-model one was exemplified by 
the relaxation of the New Zealand content requirement justified by a cosmopolitan 
industry allowing the engagement with global Hollywood “through a strategy of  
cloning, producing the Hollywood film that happens to be made in NZ.”  
The succession of growth-model policies and debates attest how the cost-effective logic 
in government initiatives inclined towards economic policies based on the short-term 
advantages of foreign allocation of resources to the film industry. This was influenced 
not only by the international context, but by the New Zealand government’s economic 
rationalism translated into institutional practices under budgetary constraints which in 
turn reinforced the growth-model approach.  
John Key period: The realm of corporate transnationalism 
The growth-model in film policies became more dominant during the National-led 
government. In this section I analyse some of the most important film industry events 
from 2009–2014 as examples of the leading growth-model. These include the “value for 
money” approach, The Hobbit dispute and its aftermath and the 2013 film crisis. This 
section discusses the outcomes of this model on the institutional relations in the 
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industry. I argue that, as policies became highly discretional and pragmatic, conflicting 
interests in the film industry were exacerbated becoming more and more fragmented 
with consequences for sustainable outcomes.  
Value for money 
The National party came to power in 2009, in the context of the global financial crisis. 
As a result, many government agency accounts, budgetary justifications and policy 
rhetoric were synchronised with recession and deficit concerns (New Zealand 
Parliament, 2009a; NZFC, 2011). They stressed the need to get the government’s books 
in order and “disciplining government spending” (Thompson, 2011a, p. 5). Compared to 
Clark’s cultural recovery package of $NZ99.5 million in 1999, the new funding for the 
arts was a modest $NZ10.5 million over four years (New Zealand Parliament, 2009c). 
Despite the National party’s electoral promises to maintain the previous level of funding 
for culture there were subsequent cuts. Chris Finlayson, the Minister for Arts, Culture 
and Heritage justified the changes: “the Government identified a number of savings to 
taxpayers as a result of its value-for-money review earlier this year. That allowed 
reprioritisation of the low-quality junk […] We want to concentrate on practical 
assistance to front-line arts and cultural services” (New Zealand Parliament, 2009b). 
In the film industry, one of those front-lines was the satellite model of production. The 
priorities of the Minister of Economic Development in film matters had been to 
examine “closely the commercial motivations for the major studios to bring productions 
to New Zealand” (Gerry Brownlee, as cited in New Zealand Parliament, 2010a). The 
primacy of the satellite-focus approach was consistent with a bigger economic policy 
plan as Key himself declared, “To grow, New Zealand needs capital and at the moment 
the only way to acquire that capital is from foreigners” (Small, 2011). For instance in 
2011, the government announced plans to partially sell state-owned companies. 
Government agencies such as NZFC were “already planning how to cope with less 
funding” (Wakefield, 2009). From 2008–2012, NZFC funding diminished from $NZ21 
million to approximately $NZ16 million. While funding from the Lottery Grants and the 
Vote Arts, Culture and Heritage remained static, it was the reserves, that is, income from 
films and interests, that diminished drastically (NZFC, 2011). In 2011, NZFC described 
its rather negative environment: 
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With the world recession, there is less international financing for film production {…} 
fewer film distribution companies {…} Consequently it is harder than ever to finance the 
production of films and there are fewer companies willing and able to buy the films that 
do get made. {…} With the decreased in television advertising, broadcast licence fees and 
a reduction on the number of films that these agencies (New Zealand On Air and Te 
Mangai Paho) are willing to support, this sources of funding are featuring less in final 
plans. {…} A decline on film sales income {…} means that there will be less available 
for industry recoupment and NZFC reinvestment in other films. (NZFC, 2011, p. 9) 
As a result, NZFC’s strategy was to select fewer projects in “a more centralised focus 
on ‘picking winners’ to give funding to” (NZPA, 2011). The NZFC decided “to place 
more emphasis on value for money {…} this will involve a reduction in the percentage 
of the budget we are able to invest” (NZFC, 2011, p. 11). To this rather difficult 
panorama for the local film and TV independent production could be added the 
government’s decision to cut public funding for public service television channels 
TVNZ 6 and TVNZ 7, which were closed down in 2011 and 2012 respectively.  
With all these financial and political constraints at the funding level, the growth-model 
policies favoured satellite film production for “wealth creation from additional foreign 
direct investment” and “knowledge and reputational spillovers” (MBIE, 2012, p. 19). 
The Hobbit dispute 
In this section, I present the issue of The Hobbit dispute as an example of the recent 
conflicting environment in the film industry and how growth-model policies have 
shaped and dealt with such tensions. Wellington city, in particular, had become heavily 
dependent on the satellite model of production and in 2010 its industry was described as 
“a struggling industry reliant on a few big players” (Rothwell, 2010). After hosting the 
blockbuster Avatar, Rothwell reported that the collapse of the Kingdom Come project 
and the delays on The Hobbit had “revealed the vulnerability of a Wellywood reliant on 
Jackson’s projects” (Rothwell, 2010, p. 9). Without much local production of films, 
television, or advertising, film workers were by then facing a cyclical period of 
unemployment (Rothwell, 2010).  
The Hobbit, the prequel to TLOTR saga was director Peter Jackson’s next project; it had 
been delayed for a number of reasons (Masters, 2012). In addition, in 2010 The Hobbit 
was the cause of an industrial relations dispute between New Zealand Actors’ Equity, a 
relatively small guild representing 600 actors, and The Hobbit producers, Peter 
Jackson’s WingNut Films and Warner Bros (Conor, 2011). The dispute had a national 
impact on film workers and consequently exacerbated the already fragmented industry. 
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Although there is no space here to recount all the events, full details can be found in the 
appended Timeline (see Appendix D). This section is based on academic and media 
coverage, statements from members of industry organisations, and government 
communications released via the Official Information Act (OIA) regarding The Hobbit 
dispute in February 2013 (Joyce, 2013). 
As a backdrop it is worth mentioning that the New Zealand film and screen industry is 
unique among other English-speaking countries as it is a non-unionised industry. It is 
characterised by having codes of best practice that guide employer-employee relations 
(Kelly, 2011). Such codes include the performers’ Pink Book (SPADA, NZAAG, 
AAANZ, NZAE, 2006) and the technicians’ Blue Book (SPADA & NZF&VTG, 2004). 
The non-unionised New Zealand status took on global proportions in the international 
context of high regional competition to attract satellite productions as well as significant 
work mobility. 
 International and local stakeholders’ interests 
The Hobbit dispute uncovered entrenched and conflicting interests among film industry 
stakeholders nationally and internationally. On the one hand, at the international level 
transnational studios benefitted keeping a cost-effective non-unionised satellite centre in 
New Zealand. On the other hand, film workers around the globe and in the Tasman 
region benefitted from a change in unionising the New Zealand film industry. They 
could either sympathise with their counterparts in New Zealand, whose international 
rights were decreased, or they could think of film workers’ status in New Zealand as 
unfair competition that made it difficult to keep quality jobs in their own regions.  
At a local level, New Zealand film producers, represented by SPADA, also benefitted 
from retaining a non-unionised industry which would keep labour costs down. This 
allowed some producers to cope with financial constraints, and a few others to attract 
finance from satellite productions. On the other hand, many local film workers, 
including actors, had struggled to have stable jobs and work-life balance as documented 
by research (Duff, 2012; Rowlands, 2009a; Rowlands & Handy, 2012).  
At an institutional level, while Actors’ Equity focused on what they considered concrete 
minimum conditions for workers, The Hobbit producers had a wider concern on what 
they considered long-term issues regarding the uncertainty of employment law. Because 
of this, The Hobbit dispute was the perfect combination of conflicting and entrenched 
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local and global interests. Furthermore, the existence of power relations escalated the 
dispute. On the one hand, the guild resorted to its international alliances with other 
actors’ unions. On the other, The Hobbit producers resorted to its close relations with the 
government. 
Power relations 
International alliances 
In 2009 the Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) in New Zealand received reports of 
producers’ non-compliance to the actors’ code of practice, the Pink Book (Kelly, 2011). 
Casts from different film and television projects had asked Actors’ Equity to represent 
them in negotiating a standard contract with their producers. But the producer’s 
responses were: (a) to threaten them with re-casting the projects; or (b) to canalise the 
demands through SPADA who refused to negotiate on any other basis than the Pink 
Book (Kelly, 2011). Actors’ Equity then decided to look for support from international 
performers who had stronger bargaining positions and waited for an international 
production to implement their strategy. Actors’ Equity formed part of the Australian 
union Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA) and the Federation of 
International Actors (FIA) to which the powerful American union Screen Actors Guild 
(SAG) belonged as well (Kelly, 2011).  
In 2010, Actors’ Equity realised that actors’ contracts for The Hobbit ignored conditions 
established in the Pink Book such as residuals. In turn, FIA agreed to advise their 
international members to hold off signing contracts unless Actors’ Equity could 
negotiate with The Hobbit producers. Jackson and Warner Brothers rejected negotiations 
arguing that union representation was illegal under New Zealand law where actors, as 
independent contractors, were prevented from entering into collective bargaining 
agreements (Watkins & Burgess, 2010) (Peter Jackson and Fran Walsh, personal 
communication, 28 September, 2010).17  
Relations with the government 
Contacted by both parties in the dispute, high officials in the New Zealand government, 
including the MCH and MED, played a facilitating role as mediators and advisors 
(Watkins & Burgess, 2010). Actors’ Equity through CTU, had approached officials to 
                                                 
17 Included in the OIA documents (Joyce, 2013). 
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meet with The Hobbit producers (Kelly, 2011). Peter Jackson himself approached the 
government with two concerns regarding Actors’ Equity. First, the guild’s ability to vet 
the employment of international actors and, second, the precedent that The Bryson 
Decision (2005) had created. In the latter case, the New Zealand Supreme Court had 
recognised a film worker belonging to 3 Foot 6, TLOTR’s production company, as a de 
facto employee as opposed to an independent contractor, as the employer had assumed. 
Jackson saw this as a precedent for Actors’ Equity to demand a legal, collective 
bargaining agreement provided that actors could prove to be employees due to the long-
term duration of The Hobbit (Tim Hurdle, personal communication, 28 September, 
2010).18  
However, AE was not asking for a collective bargaining agreement (SPADA, 2010) but 
for a new agreement covering minimum terms and conditions, 
in line with NZ law. If performers were to be employed as employees, this could take the 
form of a collective employment agreement and if they were to be employed as 
independent contractors then the agreement could be on a minimum standard contract 
which would be offered to performers for negotiation. (Kelly, 2011) 
The government’s legal advice backed up the producers’ position based on the 
Commerce Act (Peter Churchman, Legal Advice to Peter Jackson and Fran Walsh, 4 of 
October, 2010)19 but did not ask unions intentions for an agreement to cover minimum 
terms and conditions which were based on the Trade Union Act 1908. Kelly (2011) 
explained that this act “allows workers (broader than just employees) to negotiate terms 
and conditions collectively without being found in restraint of trade or criminally liable 
(i.e. an exception to the Commerce Act).” The government’s inclination to the 
producers’ position became even more perceptible with the resolution of the conflict in 
which Prime Minister John Key had a personal involvement. 
Media and public opinion 
Relations with the media were also decisive to the outcome of the dispute, as it was 
used to shape public opinion. The Actors’ Equity strategy was to refrain from discussing 
the case with the media (SPADA, 2010) and, perhaps as a consequence, news headlines 
leaned increasingly towards the producers’ position reporting, for example, the threat of 
                                                 
18 Included in the OIA documents (Joyce, 2013). 
19 Included in the OIA documents (Joyce, 2013). 
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The Hobbit moving overseas (Chug, Bradley, Fox, & Cardy, 2010) which caused “a 
widespread public opposition to the actors’ stance” (Edwards, 2010). 
However, the possibility for the movie to be made overseas was rather unlikely as the 
actors’ boycott was occurring on a global scale (Darkins, 2012). Two examples were 
stars Cate Blanchett and Sir Ian McKellen who supported the unions’ position (NZH, 
2010a). The threat also contradicted Warners’ communication to the government: “we 
are committed to NZ {…} we are not making any decisions to move this production 
lightly. {…} we are very open to identify solutions to our problems” (Carolyn 
Blackwood, personal communication, 12 October, 2010).20 The lack of transparency 
misled public opinion and leaned towards supporting the producers to keep The Hobbit 
at home.  
By the same token, other information was withheld to shape public opinion. As 
meetings of Actors’ Equity-CTU, Peter Jackson, Minister Brownlee and SPADA were 
resulting in “good faith negotiations”, Actors’ Equity decided to lift the boycott on 17 
October. The guild prepared a release statement of the settlement and agreed to have 
Warners’ approval for its public release (Kelly, 2011). Although, the statement was 
agreed on 19 October, Warners held up the release. The government was also aware of 
this but never informed the public, which helped to build a sense of crisis  (Rutherford, 
2013a).  
It could be inferred that the withholding of the information had to do with the fact that 
the actors’ boycott was not Jackson’s biggest concern, 
There is no connection between the blacklist (and its eventual retraction), and the choice 
of production base for The Hobbit. What Warners requires for The Hobbit is the certainty 
of a stable employment environment {…}” (Peter Jackson, personal communication, 18 
October, 2010).21 
Nonetheless, the actions of the guild were still used as arguments to mobilise opinions. 
On 20 October, Jackson’s closest partners, co-producers Richard Taylor and Philippa 
Boyens, mobilised 1500 film crew members to march in protest against the actors’ 
union to keep The Hobbit in New Zealand. According to media reports Taylor and 
Boyens said it was “too late” to keep The Hobbit, and accused the Australian Trade 
Union of “making a blatant play to take a controlling hand in NZ film industry” (Chug 
                                                 
20 Included in the OIA documents (Joyce, 2013). 
21 Included in the OIA documents (Joyce, 2013). 
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et al., 2010). After noting these contradictions, the CTU leaked to the media that the 
dispute had been settled and Warners was refusing to release the information (Kelly, 
2011). That night Peter Jackson and Fran Walsh informed the public: “Next week 
Warners are coming down to NZ to make arrangements to move the production 
offshore” (Chug et al., 2010). And in a Radio New Zealand interview the next morning, 
when asked to confirm her previous statement, Walsh refrained to answer “You’re 
asking us to speak for Warners which I think is a bit unfair” (Ryan, 2010). She also 
explained her long-term concerns, "Why would they [Warners] bring it [The Hobbit] 
into a place where it’s almost guaranteed industrial action will happen during the shoot" 
(Ryan, 2010).  
Although the negotiation meetings could have given certainty to producers, Jackson 
refused to be party to the Memorandum of Understanding agreed by SPADA, Minister 
Brownlee and Actors’ Equity,  
This is because the premise of the document obliges us to conform to the guidelines of 
the Pink Book. Under normal circumstances this would not be a problem, but in this 
instance is just another back door manoeuvre by Whipp to claim Equity input into The 
Hobbit contract. So unfortunately The Hobbit films cannot be party to this agreement and 
if we film in NZ it will have to be under the threat of actor litigation, which will offer 
little comfort to Warners. (Peter Jackson and Fran Walsh, personal communication, 17 
October, 2010)22 
Political pragmatism 
On 27 of October the government met with the Hollywood producers and came up with 
a schedule of financial incentives to keep the films onshore. This included extra tax 
breaks of $NZ10 million for each of The Hobbit movies on top of the $NZ65 million 
already available (the incentive of 15% Qualifying Expenditure); a Warner-Government 
strategic partnership to promote New Zealand as a tourist and film destination and an 
offset of $NZ13.4 million taxpayer money for Warners’ marketing costs (Watkins, Hunt, 
& Hartevelt, 2010). This was justified as part of Prime Minister John Key’s advocacy as 
a tourism minister. From 2008-2014, the government invested $NZ600 million in 
tourism and tourism promotion (National Party, 2014). The Hobbit deal also comprised 
a fast-track amendment clause to the Employment Relations Act (also known as The 
Hobbit Bill) to clarify the distinction between independent contractors and employees to 
support the producer’s position. The bill “change[d] employment law to remove the 
right of any worker in the film industry to challenge his or her employment status 
                                                 
22 Included in the OIA documents (Joyce, 2013). 
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(Kelly, 2011; Watkins et. al., 2010). John Key argued that the deal would secure 3,000 
jobs and called the opposing Labour party members “A bunch of Hobbit-haters” (New 
Zealand Parliament, 2010c). The legal change occurred even though according to a 
communication released by OIA (Joyce, 2013) a couple of weeks before Finlayson 
(MCH) and Brownlee (MED) had stated that despite lobbying by Peter Jackson it was 
“inappropriate to change the [employment]  law” (Rutherford, 2013a).  
The Warners-Government deal also initiated John Key’s branding diplomacy. Two years 
later he travelled to have a private dinner with the Hollywood studios’ executives. His 
goal was to attract more television series that could provide maintenance to the quiet 
periods in between blockbusters (Levy, 2012). This was a recommendation of the 
Screen Sector Work Programme review. Some journalists questioned Key’s personal 
crusade, first with the Warners-Government deal and then with “the passage of the 
three-strikes Internet disconnection laws for online copyright infringement, plus the 
enthusiastic, and it turns out, illegal co-operation in the shutdown of the pirate friendly 
digital storage site Megaupload and the arrest of its owner, Kim Dotcom” (Karaganis, 
2012). Apart from subsidies, labour and anti-piracy laws, Hollywood’s transnational 
interests in Key’s government were also in the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPPA) in New Zealand: “Our negotiators have led the way in 
resisting US demands for radical extensions to intellectual property laws, which are 
designed largely by and for Hollywood” (Kelsey, 2012). 
The aftermath of the dispute: A fragmented industry  
Aside from Actors’ Equity and SPADA, other film industry organisations stayed out of 
the dispute. As the president of the New Zealand Film and Video Technicians 
(NZFVTG), Alun Bollinger commented in 2013: “The Techos’ Guild deliberately 
stayed out of the debates which were raging at the time. We stayed out because our 
members were divided on what our stand should be, if any, and there was too little 
accurate information to go on.” (Bollinger, 2013). Nonetheless, during the dispute some 
sympathy was expressed by some members as in their AGM; Auckland Chair Jennifer 
Butcher, commented “personally I think it is sad that our most financially successful 
director ever, does not even want to enter into negotiations with them to set minimum 
terms” (NZFVTG, 2010, p. 5). And the president, Alun Bollinger, commented, “if 
SPADA had shown more willingness to engage with Actors Equity before now this 
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situation would probably never have arisen” (NZFVTG, 2010, p. 6). Meanwhile, Peter 
Bell, president of Screen Director’s Guild of New Zealand (SDGNZ), explained that 
they had not taken a position on The Hobbit dispute: “This is a complex area and we are 
not privy to any of the discussions between the production company and the actors 
union involved” (Bell, 2010). And although the New Zealand Writers Guild (NZWG) 
stayed out as well, former president Dominic Sheehan commented that in 1999 the guild 
had asked SPADA to talk about a minimum pay agreement: “Like Equity, we had only 
been looking for a meeting but the initial response was met with incredible aggression” 
(Drinnan, 2010).  
Despite film industry disenfranchisement, a combined group called Screen Industry 
New Zealand was created in 2011―comprising members of the public, academics, 
NZFVTG, NZWG, SPADA, SDGNZ, Actors’ Equity, Nga Aho Whakaari (NAW), and 
Women in Film and Television (WIFT)―as a lobby group to represent agreed film 
industry issues to government and agencies (Theatreview, 2011). Blomkamp (2012) 
notes that if such a group leads to an inclusive and critical dialogue it could be key to 
rebuild legitimacy, and I suggest, bring cohesion to the industry. 
The division that the dispute exacerbated assumed national proportions. For instance, 
after the Warners-Government deal the headlines of the two most important national 
newspapers captured such divided opinions. The Dominion Post, based in Wellington, 
celebrated “It is still our precious. New Zealand wins the battle for Middle-Earth” 
(Watkins et al., 2010). By contrast, the New Zealand Herald―based in 
Auckland―stated “Price to keep Hobbit in NZ is extortionate” (NZH, 2010b).  
During and after the dispute public opinion was also divided as some Internet forums 
and posts demonstrated (Bill, 2010; NZH, 2010a). Even in 2013, an UMR Online 
Omnibus Survey found that 42% of people thought the additional tax breaks for 
Warners was value for money. But 70% were in favour of asking Warner Bros. to repay 
the subsidy after the first Hobbit film made $US1 billion worldwide (TVNZOne, 2013). 
The amendment to the Employment Relations Act was highly criticised by the 
opposition in Parliament. The Labour party presented an initiative to add a new clause 
(2A) that would give the amendment a temporary effect expiring three months later. The 
rationale behind this proposal was that the legislation change was unnecessary and it 
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had the effect of putting people in an employment status they did not want to be in. As 
Treveor Mallard from Labour said, 
I want to make it clear that I believed Gerry Brownlee when he said that this was not a 
requirement of Warner Bros and that this was not necessary. {…} The legislation is not 
being passed for Warner Bros. If that is the case, then I ask who it is being done for. (New 
Zealand Parliament, 2010b) 
Labour’s Carol Beaumont added that the Bryson Decision had made the legislation clear 
(New Zealand Parliament, 2010b). The opposition also raised concerns about the 
political and economic sovereignty of New Zealand using ironic phrases like “becoming 
Warner Brothers colony”, “The Warner Brothers Bill”, or “the Mickey Mouse approach 
of this Government” (New Zealand Parliament, 2010b). Members of the National party 
counterargued they were acting in the national interest and criticised the opposition for 
“looking after its Aussie union mates” (New Zealand Parliament, 2010b). Nick Smith 
also explained the usefulness of the bill referring to the Bryson case in which four 
judicial bodies had come up with two different conclusions, “That, in my view, makes it 
absolutely plain to this Parliament that the law is not clear” (New Zealand Parliament, 
2010b). Smith’s speech also included a eulogy of Peter Jackson: “Successful New 
Zealanders—those who are creating jobs, wealth, and opportunities for young people—
are despised by people opposite, and those members write off successful New 
Zealanders as spoilt brats” (New Zealand Parliament, 2010b). The expiry date clause 
lost. Only Labour, the Green Party and, Progressive voted for it (New Zealand 
Parliament, 2010b).  
Contesting opinions occurred also within the Cabinet. The long-term tensions between 
the Treasury and MED23 have been referred to earlier, with regards to the tax incentives 
for the LBSPG. These inter-ministerial tensions continued in 2010. One media report 
stated,  “Months before the decision to subsidise The Hobbit, officials [from the 
Treasury] had called for an end to assistance for the film industry, saying it was negative 
for the economy and presented a risk to the Government's books” (Small, 2010). 
Moreover, government and quasi-government film agencies like NZFC and Film NZ 
expressed in press releases their concerns about losing The Hobbit and satellite 
productions (NZFC, 2010). And Gisella Carr, Chief Executive of Film NZ commented:  
                                                 
23 The Ministry of Economic Development (MED) changed its name in 2013 to Ministry of Business, 
Innovation, and Employment (MBIE). 
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“Should New Zealand lose The Hobbit because of this dispute, we could be not just 
losing these films, but also our ability to attract international film productions into the 
future” (Film New Zealand, 2010). A year later, Film NZ, an independent body 
receiving government funding partnered with post-production facility Park Road Post 
(co-owned by Peter Jackson) to open an office in Los Angeles “to expand its presence in 
North American markets” (Screen Digest, 2011).  
In 2011, nearing the time of Prime Minister John Key’s re-election, he capitalised on the 
event arguing that he had kept The Hobbit jobs and had stood up to clarify the law 
(Final Leaders Debate, 2011). His opponent, Phil Goff, was further criticised by 
opponents to the Warners-Government deal for his absence during the dispute: 
“Terrified at the prospect of having to attack a national ‘icon’ like Sir Peter Jackson, 
they simply closed their eyes […]” (Trotter, 2010). 
To conclude, the resolution of the dispute signalled a producer-driven industry (also 
shown by the appointment of producer and ex-SPADA Chair David Gibson as the new 
CEO of the NZFC in 2013) as well as a foreign capital-driven industry. SPADA’s main 
concerns were to ensure a non-unionised industry (Drinnan, 2010). Guilds and unions 
looked to represent a divided labour force, some of them struggling with detrimental 
working conditions and unemployment (Parker, 2012). Government agencies like Film 
NZ and NZFC had institutional survival interest in supporting the satellite film industry 
as it represented the core of their mandates or part of their administrative functions. 
Overall, this period was characterised by increased attention courtesy government 
policies, parliamentary debates and the media towards the satellite or external allocation 
model of film-making. Policy, legal frameworks as well as the economic landscape of 
the screen industry in New Zealand were shaped in this period favouring transnational 
corporations’ needs. This in turn, generated and exacerbated existing local interests as 
reflected in the aftermath of the dispute.  
The film industry cyclical crises: ‘Sustainability’ in New Zealand film 
policies?  
In the second half of 2013, news headlines reported the lack of offshore productions 
investing in New Zealand (Cumming, 2013a). This was further confirmed by official 
statistics reporting that feature film revenue had dropped 18% that year and total 
international production revenue had decreased by $NZ165 million (SNZ, 2014). News 
 
 
159 
 
reported that the downturn affecting production, post-production and services in film 
and TV was the worst in the last two decades, and reflected the obsolescence of non-
competitive international tax breaks and the higher rate of the New Zealand dollar, both 
of which function as deterrents to satellite production. As a consequence, news stories 
began to speak of unemployment, changing professions, workers and businesses 
relocating to other countries, and businesses downsizing or closing (Cumming, 2013b; 
Radio New Zealand, 2013b). The volatility of the blockbuster satellite model was 
captured in phrases like “the locals are left with expensive facilities and no one to use 
them” (Armstrong, 2013) or “the industry’s air performance has proved as illusory as a 
film set” (Cumming, 2013b). Film industry players were especially concerned in 
Auckland (Cumming, 2013a) which is the biggest domestic production district. But 
concerns were also raised for Wellington that traditionally had had a boom and bust 
overreliance on Jackson’s Miramar (NZ Actors’ Equity, 2013). 
A Cabinet paper released in 2013 had undertaken an evaluation of the screen industry 
excluding the distribution and consumption phases. As a report, it had received input 
from a cross-government work programme that included MED, MCH, NZFC, Film NZ, 
the Treasury and Statistics NZ to avoid previous inter-ministerial tensions and present a 
more balanced evaluation (MBIE, 2012). The evaluation of the grant for satellite 
productions found rather modest quantifiable benefits since its implementation in 2003. 
After 35 productions and a total expenditure of $NZ1,937 million, the report estimated a 
net economic benefit of $NZ13.6 million (total economic benefit $NZ281.9 million 
minus the grant cost $NZ268.3 million). The report said the grant had contributed to 
13.5% increase in the employment in the screen industry (MBIE, 2012). In addition, the 
evaluation mentioned non-quantifiable spillovers such as skill and technology transfer 
and reputation. The report concluded that the grant was efficient and reputable but likely 
to decrease its international competiveness. Therefore, the report recommended 
reducing the budget thresholds, and enhancing benefits through an internship 
programme (MBIE, 2012). 
The report’s release coincided with the government announcement of changes to lower 
the thresholds of required expenditure to obtain the grants (Frater, 2013; MCH, 2013). 
These changes aimed to attract more, smaller projects―including television series―that 
would provide a long-term and more stable investment than the intermittent nature of 
the blockbuster-driven industry. However, other changes were criticised for affecting the 
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domestic film industry, particularly SPIF’s new requirement to obtain 10% of the 
budget from a private source (Radio New Zealand, 2013a).  
The changes seemed to fail to catch up with new emerging conditions. A debate on how 
to tackle the crisis occurred at the Auckland Summit 2013, with participation of industry 
practitioners, politicians, the media, and social media. Opinions were again divided as 
“the downturn {…} only deepened and entrenched positions” over who was responsible 
(Cumming, 2013b). Some practitioners and politicians called on the government to 
increase tax rebates (Barnett, 2013; Hunt, 2013), others saw the need to cut the 
dependency on offshore productions (Armstrong, 2013; NZ Actors’ Equity, 2013). 
Steven Joyce, the Minister of Economic Development, refused to enter “a race to the 
bottom” in the competition with other satellite regions (Armstrong, 2013) and 
commented “In the past 5 years New Zealand, taxpayers have already given film-
makers $NZ411 million, and more would be hard to justify” (Hunt, 2013). In the 
meantime, the Minister saw the need to develop intellectual property ownership despite 
acknowledging it was a long-term strategy. Meanwhile, Labour’s Jacinda Arden 
demanded the government intervene in monetary policy and increase the rebate regime 
(New Zealand Parliament, 2013c).  
Other voices spoke to more structural proposals, such as regulating the requirement of 
broadcasters, like Sky Television, to invest in local programmes, as happens in many 
countries (Radio New Zealand, 2013b), as well as proposing strategies to foster “smaller 
players in commercials, television, animation and gaming” (Radio New Zealand, 
2013b).  
The film crisis in New Zealand, as mentioned in Chapter 4, showed the vulnerable and 
volatile nature of satellite productions experienced in other countries. In New Zealand, 
researchers and journalists had long warned about it (Conor, 2004; Pinflicks 
Communications & NZIER, 2003): “It is bad economic policy on every level. The 
productions bring mostly low end, temporary jobs, while the high end jobs remain in 
Hollywood or New York” (Karaganis, 2012). However, those opinions were neglected 
for the sake of short-term ephemeral benefits acting as palliative policies. This was 
acknowledged by Steve Finlayson of MBIE who referred to the vicious cycles of 
relying on the tax-break model: “[It] is not a case of not wanting to do a little more, it’s 
about how do we break the cycle?” (Hunt, 2013). He also admitted the “analgesic 
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nature” of such a model as he added that, the government was “working hard with 
agencies, including the NZFC, on a long-term solution” to the industry crisis (emphasis 
added) (Radio New Zealand, 2013b). In 2013 a NZIER report explained that “incentives 
have increased the scale of the domestic industry but not to the point where it is self-
sustaining” (NZIER, 2013). 
Despite the government’s realisation of the model’s flaws, in December 2013 it 
announced increased incentives for overseas and local screen productions to encourage 
“the development of a more sustainable New Zealand screen industry” (Joyce & 
Finlayson, 2013). The government released a memorandum of understanding among 
members of the New Zealand government, 20th Century Fox executives, and the Avatar 
producers. The latter had been in back and forth negotiations with China as well. The 
Avatar deal ensured that Avatar sequels would be made in New Zealand with 25% of 
the incentives in exchange of specific benefits such as transferring know-how (for 
example, positioning New Zealanders as Heads of Departments and offering six 
internships for technical jobs), branding and development of infrastructure (such as 
donating equipment to universities). It also included director James Cameron’s 
participation in a new screen advisory board for a future self-sustaining industry (Joyce, 
Finlayson, Cameron, Landau, & Hanneman, 2013).  
The overall government changes consisted on combining the LBSPG and SPIF to form 
the New Zealand Screen Production Grant (NZSPG). As a result overseas productions 
of at least $NZ15 million budget features, $NZ 4 million budget television programmes, 
and $NZ1 million budget VFX, could receive a grant of 20% of the Qualifying 
Expenditure, and an extra 5% if they complied with a significant economic benefits test. 
New Zealand local productions or official co-productions could still access a 40% grant 
which was extended to television for budgets up to $NZ15 million. Local budgets 
between $NZ15 million and $NZ50 million could also apply for a 40% provided they 
agreed to share the income with the NZFC to reinvest in the screen sector (NZFC, 
2013b).  
The effect of these changes is still to be seen. They increased New Zealand international 
competition; however, as has been argued before, these types of policies ignore 
structural issues such as value chain articulation, creative and IP development, as well 
as audience development. 
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Economic Indicators: Production and Post-Production  
The most economically significant screen sectors? 
Official accounts state that production and post-production sectors are the most 
significant as they account for “95% of all businesses in the screen industry” and 
“generate more revenue than business[es] in” broadcasting, distribution and exhibition 
(see Figure 16) (MED, 2012a, p. 5). However, to put those figures in context it is 
important noting that unlike the other sectors gross revenue in production, post-
production and broadcasting includes government subsidies and foreign investment (see 
Figure 18). In addition, official statistics count not only production companies but 
contracting businesses (for example, sole proprietors and freelancers) which represent 
80% of the total number of businesses which rockets the data. They also include 
“services” such as “casting, film editing and titling” (MED, 2012a, p.18; SNZ, 2007, 
p.49). Statistical methodologies in other regions separate production companies from 
auxiliary services and contractors  (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). 
Figure 16 Business count in the screen industry 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b). 
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Figure 17 Business count in production and post-production subsectors 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from MED (2012a). 
 
When Statistics New Zealand aggregates those activities, it (a) combines activities of 
very different nature: production and auxiliary services where the former represents a 
primary economy that propels the latter, which are secondary economies. (b) 
homogenises individual independent contractors with companies; and (c) inflates and 
thereby misleads on the matter of the size and economic importance of the production 
and post-production subsectors. Even disaggregated data in the Figure 17 is over-
counted as it includes services as if they were production companies. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of better information and, when critically examined, official 
statistics can show certain industry trends. For example, in 2012, overseas financing 
accounted for 51% of all the funding, government subsidies represented 38% while the 
private sector participated with 11% of the overall funding to production and post-
production (See Figure 18). 
In addition, Figure 19 shows the historical contribution that government and foreign 
financial sources allocate to gross revenue of production companies compared to the 
smaller amount coming from local, private capital. It also presents the significant 
income derived from internal activities, mainly television (including advertising and 
satellite subscriptions). From other sources and interviews conducted during this 
research we know that feature film producers hardly ever receive any profits (Jackson & 
Court, 2010). 
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Figure 18 Production and post-production: sources of funding in 2012 
  
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2013b). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Contribution of sources of funding to gross revenue ($NZm) of production 
companies  
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2013c). Excludes contractors, 
includes services. Gross revenue includes government funding, and private sector financing in the form of 
advances, presales, sponsorship, or investment. The white area represents income from sales, royalties, 
copyright, TV advertisement, satellite TV subscriptions [see gross revenue definition (SNZ, 2006)].  
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Figure 20 Sources of funding of production companies overtime (%), 2005-2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013c). 
 
Historical patterns from 2005 to 2012 show a mirror effect of an inverse trend between 
the increase of foreign financing and the decrease of local, private financing of 
production, post-production and their service providers. On the contrary there is a direct 
relation between the allocation of government funding and the increase of domestic 
private funding (see Figure 20). The increase of overseas funding reflects the 
intensification of the growth-model policies based on satellite productions. Nonetheless, 
it is a volatile source varying at a range of approximately 35% compared to government 
sources varying within a 13% range. The decrease and downward trend of private 
funding reflects qualitative academic research and media concerns about local financial 
capacity.  
Foreign funding is dominated by US capital whose contribution fluctuated from 33% to 
54% through 2005–2012. In the same period, UK, Australia and Asia’s foreign funding 
constituted 1% to 3%. Figure 21 shows, once again, domestic and US financial curves 
have an inverse mirror pattern. 
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Figure 21 Origin of gross revenue received by production companies, 2005-2012 
(excluding contractors, including services) 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b).Gross revenue 
includes funding. 
Diversification 
Film production and post-production businesses in New Zealand are diversified in 
different formats; they make use of the crossover of creative and technical skills. This 
allows them to maintain the streams of revenue and workflow. As Figure 22 shows, 
there are more companies involved in television activities and the fewest companies are 
involved in feature films. One reason for this is the relatively higher budgets and fewer 
numbers of feature films made every year compared to the smaller budgets but higher 
productivity of the other formats. However, despite accounting for the fewest 
companies, of all the formats, feature films represent the highest contribution to the 
whole subsector’s gross revenue (see Figure 23). 
For example, in 2012 feature film revenue was $NZ1,040 million, whereas television 
was $NZ448 million, commercials $NZ127 million, non-broadcast media $NZ43 
million, and music videos and short films $NZ13 million. 
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Figure 22 Diversification of activities in production and post-production sectors  
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b). Includes services. (2) 
“Other” refers to music videos and short films. 
 
 
Figure 23 Percentage of gross revenue contribution by type of activity 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b). 
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Levels of films produced and released 
Another important indicator is the amount of films produced in New Zealand which has 
fluctuated dramatically in recent years (see Figure 24). In 2012, 40 films were produced 
(SNZ, 2013c) which is a significant level of productivity for a country with 4.4 million 
inhabitants (SNZ, 2013a). However, in 2013 it decreased 50% to 22 films produced 
(NZFC, 2013a). It is important to mention that films produced include satellite 
productions, co-productions and domestic productions of various budget sizes including 
many films that do not get released. In 2012, only 25 of the 40 films produced in New 
Zealand were released in festivals and commercial cinemas (NZFC, 2013a). Similarly, 
from 2000–2012, the annual average of domestic films made was 12 as well as 1.5 film 
co-productions, however, the yearly average of New Zealand films released was 7.3 
(Screen Digest, 2013). In other words, only half of the movies produced in New 
Zealand are released in cinemas.  
Figure 24 Annual film production in New Zealand, 1995–2013 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on UNESCO (2009), OnFilm (2012), Screen Digest (2013), SNZ (2015). It 
includes wholly financed New Zealand films, co-productions and satellite productions using New Zealand 
as a location. 
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Figure 25 Annual release of New Zealand feature films, 1995-2013   
 
Note. Own elaboration based on NZFC (2013a). It includes wholly financed New Zealand films, co-
productions and satellite productions using New Zealand as a location. 
Business size 
Gross revenue distribution among production companies (and services) is rather polarized with 
93% of companies receiving gross revenue of less than $NZ500, 000 a year (small and medium-
size business). By contrast, only 1% of companies obtained over $NZ10 million a year (see 
Figure 26). 
Figure 26 Percentage of business size by gross revenue, 2012  
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b). Includes services. 
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Figure 27 Growth rate of business by gross revenue size, 2005-2012  
 
Note. Own elaboration with data from Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013b). 
Whereas the share for larger companies has remained almost the same since 2005, the 
amount of companies that receive less than $NZ100,000 in gross revenue has grown 
18%. Meanwhile the number of medium ($NZ500,000 to $NZ1 million) and large size 
firms ($NZ1 million-$NZ9.9 million) have decreased 67% (see figure 27). This 
suggests that fewer companies participate in the higher revenue shares, which, in turn, 
provides a hint of an increased concentration of capital in the production, post-
production and service sectors. 
Conclusions  
This chapter complements Chapter 5 as it addressed the question, What are the relations 
among the phases of the film industry value chain in New Zealand and what do they 
mean for its sustainability? The chapter focused specifically on the value chain phase of 
the production of films in New Zealand based on its historical and current industrial 
policy and sectoral economic developments. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, from a very early stage, the three sectors of the film industry 
in New Zealand developed unevenly in terms of business scale and origin of capital. 
Exhibition and distribution, the first sectors to develop industrially, were quickly tied to 
Hollywood films. However, as seen in this chapter, the artisanal scale of the local 
production remained disarticulated from commercial distribution and exhibition circuits. 
I argue that such arrangements had a negative impact on financial capabilities to 
increase local production which, in turn, remained artisanal, intermittent and 
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undercapitalised (Campbell & Jones, 2009; Jackson and Court, 2010). I have argued 
that although there was an initial excitement for local film production, the sector went 
through a long period of crisis.  
It was not until the end of the 1970s, with the foundation of the NZFC, that film policies 
made a difference for the local production sector. Although the NZFC mandates 
included distribution and exhibition of locally produced films, the main focus on 
production sat well with the status quo of the commercial, distribution and exhibition 
sectors tied to foreign products. The lack of structural articulation among the sectors 
made production highly dependent on state funding for its survival. 
During the Clark years, a central interest in creative industries became instrumental in 
prompting general economic growth as well as national identity and social cohesion. 
But creative industries were mainly regarded as service sector industries that could 
generate spillovers to other economic sectors. This growth-model period entailed the 
division of film policies to address two industrial models: to attract satellite productions 
and to subsidise local productions. In turn, industry stakeholders accommodated 
differently to each industrial model, further fragmenting conflicting interests. During 
Key’s period, film policies were distinguished by a personal campaign from the Prime 
Minister to establish links with the largest transnational media conglomerates that took 
the growth-model approach to a new and more pronounced level. More so when Key’s 
attention, as a tourism minister, focused on satellite spinoffs to the tourist sector, 
therefore, naturalising the purely instrumental value of the film industry. The strategy 
for the screen industry fits into this context: static budgets to support arts, culture and 
the local film industry; major cuts on public broadcasting (affecting the local film 
industry as well); and increased support to foreign satellite production through 
discretionary subsidies and regulatory frameworks to benefit major media transnational 
corporations (Small, 2011).  
As some of the satellite dynamics and government regulations (for example, The Hobbit 
Bill and the ban on parallel imports) affected some industry players positively or 
negatively, conflicting interest in the industry became more polarised. Here I argue that 
the growth-model period has seen policies characterised by being palliative (having 
partial outcomes and a short life span); discretionary (where a few big players are 
privileged in unequal power relations); homogenising (providing the same support to 
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vulnerable players and to powerful players that do not need it); as well as pragmatic 
(including short-term planning, fast-track initiatives, and ignoring officials’ advice). 
These policies created an industrial atmosphere of distrust and uncertainty among less 
powerful players (such as film workers, online retailers, small local distributors and 
local producers). Uncertainty was further increased by the satellite drought in 2013 and 
the government’s difficulty in justifying satellite policies based on net economic 
benefits. The increased incentives to satellite productions with the Avatar deal were just 
a temporary measure which failed to address structural issues, as the government itself 
acknowledged.  
In sum, the historical overview has provided evidence of the prolonged existence of an 
environment favourable to the disenfranchisement of local products from the value 
chain. Furthermore, the current state of affairs dominated by corporatist 
transnationalism and growth-model policies, has reinforced the value chain 
disarticulation by favouring the films of transnational corporations and their satellite 
activities over domestic producers’. This path generated conflicting and entrenched 
economic interests instead of common interests and synergies within and among the 
production, distribution and commercialisation sectors.  
The policies and industrial outcomes mentioned in this chapter limit the possibility of 
the local film industry to achieving sustainable outcomes since uncertainty and a lack of 
common goals affect the relationships between industry components in their capacity to 
establish synergies among themselves. Chapter 7 will look at these relations with more 
detail as they are reflected in the context of the Wellington film industrial district. The 
logic behind the GI proposal of the importance of spirals of increasing returns is based 
on the understanding that the activity of one group will translate into an opportunity for 
others. Therefore, there is a need for policies that aim to promote film industry 
development as a whole, with long-term planning, structural policies and that favour 
internal mechanisms, and strategic non-discriminatory support. 
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Chapter 7  
Patterns of Cultural, Geographic and Industrial Organisation  
Previous chapters examined the international and national dynamics shaping New 
Zealand’s film industry vis-à-vis models of sustainability such as the articulation of the 
value chain. In the next two chapters I shift to study the case of the film industrial 
district in Wellington. Drawing from the macro-level analysis of previous chapters is 
crucial as it allows me to draw on the sometimes determinant forces―international 
trade, national policies, among others―enabling and limiting the relations within the 
film industry in Wellington.  
Chapters 7 and 8 address the question, What are the relations within the Wellington film 
industrial district and what is their ability to generate self-sustainable results? To 
answer this question, Chapter 7 focuses on the patterns of cultural, geographic and 
industrial organisation, while Chapter 8 centres on patterns of labour and institutional 
organisation. Both analyses draw on previous studies under GI research (Coe, 2001; 
Scott, 2005). I draw on my interviewees’ accounts as well as secondary data such as 
media reports, statistics, and public documents.  
The film industry in Wellington comprises a film industrial district (see Chapter 1). In 
other words, drawing on GI, I suggest that the film industry in Wellington can be 
understood as “a sizable and spatially delimited area of trade-oriented economic 
activity” specialising in film production (Markusen, 1996, p. 296). Film activities in 
Wellington include the interactions among companies, labour, consumers, and relevant 
institutions (Scott, 2005). Another important component is the cultural atmosphere that 
captures the cultural socialisation and provides the creative substrate for the film 
industry (Scott, 2005). 
The Wellington film industry is, nonetheless, a small scale industry as my interviewees 
noted: “I don’t know, whether you say that Wellington has an industry as such, I think it 
is a community of film production”; another observed: “It is a bunch of lone lunatics 
dreaming their dreams and then try talking other people into helping them making it 
{…} except one or two of those lunatics, like Peter Jackson, have actually managed to 
attract […} a satellite of Hollywood.” The last comment also captures the two models 
of production in Wellington, the local and satellite models. Following Markusen’s 
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(1996) classification of industrial districts, I argue that both models comprise a hybrid 
‘state-anchored/satellite’ industrial district. The previous quotations also validate the 
ongoing debate that questions the existence of an industrial complex with real financial 
and infrastructural capacity (Conor, 2004; Jones & Smith, 2005). This contrasts with 
celebratory government and media accounts based on gross revenue growth (but not 
profits) in satellite film production. However, there is a lack of academic studies that 
examine the structural underpinnings of the challenges the Wellington film district 
faces. In order to conduct such an examination, chapters 7 and 8 pay attention to the 
interactions among the district’s components by drawing on GI theory and of concepts 
of industrial organisation highlighted in Chapter 2. Those analytical concepts are used in 
the next chapters to evaluate the generation of sustainable outcomes in the form of 
dynamic interrelations among the district’s components. 
Patterns of Cultural and Geographic Organisation  
Cultural atmosphere and urban agglomeration 
In this section, I briefly discuss how the ‘urban settings’ in Wellington, understood as 
the configuration of certain socio-economic practices embedded in a particular place 
(Scott, 2000a), have facilitated specific forms of cultural socialisation, which in turn 
have mobilised a unique creative community.  
The Māori tribes that have lived in the Wellington region for 650 years have 
appropriated the geographic and natural features of the area to their mythology (GWRC, 
2014). Similarly, such landscape features remain central in today’s post-colonial 
understandings of social dynamics in the city which is surrounded by the sea and the 
hills. One interview participant described Wellington as “a pressure cooker, even 
geographically, if you look at this amphitheatre of hills, and all that energy feeding 
down to the centre.” Wellington is a small city of 191 000 inhabitants (SNZ, 2013d) but 
it was described in one tourist review as “the best little capital” (Lonely Planet, 2010).24  
As the political capital of New Zealand, Wellington agglomerates national government 
institutions and public service workers including several screen-related government and 
quasi-government agencies such as the Ministry of Cultural Heritage (MCH), the New 
Zealand Film Commission (NZFC), New Zealand On Air (NZOA), the Film Archives, 
                                                 
24 It ranked as the fifth eco-city worldwide and the twelfth for best quality of living (Dickison, 2010; 
NZH, 2014; WAP, 2014).  
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New Zealand On Screen, and Film NZ. Wellington is also considered the cultural capital 
of New Zealand as it concentrates cultural organisations such as museums, theatres, and 
artistic companies like the national ballet and the symphonic orchestra (WCC, 2014). 
There are specific film-related events and organisations, such as film festivals, the 
Wellington Film Society, independent and mainstream cinemas.  
In a visit to Wellington, academic Richard Florida considered it a “creative city” as 
compared to other cities in the country, Wellington has high levels of tertiary education, 
employment in the creative sector, ethnic diversity and tolerance, all of them claimed to 
be key to attracting a “creative class” (Florida, 2003; Volkerling, 2004). However, 
according to Volkerling Wellington’s cultural atmosphere has been the product of “the 
interaction between unintended consequences of policymaking; the purposive public 
sector reforms of the 1980s; and a combination of recent civic activism and serendipity” 
(2004, p. 6). The city, he explains, was established by British settlers in 1839 who 
purchased land from Māori leaders and applied a “grid-style town” designed in Britain 
but when they transposed it onto “Wellington’s rugged landscape {…} the CBD had to 
develop on the narrow strip of land between {…} [the] hills and the harbour edge. This 
has led to a density of urban land use unusual among New Zealand cities” (Volkerling, 
2004, p. 7). 
Many years later, in the 1980s and 1990s the city was also shaped by liberalisation and 
privatisation policies (Volkerling, 2004). A series of activist mayors oversaw the 
redevelopment for housing (Volkerling, 2004) and fostered new markets in services to 
attract investment and tourism (Huffer, 2012). For instance, warehouse and commercial 
buildings were developed into apartments; the retail sector was upgraded―with a 
European street culture influence―as a visitor destination for lifestyle consumption 
(Volkerling, 2004). Furthermore, the Wellington City Council (WCC) increased the 
city’s branding through the establishment of a hub of entertainment and nightlife 
(Huffer, 2012). Environmental and multicultural policy agendas at the time added to the 
open-minded attitude in the city (Volkerling, 2004). I argue that all of these factors 
shaped the city’s current character, its density, walkability, thriving street life, culinary 
and café culture, which are not only “part of its identity” (MCH, 2012b) but facilitators 
of networks of socialisation and cultural consumption (Stahl, 2011). 
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Nowadays, Wellington is also the film capital of New Zealand, on account of the 
unexpected commercial success of Peter Jackson, adding to the creative reputation of 
the city, and the origin of its nickname, Wellywood (Maclean, 2014; Volkerling, 2004). 
The amount of film gross revenue from film received by Wellington from overseas has 
made it the centre of film production and post-production activity in the country (SNZ, 
2010b), and a place that has rivalled Auckland in the last years (Cairns, 2010; DP, 
2006).25 Wellington concentrates film production, auxiliary services, labour markets and 
film-related institutions which, according to GI theory, provide industrial districts with 
advantages over other regions; they reduce transaction costs, facilitate flows of 
information and the recruitment of film workers (Scott, 2000a). Those factors give 
Wellington a clear advantage over the rest of New Zealand, with the notable exception 
of Auckland which is a strong competitor, having the largest amount of screen 
production companies (see Map 1) and synergies with the television industry, in which 
it specialises (Strathdee, 2008). Nonetheless, Wellington’s urban externalities entail 
general auxiliary services (such as transportation, administration, accounting, legal and 
telecommunication services) and a specific cultural atmosphere that facilitates certain 
types of filmmaking. For example, Wellington’s specialisation in post-production 
benefits from the “highest concentration of web-based and digital technology companies 
per capita in New Zealand” attracting information technology workers and providing 
the city with data connection infrastructure (GW, 2014). 
The interviews showed that film practitioners enjoy Wellington’s cultural atmosphere, 
cosmopolitan taste, and living standards. The cultural life of the city and, in particular, 
its film culture, which predates Peter Jackson’s success, is celebrated, 
there is a history of Wellington being, not necessarily the financial power house, but 
being the creative power house of New Zealand filmmaking. I mean this is where Geoff 
Murphy, Roger Donaldson…, they were all Wellington based people and they were very 
much, sort of, the foundation of the industry and they all shared their old flats in Aro St. 
So there is a tradition in Wellington of people making films. And also I think there is a 
tradition here of people writing, and nothing starts without writing. 
Furthermore, the theatre scene is one of the city’s strengths and part of its cultural 
capital. 
Wellington has always had a strong theatre scene, we produce actors, workers, writers, 
directors, designers and so on, mainly that is the source. I mean if you are a young person 
                                                 
25 Statistics New Zealand reported that “Wellington overtook Auckland in revenue from film production 
in 2009” (SNZ, 2010a).  
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in Wellington and you want to go to somewhere where there are other people trying out 
ideas you can go to Bats [Theatre], that is what you do. 
The city also has “a thriving independent cinema business” and “for going to the movies 
it is maybe the best city in the world” suggested some interviewees. The interviews 
highlighted the effect of the city’s density on community ethos. For local independent 
producers the compact nature of the city is an advantage:  
I think Wellington being a little bit of a village, anyone can know each other, it could be 
a good or a bad thing but it does make me connect easily in some aspects, {…} 
Wellington is great because it is so tight. 
The general perception is that the condensed organisation of the city generates a sense 
of community: “in Wellington it is possible to get a low budget film made by just 
enthusiastic people in a way that is not possible in Auckland”. One participant 
commented, “Wellington people come together to help each other out. Auckland is a bit 
more cut-throat, a little bit more savage.” Likewise, another practitioner said, 
the difference in Auckland and Wellington is dramatic. {…} It is just a totally different 
ethos up there whereas down here they want to be involved and I think that is just a 
Wellington thing. {…} it is just that sense of community about Wellington city that 
Auckland is too big to have. 
Despite Wellington being more film-friendly, Auckland is recognised for having greater 
consistency of work, better facilities and being cost-efficient for independent producers. 
This is due to Auckland being the largest populated city in the country and its derived 
economies of scale.26 One public servant explained: “population always attracts 
businesses and people.” However, as another interviewee commented, the lack of 
funding in Wellington does not equal a lack of creativity and somehow catalyses a 
collective approach.  
One participant noted Auckland is “more professional” but “Wellington is going to be 
where the experimental things happen, where your art-house side of New Zealand is 
going to happen, because that is the stuff that seems to be getting creative people 
together and just do something.” This sense of community resonates with Stahl’s study 
of the music scene in Wellington which has developed “social relationships that are 
explicitly cooperative and collaborative in {…} a ‘Do-it-together’ approach.’” In fact, 
Stahl adds, this ethos develops “an aesthetic politics that often disavows commercial 
                                                 
26 1.42 million in the Auckland region (SNZ, 2013d). 
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impulses, thrives by cementing its autonomy, and distance from the mainstream” (2011, 
p.148). 
In summary, my respondents’ accounts note the existence of experimental and 
collaborative creative dispositions imprinting a specific filmmaking culture in 
Wellington. Following the academic literature, I argue that such tendencies are bound to 
forms of socialisation facilitated by the city’s urban settings, agglomeration (of services 
and institutions) and history. I now consider how the creative elements are supported by 
local policies to venture in the production system.  
Cultural disarticulation from the city’s political and industrial landscape 
In this section I establish links between my interviewees’ perceptions and a sample of 
studies that have expressed concerns over the “unequal economic and cultural flows” 
(Huffer, 2012, p. 252) that underpin Wellington’s urban policy in relation to its cultural 
activity. They highlight the special advantages given to commercial and marketable 
interests in the areas of music, film-making, and film-going (Beatty & Lawn, 2005; 
Huffer, 2012; Stahl, 2011).  
In his study of the eclectic music scene in contemporary Wellington, Stahl (2011) 
observed that practices of the indie music scene overlap uneasily with the WCC’s 
policies based on creative entrepreneurialism. The latter favours giving support to 
internationally marketable cultural manifestations which makes other creators “claim a 
space outside” certain policy frameworks (Stahl, 2011, p. 156). As the following 
sections will discuss, similar perceptions were voiced by independent film-makers 
interviewed here. Likewise, in his study of cinema exhibition in Wellington, Huffer 
identified that the New Zealand Film Archive and the New Zealand International Film 
Festival provide a space for exhibition of New Zealand films within the city centre but 
“the Council’s investment in (them) {…} pales in comparison to the support that they 
provided for the refurbishment of the Embassy” (2012, p. 258).27 The latter is a cinema 
leased to the second largest theatrical chain―Event Cinemas―that favours Hollywood 
distributed films. Huffer (2012, p. 258) argues that the WCC “highlights the primary 
purpose of film as income generating”, as part of “the market-led approach to culture” 
in post-industrial cities.  
                                                 
27 Based on support for the TLOTR premieres held there. 
 
 
179 
 
 
Figure 28 Map of film production companies in Wellington and Auckland, 2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data based on The Data Book (Onfilm, 2012), complemented and updated 
through the New Zealand Companies Office (MBIE, 2014a) and production companies’ Internet sites.
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The following sections illustrate similar conclusions based on participants’ perceptions 
of the disconnection of governments and markets from the independent grassroots of 
filmmaking in the city. For instance, a film facilitator commented on the government’s 
involvement in the film industry, “I think it looks better for them to be involved in The 
Hobbit and that sort of stuff because they can show media, so it is all to bluff people.” 
And a film producer speaking specifically about the WCC said, “for them it is easier to 
jump in with the big guys.” Comparable comments were articulated by a musician cited 
in Stahl’s study (2011, p. 156): “[The official cultural capital] is a bunch of bureaucrats 
talking about things they are not involved in, and that they don’t really support, but are 
happy to cash in on if they think it might make the city look better.” Parallel perceptions 
of local film-makers underlie the issue of local creative disconnection from the 
industrial productive activities. 
Screen Production in Wellington 
In this section, I provide an overview of the bi-modal screen production district in 
Wellington as background to examining its embedded relational dynamics later in the 
chapter. Wellington is favoured by its status as the capital of the country. For example, 
in the 1960s and 1970s government headquarters for agencies such as the National Film 
Unit, the New Zealand Film Commission, and the national television broadcasters were 
located in Wellington (see Chapter 6). Some interviewees described the scenario in the 
1980s-90s. 
Wellington was where the film industry renaissance started and where it was substantially 
sited at the time. It was the headquarters of commercial production, it was the 
headquarters of TV production {…}, the leader independent production company was 
here {…} very much the film capital at the time. 
Other interviewees recount the active production of local, low-budget films, British TV 
mini-series, and the presence of several advertising agencies producing television 
commercials. The latter, “provided the infrastructure for dramatic filmmaking.” 
Production companies “made regular income from shooting commercials” and they 
supported service providers. The film industry at the time employed around 200 to 300 
workers who had regular work. It was a small but “a totally viable business”, “it was 
sustainable, it kept bubbling along”.  
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Figure 29 Map of film production companies in Wellington, 2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data based on The Data Book (Onfilm, 2012), complemented and updated 
through the “New Zealand Companies Office” (MBIE, 2014a) and production companies’ Internet sites.
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However, in the early 1990s, many advertising agencies closed their Wellington’s 
offices or moved their television producers to Auckland; likewise TVNZ (the state-
owned broadcaster) moved, taking with it the basis for the industry (DP, 2011). Some 
participants suggested that those changes took place because of the market crash of 
1987, which forced companies to cut back and pick Auckland for its bigger market size. 
It was also suggested that the shift from TVNZ was politically driven: “A lot of people 
thought it was basically the National government at the time that thought TVNZ was a 
too left wing organisation and they didn’t like it, and then the Wellington spin on 
decisions will be made by Aucklanders”. 
Around the same time Peter Jackson’s The Frighteners (1996), a New Zealand-US 
production, set the conditions for the director to enter the blockbuster Hollywood film 
market with The Lord of the Rings (2001, 2002, 2003), introducing the satellite model of 
production to the city. Since then, Wellington has had at least two different film 
production models, the Hollywood-satellite production based in the suburb of Miramar 
and local production spread around the city. One participant observes, “it went from 
being a very small and stable industry to being a massive but very cyclical industry, 
{…} it has changed beyond recognition in the last 15 years.” 
This section analyses film production companies in terms of these two models, which 
present differences with regard to size, budgets, revenue, activities, outputs, and so on. 
This distinction is especially important as celebratory political statements, based on 
official statistics, tend to neglect the disparities between the satellite model and the local 
model. In focusing on these disparities, I hope to expand the understanding of dynamics 
of the industrial district.  
As Figure 30 shows, production and postproduction gross revenue (not profits) in the 
district is highly volatile and due to its bigger scale it reflects mainly the impact of 
satellite blockbusters being made in Wellington. 
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Figure 30 Screen production and post-production gross revenue in Wellington, 2009-
2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on Screen Industry Survey  (SNZ, 2013c). Includes production companies, 
contractors (sole traders), and services, television and other audio-visual production. 
 
The ephemeral project nature of films causes the number of production companies 
based in Wellington to vary from year to year. However, there is a group of long-lived 
firms. According to my own calculations there were approximately thirty-nine screen 
production companies in the Wellington region in 2012–2013 (see Figure 29). This 
number differs from official statistics which estimated the existence of 450 screen 
business in the region by 2012 (SNZ, 2013c). As mentioned in Chapter 5, the official 
figures include contractors and auxiliary services, not strictly production companies.28 
Misinterpretation of official data could lead to celebratory statements like that made by 
Gisela Carr, CEO of NZ Film, who commented on official numbers: “[there are] 
multiple companies out on Miramar peninsula and that diversification's very good for 
Wellington” (emphasis added) (McNicol, 2013b). I argue that the ambiguous use of 
“companies” conceals the difference between production establishments, services, and 
individual workers, despite their distinct economic roles. This research found that the 
only production companies working in Miramar are Peter Jackson’s, which disputes 
Carr’s assertion on Miramar’s diversity. 
                                                 
28 I use a definition of a screen production company as an establishment with a physical location that is 
primarily engaged in the production films and other audio-visual products for commercialisation. I 
distinguish them from individuals (freelance workers or sole traders); post-production and services 
establishments; as well as from enterprises that might own several establishments (INEGI, 2002). The 
Screen Industry Survey of Statistics New Zealand does not distinguish among those economic activities. 
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Figure 31 Percentage of film production companies in Wellington by longevity, 2012–
2013 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data based on The Data Book (Onfilm, 2012), complemented and updated 
through the “New Zealand Companies Office” (MBIE, 2014a) and production companies’ Internet sites. 
The data I collected shows in Figure 31 that 26% of the screen production companies in 
Wellington are “long-established” as well as “mature” companies which have been in 
business for more than 21 years. However, the majority of companies (74%) are 
“middle-aged” and “young” companies which have been in business somewhere 
between one and 20 years. Long-established and mature companies came to existence in 
the context of the creation of the NZFC and the tax breaks for the local production in 
the 1980s. Middle-age which were companies funded in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
have coexisted with the establishment of the Miramar satellite complex.  
Flexible production  
The industrial organisation of the film and screen industry in Wellington is 
characterised by flexible production meaning that labour, equipment, inputs, and 
diversification of goods can quickly adjust to changes (Storper, 1997). I now outline the 
indicators of companies’ flexibility which allows them to save costs and adapt to the 
project-based model. The latter is dominant in contemporary audio-visual production 
(Blair et al., 2001).  
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Firstly, a great number of the Wellington production companies are registered as limited 
companies which give shareholders a limited liability when dealing with uncertain 
environments (MBIE, 2014b). There are also a few producers operating as sole 
traders—self-employed, freelancers, or single operators (IRD, 2014)―who have full 
personal responsibility over their business liability and whose businesses do not require 
any formal or legal process to be set up. This is again suitable for high levels of 
uncertainty and work casualisation (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011). 
Secondly, as Figure 32 shows production companies are diversified in various audio-
visual activities. Thus they are able to create alternative streams of revenue for the 
company as they offer those services to third parties. Feature films represent the activity 
engaging the highest number of businesses.  
Thirdly, according to official data shown in Figure 33, post-production businesses grew 
at a greater pace than production businesses. This reflects the characteristics of satellite 
activities in Wellington which provide service work and are highly post-produced.  
 
Figure 32 Audio-visual activities performed by production companies in Wellington, 
2008‒2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013c). Includes production 
companies, contractors, and services. One company or contractor could engage in several audio-visual 
activities. 
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Figure 33 Specialisation in production and post-production in Wellington, 2008‒2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2011, 2013c). Includes production 
companies, contractors, and services. 
 
Furthermore, post-production activities are specialised in visual effects such as 
computer graphics and animation (see Figure 34). In 2012, visual effects represented 
94% of the entire post-production revenue in Wellington (SNZ, 2013c). However, the 
next section will critically discuss the “significant dominance of Weta Digital in visual 
effects” within the district (McNicol, 2013b). 
Figure 34 Specialisation in visual effects in Wellington, 2009‒2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration based on Screen Industry Survey (SNZ, 2013c). Includes production companies, 
contractors, and services. 
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The interviews suggested that flexible production characteristics are also a response to 
companies’ undercapitalisation. They showed that despite the rise in film production 
and post-production gross revenue in the district, most production companies in 
Wellington find it hard to capitalise. This confirms Jackson and Court’s report which 
observed that at the national level: “Few producers have sufficient capital to properly 
fund their operations or develop their businesses. Most limp from project to project” 
(Jackson & Court, 2010, p. 61).  
As mentioned earlier on, the limited amount of private capital involved in the local film 
industry has generated a dependency on state subsidies (MED, 2012a; Pinflicks 
Communications & NZIER, 2003). However, the exact figures for government funding 
and overseas financing for Wellington are not available in official statistics as they are 
confidential (to protect the commercial sensitivity of a few Miramar companies that 
concentrate these activities). In the next sections, I deal separately with the satellite and 
domestic models in order to tease out their main differences. 
The satellite production model: The Miramar complex 
The Miramar cluster in Wellington has been built around the core activities of WingNut 
Films, Peter Jackson’s production company, which was founded in 1988. As Jackson’s 
projects grew in size, he and his associates gradually developed a cluster of film 
facilities on the Miramar Peninsula as shown in Figure 35 (Finlay, 2006). Today, the 
facilities include physical effects (Weta Workshop), digital effects (Weta Digital), 
merchandising (Weta Ltd.), studios (Stone Street Studios), post-production services 
(Park Road Post)29, and equipment services (Portsmouth Hire). Just recently a 
commercial movie theatre, The Roxy, was added to the list as well as The Hobbit 
trilogy’s project-based company, 3 Foot 7.30 Pukeko Pictures is another company in 
Miramar focusing on children’s animation and, recently, on adult drama (Jackson & 
Walsh, 2013; Roxy Cinema, 2014). Together, Miramar production companies31 account 
for 7% of all the production companies in the district (see Figure 36). The degree of 
infrastructure developed by Peter Jackson is “a very substantial investment by any one’s 
                                                 
29 Previously the National Film Unit, bought by Peter Jackson (Finlay, 2006). 
30 3 Foot 7 is a company established for The Hobbit trilogy from 2009. The company 3 Foot 6 was 
established for TLOTR in 1997. 
31 WingNut, 3 Foot 7, and Pukeko Pictures. 
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measure” as a local filmmaker comments.32 Jackson’s personal fortune is estimated to 
worth $NZ585 million (Theunissen, 2014).  
Figure 35 Map of the Miramar complex 
 
Note. Weta Digital (2014). 
WingNut Films and Weta Digital are the biggest film production and visual effects 
companies, respectively, in Wellington and the whole country, regarding their scale of 
operations, financial as well as employment capacity. Following the blockbuster model 
Miramar is renowned for producing the films with the largest budgets in world cinema 
history. These are ‘global’ content and fantasy films such as King Kong (Jackson, 2005) 
and Avatar (Cameron, 2009) with a wealth of computer graphics and special effects. 
Films such as these are the product of Jackson’s successful commercial partnership with 
Hollywood as well as Miramar’s ability to capitalise from New Zealand government tax 
rebates. Those two factors underpin the rapid growth of the Miramar cluster which 
represents a hybrid version of Markusen’s classification (1996). On the one hand, it 
exhibits characteristics of satellite activities such as an assemblage of “branch plants 
embedded in external organization links”; on the other, it resembles state-anchored 
activities supported by “one or more public-sector institutions” (Markusen, 1996, p. 
296). 
Examining WingNut Films’ projects in the last two decades and their production 
networks through their credits, it is possible to map the companies that Miramar works 
with and the frequency of relations they establish (see Appendix E) (IMDB, 2014a). As 
a result, it can be inferred that Miramar works on the basis of a pragmatic business 
structure combining characteristics of vertical integration and vertical disintegration.  
                                                 
32 To give some examples, Park Road Post was estimated to cost $NZ50 million and Stone Street Studios, 
$NZ10 million (PWB, 2006; Xoanon, 2006). 
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On the one hand, Miramar companies show organisational characteristics of vertical 
integration, as they share a common ownership and each of them contribute in the 
supply chain towards a common product. Firstly, they are all co-owned by Peter Jackson 
and his closest collaborators (Richard Taylor, Fran Walsh, James Williams and, Jamie 
Selkirk). Secondly, they work for in-house projects providing different inputs through 
the stages of the value chain along the phases of production. For instance, they have 
pursued WingNut Film’s projects like The Lovely Bones (Jackson, 2009) and The 
Hobbit trilogy (Jackson, 2012-14) from pre-production, studios, equipment, special 
effects to post-production and visual effects. As Taylor explained: “We are in the 
process of trying to put together a {…} totally vertically-integrated entertainment 
company” (Finlay, 2006, p. 36). 
On the other hand, the Miramar complex’s companies display characteristics of vertical 
disintegration in their organisational flexibility. They are constituted as separate 
independent entities and encompass different levels of vertical disintegration. Firstly, 
when they are not working for in-house projects, they work independently undertaking 
service work for other international and national projects. Secondly, WingNut Films 
establishes partnerships and outsources work to international service companies in many 
production areas, especially when a project’s magnitude requires services that exceed 
Miramar’s capacity. Thirdly, and most importantly, Miramar’s development has 
depended on engaging with Hollywood’s vertically disintegrated studios as it relies on 
them for financial investment and distribution of films. 
This dual vertical integration-disintegration strategy has allowed Miramar to capitalise 
in such a way as to allow it to undertake its own creative projects while growing rapidly, 
despite the difficulties that the rest of the industrial district in Wellington faces. 
Such is the scale of Hollywood satellite blockbusters that Weta Digital and a couple of 
medium-sized animation companies―Pukeko, co-founded by Richard Taylor, and thus, 
related to Miramar, and Karactaz, which provides work for Hollywood majors 
(McNicol, 2013a)―are mostly responsible for the increase of 30% in Wellington’s 
screen production revenue, driven primary by animation, from 2005 to 2012 (SNZ, 
2006; 2013c).  
In 2010, 16% of the screen industry business in New Zealand spent an average of 
$NZ106, 000 in research and development (R&D). However, as an official study points 
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out, “R&D is concentrated in a few businesses” (MED, 2012a, p. 6). The Miramar 
companies are the leading innovators in New Zealand regarding state-of-the-art 
computer graphics, motion capture, 3D stereoscopic technologies and 48 frame rates. It 
could be inferred they concentrate the highest R&D expenditure in Wellington and in 
the New Zealand film industry.  
Weta Digital, for example, developed tools for emotion capture, that is, computer 
graphics (CG) of facial performance from motion capture. Although the motion capture 
techniques were already in use, for its movie Avatar, James Cameron chose to work 
with Weta after seeing that the character Gollum that Weta had produced for TLOTR had 
improved facial emotion in greater detail (Duncan & Fitzpatrick, 2010). However the 
challenge was that in Avatar almost everything required CG. A team in Weta re-
examined the CG tools developed in the 1980s that were still in use despite 
improvements in computers’ speed and memory in 2006. The result was building 
computer models with anatomically accurate muscles and facial rigs―the internal 
structures that allow animators to bend the character into a desired pose (Slick, 2015): 
“Weta modellers built geometries that simulated real muscles, fat and skin {…} [that] 
made for a more labor-intensive modelling effort at the beginning but it would produce 
far more believable animated characters at the end” (Duncan & Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 
234). Based on Duncan and Fitzpatrick (2010) description, it can be inferred that the 
type of relationship between Weta as a service provider and its clients, the Avatar 
producers, was based on intensive collaboration, communication and feedback which 
allowed the former to provide a customised service. Weta’s capacity to research, 
experiment and iterate to match the specific requirements of Avatar producers conferred 
both, the service provider and the client, with a competitive advantage based on a high-
road strategy: it was the first film ever to achieve those photorealistic CG shots. 
Miramar’s animation activities have been steady, yet, live action filming activities suffer 
from erratic production due to cyclical periods in which projects are being filmed, for 
example, one blockbuster every two or three years followed by quiet periods (Burges, 
2010). Although Miramar is able to support a core of workers, as Richard Taylor 
explains “if we were truly successful at a business level, we wouldn’t have let a hundred 
people go at the back of TLOTR, because we would have another project on our 
doorstep” (Finlay, 2006, p. 35). Diversifying activities and doing service work are 
strategies to cope with this. For example, Weta Workshop has ventured in ancillary 
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markets such as collectables because “the crew could immediately start creating those 
once their work on the film was over” (McFadden, 2009, p. 55). 
The lack of continuous production is clearly the main challenge not only for Miramar 
but for the whole district in Wellington. It also raises questions about the efficacy of 
policies that have focused only on large-budget satellite productions as a model of 
economic development, despite the fact that such productions are highly dependent on 
tax rebates and are unable to provide a constant source of employment to film workers 
in the region  (Rothwell, 2010). Despite the creation of tax incentives for large and 
small budgets (2003‒2008), the boom and bust situation still threatens the satellite 
complex (e.g., The Avatar deal, see Chapter 6). The next section presents the challenges 
from the perspective of domestic production. 
The local-independent production model 
Preceding and coexisting with the Miramar satellite model is the local independent 
model. According to my calculations, 90% of the 39 screen production companies active 
in the Wellington industrial district are independent, as opposed to 10% of the 
companies with links to the satellite production model. For the purposes of this 
research, ‘independent’ is used to describe when a company’s field of operations rarely 
or never crosses paths with the satellite companies and major Hollywood studios. In 
turn, decision-making regarding objectives, strategies, content and transactions is 
assumed by the company itself and not determined by Hollywood.  
Data compiled in this research shows that the vast majority of independent companies in 
Wellington are mainly micro-enterprises―characterised by working-proprietors with 
zero employees―or small companies with up to nine employees. There are a few 
exceptions like Gibson Group which, with a staff of 16, falls into the category of a 
medium-sized enterprise (10‒19 employees).33 Notwithstanding, staff numbers for all 
these companies could increase significantly when certain projects take off and then 
downsize again during the project development phase (Campbell & Hughes, 2003).  
As mentioned before, some screen production companies survive by diversifying their 
activities as content producers or providers of service work in various formats (such as 
commercials, visitor attractions, and animation). In the interviews one of these 
                                                 
33 Definitions for Small and Medium Enterprises (SME’s) by MED (2011a). 
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diversified producers commented that, initially, the company was focused on generating 
good story-telling but they had recently faced greater pressure to move to more 
commercial and interactive audio-visual production. 
Figure 36 Production companies by model of production in Wellington, 2012‒2013 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data based on The Data Book (Onfilm, 2012), complemented and updated 
through the “New Zealand Companies Office” (MBIE, 2014a) and production companies’ Internet sites. 
Except for a handful of highly diversified companies, the majority of production 
companies interviewed here, whose focus is primarily on making films, indicated that 
they were unable to sustain their operations apart from their production activities. In 
most cases projects could take years to develop while such producers and film-makers 
raised money in between doing other jobs within or outside the screen industry. Phrases 
like “just hanging in there”, “struggling to survive” and “the odds of getting any money 
back are minuscule” epitomise the financial struggle of local producers. Another 
filmmaker commented, “I just spent seven months on it and didn’t make a cent. Well, I 
think it was worth it. That is not a business decision it is a passion decision.” Some 
film-makers think of themselves as being rather on the margins:  
We are not part of the industry because {…} the industry is profit-driven and [their 
production house] has nothing to do with commercial imperatives {…} there is a vast 
area of sponsored media production and I suppose we are part of it. 
This sponsorship is not limited to state subsidies, and extends to film-makers personal 
capital, film workers voluntary work, crowdfunding and cooperative systems. Having 
said that, it does not mean that such local film-makers and producers do not pursue 
commercial returns through channels of distribution and broadcasting, but rather that 
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they are aware of the difficulties to entering the commercial models. Despite the 
struggle to survive, one informant observed:  
we are a reasonable size in New Zealand but internationally we are very small. {…}. 
But I think that the problem you come up against is that the nature of a lot of 
independent producing people is that they are independent so they don’t easily work 
with each other {…} that is an issue. 
Another characteristic of independent producers according to interviewees is the small 
budget of their feature films, ranging from $NZ30,000 to $NZ5 million. An experienced 
producer put it in these terms: “the kind of films we make are primarily the Cinderella 
{…} we tend to make films that are sub 5 million or often very much less.”  In such 
circumstances it is common to find cost-saving strategies like multitasking within the 
core roles of writing/directing/and producing by one individual in many projects. One 
interview participant commented on his crossover roles: “I’d say I am a producer by 
necessity, I would never consider producing anyone else’s work. I do it because I can 
and I need to for my own projects”.  
Independent producers have in common approaching filmmaking as personal projects, 
as an interviewee reflected:  
Why can’t we bring the costs of films down and basically substitute scale and money 
for a kind of individual passion {…} even if you cannot afford all those big things it 
doesn’t matter {…} what matters is your ability to actually harness that to an emotional 
story. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, it is that connection with stories and narratives that links the 
local production model to national policies that saw the creation of government bodies 
like the NZFC and NZOA in the first place. Like the satellite model, the local 
independent production model is also dependent on state support, in this case in the 
form of direct subsidies such as producer-driven contestable schemes for low- and 
medium-budget features, short films or television programmes. In order to get state 
funding from the NZFC, projects are required to comply with New Zealand cultural 
content, meaning “films that reflect New Zealand or New Zealanders” (NZFC, 2011, p. 
6). The films produced under these schemes can give greater access to a wide range of 
New Zealand film-makers whose films can also “resonate particularly to New Zealand 
audiences”, as mentioned by a creative interviewee. When seeking NZOA funding for 
television programmes, producers’ projects are required to “reflect and develop New 
Zealand identity and culture, {…} promoting {…} Māori culture” as well as targeting 
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special interest audiences such as “women, youth, children, persons with disabilities, 
[and] minorities in the community including ethnic minorities” (Broadcasting Act, 
1989). Despite state funding being critical to the existence of the local industry in the 
film industrial district in Wellington, funding is “not enough” and local industry has not 
been able to move beyond dependency. These features coincide with Markusen’s (1996) 
classification of state-anchored activities dependent on state institutions.  
So far, I have described the characteristics of the satellite and local models of 
production. In the next section, I will examine the impact they have on each other and 
the links established between them. 
Patterns of Industrial Organisation 
Satellite and domiciled relations 
This section examines relations among the satellite and the local independent 
production models described above. Few topics produced so much consistency in 
interview participants’ responses as the conceptualisation of those two different models. 
However, the majority of responses contained ambivalent views of the impact of 
Miramar on local production. As mentioned in Chapter 2, GI distinguishes positive or 
negative externalities―the benefits or costs that an activity generates for third parties 
(Bator, 1958)―as well as  interdependencies―functional collaboration where players 
learn from the experience and interaction among them (Nelson & Winter, 1982)―as 
central to industrial development. My interviewees acknowledged Miramar’s positive 
spillovers but also identified important limitations and, in some cases, what I consider 
negative externalities. There are four major areas where synergies, disconnection or 
negative effects were perceived between local and satellite relations: the technical, 
creative, financial-production areas, as well as the film district’s atmosphere.  
Technical area 
Earlier, some of the rationales for government support to the satellite model such as job 
creation and capability up-skilling were described (MBIE, 2012). Interviews confirmed 
that there are flows of crew from Miramar to the local industry and vice versa. A crew 
member commented “we all work in the same business”, blurring the perception of 
having two separate models. There is also a wide perception that Miramar “has enabled 
a lot of people to get more skills {…} the more they work, the more they do, {…} the 
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more they can bring to other projects, but that is more on a crew level.” An industry 
facilitator mentioned this type of synergy: “they [Miramar] are hiring many people, 
training them up for the domestic market, so there is a correlation, {…} that is 
importing talent, using it to upskill the local talent.” 
Some producers who were interviewed commented on how their companies or projects 
benefitted from hiring former Miramar workers. For example, an independent producer 
had hired workers who had formerly worked on Avatar and Jackson’s films: “So, even 
if they are set there, we have a core group of talented people and we can use their 
experience, {…} we can piggyback off by the skill set that is there.” Another producer 
hired a former Weta Digital computer programmer: “we managed to get him after his 
contract working on a Peter Jackson film.” Even a local exhibitor has benefitted and 
talks about the quality of staff: “a number of my staff have worked at Weta or Park 
Road.” But the flow is both ways, as a policy advisor states “in making local films you 
build up a base of skilled crew and talent {…} that can work in these large projects [in 
Miramar].” These, I argue, are clear examples of positive externalities. 
Another positive externality is the infrastructure available as a result of the satellite 
activities that built world-class facilities in Wellington. Although “too expensive” for 
the rest of the local film producers, the generosity of the Miramar technical facilities 
was a recurrent topic in the interview responses. For example, a producer received 
sponsorship for film processing:  
That was very kind of them, {…} we had no money, it was ridiculous. I wanted to shoot 
all the stuff on film so ‘How the heck are we going to do that?’ So, that is how we did it, 
by begging. 
Other participants mentioned that Portsmouth (equipment hire) or Park Road Post (post-
production) services “take some responsibility for assisting small firms” and are 
“prepared to do deals”, “offer their services at a cost-recovery rate or lower than market 
rates for New Zealand producers.” Park Road Post has a short-film package which 
includes discounts and mentoring (Onfilm, 2009a). They also support local film 
screening activities and “scanning of Archives’ prints [from the New Zealand Film 
Archive] for high definition digital reproduction.” Similarly, Weta Workshop’s special 
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effects have also engaged with local producers “on any project that is interesting” to 
them, a local government facilitator commented.34  
Having said that, local producers’ use of Park Road Post is also related to its leading 
position in the country and the world for technological expertise; as a producer noted:  
there is a weird sense of loyalty [to Park Road Post] that doesn’t really exist, {…} 
[rather] there is sort of a monopoly situation that people are obliged to use, {…} for 
example, Dolby films sound is only able to be done at Park Road Post [in Wellington] or 
Digi Post in Auckland, so you would have to use one of those places to finish a New 
Zealand film because producers are scared to not follow the standards. 
In other words, it is producers’ necessity and not loyalty that drives them to use Park 
Road Post. Other Miramar facilities such as studios are simply unavailable for the local 
industry and tied to Miramar’s international projects. That is also the case with Weta 
Digital which has always “been internationally focused {…} we don’t have the budgets 
in New Zealand films to use these kind of services” as a local facilitator commented.  
Overall, interviews confirmed commonly recognised perceptions by the media and the 
government that international productions have upgraded the technical and 
administrative skills of film workers as well as increased the technical quality of screen 
products in New Zealand (McCarthy, 2013). 
Creative area 
The satellite’s synergies with the local industry are nonetheless limited in other areas of 
film work. A film director explains, “certainly there is [sic] people going in between 
those two [Miramar and the local industry] but only really at a technical level, they 
don’t go to any senior level or at a creative level.” Another film-maker confirmed this 
view: “for people like me, producer, writer, director, Peter Jackson has no use to me 
[laughter]. I think it is fantastic they’ve got their own things.” Another producer that had 
worked in Jackson’s earlier projects noted,  
in terms of mixing with them or even…, I would never consider going to Peter for a 
local New Zealand film. I mean {…} he really does his own projects. I guess partly 
because they would open the flood gates. 
There is still little exchange of creative input and talent as Conor’s (2004) research had 
discussed a decade ago. For example, WingNut Films’ movies have used American and 
                                                 
34 Other types of facilities like the Embassy and Roxy cinemas and Bats Theatre building were earthquake 
strengthened and renovated with the financial aid of Peter Jackson. 
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British stars with a few New Zealand actors who usually perform secondary roles. By 
the same token, scriptwriting is a close knit team of Jackson-Walsh-Boyens, with the 
exception of Jackson’s earlier pre-satellite films in which he collaborated with local 
film-makers on movies like Forgotten Silver (Botes & Jackson, 1995). The perceptions 
of interview participants’ on this matter are reflected in a film director’s comment, 
“Peter Jackson doesn’t employ any writers, well, he employs his wife and Philippa, and 
they are the key people. But they are not involved in developing other New Zealand 
writers.” A local writer confirms,  
There has never been and it never would be a Peter Jackson film that is not written by 
Peter Jackson, Fran Walsh and Philippa Boyens. They have sorted that, they don’t need 
any writers. They are a completely sealed environment to themselves.  
This detachment is also present at the creative content level. A crew member noted, 
“The Lord of the Rings, I don’t think they are New Zealand films, to me they are 
Hollywood films that are made by a New Zealand director in New Zealand.” Similarly, 
a local writer argued that, 
Peter Jackson does a particular kind of filmmaking so he is making epics set in Middle 
Earth which are sort of very broad crowd pleasers. {…} And the sort of films that are 
our favourite films in the world are often films which are quite different to that. About 
real people, real situations, {…} commercially that might be great but artistically maybe 
there are better things you can do.  
By the same token a service provider explained, “the films made in Miramar are entirely 
box office-related commercial focus and nothing to do with New Zealand content.” I 
argue that it is in the creative area where a gap between Miramar and the local industry 
can be perceived. 
Financial and production areas 
The conceptualisation of Miramar by interview participants was that of a foreign model, 
“a different world”, “removed from my daily reality” and “another planet.” As a 
creative boundary spanner noted, Peter Jackson “has created in Miramar a little portion 
of Burbank {…} it is something that is happening over there, and we know about it but 
is not really something we interact with in any meaningful way.” In the same vein, 
another participant commented, “He [Jackson] could be living in LA and doing 
everything that he does over there, and there wouldn’t be any difference to our film 
industry, which is completely separate to what he does.” And the references to foreign-
ness continued to appear. Another local producer suggested, “In some ways it is helpful 
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to think that Miramar is an island that is off the shore of California. It is conceptually a 
better way to think about it than it is part of the local or the domestic industry. Certainly 
financially it is not. It sort of happens to be in New Zealand.” Another producer in a 
medium-sized said that at the financing and distribution level “there is no connection at 
all.” A creative boundary spanner commented how “the Jackson Empire” added a 
“whole new equation which is the importation of production {...}, they are essentially 
funded from offshore.” This observation was shared by producers that have worked on 
Jackson’s projects in the past:  
Peter and Fran are incredibly removed from the New Zealand film industry. In terms of 
other producers, not of course in terms of their crew and cast, they are really in their own 
world {…} They are not horrible or arrogant, they are just very busy and they just chose 
to be like that.  
Examining the titles produced by Miramar (IMDB, 2014a), it is evident that there are no 
co-financial or co-production activities between Miramar and the local production 
companies, except for sponsorship of technical facilities. On the contrary, WingNut 
Films often establishes project-based partnerships with transnational and international 
companies. For example, at a financial and co-production level WingNut Films has 
established associations with major Hollywood studios or their subsidiaries, Warner 
Brothers (New Line Cinema), Sony (Columbia Pictures, TriStar Pictures), Viacom 
(Paramount Pictures, Nickelodeon), MGM and Universal Pictures. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, majors form an oligopoly that controls the most extensive network of film 
distribution channels in the world. The other production companies that WingNut has 
worked with include large international players such as US Amblin Entertainment, 
DreamWorks and UK’s Film 4 (IMDB, 2014a). In sum, the financial-production area 
shows no functional interdependencies established between Miramar companies and 
local independent production companies. 
Atmosphere 
Despite feelings of detachment from Miramar, interviewees from the local production 
model acknowledge the positive externalities from both models co-existing in the film 
district. The buzz around Miramar, some said, worked as a branding strategy; it gave the 
film industry an important place in public opinion and international visibility. A 
producer in a medium-sized local company commented: “The main advantage of 
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Miramar is that if you travel overseas and you say you are from Wellington, then they 
believe that there is an industry here {…} it is only a broad marketing plus.” 
Participants also concurred on Miramar contributing positively to a collective 
psychological atmosphere in Wellington. A crew member observed, “there is nothing 
[that] makes people realise that they can do something like watching your friend doing 
it, {…} so I think that the whole city psychologically had a boost.” Jackson’s 
entrepreneurial spirit was also a positive influence on some local film-makers: “I 
believe he will be remembered less as a filmmaker than as an entrepreneur. {…} And I 
think that sort of inspiration is really great.” A local writer observed “what he [Jackson] 
has done is fantastic, you know, and choosing to stay in Wellington.” A local exhibitor 
conceded “it is great to have that level of enthusiasm”. 
However, participants also acknowledged that the scale of Miramar operations can be 
overwhelming and in that sense constitute a negative externality. A public servant 
commented, “the problem is that the Wellington industry needs to fit around this big 
thing.” A policy advisor suggested “the need for the industry to ride on Peter Jackson’s 
coattails for as long as possible. Like compare Peter Jackson to a meteor across the sky, 
{…} [laughter] before it burns out you need to make the most of it.” For other 
participants, it is this hype around Miramar’s astronomic proportions that has somehow 
overshadowed the local industry. An interviewee suggested, “the New Zealand film 
industry {…} is getting smaller and smaller with time, pretty hard to notice now, and 
there is the Jackson industry. {…} And Jackson’s operations are so enormous that they 
tend to overshadow most of other things.” This feeling was shared by many other 
interviewees:  
I guess as film-makers wanting to do independent films not necessarily big blockbuster 
hits {…}, it is a bit like how rugby gets a lot of the attention in sports but there are so 
many other fantastic sports {…} and people do amazing things in other sports and other 
amazing film projects. But the recognition it just really isn’t there. {…} I understand why 
that is important but it is not the driving force for New Zealand. 
Another participant resents that the unbalanced relation between Miramar and the local 
industry is widespread in the perceptions of government and quasi-government 
organisations:  
Only if the Prime Minister stops trying to {…} have the “Oh Hollywood!-thing” going, it 
would be incredibly beneficial that they realise how hard and how the industry exists only 
by the sacrifice given by so many people in the film industry. It is not Hollywood, New 
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Zealand film is not Hollywood. {…} all the things that are going on and yet the only 
thing we hear about is Jackson and I mean no disrespect to him, you know, I like him, but 
to me is like is such an unrealistic portrayal {…} a very skewed view of the industry and 
I think it starts with government really. 
Indeed, as I will show in the next chapter, the local industry’s repeated perception of 
this skewed governmental view of the industry has increased the institutional tensions 
regarding policy. Before I go on to consider that, I now examine the relations that the 
domestic and satellite models develop with specialised service providers.  
Service providers 
In this section, I discuss the relations that the satellite and the local production models 
establish with ‘intra-sectoral’ or film-specialised service providers (Scott, 2005). Film 
service providers are highly relational businesses and according to GI the more frequent 
their transactions are with producers the more potential they have to generate 
competitive advantages based on the specificity of services they can provide  (Scott, 
2005; Williamson, 1981).  
General characteristics of intra-sectoral service providers  
Film specialised services are mainly delivered by private companies but sometimes are 
also administered by public offices such as location offices. My research identified the 
existence of around 32 hire companies in Wellington in 2012 (see Figure 37).35 Among 
them are film studios, equipment hire companies (cameras, key grips), lighting, editing, 
sound-mixing studios, special and visual effects as well as a motion capture facility in 
the Miramar complex.  
Companies that function as service providers in Wellington also present big disparities. 
Miramar service providers employ several dozens of people and are able to make 
massive reinvestments every year. For example, Park Road Post employs between 65 
and 72 people (Onfilm, 2009b; Xoanon, 2006). In 2008, the company stated it was 
“continually updating equipment {…} to remain a world class level” (Onfilm, 2008, p. 
23). That year the improvements comprised a second intermediate digital suite, greatly 
increased storage (SAM, a CSIF server), and the Miramar fibre network, among others.  
                                                 
35
 That number has remained almost steady since 2000 when there were thirty service providers based on 
the The Data Book (Onfilm, 2000, 2012), the “New Zealand Companies Office” (MBIE, 2014a) and 
production companies’ Internet sites. 
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A local facilitator said that, Park Road Post interacts “with the industry worldwide, not 
just domestically. The same will go for the equipment hire [Portsmouth].” However, the 
majority of the local hire companies are smaller, have modest reinvestments and deal 
with a rapidly changing and risky business environment (Onfilm, 2008; Parnham, 
2009).  
Structural challenges for service providers 
Film services are considered to be customer contact services (Long, Ouschan, & 
Ramaseshan, 2007) where employees and managers have direct contact with film 
producers. In this section, I examine the interviews with local service providers to 
determine the structural challenges faced by them in relating with producers. 
Firstly, interviews highlighted service providers’ sensitivity towards the lack of constant 
production and producers’ pressure to lower the budgets. As Miramar’s Park Road Post 
confirmed, “There continues to be big pressure on the budgets of NZ film-makers, 
predominantly due to the limited funding available. It’s a constant struggle for both, 
film-makers and service providers” (Onfilm, 2008, p. 24). For a small local supplier it is 
“the sporadic nature of the business {…} [that makes it] hard to do the kind of long-
term business plan {…} [their bank manager asks them for], let alone the short-term 
one!” (Onfilm, 2009b, p. 33). Some sources have suggested that overreliance on 
government funding bodies’ unrealistic budgets―which are generally very 
small―might be distorting producers’ understanding of the market rates of the real costs 
of making shows (Onfilm, 2008, 2009b).  
Secondly, interviews indicated the difficulties posed by the contrasting gap between 
small and large productions. On the one hand, many small local producers cannot afford 
hiring services and tend to buy their own affordable gear. On the other hand, satellite 
production requirements exceed the capacity of local service providers. The scarcity of 
medium-sized productions in the district―such as television production and the 
decrease of television commercials (TVC’s)―add to the difficult situation. Such 
structural challenges impact negatively on independent service providers’ sustainable 
cycles of reinvestment to upgrade their gear and facilities. 
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Figure 37 Map of specialised service providers for film in Wellington, 2012 
 
Note. Own elaboration with data based on The Data Book (Onfilm, 2012), complemented and updated 
through the “New Zealand Companies Office” (MBIE, 2014a) and service companies’ Internet sites.
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I now outline some of the effects of those structural challenges which are unsustainable 
including discounting, loss of market or clients, inability to upgrade or reinvest, and loss 
of synergies and interdependencies. Lack of funding and budgetary pressures has forced 
producers to increase demands for discounting from service providers. As a local 
supplier explained, “These days you have to be prepared to discount for all jobs or 
producers will look for someone else who will do the job for less” (Onfilm, 2008, p.24). 
This is also the case for Park Road Post: “we always try to find ways to work within the 
budget restraints” (Onfilm, 2009a, p. 31). The level of discounting has actually made it 
difficult for independent service providers to maintain capability. “Healthy 
competition,” some say, could easily become “unhealthy price fighting” and “playing 
suppliers off each other isn’t a good long-term strategy for producers or suppliers” 
(Onfilm, 2008, pp. 26–28). A local supplier mentioned that the levels of discounting 
given by the company “weren’t sustainable” (Onfilm, 2008, p. 27). I identified the 
strategies of some service providers’ to deal with the fierce competition, including being 
aware of price fighting and communicating with other companies. A local supplier said, 
“I try to get prices from the other rental companies, so {…} they can keep {…} [their] 
prices and make a profit.” Another strategy was to co-supply: “I work hard in keeping 
the relationships good {…} with other rental companies, so we cross-hire, if I don’t 
have something we’ll get it from another player in Wellington {…}. There is no money 
out there to try to buy your own gear a lot of the time.” 
Interviews showed that with the increased tendency for producers and film-makers to 
buy their own gear, service providers face losing clients. One service provider 
commented how production units tended to outsource equipment from outside but now 
“they have a lot of in-house”. This is also a strategy for production companies to 
recapitalise themselves:  
in setting out to do your own production you end up with resources around you that you 
feel aren’t utilised {…} we decided that we could develop a business in renting those {…} 
the fact that we had already invested considerable money to do that and the flow-on effect 
just made sense. 
For film-makers it is a matter of saving costs, recapitalisation and control: “It is nice to 
have your own [gear], because then you can just go out and do your things”. 
Nonetheless, for established rental companies this presents a challenge. In the 
traditional system, production companies hiring rental companies implied: “keeping the 
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money flowing into the rental company {…} [to] purchase the latest gear. {…} if we 
change that, {…} the industry starts to dummy.” 
In this adverse environment for service providers, some of them have had to scale down 
their operations and staff. To make things worse, rapid changes in technology have 
made equipment and facilities obsolete very quickly which increases the pressure to 
reinvest. However, those changes can benefit service providers; a supplier observed that 
changes to digital equipment can mean “a reduction in price but it still keeps out of the 
range of the regular person, so that is where the rental companies want to sit.”  
Furthermore, sporadic film production in the district has also meant that transactions are 
not frequent, and therefore, not synergistic enough to have an impact on creating 
interdependencies among hire companies and production companies. Nonetheless, the 
software area is quite fertile ground. One supplier company commented on innovation 
as a result of providing customised services to clients who prefer to use film rather than 
digital cameras. The piece of software that the company was making at the time, he 
commented, “was based on {…} feedback from people we would have work with. {…} 
[If] we can produce some tool to help digital cameras look almost exactly like film there 
would be a way forward {…} I guess there is a need for something like that.” It is these 
types of learning-based transactions that could create interdependencies and foster a 
comparative advantage for suppliers and clients (Scott, 2005) but they are not very 
frequent in this phase of development of the Wellington film district. 
Relations of independent service providers with satellite productions 
I now turn to the discussion of the local service providers relations with large scale 
Miramar productions. Examining the titles produced by Miramar (IMDB, 2014a), it is 
evident that only very general auxiliary services like local catering companies or 
security services have benefitted. When outsourcing intra-sectoral services, Miramar 
establishes relations with international companies, drawing upon, for example, special 
effects, audio-digital recording, digital production and titling from Australia, the UK, 
and the US (see Appendix E). A local service provider commented on Peter Jackson’s 
businesses “over the years, he owns his own equipment, he has rented from overseas in 
the past, nothing personal, this is just my own perception.” Nonetheless, the local 
service providers acknowledge that many local rentals do not have the scale to supply 
Jackson’s big budget films. However, as one suggested, “if he spread it over a couple of 
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rental companies in Auckland or Wellington then that would help. But he is not 
concerned about the local industry in that sense.” Independent hire companies call for 
large local or satellite productions to keep it local: “at least give us the opportunity to 
quote no matter what size the shoot {…} the greater industry has everything to gain” 
(Onfilm, 2009a, p. 31). Nonetheless, some local service providers have benefitted from 
buying equipment no longer used by Miramar service companies such as cameras. For 
instance, a service provider explained “we do pick up bits and pieces.”  
For Miramar service companies, Hollywood productions are at the core of their 
business. For smaller independent service providers international productions that are 
not based in Miramar are very important: “It is really important to occasionally get the 
large overseas job, otherwise I can’t afford the big ticket gear that local[s] {…} expect” 
(Onfilm, 2008, p. 25).  
There is an old debate about the negative externalities of Miramar activities in the form 
of inflationary effects. For example, Pinflicks-NZIER (2003) and Conor (2004) had 
counselled against the effect of runaway productions driving up costs for the local 
industry. In Wellington some of my interview participants commented on potential 
inflationary effects that Miramar had on both TV and the film industry by increasing 
salaries and in consequence driving up costs. Although it has been followed by an 
increase in onscreen technical quality, the participant notes that catering companies do 
not increase onscreen quality, “and yet, catering is much more expensive because the 
base rate is higher.” The same logic was observed by a service provider, with regard to 
Miramar’s world class facilities who said,  
all that has to sit with the price point, if you build a big facility more money goes into 
more expectation, more people involved and suddenly the prices up and up and up and 
up and it’s beyond the scope of any production to drag themselves down here because it 
is not cost efficient. 
According to the perceptions of some of my interviewees regarding Miramar’s negative 
externalities in the form of rising salaries, it could be inferred that this is contributing to 
polarised pressures on service providers in the form of rising costs (to afford gear and 
staff wages) and providing discounts to local producers. 
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Conclusions 
In order to tackle the question regarding the relations within the film district and their 
ability to generate sustainable results, I have delineated a set of critical relations within 
the Wellington film industrial district. In order to do so, I examined the generation of 
synergies, interdependencies and positive externalities derived from the interaction and 
co-existence of the districts’ agents, that engage in ‘spirals of increasing returns’ 
(Young, 1928). The chapter described, firstly, how the urban externalities have shaped 
forms of cultural socialisation in Wellington, which in turn, mobilise a space for 
collective experimentation in film activities. However, Wellington’s creative grassroots 
disenfranchisement from industrial dynamics limits the possibility to reprocess sources 
of creativity into sustainable production mechanisms. 
Secondly, I have explained that the film district in Wellington is comprised of two 
polarised models. The local model is dominated by micro and small locally owned 
companies. The satellite model is mostly concentrated in Peter Jackson’s co-owned 
large companies in Miramar whose key investment decisions are made externally by 
Hollywood majors. Despite their asymmetries, both models are flexibly organised. 
However, flexible production has not yet entailed generalised levels of frequent and 
functional interactions among district players that could become competitive advantages 
(Scott, 2005). In analysing the patterns of industrial organisation, I identified synergetic 
outcomes, those frequently praised by the government and media, but I have also 
contended that such assessments overlook a pervasive perception of disconnection 
among districts’ components against functional collaboration.  
I have noted that despite their financial struggle, locally owned small companies remain 
literally ‘independent,’ as they hardly ever collaborate with each other. Likewise, there 
is a lack of functional interdependencies at the financial and production levels between 
the Miramar activities and the local independent production houses. Furthermore, there 
is a limited exchange of above-the-line creative talent and content creation between both 
models. Therefore, there are limitations to the positive spillovers that could be derived 
from the larger scale of operations of the satellite model in those crucial areas. I argue 
that my analysis confirms the assumptions of GI theory that the absence of functional 
interdependencies signals the early phases of a district development where 
agglomeration economies are not fully realised and, hence, sustainable dynamics are not 
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yet functioning. But, despite the absence of major spillovers from primary 
economies―production activities (Young, 1928)―there are, mutual externalities 
between the models regarding technical labour mobility, upskilling, and an enthusiast 
film atmosphere. 
I have noted that local service providers are disconnected from Miramar productions, 
and the undercapitalisation of independent producers has weakened transactions with 
service providers who face heavy demands to discount. Those challenges underscore the 
difficulty of developing interdependencies driven by customised services in which both 
producers and local services benefit (Williamson, 1981).  
To conclude, the film industrial district in Wellington could be conceptualised as a 
hybrid satellite/state-anchored film district (Markusen, 1996). This is because the 
district depends to a large extent on state financing to complement private investment 
and to incentivise external satellite investment. While I have attended to the industrial 
organisation in this chapter, in Chapter 8 I evaluate the patterns of labour and 
institutional relations to complete the analysis of the internal dynamics of the film 
district. 
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Chapter 8  
Patterns of Labour and Institutional Organisation 
As the preceding chapter, this one addresses the question: What are the relations within 
the Wellington film industrial district and their ability to generate self-sustainable 
results? However, here I shift the focus of my analysis to the patterns of labour and 
institutional organisation.36 While Chapter 7 analysed the industrial organisation in the 
film district, that is, the boundaries between firms and markets, in Chapter 8, I 
complement the district analysis by adding two other key factors, labour pools and 
institutional arrangements. I aim to evaluate the functional interdependencies and 
externalities operating among production players, labour and institutions within the 
district, as GI theory considers them critical factors to explain film industrial 
development. Here, I argue they are also crucial factors to take into account when 
analysing and promoting sustainable outcomes as discussed in Chapter 2. In order to 
conduct the analysis, I explore academic literature, media reports, public documents and 
interview accounts. 
Patterns of Labour 
GI assumes that labour pools are one of the key factors for the development of a film 
industrial district, and consider that specialised film workers are organically developed 
by a complex set of interlaced relations of production and work in a given place (Scott, 
2006). In the following sections, I examine employment patterns in the Wellington film 
district, as a way to analyse the links between production and labour markets. More 
specifically, I look at the conditions and regulatory frameworks in which labour 
relations are embedded. I pay especial attention to how the satellite model has shaped 
film work dynamics in the district.  
One of the major reasons claimed by the government to offer tax breaks for large budget 
international films was their capacity to generate local jobs (Key, 2012). As Table 21 
shows, according to official statistics, screen production employment in the country 
grew substantially as a result of hosting satellite productions. However, very little 
information is publicly available about the characteristics and statistics of satellite and 
                                                 
36 Film related institutions are understood as those organisations that have developed conventionalised 
practices and rules (see Chapter 1). 
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local jobs such as screen workers numbers by subsector and region, let alone the 
number of international and local workers employed by satellite productions and the 
duration of contractual relations. Rather, it has been the role of academics to study 
labour markets in the film industry both nationally and in Wellington (Jones & Pringle, 
2013; McAndrew & Risak, 2012; Rowlands, 2009; Strathdee, 2008). 
Table 21 Screen production and post-production employment in New Zealand 
Year 1996 2001 2006 2010 or 2011 Methodology 
Workers 1,700 3,600 4,500  Census 
   4,156 FTE
37
 
5,900 Adjusted RME
38
 
8,600 LEED
39
 
Note. Own elaboration based on (MED, 2012a; SNZ, 2012; Thorpe, 2009). Includes workers in 
production and post-production of film TV, TVC’s, music videos and shorts films. 
 
Satellite productions increased the number of workers in Wellington by a couple of 
thousand. There is a lack of regional statistics but the government affirmed that 
Miramar’s activity at its peak employs around 3,000 people (Parliament Today, 2012).40  
According to interview participants, a few hundred people in Wellington might work for 
local independent production. Most of them across a variety of mediums, such as film, 
theatre, television, music video and TVCs as writers, directors, producers, technical 
crew and actors. In her study of film workers in Wellington, Rowlands (2009, p.12) 
found that film industry growth had “not brought any degree of stability and consistency 
of work for the majority of workers {…}, rather just a series of short-term contracts.” 
Employment statistics attest that at a national level there were 1,700 employees and 
4,200 contractors (freelancers, sole traders, owner operators) in screen production and 
post-production sectors in 2010.41 It can be inferred that, as in the rest of New Zealand, 
                                                 
37 Full time equivalent (FTE) direct jobs “counts part-time jobs as a proportion of a full-time job and 
accounts for working proprietors and independent contractors.” (PWC, 2012, p.21). 
38 Rolling Mean Employment (RME) is “the twelve month moving average of the monthly employee 
count {…} [salary and wage earners] provided by Inland Revenue” but it is adjusted to include 
contractors who would have at least one working person (MED, 2012a, pp. 19‒20). 
39 Link Employer-Employee Data (LEED) uses taxation with business data and includes non-PAYE-
based employment contracts with more detail than the Adjusted RME (MED, 2012a). 
40 WingNut Films stated they had employed those numbers for The Hobbit movies (Chapman, 2013).  
41 Those numbers are obtained with the Adjusted RME. Other figures vary substantially depending on the 
source because freelance work challenges counting methodologies (see Table 21). LEED estimated that in 
2011 there were 4,300 workers in screen production businesses and 4,300 in contracting activities that 
service work to production business (SNZ, 2012a, 2012b). According to Statistics New Zealand, the 
Adjusted RME “undercounts the industry” as it is based on average figures. By the same token, it could 
be argued that LEED data overcounts the industry as it does not distinguish between “a person who works 
one day, or 365 days” (SNZ, 2012b).  
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Wellington’s film labour force is mainly comprised of self-employed individuals with 
temporary contracts, and a minor proportion of employees with permanent jobs, usually 
administrative (MED, 2012a). Therefore, I suggest that film industry labour relations in 
Wellington are highly flexible. 
Based on previous research and my informants I outline the characteristics of the 
satellite film jobs that are usually concealed by celebratory views of job numbers. 
Rowlands (2009) found that regardless of the creative or technical nature of the job, 
there is a ‘core’ of workers, a “tight knit group whose main source of income comes 
from work in the film or related industries,” and who enjoy a certain degree of 
autonomy on projects. And there is a peripheral mass of film workers with lower wages, 
or who work for free to prove themselves, while having employment in other sectors 
(Rowlands, 2009, p. 15). Furthermore, Rowlands argued that the majority of the jobs in 
the industry are not considered creative. Rather they are technical jobs in which 
Strathdee found a military-like organisational style in which workers need to “be highly 
disciplined, able to follow instructions, and work as part of a team” (Strathdee, 2008, p. 
98). This was confirmed by one of my informants who spoke of the “war-like” nature of 
film projects. Another participant demystified work in animation for its lack of creative 
input: “the worst thing I’ve ever seen in my life was walking to the Weta Digital 
rotoscoping where there are like a hundred people like zombies, and I just think ‘Oh! 
That is my vision of hell’ you know [laughter].” 
I argue that the introduction of satellite work also shaped film labour dynamics in the 
district. First, my respondents confirmed the escalation of workers’ numbers in 
Wellington and their connection with the “boom and bust” structural characteristics of 
the satellite-reliant industry. A service provider commented: “since the likes of Peter 
Jackson came about and he got big feature films {…} it brought a whole lot of people 
into the industry in Wellington and {…} increasing interest in the industry.” However, 
the gaps between big projects meant that, “all those people that come out {…} struggle 
to get work again for a while.”  
Secondly, satellite productions have shifted the occupational style. For example, they 
have enhanced technical capabilities in animation but at the same time they have 
employed workers who had never worked in the industry and became “ready-made 
experts” with highly delineated skills. This occupational style contrasts with “more 
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general well-rounded people [that] could move between departments” from smaller 
local productions where a career path of knowledge and experience, was key. The 
occupational shift, it was suggested, had organisational and political implications, “you 
get people with highly specialised skills {…} and it is hard to get to actually lift their 
heads out of it and get them to see the broader issues.” For another informant, the 
oversupply of labour started “undercutting top professionals who really know how to do 
their stuff.”  
Thirdly, academic literature has highlighted the number of voluntary jobs as a point of 
entry into the industry, and for gaining skills (Jones & Pringle, 2013; Strathdee, 2008). 
Moreover, as a result of the “feast” periods, the income of satellite film workers has also 
impacted positively on independent local production in Wellington. A public servant 
noted,  
people in Wellington are more willing to do stuff for free and if they work in the 
industry already because they work in {…} Miramar, they can get paid an international 
salary, it is low international salary but it is high in New Zealand terms. 
Voluntary work was perceived by some participants as part of an ‘artistic community 
ethos’ based on solidarity: “you turn out and work for free or greatly reduced rates on a 
project just because you support the project.” More importantly, this allowed film 
workers to get involved in projects where they had more autonomy, creative input, and 
the opportunity to take a personalised approach than they could have had in large 
Hollywood movies. But for other participants, this was an sign of losing 
professionalism in the industry because local film projects have “become subsidised by 
the workers, who are sacrificing their wages, their gear to make a movie {…} which I 
think is {…} criminal.” Voluntary work is, nonetheless, part of a broader set of working 
conditions that I explore in the following section. 
Uncertainty in labour relations: Working conditions 
In a recent study Jones and Pringle (2013) discuss how creative work’s precarious 
conditions, as examined by international critical research (Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 
2011; Randle, 2011), are intensified in New Zealand’s small film industry where, 
“scarcity of work in relation to demand drives the conditions and precariousness that 
film workers tolerate” (Jones & Pringle, 2013, p. 8). In addition, studies have reported 
that intermittent production brings uncertainty to film workers about how long the 
current job would last and how long it would take to secure another (Jones and Pringle, 
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2013; Rowlands, 2009). Rowlands (2009) argues that, in Wellington, the uncertainty is 
increased by the use of open-ended contracts as a common business practice. This 
allows production companies to avoid giving compensation to workers if the work 
finishes earlier, but impedes workers in their planning for the long-term. Furthermore, 
workers in Wellington lack of security and benefits (Jones & Pringle, 2013; Rowlands, 
2009; Strethdee, 2008). As a result, Rowlands (2009) identified that workers suffer from 
financial stress during the periods of unemployment where they often have to resort to 
the unemployment benefit. The author highlights that in comparison to the benefits that 
freelancer counterparts have in the US, UK, Canada and Australia, film workers in 
Wellington lack provisions for sick leave, holiday pay, superannuation, health insurance 
and a negotiated hourly rate. In addition, there are the common working conditions 
found in many film industries such as extremely long work day (and even weekend 
work), the workload and pressure to perform to high standards.  
Rowlands and Handy (2012) examined the psychological and health consequences 
derived from work pressures and the absence of work-life balance among Wellington 
film workers such as depression, anxiety, broken social relationships, and a low sense of 
self-worth and self-steem. The authors suggest that structural factors underwrite 
“workaholism” as a collective modus operandi of film industry labour. Workaholism 
refers to work becoming such a predominant feature in workers’ lives in an intense 
love-hate relationship with the industry.  
Academic research has also explained how film working conditions are socially 
reproduced. For Rowlands (2009) the addictive side of film work implies workers’ 
perception of a lack of control over their lives and financial situation, as well as 
compelling feelings to return to work in an industry which they know is not good for 
their physical or emotional well-being but which they feel somehow powerless to 
change. This all adds to freelancers being “trapped in a vulnerable and insecure situation 
and enables the industry to continue to function in this manner without challenge” 
(Rowlands, 2009, p.130).  
For Jones and Pringle (2013) the precariousness of work and other working conditions, 
such as gender inequality, are perpetuated due to the fact that the “labour force is 
expendable and can be replaced quickly” (Rowlands, 2009, p.18). In this way, workers 
might be forced to lower their rates and comply with rigid codes of unspoken rules 
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(such as social pressure to “not complain”) and explicit rules (such as signing 
confidentiality agreements) that deterred dissent (Jones & Pringle, 2013; Rowlands, 
2009; Strathdee, 2008). Adhesion to the rules is particularly important in film work 
which is based on reputation and social networks to gain access to and maintain work 
(Rowlands, 2009).  
Another form of the social reproduction of working conditions is facilitated by the 
glamorisation of the film industry to which the media and government contribute a great 
deal (Conor, 2014; Jones & Pringle, 2013; Rowlands, 2009). People are attracted to the 
film industry and once they are working in it, the creative and prestigious elements are 
tied to their sense of identity; they “provide a feeling of importance, or being special, 
even if their work is actually very mundane and ordinary” (Rowlands, 2009, p. 128). 
Such a perception was shared by many of my informants: “because it is a very 
glamorous industry people seem to sort of take it on the chin and accept it.” In other 
words, workers fail “to look at the structural conditions of the industry” (Rowlands, 
2009, p.130). On the contrary, critical scholarly studies identified that working 
conditions are easily attributed to workers’ “own choice, to either refuse or accept” and 
“make sacrifices” (Jones & Pringle; Rowlands, 2009, p. 48). However, as Rowlands 
explains,  
Choice is always socially embedded (Lewis et al, 2007) and film industry contractors are 
heavily constrained by industry structures when making decisions about their working 
lives. The insecure nature of its work means that they must accept the working conditions 
which are given. (Rowlands, 2009, p. 48)  
In other words, due to the highly reputational conditions necessary to maintain work, 
any dissent may cause the industry to reject them (Rowlands, 2009). In the next section 
I look at the broader social-regulation framework that contributes to reinforcing the 
working conditions discussed above. 
Regulatory environment 
Scholarly literature has identified that “at the core of the problem faced by freelance 
production workers are the structural issues in the industry” (Rowlands, 2009, p. 144), 
that is, intermittent project-based production and high competition in labour markets 
(Jones & Pringle, 2013; Strathdee, 2008). I argue that these are related to broader 
structural issues such as producers’ lack of financial capacity and their cost-effective 
imperatives. It is important to highlight that none of those structural issues are inherent 
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to the film industry, but rather they are socially embedded in regulatory environments in 
the form of policies, legislation, cultural and business practices as well as conventions 
shaping people’s behaviour (Boyer, 2005).  
For example, the project-based model has been favoured as prototypical of flexible 
production as it has evident cost-effective advantages for production companies (Storper 
& Christopherson, 1987). That does not imply the model is necessarily the best, for 
example, it runs the risk of losing key institutional knowledge when the project finishes 
and freelancers move to another project (Davenport, 2006). The model has also 
“contributed to uncertainty and heightened sense of personal risks for workers in the 
field” (Strathdee, 2008, p. 95). In his research of film work in Wellington, Strathdee 
argues that project-based work has been “encouraged by policy changes introduced by 
successive governments. Of significance here is the way funding provided by the state is 
specifically intended to support one-off productions, which have definite completion 
dates” (Strathdee, 2008, pp. 94–95). Strathdee, refers to funding to independent as well 
as satellite productions. He also discusses that the state’s promotion of entrepreneurial 
freelance jobs is a strategy designed to encourage people to adjust to “‘dispositions that 
present a barrier to {…} them participating in the creative labour market’” (Dean as 
cited on Strathdee, 2004, p. 92).  
Another example of social regulation influencing structural characteristics is film 
industrial relations in New Zealand that are based on non-enforceable codes of practices 
agreed on by professional guilds and the producers’ association. But guild organisations 
are unable to represent workers in collective bargaining agreements. As a result of this, 
Jones and Pringle (2013, p.8) pointed to the risks of the “individualised nature of work 
arrangements in the film industry” and similarly Rowlands (2009, p.136) observed how 
“the structure of the system and the freelancers’ individualistic approach to negotiation, 
further hinder them from any form of collective bargaining which might bring about 
improved conditions.” For Rowlands (2009) this lack of collaboration generates intense 
competition that ensures that film production companies retain power in negotiations. 
Therefore, she suggested the need to protect New Zealand film workers from the effects 
of high-level international negotiations by increasing unionisation and requiring 
legislation to include industry workers’ contracts with end dates. As Jones and Pringle 
(2013, p.7) note, “unlike larger film industries where there is a history of unionism, 
albeit eroding (Blair et al., 2003), there is no unionism in local filmmaking” in New 
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Zealand. Contrary to Rowlands’ proposal (2009), the law changes after The Hobbit 
dispute (2010) naturalised film workers’ vulnerable situation when, 
the New Zealand government introduced into the national Parliament, legislation 
designed to strip workers in the film production industry of the rights and entitlements all 
employees in New Zealand have {…} including the minimum wage, protections against 
unfair dismissal and discrimination for union activity, access to paid sick leave, 
bereavement leave, public holidays, paid vacations and the right to bargain collectively. 
(McAndrew & Risak, 2012, p.1)  
A crew member who welcomes satellite productions reflected,  
we’ve got good pay rates established {…} but I worry that it is only a matter of time 
before {…} [they] offer New Zealanders half of what {…} they would have on the last 
film in New Zealand {…} Well, without a union it is going to be very hard to stop it. And 
it is only a matter of time before someone in Hollywood would…, ‘cos they are all about 
the money, {…} if it is a biased market and we are a non-unionised workforce then we 
are wearing a tight rope. 
The last comment is related to the continuous threat that foreign investment might go 
somewhere else (Conor, 2011) (see Chapter 4). As McAndrew and Risak (2012, p. 6) 
observed, “union avoidance has long involved the use of ‘runaway’ production 
strategies” and Hollywood conglomerates’ power poses new challenges for unions in 
Hollywood and elsewhere. The pressure to diminish unions’ power derives not only 
from transnational corporations, but also from local companies and governments. As the 
documents released by the OIA regarding The Hobbit dispute in February 2013 
demonstrated (Joyce, 2013), Jackson and SPADA lobbied in favour of such law changes 
being made (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, political leaders who see “workplace rights 
and protections not as basic, non-negotiable human rights, but as something that can be 
exchanged for other goods like foreign investment”, are also liable (McAndrew & 
Risak, 2012, p. 21).  
In this section I have integrated earlier material and my original research to highlight the 
ways that the satellite model has contributed to the oversupply of film workers. As a 
result, the model has shaped extremely flexible and uncertain employment 
relations―reinforced by the regulatory framework―which have disadvantaged workers 
in Wellington. This analysis of labour patterns is relevant to my evaluation of conditions 
of sustainability because despite the existence of labour pools, the district has not been 
able to provide what GI considers key to industrial development, and that is, a 
production system that can guarantee the generation and maintenance of quality jobs 
(Scott, 2006).  
 
 
217 
 
Patterns of Institutional Organisation 
According to institutional economics, complex economic arrangements that can 
reproduce themselves based purely on market relations without a minimum of collective 
support do not exist. Furthermore, consistent with GI, economic development can be 
enhanced where markets are complemented by appropriate institutional arrangements 
(Scott, 2000a). This section examines the relations of key institutional actors involved in 
the film industry in Wellington and the potential impact they have on sustainable 
outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Own elaboration 
 
The film district in Wellington is supported by a wide range of public, private and civil 
screen-related organisations which participate along the whole value chain (see Figure 
38). Some of these institutions have conflicting interests and practices and their power 
to intervene in the district’s governance varies. This confers on them an unequal ability 
to influence sustainable outcomes. My interviews provided a basis to examine the 
interdependencies and challenges among inter-institutional relations. Some of the 
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institutions covered here operate at a national level which impact upon Wellington, 
while others are exclusive to the region. 
Public sector institutions 
Local government in Wellington is influential in providing support to the film district. 
My investigation has highlighted that the Wellington City Council (WCC) has 
contributed markedly to the development of the satellite model in the district 
complementing national tax incentives. To attract foreign investment to the city WCC 
has implemented red tape-free strategies; it has invested in cinema real estate; in 
developing facilities―tied to a single producer; as well as in innovation and capability 
development (see “Education and training institutions”).  
In the late 1990s, WCC considered screen production and digital technologies to be a 
strategic sector. In 1996, Film Wellington became the first regional film office in the 
country and its reactive role consisted of approving permits, and location finding as well 
as facilitating contacts with local services and crew (Prendergast, 2010). As one 
informant explained, the development of Film Wellington and Miramar was almost 
parallel: “it was pretty much specifically in response to what Miramar needed with The 
Lord of The Rings. {…} they were doing so much filming in Wellington {…} that they 
needed basically a separate desk just to deal with their enquiries.” In order to become a 
film-friendly city, nine different councils (which together they make up WCC) signed 
the Local Government Filming Protocol (INZ, 2002). Film Wellington is in charge of 
informing the councils to maintain their commitment. It also has a proactive approach to 
engage in research and promote business development initiatives as it is part of Grow 
Wellington, an economic development agency funded by WCC.  
In 1999, the WCC approved a loan of $NZ300, 000 to set up the Film and Television 
School in Wellington. The reasons underlying that support were to address the overseas 
perception that Wellington could not provide enough crews: “A big part of creating the 
right conditions for mainstream film production to flourish in Wellington will be 
providing those crews” (WCC, 2001, p. 6). 
Other initiatives from WCC involved the restoration of the Embassy cinema, a heritage 
building in the city centre that received an initial loan of $NZ1.3 million. Subsequently 
WCC took ownership of the Embassy to lease it to private companies. 
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the Council sought to capitalise on the production of The Lord of the Rings trilogy within 
the City. The cinema [Embassy] was the site of {…} the world premiere of the last film, 
providing publicity to the city as a tourist location and film production centre. {…} The 
Council contributed with the majority of $4.5 million upgrade of the site demanded by 
US producer New Line {…} [that underlines that] Wellington’s strategy for post-
industrial success has been dependent upon satisfying the interest of transnational 
corporations. (Huffer, 2012, p. 252) 
Similarly, WCC paid $NZ1.1 million for The Hobbit premiere in 2012 (WCC, 2012). 
Other initiatives to attract international work included assisting with $NZ2 of the 
$NZ10 million it cost to build Stone Street Studios in Miramar (WCC, 2010). The stage, 
however, was tied to a single producer, Peter Jackson, and was used for making Avatar 
and The Hobbit movies reportedly providing $NZ250 and $NZ650 million revenue 
(PWB, 2006). Nonetheless, this revenue impacted mainly on Miramar production 
companies with their many, albeit temporary, jobs and equally short-term spillovers to 
general local services.  
My interviews with local practitioners showed that WCC has only sporadically 
supported independent film businesses through subsidising internships or other types of 
aid. The perception of one informant was that the WCC has put:  
all the eggs in the basket of Hollywood productions and Peter Jackson and that is fine but 
doesn’t really help the independent productions which all feed into it as well, they put a 
lot of money in the past into Peter Jackson facilities {…} which is {…} great but I don’t 
feel it has maximised its potential at all {…} They are not close enough to the 
independents to see how it all glues together. 
Wellington is also the base of national government screen-related institutions. Contrary 
to the focus on the satellite model, as discussed in Chapter 6, NZFC has had a crucial 
role in supporting the local model of production in the country. In the remainder of this 
section I explore NZFC’s relations with the domestic and the satellite models. NZFC is 
the most cherished and the most criticised film institution in New Zealand as shown by 
media reports and my interviews. I argue that this position responds to its central 
spanning function by bridging the institutional relations of the whole film industry, from 
guilds to relevant ministries. The criticism also relates to the industry’s dependence on 
NZFC, its broad spectrum mandates, limited resources, and the lack of long-term 
integrative policies.  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, NZFC offers loans and equity investment for “short films, 
low budget features and cinematic documentaries and feature films with significant 
New Zealand content” (NZFC, 2014b). Besides, the Commission administers the tax 
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break grants for different production and post-production budgets. However, the 
funding body’s relations with the industry were characterised by one local producer as 
overly reliant: “you wouldn’t have an industry here without government support, even 
Peter Jackson still relies on the large budget grants {…} which is interesting for a 
company like ours because we don’t want to be a government-reliant company.” 
Another producer commented also on the need to “empower people to sort of outgrow 
the initial forms of support that they could get.” However, even when film-makers get 
funding and are empowered to be self-reliant, another producer explained that despite 
having successful box office and sales, their film had not paid back the investor, that is, 
the NZFC. The producer noted: “I think that you really need the government subsidy.” 
Nonetheless, I argue that the issue highlighted here is the financial redistribution of 
commercial returns in which exhibitors, distributors and investors recoup first over the 
producer and they keep “the biggest slice of the pie”.  
Besides funding films, NZFC is involved in funding above-the-line guilds, including the 
producers’ association (SPADA) with $NZ70,000 dollars a year. Interviews showed that 
NZFC was considering stopping its support for what it saw as an increasingly dependent 
relationship. However, interviews showed that the guilds struggled to self-fund through 
their membership as a result of the structural issues of flickering production and 
undercapitalisation impacting stable employment. NZFC encouraged the guilds to 
reinvigorate themselves to keep receiving funding. Nonetheless, one participant 
considered that initially NZFC’s role was to represent the film community within the 
government, a bottom-up approach (i.e., representing film-makers’ needs to the 
government). He considered that NZFC had shifted to represent government priorities 
instead. Indeed, the financial concerns underlying NZFC’s approach are demarcated by 
its own relationships with the ministries. 
NZFC’s strongest historical relationship has been with the Ministry of Culture and 
Heritage as the ministry responsible for funding it, monitoring its accountability, 
advising its strategy and responding on its behalf inside the Parliament. My interviews 
with  public servants described  a top-down approach with regards to NZFC’s strategy 
that reflects the government’s main priorities of “economic growth through growing an 
export-led economy” and the static allocation of government funding to the NZCF (see 
Chapter 6). In fact, interviewees reported the growing influence of the Ministry of 
Economic Development (later Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment or 
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MBIE) over NZFC’s operations; specifically, since it started administering the large 
budget scheme in 2003. Interview participants shared a similar view of the current 
government’s lack of clarity about what the cultural priorities are, if any.  
In this environment NZFC is pressured to “remain a viable organisation” that needs to 
demonstrate to the ministries “that what [it is] {…} doing has some economic benefit as 
well as cultural benefit.” Consequently, public servants commented that to promote 
itself to the government NZFC has taken the role of “the research and development 
laboratory”, that is, finding and upskilling talent that feeds not only the domestic but the 
satellite export-led production model which is the government’s priority. However, I 
argue that in terms of sustainability focusing primarily on talent development is an 
incomplete strategy. But, I suggest this approach combined with strong support for 
distribution and audience development could have better outcomes for sustainability.  
Another challenge for NZFC in terms of remaining relevant is the digital convergence 
among screen content platforms. In this context, another government priority has been 
interagency collaboration. As a public servant explained, this was part of the “value for 
money” approach to sharing information and saving costs. Another public servant 
suggested that the coordinated response had improved in terms of project management 
but not necessarily on the creative or dissemination outcomes for screen products. This 
priority was reflected in the creation of Screen New Zealand in 2014, a virtual agency 
that merged the NZFC, Film NZ and NZOA, the television funding agency (MCH, 
2014). The results of this restructuring are yet to be seen. However, I argue that positive 
outcomes depend on fostering common synergies not on budget cuts or in re-allocating 
funds from the local industry to the satellite exports of intermediate services. 
Despite being driven by a different model of production, Miramar has given policy 
advice to NZFC. During the electoral campaign of 2008, explains a public servant, 
“certain senior film-makers in the industry were unhappy {…} and they thought they 
could put pressure [on] {…} through the National Party.” Once the National Party was 
in power, the Minister of Culture and Heritage commissioned a ministerial review of 
NZFC by Australian scholar David Court and director Peter Jackson (New Zealand 
Parliament, 2009d). This was despite a potential conflict of interest since Peter Jackson 
was a powerful film-maker and entrepreneur who benefited from certain arrangements 
within the film industry. The review, released in 2010 (Jackson & Court, 2010), had 
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several recommendations for NZFC which, in 2011, claimed nearly all had already been 
addressed (NZPA, 2011). The NZFC staff―and not the board―were making funding 
decisions by then; NZFC had relaxed requirements of director, producer or distributor 
attached to applications and had removed the prerequisite to use the funding body as a 
sales agent; the Commission had also begun to focus on fewer but bigger budget 
projects (MCH, 2014). The only set of recommendations not addressed were those 
suggested as alternatives to cycles of dependency and, therefore, I argue essential for 
sustainable mechanisms. Among them were a Box Office Incentive Scheme for 
experienced film-makers, and a Mezzanine Distribution Fund which would match 
distributors’ financial commitments to projects, with the distributor having priority in 
recoupment of its distribution fees (see further discussion in Chapter 9) (Jackson & 
Court, 2010).  
Although the review had consulted the film community, Jackson’s imprint on the report 
was evident. For example, the Commissions’ view, as “the research and development 
laboratory”, was to feed the industry in the image and likeness of Miramar, implying 
that the satellite model is a successful one to develop the local industry: “If we had six 
or eight strong Kiwi storytellers based here, attracting US dollar budgets, there will be a 
natural mix of films with Kiwi content and films without” (Jackson & Court, 2010, p. 
59). As mentioned above, NZFC has accommodated itself in this role to complement 
the export-led satellite model, legitimising itself as economically significant. In this 
way, I argue, the institutional relations between NZFC and the domestic production 
model have become subjected to top-down priorities including the institutional support 
given to the satellite model. 
Guilds and professional associations 
Another part of the institutional scaffolding in the Wellington film district is comprised 
by organisations of skilled labour markets. According to GI theory, these type of 
organisations are crucial to nurture the production system in flexible environments to 
avoid losing labour pools (Power & Scott, 2004). Labour markets in New Zealand are 
organised in professional guilds at a national level, often with local branches: for 
example, the New Zealand Film and Video Technicians Guild (NZFVTG),42 Directors 
                                                 
42 During the 1980s it was part of The Academy, and has been independent since 1988. It has a fully paid 
membership of over 500.   
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and Editors Guild of New Zealand (DEGNZ),43 New Zealand Writers Guild (NZWG),44 
New Zealand Cinematographers Society,45 and New Zealand Actors’ Equity (AE).46 In 
the last couple of decades they have been instrumental in establishing relations with 
producers and government agencies. As one informant observed, professional 
organisations represent the concerns and practices of New Zealand film-makers and 
their members have been key in developing the film and screen industries in the country 
in the first place. However, my interview analysis has identified a diminishing power in 
their ability to influence film dynamics in the district. This complements the analysis of 
the industrial relations dispute discussed in Chapter 6.  
Guilds are important because they offer their members professional forums, 
information, expert advice and political representation. They also promote work 
opportunities, professional standards, welfare and security in the workplace. The guilds 
are in charge of negotiating the non-enforceable guidelines of best practice―such as the 
Pink Book (actors), the Blue Book and Safety Code of Practice (technicians) as well as 
the White Book (writers)―with the employers, that is, the producers as represented by 
SPADA (DEGNZ, 2014; Kelly, 2011; NZFVTG, 2014; NZWG, 2011). 
Except for Actors’ Equity, the majority of the guilds are young, reflecting a young film 
industry. There are also other organisations representing social groups such as Women 
in Film and Television (WIFT)47 “with a particular emphasis on equal opportunity and 
participation for women” (WIFT NZ, 2014);  Nga Aho Whakaari formed by Māori 
practitioners in film, TV and video; Te Paepae Ataata, a Māori film development 
organisation; and Te Mangai Paho, the Māori broadcasting funding body. After The 
Hobbit dispute the NZ Actors’ Guild (NZAG) formed as a breakaway actors’ group, 
independent from Actors’ Equity. It was created to work in tune with “the fact that 
under the current law actors are independent contractors” (NZAG, 2014). There are also 
other industry and community organisations such as Script to Screen “established to 
develop the craft and culture of storytelling for the screen” (Script to Screen, 2014).  
                                                 
43 Before 2014 it was called the Screen Directors Guild (SGD). It broke away from SPADA in 1995 and 
before that it was part of the Independent Producers and Directors Guild.  
44Given the precedent of the Poets, Essayist and Novelists (PEN), a meeting of scriptwriters and 
playwrights to create the organisation called the New Zealand Scriptwriters Guild took place in 1975. In 
1980 it shortened its name to NZWG. 
45 Established in 2009. 
46 AE has a membership of 600 performers. 
47 The first chapter was founded in 1993 in Wellington. In 2009 all the regional chapters merged into 
WIFTNZ. It has approximately 500 members.  
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The level of interaction among the guilds is highly circumstantial with periods ranging 
from unity to distant relations. I noted that interrelations among guilds were demarcated 
by the interplay of their inherent occupational interests which reflected their interaction 
in the workplace, the divided opinions within each guild membership or each 
occupational field, the power of influence conferred on them by their membership 
numbers, the strategic communication and collaboration among them, and the influence 
that that government policies have on them (for instance, the positive or negative 
influence of the satellite model on different occupations).  
Yet, sometimes the guilds have common interests such as their status in negotiating 
with their organised employers (SPADA) with whom guilds establish ‘professional’ 
relations such as negotiations on the codes of practice. On other occasions, the guilds 
and SPADA have advocated for mutual interests when dealing with the government, 
such as the establishment of local screen quotas, the creation of local film funds, and 
guilds funding.  
According to informants, with the satellite model’s importation of production the guilds 
have “suffered a considerable disadvantage” amidst increasing pressures to fund 
themselves. The technicians guild benefits most from satellite activities in Wellington 
and yet they are aware of the risks of the districts’ overreliance on work from Miramar 
which is “intermittent at best” (NZFVTG, 2010). Before 2012, the main guilds were in 
charge of providing letters of non-objection to grant visas for non-residents to work 
with offshore productions in New Zealand. Guilds were able to charge a fee to 
compensate for  administrative and research endeavours to ensure there were no New 
Zealand workers available with the expertise to work on the projects. That same year, a 
change came into effect whereby the Immigration Department was then placed in 
charge of granting work permits for overseas projects (NZFVTG, 2011). According to 
these changes, for long-term productions, guilds have only five days to object should 
they find New Zealand workers available to do such jobs. Besides the shorter time 
frame, participants from the guilds mentioned they were not receiving the overseas 
applications they were supposed to receive from Immigration: “[the guilds have] still 
got to do the work, and in the past could charge $51 for doing it. If [guilds] don’t do 
anything in five working days then Immigration would just sign it off.” As Immigration 
is not doing the research work, the outcome of those changes is, “taking jobs away from 
New Zealanders because {…} [the guilds] cannot monitor it”. In addition, the changes 
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allowed any non-resident to work in the country for fourteen days or less without a 
permit. Consequently productions can be “unregulated” and “off the grid”; as such they 
are difficult to monitor or to advise about the “local rules and conditions”, such as 
permits, environmental and, safety matters among others (NZFVTG, 2011).   
Participants from these organisations specified that the introduction of these changes 
spoke about the government’s lack of knowledge of the industry. One informant 
commented that there is a “lack of understanding of what we do, and what we are and a 
lack of evaluation.” Guild staff that have worked in the industry for several decades 
have accrued significant network access to New Zealand workers, knowledge of their 
job positions, and were able to monitor a project’s workflow and end dates, all of which 
are key to leveraging the job opportunities that foreign productions bring to the country. 
As one informant mentioned, the Immigration Department thought, “there were actors 
involved in an application from Weta Digital! [a digital post-production company].”  
The perception of the guilds was that they were not being consulted by the government, 
specifically, the Immigration Department under MBIE. The creation of Screen Industry 
New Zealand (SINZ) (see Chapter 6) that agglutinates most of the guilds was an attempt 
to find a common voice to face the current issues: “we know, we’ve got to work 
together” said one representative. 
Private industry associations 
There are yet other institutional players which my interviews show have greater ability 
to influence the policies of the film industrial district. In the interplay of institutional 
relations, SPADA is one of the key organisations spanning relations in the film industry. 
With its headquarters in Wellington, it “represents the interests of producers and 
production companies {…} [as well as] independent screen production in New 
Zealand” (SPADA, 2013). Its members “include film and television production 
companies, post-production houses, production accountants, entertainment lawyers and 
other film industry related service providers” (SPADA, 2013). SPADA as an advocate 
group has a strong relationship with government agencies such as NZFC whose 
philosophy, according to an informant, “has always been that a film cannot be made 
without a responsible producer.” For that reason, said a public servant, NZFC has 
always had “a relationship with SPADA, sometimes easy and sometimes uneasy, but 
always understanding that {…} [they] need to work with each other.” SPADA is also 
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influential with the MCH and MBIE. As mentioned above, its relations with the guilds 
are also frequent. 
Another prominent organisation is Film New Zealand (Film NZ), a national location 
office established to attract offshore productions to make use of the New Zealand 
landscape and crews. As a funding agency facilitator commented “their interest is 
completely 100% economic;” that is, to attract offshore productions and generate crew 
jobs. After being constituted as a private company it then became part of SPADA, and 
later on was owned by Peter Jackson. Since 2005, it has become an independent trust 
receiving annual grants from the MED (later MBIE). According to a public servant the 
MED decided “there were good economic reasons to fund Film NZ.” For example, in 
2009 the government granted $NZ799,000 NZD to Film NZ in 2009/10 and $NZ1.1 m 
in 2012 (MED, 2009a, 2012b). On top of the government’s annual funding, Film NZ 
also receives money from NZFC. It has also shared an office with Park Road Post in 
Los Angeles, California, since 2011 (Screen Digest, 2011). 
According to my interviewees, the immigration changes referred to in the last section, 
were advocated by Film NZ and a few industry players. Documents from 2010 released 
through the OIA in 2013 (Joyce, 2013), provide evidence indicating that SPADA, Film 
NZ and Peter Jackson had concerns around Actors’ Equity role in granting letters of 
non-objection (Hurdle, 2010; Swallow, 2010). In 2010, Actors’ Equity was requesting 
individual information about the unsuccessful auditions of New Zealand actors in a 
Walt Disney TV production in New Zealand, causing production delays. SPADA and 
Film NZ considered that providing names and reasons as to why individuals were not 
cast raised “significant privacy and reputational concerns for the actors involved” 
(Swallow, 2010). The issue was resolved by the Department of Labour directly issuing 
the visas in a couple of days. The document recommended Minister Brownlee to ask AE 
to look for alternative ways to gather information about fair opportunities given to New 
Zealand performers and encouraged all the other players to agree on assessment 
processes and timeframes. It also suggested investigating whether the policy should be 
replaced, although it noted, “this could be problematic because under ‘the Kiwi-first’ 
principle, a relevant union may still need to be consulted” (Swallow, 2010). After the 
immigration policy was changed in 2012 (INZ, 2012), one informant commented: “they 
changed the legislation based on actors’ issues and they damaged the whole industry, 
because {…} they don’t understand how the different parts of the industry work.” 
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According to the informant, most guilds were cooperative, non-obstructive, and 
efficient in negotiating issues.  
According to a guild representative, SPADA was also concerned about the effect the 
immigration changes would have on the guilds’ survival. The sentiment was not the 
same towards Film NZ. One guild representative commented, “they have done nothing 
but damage our industry and the guilds.” Not only had Film NZ “pushed for” the 
immigration changes, but foreign producers were not complying with the codes of 
practice because Film NZ was not informing them about the regulations in New 
Zealand. The perception of disconnection and antagonism with Film NZ from the rest of 
the domestic film industry was confirmed by other participants. A public servant 
mentioned:  
they organised to take John Key to Hollywood and introduce him to these fancy people 
{…} [Film NZ’s CEO] has the ear of John Key and is standing up making quite big 
announcements standing on the toes of quite a lot of people, because she’s [Gisella 
Carr’s] got this weight behind. 
As illustrated in Chapter 6, there are conflicting interests between the satellite model 
and domestic production. Here, I have shown that in Wellington this is reflected in the 
institutional interplay of national and local organisations, where tensions and power 
alliances have inclined towards favouring satellite-model conditions, while increasing 
the vulnerability of the domestic model. 
Education and training institutions 
In the institutional framework of a film district, educational organisations facilitate the 
innovation and transmission of creative skills and cultural resources. However, these 
aspects might remain inert unless “energised through an actually working production 
system” (Scott, 2000a, p. 25). In this section, I focus on the relations between the 
education institutions, trainees and the industry, as indicators of the capacity of the film 
district to draw on creative and technical sources.  
Wellington has tertiary courses for heterogeneous filmmaking skill areas and many 
cross-over with other fields, for example, drama, scriptwriting, design, arts, 
administration, law, accounting and technical skills for film and TV. Of significant role 
is the Wellington Film and Television School covering the areas of screenwriting, 
directing, lightning, camerawork, sound and editing. There are also non-technical 
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courses such as universities’ film or media departments which have “little to do with the 
application of film-making” (Strathdee, 2009, p. 108). However, they provide exposure 
to a commonly neglected but important area, film culture and that translates into cultural 
capital (see Chapter 2). There are also short-term courses and workshops provided by 
the guilds with NZFC funding. The WCC also launched a trust to establish mentoring 
by experienced practitioners (EAT, 2009). 
In his study of training institutions in the Wellington film industry, Strathdee (2009) 
argued that the relation between tertiary education and access to the labour market was 
weak. He identified that most film-makers and workers were self-taught and that film 
project managers resorted to informal practices, that is, social contacts to gather 
information about potential recruits. The study by De Bruin and Dupuis (2004) of New 
Zealand film workers had noted that nepotism (including family and friendship 
connections) was a pervasive practice and was considered as a reliable way to recruit 
workers with the necessary social skills to work in teams and be trustworthy. 
Nonetheless, concluded that nepotism could not guarantee that recruits were always 
competent. In such an environment, Strathdee (2009) observed: “there did not seem to 
be any connections between the production of innovative or creative ideas and training 
in the tertiary education sector” (Strathdee, 2009, p. 105). On the one hand, for creative 
workers “it is the quality of their ideas and their attractiveness to buyers of content that 
counts. [However] knowledge about {…} [these] was only available to [industry] 
insiders, or those who participated in the right networks” (Strathdhee, 2009, p.109). On 
the other hand, networks were also essential to enter and maintain technical jobs. 
Furthermore, Strathdee (2009) argued that tertiary education was sometimes a dead end 
for students that lacked understanding of the rules, skills and contacts required to enter 
the labour market. Therefore, the need to create an educational environment that could 
provide students with “quality advice” regarding such “rules” as well as allowing 
students to be “embedded in the social networks” (Strathedee, 2009, p. 109). I argue that 
with hermetic commercial gatekeeping positions, the power of tertiary education to 
influence such networks is limited. I suggest that apprenticeships and internship 
programmes that are strategic enough to engage with the industry could be successful. 
This type of liaison is commonly used in other countries’ screen industries (Strathdee, 
2009). 
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In Wellington recent attention has been placed on the area of computer graphics and 
animation. Current undergraduate, Honours, Masters and PhD programmes at Massey 
and Victoria universities (MU, 2014; VUW, 2011), offer digital media skills and 
involvement with the local industry: “We have worked very closely with leading 
companies in the digital industries sectors particularly with Weta Digital, Sidhe 
Interactive and Unlimited Realities to develop a course that {…} will produce graduates 
with the skills that the sector needs” (VUW, 2011). The ongoing liaison with the 
industry entails scholarships, internships, guest lectures and consultation. The 
programme at Victoria also received support from the Ministry of Science and 
Innovation. 
Another development in animation is the Pukeko IP Initiative (PIPI) formed in 2013. It 
comprises animation companies Pukeko Pictures and Gamefroot.com, Grow 
Wellington, the law firm Chapman Tripp, and Massey and Victoria universities. The 
programme consists of providing student writers and designers skills to collaborate and 
commercialise their creative content by introducing them to the “industry process {…} 
of entertainment properties for international export” (GW, 2012, 2013). As an informant 
mentioned, Miramar―through Pukeko―is reaching out as it recognises that “they need 
to serve their own pipelines.” Those are important developments when considering that 
after more than a decade of satellite productions there was still significant importation 
of animation workers from overseas―526 foreign workers worked in Weta Digital in 
2013 (Howie, 2013). Although, it is too soon to evaluate the outcomes, those 
programmes seem to be targeting the obstacles to labour market entry outlined by 
Strathdee (2009). Other fields, such as adult drama scriptwriting, need similar attention. 
For example, only a couple of graduates from the Masters scriptwriting programme at 
Victoria University (VUW, 2013) have had the opportunity to produce their film or 
television scripts.48 A recent initiative to enhance links with the industry was the 
organisation of pitching sessions where students test their ideas with a handful of local 
production companies. 
Through my interviews I identified that the type of engagement between tertiary 
education organisations and the industry―including government agencies, the satellite 
                                                 
48 Such is the case of The Orator 2011 by Tusi Tamasese. 
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cluster in Miramar, the independent producers, service providers, and exhibitors― 
could be grouped into five categories:  
1. Education institutions and industry practitioners benefit mutually as the former 
provides teaching and mentorship “day-jobs” while benefiting from industry expertise 
via permanent positions and guest lectures;  
 
2. The industry has occasionally provided input to develop universities’ curricula that 
better adapt to the industry’s needs (although currently limited to animation).  
 
3. Schools and industry establish technical relations in the form of sponsorships when 
the industry offers facilities, equipment and mentoring in the use of those.  
 
4. Fourth, there is a weak but incipient establishment of professional and research and 
development relations that through apprenticeships, internships and scholarships could 
have an impact on the industry’s recruitment of professionals and technological 
advancements (although currently limited to computer animation and children-targeted 
scriptwriting).  
 
5. There is an emergent area of liaison based on exposing students to networking in 
order to gain insider knowledge within the industry. This liaison has addressed 
animation and children-targeted scriptwriting and, only recently, adult drama 
screenwriting.  
 
By drawing on the work of Strathdee, I have outlined the detachment of education 
institutions and their trainees from the film industry. Nonetheless, through original 
research I have pointed out important recent developments in the form of institutional 
partnerships among the private, public and educational sectors to increase the 
application of local creativity and technical skills to the working production system. 
Although, it is early to evaluate the outcomes, based on GI theory this type of local 
grassroots initiative could generate vibrant externalities as a comparative advantage to 
contribute to the districts’ sustainability. 
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Relations with the distribution and commercialisation sectors 
In the institutional scaffolding of a film district, distribution organisations are crucial to 
linking production and consumption of films (Garnham, 1990). Therefore, they are 
important intermediaries to propel sustainable cycles in the value chain. Having 
characterised the New Zealand distribution and exhibition markets in Chapter 5, I turn 
to explore the particular links of Wellington producers with distributors and exhibition 
outlets. In doing so, I look for the reasons that underwrite functional interdependencies 
or detachment between them. 
Wellington lacks any locally based film distributors, which led one of my informants to 
suggest: “we accept other people’s choices in that respect. But it is a really strong 
exhibition town.” Commercialisation windows in Wellington such as cinemas and video 
shops all set up links with distributors based in Auckland and Australia. Producers from 
Wellington, however, expressed difficulty in dealing with them. According to an 
independent producer, leaving aside any issues of quality, a low budget film is a 
limitation in terms of a distribution deal, as “distributors will not want to even touch it.” 
My interview with a large transnational distributor confirmed this: “It is hard to get a 
local film to screen these days, ’cos generally is not a big enough budget film and you 
are trying to get screen space competing with all Hollywood blockbuster films.” 
Likewise a small New Zealand distributor explained that profitability and a lost sense of 
loyalty are the reasons for disengaging from New Zealand producers: 
Sadly, we as a company have made the decision for the short-term, we would not release 
another New Zealand locally produced film. And I am a bit sad about that, but the reality 
is they don’t work {…}. And again there is only us and Rialto distribution really that 
acquire films that are based in New Zealand and I get a bit offended because a lot of the 
bigger more likely to succeed [local] films get signed by Madman and Transmission 
[offshore-based distribution companies], they seem to have a higher ranking {…}. And I 
am tired of losing money on locally produced films, basically. 
Furthermore, evidence from my interviews show that even local films that achieve 
national and international distribution deals with successful sales and box office figures 
struggle to recoup. I argue that presale financial structures and revenue 
streams―encompassing the different intermediaries along the value chain―are 
disadvantageous for the producer. For example, my respondents explained how sales 
agents, distributors and the exhibitors “take their cut and take their expenses” which 
accounts for “the bulk of the money.” According to my informants, there are two 
models of box office redistribution. In one model, the exhibitor takes its house costs and 
 
 
232 
 
what is left over is split between distributor and exhibitor. In a second model, the 
exhibitor’s share usually starts at 55% and the distributor’s at 45% of the box office; 
this can change each week up to 75% and 25%, respectively, depending on the movie. 
In addition, other investors might recoup ahead of the producer. I suggest that these 
models are designed to compensate for the risks that distributors, exhibitors, and 
investors incur given the uncertainty of the movie performing well; however, they fail 
competely to compensate the producers’ investment, added value and risks. In fact, for 
independent producers in Wellington theatrical exhibition is accepted as a non-
profitable window. Instead, producers expect to make money directly from sales to 
territories: “it is just one figure that comes back to the investors, whereas the box office 
is everyone taking their slice.” I argue that these findings are in line with studies based 
on PEC which has suggested that the global distribution of films, dominated by 
Hollywood’s powerful oligopoly, presents a bottleneck that impedes competition 
(Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Garnham, 2005). 
This situation, in turn, has led independent producers to self-distribute their films with 
modest results: “I’m working directly with them [cinemas] now.” Another producer said 
“I think if you go with a distributor they end up doing nothing so in some ways is much 
better to have control over this.” With producers’ self-distribution cinemas “generally 
get 70% and then it goes down every week about 5 %.” Nonetheless, producers have to 
pay for advertising costs: “so you are lucky if you break even.” Once again, I suggest 
that business models for revenue streams reflect a power imbalance, this time between 
producers and the exhibition market. In fact, the only reason independent producers 
keep thinking in terms of theatres is so the film “travels around the country and people 
get to see it.”  
It was interesting to find that, unfortunately, the burgeoning Wellington independent 
exhibition,49 which offers international films as an alternative to the Hollywood-centred 
major chains50 is, nonetheless, reliant financially upon widely promoted Hollywood 
movies to be able to deliver diversity (Huffer, 2012) (see Chapter 6). In this 
environment, only local movies that have proven to be critically successful or are 
backed up by a big distributor are screened in independent and major chains. Modest 
                                                 
49 The Roxy in the suburb of Miramar, the Penthouse in Brooklyn, the Paramount and Light House in the 
city centre, and another Light House in Petone (in 2013 the Empire in Island Bay closed down). 
50 Reading Cinemas (Reading International) and the Embassy (Event Cinemas) 
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local films have a space in the film festivals and the New Zealand Film Archive 
(NZFA). However, some participants expressed disappointment with NZFA’s exhibition 
endeavours: “they don’t decide their program till really late, they don’t market or 
publicise the program, so what they screen is a wasted opportunity and the room that 
they screen in is a wasted opportunity.” Another participant commented the NZFA  had 
“a real sense of protection, to preserve but also [made] it […] difficult for people to 
make use of it.” Despite this, it is one of the few institutions set to address “the failure 
of the commercial market to provide a space for New Zealand films within the city 
centre” (Huffer, 2012, p. 258). However, as Huffer (2012) argues, the funding and 
support NZFA receives from WCC is not enough and “pales in comparison to the 
support” received by other film initiatives involving transnational corporations (Huffer, 
2012, p. 258).  
In sum, although there is a clear market failure at the distribution and commercialisation 
level for local films, film policies barely target these areas. I now go on to outline other 
alternative outlets for the consumption of local films. 
Relations with the television sector 
In this section I discuss the synergies between television and film-related organisations 
in the Wellington district at the production and broadcasting levels. Despite the 
differences in the way they reach audiences via theatrical exhibition or broadcasting, 
film and TV are able to establish synergies at the production, labour, and 
commercialisation levels. In New Zealand, both are also heavily reliant on state 
funding. Furthermore, in the context of flickering film production in the Wellington 
district―and in New Zealand―television offers potential continuity in production 
activities due to the wider demand for broadcasting programmes. Therefore, a 
discussion around those synergies is relevant to the study of the capacity to maintain 
sustainable cycles of production. 
Unfortunately, my interviews showed a disconnection between the television sector and 
local film production in Wellington. This issue is related to the relocation of advertising 
and television activities to Auckland in the late 1980s (DP, 2011). As one participant 
noted, “the networks are in Auckland so {…} it is easier for networks to engage with 
Auckland production companies.” However, I argue that disconnection also derives 
from the regulatory arrangements of the television sector; for example, the lack of 
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content quotas and the type of contestable mechanisms used to obtain funding for local 
content production (Dunleavy & Joyce, 2012; Thompson, 2011b). 
New Zealand’s free-to-air television market comprises a public channel, Māori 
Television Service (MTS), two state-funded channels―TVNZ 1 and TVNZ 2―obliged 
to provide commercial dividends, and TV3 and Prime channels which are privately 
owned. Satellite television is monopolised by Sky TV which can retransmit state-
funded channels for free. As part of the Labour government’s efforts to “redress the 
market failures of the broadcasting sector stemming from the deregulation of the 
1990s” (Thompson, 2011b, p. 1) (see Chapter 4), it established MTS and restructured 
TVNZ as a crown company. However, TVNZ failed to maintain its public service 
charter because of obligations to perform commercially. TVNZ was 90% dependent on 
commercial revenue and therefore started competing with private networks for 
audience share and advertising. In 2008, the National-led government shared with 
private networks the vision that the public subsidy to TVNZ was a market distortion, so 
it abolished TVNZ’s public service charter. In addition, the government redirected its 
funding through a contestable fund for independent producers to be administered by 
NZOA, a state funding body. However, NZOA funding requires “that a national 
broadcaster agree[s] to air proposed programmes {…} [which means that] funding 
decisions cannot always be insulated from the commercial priorities of 
commissioners/schedulers, especially with genres that incur significant opportunity 
costs” (Thompson, 2011b, p. 2).  
NZOA has acknowledged the potential for local films to be screened on TV and has 
established co-funding synergies with NZFC to support two or three films a year. 
Therefore, a film project could convince a New Zealand broadcaster to ask for NZOA 
funding. According to a public servant, NZOA funds 95% of local television content 
and lamented that, “it’s a disaster that New Zealand doesn’t have quotas because the 
government always seems to spend large sums of money to get New Zealand content 
for New Zealanders.” The general sentiment among film practitioners and producers 
was that the fight for quotas “had been fought and lost,” 
Quota became a dirty word {…} you say that and politicians will be reaching for their 
guns. {…} It’s almost like a shame or a kind of embarrassment of their own culture. {…} 
And now, they don’t even understand the concept of something having a cultural good. 
{…} It is such a philistine country. They don’t respect things that you can’t see on a 
balance sheet [laughter] I hate it! 
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For interviewees in Wellington, the fact that commercial gatekeepers such as 
broadcasters and advertising companies decide on which projects get public funding 
was “the great issue” with repercussions on content quality and access to funding. For 
the government, explained a public servant, “is just a mechanism” to ensure that “the 
programme they spend money on will reach an audience.” However, a filmmaker 
explained, there “is a big gap now between the producer and the audience”: 
the scheduler talks to the advertisers on the basis of ‘what is it you think you might be 
interested in buying or paying for?’ And effectively the advertisers have a scheduler now 
to come up with programmes that they like {…}. Now, when you look at Māori 
Television that doesn’t exist because they don’t have the pressure of advertising.  
Another producer commented, “Broadcasters become the gatekeepers because they 
decide what is good for them. But what it’s good for them is not good for the country 
{…}. And the visible evidence of that is on the TV screens every single night. We just 
have a diet of shit!.” Similarly other participants referred to television as “rubbish {…} 
reality blah blah blah!” or “it’s a disgrace”.  
Another public servant criticised the networks’ use of the rating systems that ultimately 
determine how much state funding is allocated based on advertising revenue,  
I think it is quite a flawed model. {…} it is like a chicken and egg, if you watch at 8 pm 
and there is crap in every channel but you are a household that has TV all the time, one 
of them will be crap, you’ll watch the crap. If there was quality stuff would you watch it? 
Probably. Would they know that? They won’t know. {…}. It goes round and round. 
This system seems to have profoundly damaged the screen sector in Wellington. One 
public servant mentioned that Wellington was over-represented on New Zealand 
screens in terms of locations per capita. This might be true for news since Wellington is 
the political capital of the country. However, in the opinion of local film producers and 
practitioners the picture was quite different. A local producer commented that 
television broadcasters were “such a different beast” and “literally ruled by the ratings. 
{…} so unless you really fit into what they are after, I find it quite difficult.” For many 
participants in Wellington the television system had had a negative impact on television 
drama and documentary. Having to pay a license fee as part of the agreement with 
NZOA, “generally for things like drama {…} [broadcasters] pay more than they would 
for an international programme” which disincentivises local drama production. In 
addition, one creative participant stated that the entire style of TV drama, “has turned 
into an Auckland style {…} which is more an American model.” In the past, however, 
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“people in TV had a little bit more ambition to put complex shows up, and shows that 
commented on New Zealand in an interesting and sometimes confrontational way and 
that seems to have completely gone.” Other participants felt that television broadcasters 
had given up on documentaries which are otherwise an important format for Wellington 
independent producers. 
Even when producers are able to persuade a broadcaster and thus obtain NZOA funding, 
as one public servant commented, “the producer doesn’t get any money if it is popular 
on television, it is all presales and the presales are low because they expect it to not do 
that well.” In other words, NZOA funding is fairly close to the cost of making the 
programme, and therefore, television production gives no money back to producers and 
the subsidy does not contribute to producers’ economic returns to reinvest in sustainable 
cycles.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have addressed a key set of relations within the Wellington film 
industrial district, specifically the patterns of labour and institutional organisation as 
indicators of the district’s ability to generate conditions for film industry sustainability. 
The latter are functional interdependencies―such as mutual benefiting collaboration 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982)―and positive externalities―benefits that an activity generates 
for third parties (Bator, 1958)―that give rise to spirals of increasing returns (Young, 
1928). In examining these relations, I identified that a common perception of 
disconnection, dependency and power imbalance are perceived as a result of the 
interaction among producers, workers, markets and institutions.  
Based on previous academic studies and original research, my examination of labour 
patterns concluded that satellite productions have influenced the district by increasing 
the number of workers. The fierce labour competition coupled with flickering 
production has engendered individualised contract negotiations with repercussions such 
as weakened bargaining position for workers, increased financial uncertainty and 
diminished conditions of work (such as the right to bargain collectively). I have argued 
that this signals a major hindrance for one of the sustainable conditions outlined in 
Chapter 2, that is, the existence a production system that can guarantee the generation 
and maintenance of quality jobs. 
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In my discussion of institutional arrangements, I identified a sense of disconnection 
between the needs of independent film-makers and the priorities of government and 
quasi-government bodies. Recent industrial relations that have had a negative impact on 
the film-making’s grassroots have, at the same time, catalysed closer relations among 
them in order to advocate for their interests. By contrast, Miramar stood as a well-
positioned actor with the ability to influence government agencies because it embodies 
the government priority of growing an export-led industry. The primacy of the satellite 
model in the institutional interplay occurs despite its spillover limitations and its 
dependency on overseas capital that threatens its mobility in the long-term. 
Furthermore, state mechanisms of financial support to both local and satellite activities 
lack the inclination to promote the financial autonomy of industry players and their 
recapitalisation (through audience development, opening alternative distribution and 
commercialisation channels, and better financial structures for redistribution of profits). 
In this way, I argue, the dependent relationship among the government and the industry 
maintains a status quo that contradicts the basic logic of sustainable development.  
Furthermore, to expand the discussion in Chapter 5, I have contended that the 
distribution subsector, which is dominated by Hollywood majors, lacks interest in local 
productions due to their lack of profitability. The exhibition market has become a 
hopeless opportunity for local films’ recoupment, even for successful titles, due to the 
big slice that distributors and exhibitors take in exchange for their intermediary services. 
Furthermore, the film industry in Wellington is disconnected from the television 
industry, whose externalities are limited by being located in Auckland, lacking local 
content quotas, as well as involving commercial gatekeepers in deciding contestable 
government funding mechanisms. The inability of local production to establish 
functional interdependencies with distributors and commercialisation outlets shapes the 
disarticulation of the value chain with structural consequences for sustainable outcomes. 
Overall, taking into account the limited externalities and functional interdependencies 
present in the district, I argue that it shows two unequal stages of development. 
Applying Scott’s (2005) categorisation of industrial agglomeration processes (see 
Chapter 2), I argue that the local production model is in the first phase of development, 
a phase of localisation facilitated by geographic specificities, urban externalities, and 
the film culture tradition. I suggest that the satellite model has developed into a second 
phase, one that attracts investment standing out over other regions (such as Avatar 
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producers decision to film in Wellington). However, its attractiveness is primarily driven 
by cost-efficiency and only secondarily by its innovation or differentiation strategies 
(see the Avatar deal in Chapter 6). The district’s development is also limited by its 
overreliance on one big internal player and a few external players which makes its 
attraction “slippery” (Markusen, 1996). Other successful film industrial districts have, 
on the contrary, been able to generate multiple interdependencies among the interaction 
of different players and their functional specialised interconnection, which leads them to 
a third phase of development based on competitive advantages borne out of 
agglomeration. 
In the following chapter I discuss the arguments made in this and the preceding chapters 
with reference to my original line of inquiry, identifying constraints and opportunities 
for sustainability.   
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Chapter 9  
Discussion: Constraints and Opportunities for Sustainability 
In this chapter, I discuss the question: How can relationships in the film industry in 
Wellington work to create sustainability? In order to answer the question, I establish 
links back to PEC and GI theory to map out the sources of increasing returns, as 
suggested by Power and Scott (2004). I pay special attention to the increasing returns 
that are critical to sustainability according to my analytic and normative framework (see 
Chapter 2). Therefore, I thought it important to integrate the constraints on increasing 
returns in the value chain cycles, and the generation of interdependencies and 
externalities identified in Wellington as part of this thesis. When identifying the 
constraints on sustainable outcomes I suggest they are also opportunities for 
development. As a result, I present the opinions my informants and other film industry 
stakeholders on what the film industry should look like in Wellington.  
Later in the chapter, as part of a critical analysis I trace in my participants’ responses 
some conventionalised ways to ‘think’ about the available channels of action to develop 
a sustainable film industry in Wellington. These conventionalised ways of thinking or 
mindsets, shape policies and business practices as well. In particular, I focus on those 
conventional thoughts that I argue represent constraints on achieving a sustainable 
industry. I also present the possibilities that alternative points of view offer and, when 
appropriate, I suggest that transformation of conventional ways is necessary to move 
forward. My suggestions are based on my analytical framework on sustainability.  
Constraints on the Value Chain and Interdependencies 
In this section, I integrate findings from Chapters 4 to 7, to outline and discuss the 
blockages which have been identified in the value chain and interrelations among film 
district players that prevent them from generating spirals of increasing returns whether 
economic or social. In order to do so, I first track such constraints on each of the five 
criteria of sustainability, that is, on the industry’s financial capacity, the ability to feed 
from pools of specialised labour and creative sources, adequate levels of productivity 
and appropriate infrastructure, as well as captive market audiences (see Chapter 2). 
Secondly, I locate the constraints in the value chain phase, which I call “vertical 
blockages”. Then, I identify constraints on the interrelations with other players, which I 
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call “horizontal blockages” (see Figure 39). Lastly, I argue blockages actually offer 
opportunities and I explore some proposals traced from the theory, reports and 
participants’ normative statements. The latter are subjective expressions that evaluate 
the desirability of various scenarios.   
Figure 39 Blockages in the value chain for the local film industry 
 
Note. Own elaboration. 
Financial capacity 
Scholars working on the economics of the film industry, such as Garnham (2005), 
Picard (2002), have observed that films incur large amounts of costs in the phase of 
production, while the distribution phase experiences lower or nill marginal costs. This 
has promoted the generation of economies of scale for businesses that control 
production and distribution (Garnham, 2005). This tendency to market expansion has 
historically favoured the existence of oligopolies, that is, market concentration in a few 
companies. As explained in Chapter 2, for independent producers, fundraising can be 
extremely difficult because of the non-competitive conditions derived from an 
oligopolistic environment such as barriers to entry and disadvantageous agreements 
regarding revenue streams. Based on the emphasis in PEC theory on the articulation of 
the value chain as a way to guarantee cycles of reinvestment, I have argued that having 
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financial capacity is a necessary condition for a sustainable industry. In the next section, 
I make the case for how and why independent producers in Wellington struggle to 
achieve financial capacity. 
Undercapitalisation 
One of the main constraints I identified, that aligns with other research findings 
(Campbell & Jones, 2009; Jackson & Court, 2010), is the undercapitalisation of local 
producers. It is a vertical blockage shaping the phase of production in the value chain, 
but structurally linked to the phases of distribution and commercialisation of films. In 
this sense it signals a hindrance to capital flow from markets back to producers 
(Garnham, 1990). As the report from Pinflicks and NZIER stated, “Sustainability and 
growth in the screen production industry depend on the ability to generate profits in 
each of those steps of the value chain, as well as across the chain as a whole” (2003, p. 
6). Interviews with film practitioners in Wellington showed that undercapitalisation is a 
horizontal blockage that reflects broken relations between local independent producers 
on the one hand, and investors, sales agents, distributors, exhibitors and broadcasters on 
the other. Specifically, the perception of the impossibility of finding mutual benefits in 
working together hinders collaboration. 
The undercapitalisation of the production base perpetuates itself in a vicious circle. The 
lack of funding decreases productivity, underwrites intermittent production, and lowers 
film budgets, all of which increase uncertainty―understood as the perception of 
unknown future circumstances―(Kawashima, 1999). In turn, uncertainty discourages 
investors and presale deals with distributors because of the risk or “possibility of loss” 
they represent (Rose, 2001). Even for state-funded films, the dominant “strings-
attached” funding in New Zealand means that “the potential return to the funding 
agency is usually much greater than the return to the producer, making it not financially 
viable for the producer to spend further money marketing and distributing the product” 
or in developing new projects (Wrightson, 2003a, p. 3). Although the creation of SPIF 
in 2008 gave local producers a 40% grant as a better foundation from which to negotiate 
with intermediaries (Campbell & Jones, 2009), local films’ overreliance on big foreign 
distributors and exhibitors that dominate the markets puts them in a disadvantageous 
position regarding negotiating waterfall revenue streams. According to the common 
practice of such financial agreements, even if commercially successful, the producers 
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are at the back end of the recoupment process and hardly ever receive any profits. 
Meanwhile, there is a flight of capital to the headquarters of overseas companies 
(Conor, 2004; Huffer, 2012; McAndrew & Risak, 2012; Watson, 1988). According to 
interviewees, commercialisation through broadcasters shows a similar power imbalance 
through presale contracts that inhibit producers’ recapitalisation. Although the 
government view is that commercial gatekeepers―broadcasters and 
distributors―guarantee there would be an audience for the products, in reality, and as 
informants and Jackson and Court (2010) believed, it exposes independent producers to 
unfavourable positions and results in market failure. Although NZFC relaxed its 
distribution attachment requirements to obtain their funding from 2011 (MCH, 2011), 
the power imbalance in negotiations with distributors and broadcasters in the market 
place is still disadvantageous for local producers.  
The repercussions of limited access to capital were detected more than 10 years ago by 
the Pinflicks and NZIER report: “If no private investment is raised in New Zealand, it 
cuts off potential backend here, other than through the government funding agencies, as 
well as limiting the ability to own or have a major interest in IP […] which could feed 
back to New Zealand” (Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003, p. 26). 
Unfortunately, a decade after these recommendations, no significant progress has been 
made in the form of structural policy intervention. I argue that the government support 
in the form of taxpayer money, though necessary, is still partly misallocated as it fails to 
break dependency cycles. For instance, the Jackson and Court report suggested the 
creation of a Box Office Incentive Scheme rewarding local box office films with “$1 
per each $10 of the gross box office” (2010, p. 69), but the government made no 
advancements in this area. Many interview participants stressed the desirability of less 
reliance on government money and increased private investment through collaborations 
either local, international or a mix of both. For example, one participant suggested 
amalgamation strategies where mergers and joint ventures of production companies 
could leverage access to capital.  
Ability to feed from creative sources and pools of specialised labour 
As discussed in Chapter 2, another two necessary conditions for film sustainability are 
production systems that can nurture from labour pools, and creative sources. According 
to Scott (2006), in order for specialised labour to be available, film workers have to be 
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organically developed and maintained in relations of production over time. In this way 
they can acquire the technical skills and cultural sensibilities that are applicable to the 
production process. By the same token, Scott (2000a) considers that film production 
systems are entrenched in a creative substrate that infuse a ‘cinematic vocabulary’ to 
them. Nonetheless, workers and the creative substrate might remain inert unless 
energised though a working production system (Scott, 2000a). I now outline my 
findings around the Wellington district’s ability to nurture film production from creative 
sources and specialised labour. 
Above-the-line talent 
Another main constraint identified in this thesis and other studies is the lack of 
professional screenwriters (Jackson & Court, 2010; Kenworthy, 2013). It is a vertical 
blockage in the value chain phase of production as it impedes good storytelling from 
becoming an input into film development and, further on, to engage with audiences. It is 
also a horizontal blockage of disconnection between the pool of creative writers and 
screen producers. Although some scriptwriters work in other forms of creative writing, 
the special skill and craft required to develop screenwriters is “built through the ‘doing’ 
and opportunities for ongoing work are not always available. Rarely does international 
production (except sometimes through co-production) allow for continuous work” 
(Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003, p. 28). Although television drama could 
provide continuity, the cost-effective strategies of broadcasters move away from that 
format.  
Therefore, I argue that undercapitalisation of producers and flickering production has an 
impact on developing good storytelling and vice versa. Many participants’ normative 
statements included the need to develop “good storytellers” and “good scripts.” A 
creative participant observed that “there is too much attention on the golden egg rather 
than the goose who lays it,” suggesting not only the importance of formal writing 
training but the implementation of schemes to develop writers instead of projects. A 
way to do so, the participant suggested, is through a series of screen projects with 
modest budgets that allow writers to establish collaborative relations with directors, gain 
exposure to audiences, learn from project to project and “build up.”  
Another vertical blockage I identified is the shortage of experienced creative producers 
(Barnett, 2013). The limited access to capital and lack of production continuity diminish 
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producers’ exposure to dealing with financiers and buyers. A decade ago, that issue was 
reported as a constraint on creating screen content, as there are “shortages of high-level 
business skills, [in]ability to exploit the idea, the lack of international finance and 
marketing skills other than a notable few” (Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003, 
p. 28). Furthermore, in order to expand international audiences, market intelligence and 
co-production knowledge are required which are “time consuming and expensive” 
(Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003, p. 28). In this area, my interviewees 
referred to the need to “work beyond our borders” and to increase “knowledge of the 
international market and the ability to market.” Despite long-term government efforts to 
finance individual producers to attend film markets―a strategy that is still 
current―some practitioners have observed that experienced producers apply their 
marketing knowledge only to their own projects while inexperienced newcomers keep 
entering the industry (Campbell & Hughes, 2003). I argue this is another disadvantage 
of the project-based model identified by Davenport (2006). Such a model is unable to 
retain the specialised knowledge and social contacts acquired by individual producers to 
be able to establish permanent and transferable resources to other producers. In this 
case, I suggest that it would be appropriate to set up local intermediary organisations 
with private, public or mixed capital, that are able to accrue marketing knowledge and 
to manage it in the long-term (Grant, 1996).  
Intellectual property 
A third constraint is the infrequent generation of intellectual property rights and the 
inability to exploit them. It is a vertical blockage in the production phase that prevents 
the film industry from transforming ideas into products to reach dissemination phases. It 
is a horizontal blockage in the sense that it reflects disarticulation and unequal relations 
between innovators or content creators on the one hand, and producers, financial pools 
and markets on the other. Intellectual property rights are first and foremost important 
assets for creators, innovators, and producers’ livelihoods “which, in turn, flow to their 
investment in developing new projects” (Wrightson, 2003a).  
A major hindrance with respect to copyright is the dearth of professional screenwriters 
but also their vulnerable position in controlling the benefits of retaining the copyright 
holder status. Something similar occurs in the area of computer and industrial design 
(Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003). This is because the creation, management 
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and exploitation of rights is costly; it requires expertise and a range of intermediaries 
such as accountants, lawyers, sales agents, distributors and collecting societies. A report 
for the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and UNCTAD has 
acknowledged this as an obstacle for the development of local cultural industries 
(Wallis, 2001). Furthermore, Epstein (2005) has argued that because of the current 
global imbalances of corporate power, large media conglomerates are better described 
as platforms involved in extracting value from intellectual property. In the context of 
New Zealand’s market dynamics: “Ownership of copyrights and patents is often lost 
with foreign money driving the deal” (Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003, p. 
27). This is true for Jackson’s blockbuster movies such as TLOTR whose vast copyright 
revenue―including theatrical, secondary markets and ancillary products―belongs to 
the US-based transnational company (SPT, 2003). The Pinflicks and NZIER report 
concluded that satellite production servicing activities do “nothing to build the 
intellectual property platform for income generation and future development” (2003, p. 
27). There are of course individual efforts from Miramar companies to venture into 
intellectual property development (McFadden, 2009) but the broader screen-industry 
sectors do not benefit from it. IP is therefore an area of market failure and Pinflicks and 
NZIER have suggested “there is a role for government in assisting with a broad-based 
development of industry capability” (2003, p. 42). But the issue of IP ownership is also 
present within the public funding system in New Zealand:  
Government funders, in search of making their limited money allocation go further, were 
often insistent that they should claim these [rights]. Industry people saw this as an 
unnecessary piece of equity taking {…} it has meant that the residuals are often wind up 
in the hands of people with limited motivation and abilities to exploit them (Pinflicks 
Communications & NZIER, 2003, p. vii).  
By the same token, when funding bodies encourage producers to search for third party 
investment―known as “gap funding”―investors have “a powerful negotiation position, 
which often weakens the position of the owner of the residual and other IP rights” 
(Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003, p. vii). To the present day, the lack of 
direct structural change in this area hampers the film industry’s ability to feed from 
creative sources, a necessary condition for self-sustainable outcomes: “The development 
and exploitation of intellectual property is one of the major ways in which the industry 
can be responsible for its own growth without direct Government funding or 
intervention” (SPT, 2003, p. 27). The normative statements of interviewees pointed to 
the desirability of growing not so much service-like production companies, but IP-
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generating companies, which are indeed, according to the theory, primary economies 
with potential to develop positive externalities (Young, 1928). 
Productivity and appropriate infrastructure  
Drawing on several studies, I have argued that another necessary condition for the 
sustainability of the film industry (see Chapter 2) is adequate levels of productivity that 
allow for the maintenance of jobs and upskilling processes, the development of 
audiences and the encouragement of film services and facilities that support it (Coe, 
2001; Davenport, 2006; Scott, 2000b). In the next section, I present the constraints on 
productivity and appropriate infrastructure in the Wellington film district. 
Mismatch of scale of operations  
Another set of horizontal blockages identified here is made up of budgetary mismatches 
between independent and large satellite productions during the production phase, and 
between small producers and large international distributors during the distribution 
phase. As explained below, these mismatches reinforce flickering production and low 
productivity.  
In the production sector, most of the projects and companies are polarised on either 
large-scale satellite operations or small-scale independent productions. Middle-tier 
productions such as co-productions, television productions and medium-sized film 
budgets are scarce. This creates a disproportionate effect on the industrial ecology, those 
interdependent networks of mutually beneficial relations (Corner, 1999). Firstly, the 
small domestic producers lack the capacity to absorb large numbers of workers during 
the satellite blockbuster downtimes. Secondly, neither large- nor small-scale producers 
can provide the industry with the continuity of work it requires to develop. This 
problem has been identified by government reports “dating back to the 1990s. {…} The 
central issue for New Zealand’s production/post-production sector {…} is the 
‘lumpiness’ of demand, the feast/famine rollercoaster that inhibits growth and creates 
havoc across the entire value chain of production” (Film NZ, 2013, p. 25). Despite the 
issue being acknowledged, there have not been enough structural strategies to address it. 
Film NZ’s recent recommendation to attract satellite international television series that 
could provide mid-term continuity to the industry has considerable short-comings. This 
is because the governance of transnational companies often imposes limitations on 
developing domestic, creative talent and IP which are essential for a long-term strategy. 
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Thirdly, as large satellite productions drive up costs of labour, facilities and general 
services (Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003), the domestic industry has to 
stretch its already thin budgets. For example, domestic production is systematically 
resorting to cross-subsidisation, through wages from satellite productions or other 
industries, and discounting demands. Both of these measures are unviable for some film 
workers’ livelihoods and local service providers’ operations. Another example is the 
existence of high-quality facilities built with government support but tied up to a single, 
top producer which makes them expensive for independent producers to use. This could 
be considered discriminatory and represents a horizontal blockage in which many 
producers are left out. Producers themselves see the need to build facilities that can be 
“open to all customers to use” (Kenworthy, 2013, p. 52). 
In addition, big disparities are found in the distribution sector between large and 
medium but internationally-owned distributors that dominate the New Zealand market 
and a few local small distributors; this also contributes to a budget scale mismatch. 
Firstly, large and medium distributors are not interested in small-budget local films, and 
tend to bring in larger budget international films. Secondly, small local distributors who 
are striving to survive depend on medium- or large-budget international films as they 
are highly publicised. This, in turn, inhibits symbiotic relations between small 
distributors and local films.  
The disparities described above are related to the uncompetitive oligopolistic market 
both in the production and distribution of films in New Zealand that inhibits growth of 
competitor businesses (see Chapter 5). The disparities signal market failures that are 
important to address, particularly, the assumption in New Zealand’s economic policies 
that favouring large corporations will spillover to the rest of the sector that is, the 
“dynamic trickle down hypothesis” (Quiggin, 2010, p. 143). The normative statements 
of some interviewees referred to “the need to breach the gap” or sit in the “middle of the 
road” to “increase production” that provides “ongoing work on an indigenous level” as 
well as increasing local or international television production and middle-tier films. 
Some participants believed that expanding areas of retail and other windows of 
commercialisation were needed to grow a local distribution business that can afford a 
risk-taking attitude. 
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Captive local and international audiences 
One final necessary condition for sustainable dynamics in the film industry is the 
capacity to obtain economic and social rewards through expanding market audiences 
and to be able to generate economies of scale. This is the reason why political 
economists consider distribution and commercialisation to be the critical phases of the 
value chain to generate reinvestments (Garnham, 2005). In the following section, I 
pinpoint the constraints on accessing local and international audiences that Wellington 
films face. 
Low market share 
The small share of local audiences for New Zealand screen products is another major 
vertical blockage identified in this thesis. This constraint is located in the dissemination 
phase of the value chain. For instance, from 1993‒2012, the local market share 
represented an average of 2.5% of the box office (MPDA-NZFC, 2013). There is no 
data available to estimate the volume of international audiences for New Zealand films 
but interviews indicated that it is very modest. This is a historical issue since the 
Pinflicks and NZIER (2003, p. vi) report mentioned the “inadequate connection to 
global sales for television and features, other than through some individual producer 
efforts.” Furthermore the report observed, “there is a lack of cohesion in approaching 
the global marketplace, which means less consistent and comprehensive market 
intelligence that might be needed” (2003, p. vi), especially when film sales and 
distribution are based on expanding networks. I argue this is, once more, an unintended 
consequence of the project-based model (Davenport, 2006). Therefore, the small 
domestic market share also signals a horizontal blockage in the relations among 
producers and audiences caused by distributors becoming the bottleneck or traffic 
control of film products and it is this control that influences the possibility of obtaining 
commercial and social rewards at the end of the value chain cycle. 
The small domestic market share can be explained by multiple factors such as the 
saturation of foreign screen products which has shaped consumers’ preference for 
foreign films (Dunleavy & Joyce, 2012); the filter of a handful of distributors and 
broadcasters which prefer to buy highly publicised foreign products; the modest volume 
of local films produced; the lack of local exploitation of synergies among different 
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commercialisation-ancillary windows; and the shortage of small and medium 
independent distributors and platforms backing local films (see Chapter 5).  
So far, the small domestic market share is an area of market failure neglected by 
policies which have focused mainly on subsidising production but could be at the same 
time, implementing audience development strategies. For instance, a ministerial report 
established that the production sector: “makes the majority of the industry  {…} and [is] 
the most appropriate sector in the industry to analyse when investigating economic 
impacts, as it is an internationally tradable sector” (MED, 2012b, p. 9). Nonetheless, 
Chapter 6 argued that official figures for production are skewed by aggregation of 
categories and because it is a labour-intensive sector. Contrary to the previous 
ministerial quotation, Chapter 7 discussed the limitations of a service-led tradable 
sector. In here, I argue that in order to understand the economic impacts of the film 
industry the inclusion of distribution and consumption sectors is crucial. For public 
policies whose rationale is the generation of social and commercial rewards―let alone 
the promotion of final and not just intermediary exports, as well as achieve a self-
sustaining film industry―local and international consumption should be emphasised, as 
it has the potential to outgrow dependency dynamics on external support. 
The normative statements of interview participants referred to this overlooked area by 
talking about the need to expand audiences for New Zealand screen products, as well as 
increase the channels for dissemination of screen products. For instance, one participant 
said “I would like to see more New Zealand [content] {…} available for a wider 
audience either TV or online.”  Other participants concurred on the desirability of 
having “a much healthier, more collaborative relation with New Zealand broadcasting.” 
By the same token, another interviewee proposed the appropriateness of having spaces 
of cinema exhibition that are alternative to mainstream cinema with a well-publicised 
programme that could offer enjoyment of cinema. In Wellington, he proposed, it should 
be run by a non-for profit trust and its facilities should include a café, bookstore and an 
ancillary shop, meeting rooms to host forums and have genuine partnerships with the 
tertiary educators and the Film Archive. Another participant proposed strategies to 
engage audiences, such as pre-screen tests and audience research. Respondents also 
agreed on the need to expand international markets.  
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After outlining the industrial constraints in the last sections, the following discussion 
addresses key social conventions identified as constraints on the idea that sustainability 
can be implemented in New Zealand. 
Conventional Mindsets 
Some recurrent topics among my interviewee responses illustrated ways to think of the 
film industry which, in my view, might hinder a transformative path towards a 
sustainable industry. First of all, I have noted the internalised belief of most participants 
that New Zealand’s small population size explains its industrial struggles. The following 
quotations summarise participants’ perceptions: “you cannot make money from NZ 
because it is only 4.4 million people”, “So there is not enough population here to make a 
profit off just about any film.”  
Indeed, the New Zealand market size is small compared to many other countries, and 
represents a significant challenge for its film industry. Nonetheless, I argue that this 
issue is exacerbated by New Zealand’s regulatory and market arrangements. The 
internalised belief in a “small market” has a wide range of implications from 
participants’ acknowledgement of a challenge with possibilities to overturn it, to more 
pessimistic views whose political repercussions contribute to legitimise the status quo of 
industrial affairs. This latter view was particularly evident in the responses of public 
servants: 
I slightly laugh when people say we need to do this to develop an industry and I… you 
know, a country with 4 million people, how realistic would it be? Yes we can become a 
production facility for international production, but that is not a local film industry, that is 
just about what is reasonable for the population. 
Another public servant explained his view on the influence of the small domestic 
market on state subsidies: “The only market failure reason for supporting New Zealand 
stories on screen is that […] the markets aren’t a sufficient size for the private sector to 
provide that [local] content. We are just getting international material imported in, 
which is much more cost-effective.” John Barnett and Peter Jackson are two examples 
of top producers who disagree, “believing that it is possible for local productions to turn 
a profit” (Jackson & Court, 2010; Kenworthy, 2013, p. 53). Here I argue against some 
deterministic assumptions of the impossibility of developing film industries in small 
countries. Firstly, New Zealand participates in a global capitalist environment where 
free trade market dynamics dominate and the government has pursued an export-led 
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economy. Therefore, arguments that limit New Zealand’s available channels of action to 
the domestic market can be counter-argued even within the free market logic in which 
products have potential markets beyond a country’s borders. Secondly, I argue that 
cinema markets in New Zealand have not even been expanded to their full 
potential―2.5% of domestic market share―making the already-small market much 
smaller. Thirdly, the issue of having an undercapitalised local production sector is 
common to many underdeveloped film industries around the world like Australia 
(Hartley & Cunningham 2002), UK (UKFC, 2000) and Mexico (Muñoz Larroa & 
Gómez García, 2011; Ugalde, 2005), which indicates the problem is not unique to 
small-population countries. As I argued in the previous sections, the structural 
challenges lie elsewhere.  
A second belief identified in some interviewees’ responses pointed towards New 
Zealand’s isolation as another constraint on developing its film industry. As one 
participant noted, “it is difficult with a country […] that is physically remote from the 
rest of the world.” Another participant commented, “our location is crap. Compared to 
being in the middle of Europe or America […] We are really disadvantaged by that.” 
Nonetheless, the same interviewee observed that the constraint lies in the New Zealand 
mindset, “I think even mentally, it is the truth, because we have a lot of technology that 
could help us maintain contact, but it’s mentally where there is this… even we have had 
so few co-productions with Australia.” Despite physical isolation being an important 
aspect of New Zealand’s cultural history and without denying the challenges of the 
higher costs to commute to other parts of the world, I agree that those arguments have 
less and less weight in a contemporary cosmopolitan, technology-led, diplomatically 
and trade-wise connected New Zealand. 
As a third example of how current arrangements are institutionalised models that have 
been internalised in people’s beliefs, I present a common assumption that New Zealand 
local content and its cultural imprint in films is a barrier to gaining international 
markets. A public servant explained, 
sustainability has always been a goal for the local industry no matter how [far] 
back you look. But the truth is, for indigenous New Zealand productions with 
strong New Zealand stories, New Zealand content, there isn’t a large international 
market for that type of content. Hence, {…} the reliance on government subsidy.   
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Yet, the same participant conceded: “The only way it could really be made sustainable 
is if producers would be generating unique intellectual property and sell that 
internationally and be able to rip the ongoing revenue streams from film sales, DVD, 
merchandise, online distribution.” As I commented in previous sections, those are some 
of the unexplored areas of opportunities more likely to succeed according to the theory 
used for this research and examples from other regions. In the last decades, New 
Zealand films such as Once Were Warriors (Tamahori, 1995), Heavenly Creatures 
(Jackson, 1994), and Whale Rider (Caro, 2002) gained international visibility, 
widespread distribution, and successful box office by being New Zealand films with 
New Zealand content. I argue those movies are good examples of New Zealand films 
connecting with local and foreign audiences. This in turn, questions the validity of 
accounts based on the impossibility for New Zealand’s screen industries to capture the 
interest of international audiences.  
A fourth belief signals an institutionalised model also influencing industrial practices. 
Some interview responses implied participants’ beliefs in the “given nature” of 
economic conditions, which inevitably led to a feeling of impotence to change things. 
For example, a producer commented about intermediaries taking their slice of money in 
this way: “it’s a rough business model {…} But it seems to be part of the model” 
(emphasis added). A public servant talking about market audiences, “the truth is that for 
New Zealand indigenous productions {...} there isn’t a large international market” 
(emphasis added). Or a public servant’s realisation that wishing for better relations 
between local producers and TV broadcasters cannot be “mandated”: “It is just the 
reality” (emphasis added). Those comments correspond to the participants’ internalised 
ideas of given economic circumstances, which align with the neoclassical economic 
assumptions in New Zealand. Whereas, based on criticism of institutional economic 
(see Chapter 3), I argue that economic circumstances are socially made and therefore 
can be transformed. This is not to say that they do not present constraints, or that they 
are easy to change, but is important to emphasise their social genesis. With this 
awareness in mind, it is fair to rephrase the quotes and say that under the current socio-
economic arrangements, local producers are disadvantaged in their relations with 
intermediaries; as also, that in the current socio-economic settings, local films have a 
limited international market. Furthermore, it can be misleading to infer that the 
particular market arrangement of the screen industry in New Zealand is how the 
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economics of the film industry works in general. Indeed, I suggest that self-
sustainability in the cultural sector is not exclusively limited to market dynamics. For 
example, I argue that experience around the globe provides examples of successful, 
sustainable film districts that are based on state regulation―not state dependency―on 
private-public partnerships, and on some form of support from the civil society. 
In fact, other participants demystified these assumptions. For some interviewees, mainly 
creative film workers, pessimistic mindsets make the public sector support far from 
satisfactory: “New Zealand is not a country which understands the concept of putting a 
lot of money towards arts; it is a physical country funded on farming and hard work.” 
Likewise, another interviewee reflected on the focus of commercial imperatives:  
you go to other countries like in Scandinavia {…} and it is a completely different 
approach and mentality. And I think we kind of breathe this into ourselves and we are 
kind of made up with it now and I think it is going to take a long time to change that. 
Anther participant commented,  
things are different for us because we are a bit further away from some other countries, 
but in some ways, that is the reason why {…} we can play with stuff, iterate and say 
‘well, this actually works for us, what about you guys?’ 
Conclusions 
The discussion in this chapter addressed the question: How can relationships in the film 
industry work to create sustainability? In order to answer it, I followed the GI theory 
suggestion to map out the industrial district’s sources of increasing returns (Power & 
Scott, 2004, p. 9). Based on my analytic framework on sustainability in Chapter 2, I 
paid special attention to those constraints to increasing returns occurring in each of the 
necessary conditions on a sustainable film industry: financial capacity, the ability to 
nurture from pools of specialised labour and creative sources, adequate levels of 
productivity and appropriate infrastructure, as well as captive market audiences. In this 
way I hope to contribute to systematising information that could be useful to guide 
policymaking to foster film industry relations that could work to create sustainability. 
Of great help were not only the theoretical normative statements that informed my 
integrative framework on sustainability, but also what my interviewees and some 
unofficial reports considered desirable for the film industry in Wellington. 
I now summarise the proposals on tackling industrial restraints addressed in this 
chapter. Some of the main sources of increasing returns mapped out in this chapter are 
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film dissemination channels. However, a major constraint underwriting Wellington 
independent producers’ undercapitalisation is the overreliance on large, dominant, 
foreign distributors, exhibitors, and New Zealand broadcasters. Their power allows 
them to dictate the terms of the revenue streams where producers get the lowest margins 
and are at the lower end of the recoupment process. In addition, state support has not 
been enough nor allocated appropriately to facilitate alternative channels of 
dissemination for producers. As I have argued in this chapter, based on the normative 
statements gathered in this thesis, there are suggestions to tackle this issue, among them:  
1. The possibility of implementing revenue schemes, for example, Jackson and Court’s 
Box Office Revenue Scheme (2010). Or, I suggest, minimum standards regulating 
contractual relations between dissemination channels and producers to guarantee the 
latter a better cut and recoupment position.  
2. The establishment of collaboration and amalgamation strategies between production 
companies to leverage their position to negotiate access to capital or dissemination 
deals. 
The chapter argued that other sources of increasing returns depend on the availability of 
screenwriters, creative producers, and the generation and exploitation of intellectual 
property (IP) rights. But opinions collected in this thesis identified a lack of experts in 
those areas. Some industry practitioners mentioned that continuity of projects, even 
when they are low-budget projects, was desirable to build up proficiency in 
scriptwriting. I also suggest that producers’ marketing skills and copyright expertise 
should move beyond an individual-project-based model towards an organisational 
model specialising in accruing and transferring marketing or IP management in a 
collective way. 
Other major sources of increasing returns identified here were middle-tier budget scale 
projects that provide continuity and overcome the highs and lows of large and small 
productions characteristic of Wellington. Another constraint on increasing returns in the 
distribution area is the budget scale mismatch between the distributors’ interest in large-
budget films and local low-budget independent films. Many interviewees were of the 
opinion that a solution should focus on facilitating an increase of projects and 
distribution companies that sit in the middle ground. 
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 Finally, another source of increasing returns derives from captive audiences for local 
films which are so far very limited for New Zealand films. Expanding audiences was an 
imperative for many practitioners who saw the existence of a major constraint in this 
area. I suggest that in terms of public policy, there are potential strategies that have not 
been explored yet, such as audience-development strategies and facilitation of 
alternative channels of dissemination. 
In this chapter I argued that besides the industrial constraints there are also social 
conventions nurtured by people’s beliefs that represent barriers to thinking that 
sustainability is possible for the film industry in Wellington. Based on the normative 
statements gathered through various sources, I argue that it is important to be open to 
the possibility of expanding domestic and international audiences. I suggest that earlier 
examples of local films that have enjoyed international success are considered as an 
evidence of New Zealand’s unique cultural appeal to the rest of the world. It is also 
important to bear in mind that the current socio-economic arrangements of the film 
industry are contingent on the set of regulations, conventions and industry practices 
currently in force and which can be transformed in the future. 
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Chapter 10  
Conclusions: Towards Sustainability in the Film Industry 
In this concluding chapter, I discuss the potential contributions of this thesis by referring 
back to the line of inquiry as expressed in the main question: What interrelations in the 
film industry enable its sustainability? My interest in this question was motivated by a 
central issue outlined in Chapter 1: the struggle for many regions―including 
Wellington―to sustain local film industries vis-à-vis Hollywood’s global supremacy 
(Aksoy & Robins, 1992; Scott, 2005; Wasko, 2004). In order to outline the potential 
contributions towards addressing this issue I go back to sustainability as an initial 
concept with which to capture the long-term viability of the film industry. I also suggest 
potential paths for policymaking and further research at a local and international level.  
After having tested the analytical framework of sustainability on the Wellington 
example, I propose its transferability to other film districts and the possibility of making 
empirical inferences to districts that, like Wellington, experience similar situations. 
These would include analogous local, national, and international environments 
characterised by having similar film production models, film policies, and economic 
policies. In this sense, there are lessons to learn from the Wellington case that could be 
inferred to other districts around the world. Similarly, the study of the Wellington 
district and the analytical framework of sustainability help to understand the wider issue 
of sustainability in a national context. 
The Contributions of the Thesis 
This thesis began with a contradiction between accounts about the film industry in 
Wellington. These were: (a) celebratory accounts of increased foreign investment; and 
(b) discouraging accounts questioning the long-term viability of the industry. Indeed, in 
the preceding chapters I have confirmed the existence of a very polarised and fragile 
industry in which many players are small and vulnerable, and a few others are large and 
powerful. I argue that the main challenge, therefore, is that future opportunities in the 
industry should be better spread by the industry becoming sustainable. I defined the 
self-sustainability of the film industry as its ability to achieve the long-term supporting 
viability of the sociocultural aspects of film and the socio-economic aspects of its 
industry, as well as the capacity to fend for itself. In the following sections, I explain 
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how I integrated a framework to analyse and evaluate a film industry in terms of its 
sustainability, and based upon that I explore potential directions to transform challenges 
into opportunities. 
Theoretical and analytical contributions 
Theoretical and analytical gap 
Several scholars have observed that Hollywood’s worldwide dominant position 
challenges diversity in filmmaking and film consumption in other regions (Aksoy & 
Robins, 1992; Christopherson, 2006; Garnham, 1990; Scott, 2005; Wasko, 2004). In 
this international context, where many regions struggle to keep their film industries 
afloat, two relevant fields of literature on the cultural industries particularly concerned 
with the previous issue have emerged.  
On the one hand, there are two theoretical approaches that have explained how the film 
industries work: these are the political economy of culture (PEC) and the geographical 
industrialisation (GI) theory. On the other hand, there are reports from international 
organisations on cultural policies, which suggest the desirability of cultural sustainable 
development (UNCTAD, 2010). The latter entails equal access to culture by different 
social groups and urges the need for cultural protection and cultural interconnectedness 
with other aspects of socio-economic development. However, as Figure 40 shows there 
is a gap between the theoretical accounts of PEC and GI and the broad, normative goals 
of UNCTAD and other international regimes with respect to achieving sustainable 
development in the film industry. My analysis drew from, and contributes to both 
fields―in which there remained few explicit clarification of how to give an account of 
sustainability in the film industry―by proposing a framework to analyse and evaluate 
sustainable criteria and outcomes.  
In these concluding sections, I join the various strands of my argument together to 
summarise how I developed the normative and analytical framework and the ways in 
which I applied it to study the film industry’s sustainability in Wellington, New 
Zealand.  
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Note. Own elaboration. For more on each approach see Chapter 2. 
Analytical framework 
Throsby (1997) has argued that tangible and intangible cultural stocks―and 
practices―carry a symbolic value that can deteriorate or grow. Their maintenance 
requires resources just as other elements of economic and social systems do. He then 
established the link between such cultural stocks and the capacity to make them 
sustainable, that is, viable in the long-term (Throsby, 1997). In addition, international 
organisations promoted the desirability to protect the world’s cultural diversity by 
achieving sustainability in cultural industries so that they can be preserved in the long-
term and continue to provide access to production and consumption for different social 
groups, and interrelate with other socio-economic activities (UNCTAD, 2010; 
UNESCO, 2002). My analytical framework started by appropriating those normative 
principles and defining the film industry’s sustainability as the capacity to fend for itself 
and enjoy the long-term supporting viability of the cultural aspects of film and the 
economic aspects of its industry. I then enquired about the process necessary to achieve 
sustainability by examining and interpreting the empirical and theoretical studies of 
various film industries by PEC and GI authors. Both approaches had developed 
theoretical explanations of endogenous industrial development whose advantages 
encompassed two main qualities: (a) the long-term maintenance of the film industry, 
and (b) the incorporation of its wide cultural and socio-economic aspects.  
I identified the first of those qualities in PEC and GI’s use of visual metaphors like 
“cycles” to implicitly depict the long-term dynamics of self-sustaining systems 
(Garnham, 1990; Scott, 2005). With the use of “positive cycles” PEC refers to 
EXPLANATORY 
THEORY 
PEC & GI 
 
Vertical (articulation of 
the value chain)  
 
Horizontal relations 
(spirals of increasing 
returns) 
SUSTAINABILITY AS 
AN ANALYTIC AND 
NORMATIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
Financial capacity 
Labour pools 
Creative sources 
Productivity and 
infrastructure 
Market audiences 
 
 
POLICY 
MAKING 
Specific to 
each 
region/ 
industry 
DESIRABLE OUTCOMES OF 
CULTURAL SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
International Regimes on 
Cultural Policy 
Long-term 
Holistic 
Inter-generational equity 
Intra-generational equity 
Cultural diversity 
Cultural protection 
 
 
GAP AND CONTRIBUTION 
Figure 40 Theoretical and analytical contribution of the thesis 
 
 
260 
 
sustainable vertical interrelations within the value chain phases created by the flow of 
resources from production to distribution, consumption, and reinvestment in more 
production in a self-perpetuating way (Garnham, 1990). With the use of the term 
“positive cycles” GI refers to sustainable or horizontal interrelations in the form of 
externalities and interdependencies among film industry players that self-perpetuate 
their functional benefits (Scott, 2005).  
My analytical framework incorporated the cyclical models of GI and PEC theory, 
interpreted here as representing the sufficient conditions for the reproduction of capital 
in the film industry. But I also identified in PEC and GI studies a set of necessary 
conditions that are mutually constitutive of such cyclical models. In their empirical 
studies GI and PEC have distinguished that film industries with positive outcomes have 
financial capacity for reinvestment; pools of specialised workers and a production 
system with the ability to generate and maintain quality jobs; the capacity to feed from 
creative sources and environments; adequate productivity levels with the appropriate 
infrastructure; as well as captive local and international audiences. Those necessary 
conditions completed my analytical framework. 
Figure 41 Analytical framework of sustainability 
 
Note. Own elaboration. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the normative frameworks of sustainability should rely on 
regional sovereignty and the one proposed here does not pretend to replace that local 
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process, nor to be the best or the only one. However, it systematised and integrated 
previous work and was tested by an in-depth analysis of the vertical and horizontal 
interrelations in a film industrial district. I have analysed these interrelations and their 
influence on the sufficient and necessary conditions for sustainability across multiple 
sources including public policy documents, media reports, statistics, and interviews with 
individuals working in a range of film industry organisations. In the following section I 
integrate with examples the most significant findings of this endeavour. 
Testing the theory and the analytical framework 
My research has contributed theoretically by confirming the relevance of the main 
explanatory cues of PEC and GI theories as the key, contemporary theoretical proposals 
to understand the film industries. This confirmation was achieved by testing PEC and 
GI theories against the case of Wellington as a film industrial district. Studies had 
emphasised the importance of the film industry’s interrelations for its development and, 
I have inferred, for its sustainability. The thesis has addressed the main question, What 
interrelations in the film industry enable its sustainability? I have argued that vertical 
and horizontal film industry interrelations are critical to sustainability, and this can be 
observed in five specific areas: financial capacity, labour pools, creative sources, 
productivity and infrastructure as well as captive audiences. As explained in the 
previous section, I arrived at such conclusions by integrating my theoretical approaches. 
Firstly, as Chapter 2 illustrates, authors of PEC such as Garnham (1990) and Aksoy and 
Robins (1992) give primacy to industry relations in the form of vertical value chain 
articulation. Accordingly, Chapters 5 and 6 examined the film industry value chain in 
New Zealand through a historical-structural analysis. As a result, I have identified that 
over time the persistent disenfranchisement of the local production sector from 
distribution and commercialisation sectors―oriented to transnational corporations and 
products―has played an important role in keeping the local production artisanal and 
undercapitalised. This in turn, has favoured dependency on state subsidies and tax 
incentives. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 2, geographical industrialisation theory in 
the work of Scott (2005) gives explanatory pre-eminence to industry relations in the 
form of horizontal interdependencies among film industry players. Thus, Chapters 7 and 
8 examined the film district in Wellington via an industrial and institutional analysis. I 
have argued that the film district in Wellington comprises two different models of film 
production, the satellite (transnationally-oriented) and the local independent production 
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models. The disparities between both models indicate a big gap, something I traced by 
triangulating data from interview responses, document analysis and previous academic 
research. The satellite model’s scale of budgets, employment capacity, and power to 
influence local and national policies, overwhelm the capacity of local independent 
producers. Nonetheless, I have shown that because satellite activities are service-led, 
they have a limited ability to spin off opportunities for the rest of the district that, 
otherwise, production-led activities could have generated. Other film districts have an 
important lesson to learn from the Wellington example regarding the limitation of 
satellite activities based on cost-efficiency as they have been implemented there. This 
also adds to the findings of international research of other satellite centres where, so far, 
policymakers have not been able to “push the development of the film industry {…} to 
the point where a virtuous circle of agglomerated growth is set in motion” (Scott, 2006, 
p. 14). Therefore, different policies should be explored. In the Wellington case, the 
satellite activities based on cost-efficiency have created, for example, limited 
interdependencies with above-the-line New Zealand workers, who have more 
opportunities in the local production model. Additionally, I have identified a financial 
breach between both the satellite and local production activities, which is reflected in a 
series of dysfunctional relations. Firstly, there are no co-financial and co-production 
activities between the models; relations are reduced to sharing of below-the-line 
workers and technical sponsorship. Secondly, relations with local service providers are 
hampered because local producers cannot afford them and satellite activities exceed 
local services’ capacity. Thirdly, I have discussed how the downtime in satellite 
employment generates an oversupply of workers that the local industry is unable to 
absorb. In turn, this has disadvantaged the bargaining position of non-union workers’ 
organisations demanding better working conditions.  
My findings confirm those of international studies which noted that decentralisation of 
film production―in the form of independent production or satellite productions outside 
Los Angeles―“does not imply the end of unequal economic power among firms” and 
among different types of workers (Harrison, 1997, p. 9).   
Despite the structural constraints, I noted that some participants identified what they 
considered strengths in the film industry in Wellington. For example, the effort and 
passion of many film practitioners; the psychological boost of enjoying the international 
visibility of the satellite model; the film community’s excitement to get involved in film 
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activities; the increased technical quality of films―derived from Miramar’s facilities 
and sponsorship; and the perception of a growing enthusiastic reception of some local 
films by New Zealand audiences. Moreover, I have argued that the cultural socialisation 
practices and urban externalities in Wellington create a facilitating environment for 
film-making. Nonetheless, throughout my research I have maintained a focus on the 
sufficient and necessary conditions for a sustainable film industry. In this regard it is 
important to distinguish between strengths and structural sustainable outcomes. When 
contrasting the previous findings with the conditions for a sustainable industry, I have 
also argued that the film industry in Wellington presents several challenging areas. As 
outlined in the previous chapter (Chapter 9), these are constraints on the financial 
capacity; on employment continuity; on canalisation of creative sources into the 
production system; and on reaching domestic and international audiences. These are all 
key areas which restrict sustainability, but are also areas for opportunity. It can be 
inferred from the Wellington example―which expanded the empirical and theoretical 
findings of PEC and GI―that districts―and film industries at a national level―with 
attention to these areas51 positioned themselves to achieve sustainable goals. In the 
following section I consider what the implications of my research might be for 
policymakers. 
Considerations for Policy Making 
From the start, my purpose was that my research would be relevant to policymakers 
working in the area of cultural industries in New Zealand and other regions by linking 
the theories’ explanatory power to more prescriptive suggestions of where structural 
constraints and opportunities might be addressed. However, I did not intend to make 
recommendations for policymaking as such, because implementable policy suggestions 
would require access to inside financial and legal knowledge of both public or 
commercial institutions, which I do not have. Therefore, the potential practical 
contributions of this research lie in pinpointing main areas of policy influence and 
business strategies, hoping it might contribute to discussions between academics, 
practitioners and policymakers.  
As examined in Chapter 6, the important role of NZFC in capitalising the sector has 
been essential, yet insufficient. A decade ago, the production sector was somewhat 
                                                 
51 For the film industry in Vancouver, Coe (2001), in Mexico City, Munoz Larroa & Gómez García, 
(2011), for French cinema, Scott (2000), for Hollywood, Scott (2005). 
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transformed by transnational interests as well. The global expansion of satellite 
productions as described in Chapter 4 corresponded with New Zealand domestic 
growth-model policies to attract such activities. However, up to the present day neither 
state support to local production nor the incentives for attracting satellite productions 
have managed to break the cycle of dependency and organic undercapitalisation. 
Furthermore, I have argued that, responding to very different logic of film production, 
in Wellington the satellite production model fashioned new interests such as those of 
service-like producers and crews who became reliant on satellite productions, while 
other players with conflicting interests remained dissatisfied by the precariousness of 
the local production and the limitations of the satellite productions. In addition, as 
examined in Chapter 6, these conflicting interests were exacerbated as a result of 
discretionary, palliative and homogenising policies and regulations that have inclined to 
shape the environment in favour of transnational interests. As a result, many of the 
economic benefits are concentrated in a few companies and many are lost to overseas 
players. Furthermore, the economic externalities released are limited, as they are not 
based on organic, inward funding but the external allocation of foreign investment and 
state subsidies. Academic studies such as Christopherson’s (2006, p. 741) have 
suggested that, “there is substantial evidence to demonstrate that transnational media 
conglomerates use their considerable political power to reconstruct the production 
environment {…} internationally so as to increase both their profitability and their 
flexibility.” The example in Wellington documented here, adds to the international 
empirical evidence. 
This scenario presents a complex industry, one whose institutional relations are highly 
fragmented. As Chapter 6 details, the debates, conflicts and struggles of recent years are 
a reflection of this situation. In this regard, I have shown that recent government 
initiatives seem to be targeting some parts of the challenging areas highlighted in this 
thesis. For example, to foster medium-sized operations, to make better use of co-
production deals, to increase the commercial exposure of films, to link the industry with 
training institutions, and the steps to coordinate the government screen institutions. 
Although, I infer that those initiatives come from recognising problematic areas, they 
are rather isolated attempts to tackle them and, indeed, lack of awareness of structural 
considerations seems to underlie them. For example, the attempt to bring international 
TV production to foster medium-sized operations and tackle flickering production 
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overlooks the fact that spillovers to above-the-line talent workers, IP creation and 
exploitation, as well as increasing inward financial pools, would be absent. 
Instead, by drawing on sustainability as an analytical framework, the results of this 
study suggest the desirability of establishing overarching, structural and long-term 
policies. That is, policies which encompass the production, distribution and 
commercialisation of films; that are coordinated by an integrative policy; that target the 
structural blockages of the industry; and that are able to identify vulnerable players and 
those areas of economic and cultural activity that have the most potential to create long-
term benefits. This by no means implies the presence of a paternalistic state; rather, it 
suggests the potential of film and screen policies in several areas, such as research, 
regulation and strategic intervention. 
However, first of all, the best film policies should be based on establishing clear 
definitions and objectives (Pinflicks Communications & NZIER, 2003, p. iii), and this 
thesis aimed to contribute to this goal with some clarifications regarding a definition of 
a sustainable film industry. In order to build clear definitions and objectives it is also 
important for the New Zealand film industry to have more detailed statistics to provide a 
more realistic foundation on which to base policymaking. For example, statistics that: 
1. Disaggregate film related activities (such as film from TV, or production from 
services).  
2. Provide indicators of profits for each sector, currently they focus only on revenue but 
not on contrasting it to expenditure.  
3. Offer a more realistic reflection of freelance working characteristics (including 
duration of contracts and periods of unemployment).  
4. Are able to capture the asymmetries among different players (market concentration).  
5. Measure consumption habits through cultural diversity indicators (market share by 
country of origin).  
In the discussion presented in Chapter 9, I have detailed the areas that need special and 
consistent attention, such as audience development; professionalisation in scriptwriting 
as well as production and protection of original creative content; intermediary expertise 
(including public and private organisations accruing knowledge around marketing 
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networks and copyright management); alternative channels of distribution and 
dissemination and the synergies among them (including theatrical, TV, online, etc.). 
Furthermore, I suggest the importance that contractual models for financial recoupment 
of such alternative dissemination channels guarantee with minimum standards a fair and 
quick redistribution of the revenue stream for the producer (see Chapter 9). In addition, 
I have argued the suitability of fostering functional bonds between local producers 
whose businesses are of equivalent and different sizes to combine efforts, for example, 
with co-financial or creative collaboration (either co-productions or joint ventures). 
Likewise, I consider it essential to increase the collaboration of local companies with 
independent international players in order to maintain the balancing power in 
negotiation. This collaboration could occur through distribution deals, international co-
ventures and official co-productions―which have not been used at their full potential 
(Gibson, 2014). As mentioned in Chapter 4, independent transnational links offer 
advantages such as access to financial pools and markets as well as above- and below-
the-line jobs without compromising control over revenue.  
Further Research 
Throughout my research, I have maintained a focus on discussing the general forms of 
interrelations in the film industry in Wellington and I have provided an explanation of 
how they shape the industry’s potential to be self-sustaining. A key question raised by 
my analysis is what are the specific (micro-level) mechanisms leveraging or hampering 
the sustainable operations of a film or audio-visual firm. Further research to address this 
question would need to consider the specific contractual transactions within the 
industry. Film distribution is one of these transactions and because of the way that film 
distribution forms a ‘bottleneck’ it would be important to study it (among other 
intermediaries such as sales agents). It is also a globally neglected topic in academic and 
government research. In addition, the structural relevance of securing copyrights makes 
it another potential area of research. Both areas of investigation could lead to workable 
policies.  
Another fruitful avenue of research is the detailed consideration of the international 
standards of the industry; that is, the business models, contractual practices and 
regulations not only accepted in the industry but also taken for granted in people’s 
mindsets. A specific analysis of the power relations and self-regulatory institutional 
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mechanisms that reproduce those conventionalised practices would require attending 
specifically to how they are legitimised as institutional practices. Furthermore, it should 
open up the question of forecasting scenarios about the transformation of such 
conventions which might imply economic costs, social risks and cognitive challenges 
(Scott, 2004). 
Research about distinct and potentially comparable policies from other countries could 
provide valuable evidence to be incorporated into policymaking processes here. For 
example, the case of the film industry in Denmark is interesting to the New Zealand 
case because of Denmark’s relatively small population of 5.6 million and because it has 
successfully tackled in an overarching way constraints similar to the ones identified in 
the New Zealand film industry. Initially based on state support, the Danish film industry 
has increased its commercial success and social rewards by differentiating itself from 
Hollywood (Hjort, 2010). Its financial capacity has received a boost by transforming 
local state funding mechanisms into international sales through extending independent 
distribution networks (I Bondebjerg, 2014; Tartaglione, 2014). It has established 
significant synergies between film and TV series in terms of branding and flows of 
creative and technical film workers (Sérisier, 2014). In addition, it has focused on IP 
creation and exploitation based on increasing the quantity of low-budget but high-
quality storytelling (Collins, 2012; Séry, 2012). By developing writers the industry has 
increased its ability to feed from local creative sources. Furthermore, audience 
development strategies and collaboration of local exhibitors with local producers 
(Schramm, 2002) has expanded local audiences (Ib Bondebjerg, 2014). The so-called 
Danish cinema’s golden era reflects its stable 25‒30% share of the domestic market, and 
the 2.4 ratio of yearly cinema attendance per capita, the increased productivity to an 
average of 35 films per year between 2000 and 2008, and increasing export sales 
(MacPherson, 2010; Mathieu, 2006; NFTF, 2013; Scoffier, 2014). A more in-depth 
analysis of the film district in Copenhagen could shed light on the pros and cons of their 
film policies in addressing the film industry’s sustainability. 
Towards a Sustainable Film Industry 
This research has been concerned with the global problem of contemporary societies 
that are struggling to sustain local film industries and therefore to express and 
disseminate diverse cultural depictions through cinema. In this regard, the project was 
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motivated by the idea that different cultures have the right to express themselves and 
make themselves known (UNESCO, 2002). I have observed with a critical lens the 
vertical and horizontal interrelations of the film industry in the hope of understanding 
better its implications for social access to participation, dissemination, and consumption 
of films in Wellington and New Zealand. My findings aligned with and confirmed the 
relevance of my main theoretical approaches, PEC and GI, in which structural 
constraints on the film industry’s interrelations are able to have a decisive influence on 
struggling industries. Underlying my research were values of equal access to 
participation and dissemination in cultural domains as prompted by political economists 
of culture and UNESCO’s Declaration on Cultural Diversity (Mosco, 2009, p. 4; 
UNESCO, 2002). In addition, motivating this research was the idea of social praxis, in 
that “the division between research and action is artificial” (Mosco, 2009, p. 4) as well 
as the assumption that human agency is able to transform its social and economic 
environment. With these principles in mind, I have argued that questioning and 
analysing the film industry’s interrelations and identifying its industrial and institutional 
constraints (vertical, horizontal blockages, and conventional mind-sets) have the 
potential to create paths for social transformation towards sustainable outcomes. 
In this chapter I have joined together the strands of my thesis to present the argument 
that even in the context of increased externally allocated funding, where celebratory 
government accounts dominate, film-makers and film practitioners in fact continue to be 
marginalised, and audiences remain disenfranchised from local narratives and 
storytelling. My analysis illustrates that the recent set of government policies does not 
address and challenge structural difficulties about sustainable mechanisms which should 
otherwise be inclusive of different social groups as well as aim to pursue the film 
industry’s long-term viability. It is only through the discussion of critical and alternative 
accounts of different film industry stakeholders, their industrial and institutional 
relations (including power relations and business models), that conventional ways to 
‘do’ and ‘think’ the film industry will be re-evaluated, and integral transformations 
might become plausible. It is with this hope that my thesis may contribute to the 
creation of a sustainable film industry in Wellington and elsewhere. 
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